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
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
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THE THEAETETUS OF PLATO

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OF

PLATO

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
A REVISED TEXT AND ENGLISH NOTES

BY

LEWIS CAMPBELL, M.A., LL.D.

PROFESSOR OF GREEK

IN THE UNIVERSITY OF ST. ANDREWS



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TO

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
EMERITUS PROFESSOR OF GREEK IN THE UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW,

THIS EDITION OF PLATO'S THEÆTETUS

IS ONCE MORE GRATEFULLY INSCRIBED.

L. C.

January, 1883.





PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION.

SINCE the first edition of this work was published in 1861, there have been several important additions to Platonic literature in England. Mr. Grote's book on Plato and the other companions of Socrates appeared in 1865; Professor Jowett's translation, with the analyses and introductions, in 1871 (the second edition in 1875). These great and monumental works had been preceded by the less important effort of Dr. Whewell, who, in 1861, attempted, not without success, to popularize the dialogues in part, and to assert their educational value. Of critical editions, Riddell's *Apology*, with the valuable *Digest of Idioms*, was published in 1867 (after the author's death), Dr. Thompson's *Phædrus* in 1868, his *Gorgias* in 1871, and the edition of the *Sophistes* and *Politicus*, which forms the continuation of this *Theætetus*, came out in 1867. An edition of the *Parmenides*, by Professor Maguire, published at Dublin in 1882, is remarkable for clearness of arrangement, and also for a point of view which I venture to think more idealistic than Plato's

own. Mr. F. A. Paley published a translation of the *Theætetus*, with some notes, in 1875. The recent edition of this dialogue by Professor Kennedy of Cambridge is also accompanied with a translation.

Mr. Grote's intensely real conception of Hellenic, and especially of Athenian life, his personal interest in the Sophists and in Socrates, have enabled him to throw a powerful cross-light on Plato, bringing out some features which would otherwise have remained in shadow. His intellectual sympathy with Protagoras in particular gives great piquancy to his analysis of the *Theætetus*. But his steadfast utilitarian point of view has made it hard for him to do real justice to Plato's meaning here. No part of Mr. Grote's singular exposition is more paradoxical, or has called forth more criticism, than his account of this dialogue. Mr. Cope's just and clear rejoinder may be alluded to in passing; and an article in the *Edinburgh Review* for October, 1865, which contains a powerful refutation of Mr. Grote's 'theory of Knowledge,' is the more noteworthy, as it is known to have been written by his friend and fellow-disciple Mr. John Stuart Mill, who, although not a Platonist in philosophy, was a warm admirer of Plato. An excerpt from the *Quarterly Review* for January, 1866, on the same subject, is reprinted, with Mr. Murray's permission, as an Appendix to the present volume.

Several interesting papers on Plato have appeared in the *Journal of Philology*, of which those by Mr. Henry Jackson, 'On Plato's later theory of Ideas,' are the most recent and in some ways the most important.

It is needless to refer at length to the many works on Plato which have appeared in other countries since 1861. Of books dealing generally in a critical spirit with the whole body of the dialogues, that of Schaarschmidt (1866), of which more will be said presently, is probably the most remarkable. The voluminous work of Peipers (1874) deals so far principally with the *Theætetus*. His exposition is learned and thoughtful, but is only occasionally referred to in this volume. On the other hand, I have made constant use, in revising my notes, of three important helps to the study of the *Theætetus* which have appeared in recent years:—the critical and exegetical commentaries of Hermann Schmidt (1877), the revision of Stallbaum's edition (in the case of the *Theætetus* amounting to a new edition) by Wohlrab (1869), and the critical edition of Martinus Schanz (1880), who has in many ways done good service to the text of Plato.

It has been no small satisfaction to me to find that many of the views advanced in my former edition have been since endorsed by writers of so

much authority. To H. Schmidt, especially, my acknowledgments are due for the close attention which he has given to my observations, and for the subtlety and acuteness which he has often expended in examining them.

A full *apparatus criticus* has never formed part of the plan of this edition. But in the year 1856, being still at Oxford, and having undertaken to edit the *Theætetus*, I collated the dialogue in the Bodleian MS. with the Zurich edition of 1839, and with Gaisford's collation in his *Lectiones Platonicae* (1820). Bekker in his *Commentaria Critica* (1823) had written with reference to this work of the Oxford Professor of Greek:—'Cogat agmen, quem solum non ipse exploravi, (2) codex Clarkianus. Eius enim causa Oxonium profectus cum Thomæ Gaisfordi lectiones Platonicas prelo paratas invenissem, nolui actum agere, totumque viri diligentissimi libellum in mea commentaria ita recepi, ut quæ ad sententiam, ad syntaxin, ad flexionem quoquo modo pertinerent, transcriberem omnia, quæ orthographica essent, ea fere speciminis loco semel atque iterum posita deinde omitterem.' Bekker's confidence in Gaisford's accuracy was sufficiently well-grounded, but finality in dealing with MSS. is not soon reached, and I was able in several places to correct or supplement Gaisford's report. To place on record every *ν ἐφέλκυστικόν*, every accent

or breathing supplied by a later hand, was no part of my intention, nor has it yet been done. Any one who turns from the Theætetus in the MS. to the Sophist, Politicus, or Parmenides, which have been much less read, and are therefore more nearly as the scribe left them, will see at once how many accents in particular must have been added by later hands.

I left Oxford in 1858, and was therefore unable, at the time of bringing out my edition in 1861, personally to verify my notes. I might else have avoided one somewhat serious error, viz. that of printing ἐπὶ πολὺ instead of ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, as the Bodleian reading in 153 B. How easily such an error might arise under the circumstances may be illustrated by a simple instance. Dindorf's critical note on Œd. Tyr. 11, at least in the editions of 1861 and 1868, is as follows:—'στέρξαντες pro στέξαντες a m. rec.' This is the reverse of the fact, and M. Schanz may perhaps conjecture that Dübner, who collated for Dindorf, 'merely inspected' the Medicean MS. But it must be evident to a candid mind,—to borrow for a moment the language of constructive criticism,—that Dübner wrote στέρξαντες pr.: στέξαντες a m. rec., and that Dindorf misread Dübner's note.

Schanz collated the MS. in 1870, and having tested his work on this dialogue I can bear witness to its great accuracy. He tells us that he went on

the principle of registering everything, however slight. Yet even a Schanz is compelled to place limits to minutiae. Not only are there still many changes of accent unregistered, not only is the resolution of σ , $\sigma\tau$, etc., by correctors unobserved in places where it affects the reading, but the distinction between early and late corrections (b and *recens* b) is by no means completely noted. Also, if Schanz were supposed to have transcribed everything however slight, it might be inferred that the MS. was not punctuated. Now the Bodleian MS. as it stands has three distinct sorts of punctuation:—1. the double colon, by which in this, as in other MSS. of Plato, the speeches of the different interlocutors are kept apart. These divisions are right in some places where the earlier editors went wrong. 2. The colon, often marking even insignificant pauses. This, as well as the mark of a new speaker, has been generally inserted by the first hand. 3. The comma, frequently added by an early diorthotes so as to indicate a slight break in the sentence. This sometimes amounts to an interpretation. The same hand has often added a comma beneath the double colon, thus ; where the preceding sentence is interrogative. These three marks—in different degrees certainly, and none of them in a significant degree, but still appreciably,—form part of the traditional deposit which the MS. contains. None of them, least of all the first,

should be ignored by those who undertake to register every difference however apparently unimportant.

Having reperused the MS. side by side with Schanz's edition, I may be permitted to register a few points (certainly of the very slightest moment) where his observation seems to have been at fault.

N.B.—*The references are to Schanz's edition of the Theætetus, published at Leipzig in 1880.*

Schanz, page 1, line 5. τ ποῦ μήν; Here as below p. 2, l. 9, b has added τ for *τερψίων*, which was however unnecessary, as the double colon (:) marks the new persons—hence τ is not continued.

2. 9. 'καὶ . . εἶπεν Terpsioni tribuit b.' This is not true in the sense that B had omitted to distinguish the persons with the colon (:); τ is added, as before, ἐκ περιουσίας.

2. 15. ἐπνηροθούμην BT, corr. bt. ὥστε BT (so also in 15, l. 22 μήτέ).

3. 6. τὰ ἐκεῖ ἄν σε, καὶ περὶ ἐκείνων ἄν ἡρώτων interp. B vel b.

4. 11. εὐδοκίμον Tb. (rec.): εὐδόκιμον B.

10. 35. 'ἀτόκοις BT, sed κ ex emend. B.' The correction is by a recent hand. The note should run therefore 'ἀτόκοις b rec. T: ἀτόποις B et apogr. V.'

12. 22. Post γεγονὸς commate distinxit b vetus.

12. 26. Post ἐναργὲς distinguit B.

13. 29. ἀφαιρῶμαι bt: ἀφαίρωμαι BT.

16. 23. 'ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ revera B.' This is so, but ἐπιτοπολὺ b should be added.

17. 8. τὸν κολοφῶνα ἀναγκάζω· προσβιβάζων τὴν χρυσὴν σειράν· ὧς sic distinxit b.

19. 7. ἔγωγε is written in space of fewer letters by first hand. The former word was oxytone: qy. ἐγώ?

20. 9. 'θαύμαντος BT, sed *v* in ras. B.' Imo *v* erasit b.

22. 1. ὄθουν οὖν (in the note) is an obvious misprint.

23. 16. ἤπερ (accent uncertain) B: ἦπερ b.

24. 15. Post ὄναρ distinguit B.

27. 4. 'τε add. T. om. B.' It should be observed that ἐμέ is at the end of a line (ἐμέ | τινος).

27. 16, 17. 16. 'οὔτ' ἄλλου λέγοντος ἀποδεκτέον om. BD, add. bd. 17. ἀποδεκτέον T: ἀπολεκτέον B.' This is not quite accurate. The note should run οὐ | τάντωι λεκτέον B: Litteras τ'αυτῶι erasit, τ'αὐτῶι λεκτέον, οὔτ' ἄλλου λέγον in margine sinistra supplevit, τος ἀπο in rasura scripsit, λ in δ mutavit, b. (The vox nihili ἀπολεκτέον was never written.)

28. 14. τίσου B: the corrector erased the stroke which made the τ, changed ο to σ and *v* to γ.

29. 9. 'λέγομεν' recens 'b.'

31. 1. 'πιθανολογία TV et ut videtur B: πιθανολογίαις ex emend. B.'

πιθανολογίαις is the reading of B p. m.: only, as in numberless other places, σ has been corrected by a recent hand to στ.

31. 9. 'ἢ ἕτερον T' et recens 'b.'

32. 29. ὀρήη (sic) (not ὀρηᾶ) b.

35. 24. οἶων τε 'in marg.' recens 'b.'

36. 26. παρ' ἃ ἀν etiam b.

37. 22. ἀλλ' ἢ (not ἀλλ' ἦ) B.

38. 19. 'ἐβοήθησαν B, corr.' recens 'b.'

39. 1. αὖ τοῦτὸν τὸν (sic) B pr.

39. 16. τὸν σκίρρωνα (?) B.

40. 3. The confusion in B is increased by το having no accent:—ὕπῆρειτο.

43. 7. ταυτὰ B.

43. 13. ἦ b.

44. 20. 'ἦ* B.'—Fuit ἦι.

45. 15. ἦ B pr. (?).

46. 5. ἦ τι τῶι B pr.

46. 18. θρατ τά B pr.

47. 27. *μυρία* BT: *μύρια* b.
48. 23. τ' *αὐ* B: τ' *ἀὐ* b.
49. 15. 'ἐπιδέξια B.' The accent is not by the first hand.
50. 15. *καὶ σοφαὶ* B (Schanz has here corrected his own error).
51. 34-52. 1. B omits the division of the persons after *πάνν γε*, and the second *μὴ γάρ*.
52. 27. B has *αὐτῶι*.
53. 16. I read *ἀκυροτέρα* in B.
54. 9. 'ἦ* B.' Fuit *ἦι*.
55. 4. Post *ὑπερβάλλει* commate distinxit b.
55. 18. *αὐτοῖς* B: *αὐτοῖς* b.
55. 24. *ὑπεριη ἀέρων* B: *ὑπεριηἀέρων* vetus b.
57. 15. *ἀναγκαῖον μὲν οὖν* statim post *δοκεῖ* sine puncto infert et Theodoro tribuit B.
59. 7. *αὐτῶι* B:—the breathing is by a second hand.
59. 16. 'ταῦτὰ ut videtur in margine voluit b'—recentior.
61. 33. *ὄ · τι* B (sic).
61. 34. 'ὀργάνων B, sed *ν* postea additum.' B wrote *ὀργάνωι*, and the *ι* has since been changed to *ν*—probably not by the first hand.
62. 34. 'ἀμφοτέρως T, apogr. V et ut videtur B.' The last statement is erroneous. What may have looked like a sigma over the line is a mark of reference to the marginal note *φωνήν καὶ χροάν*, which has a corresponding mark.
63. 4. *τό, τε* (sic) b.
64. 3. *ἡ ψυχῆ* (recens b) is not a v. r., but an interlinear gloss.
64. 10. Here is a similar error, *τούτων δηλονότι* (not *δη*) is an interlinear gloss.
64. 24. 'οὐδὲ B' (cum rasura supra *ν*), 'εἰ in marg.' (recens) 'b.'
64. 29, 30. The Bodleian while reading *οὗ* for *οὖν*, also loses the distinction of persons, appearing to drop a speech of Theætetus, thus:—*ἐκεῖ δὲ ἀδύνατον φαίνεται ἢ οὗ: ταῦτὸν ἐκεῖνό τε καὶ τοῦτο καλεῖς*. There is this mark of uncertainty ∴ in the margin.

65. 1. δὴ (η in rasura) B.

66. 11. ὀπηγοῦν (not ὀπηγοῦν) B.

69. 18. (Here in Schanz's text the second Σω. should be deleted and Κάλλιστα. τὸ δέ, κ.τ.λ. should be continued. There has been an oversight in proof-correcting). 'ἦτοι . . . μέρει Theæteto, κάλλιστα Socrati tribuit Hirzel.' B reads as Schanz intends to do, only with a superfluous colon (:) after ἀνάγκη μὲν οὔν. But the lower dot is probably by a second hand.

71. 6. 'ἀναγκάζοιτο . . . δοξάζει primus Theæteto tribuit Heindorf.' Here B is not clear about the persons, placing the colon (:) after *both* λέγεις and δοξάζει. But the Cesena MS. divides with Heindorf.

71. 23. ἦ revera B: ἦ vetus b, sed ἦ iterum in marg. b.

72. 4. νῶι B with :· in marg.

73. 10. αἰσθανεται sine accentu B.

73. 21. Dele 'αὐτοῖς B.'

73. 24. δὴ B. Fuit δή:.

74. 11. In the marginal reading of b, which is prefaced with ἐν ἄλλοις οὔτως, τούτων is read for τούτο.

75. 15. το sine accentu B.

75. 21. αὐτοῦ sine spiritu B.

76. 4. B probably wrote *επειθετο ἐπίσθετο*. The corrector has erased all but the last five letters, and clumsily corrected to *ἐπίσθετο*.

76. 26. διαβαινουσιν b (not B). The β and ν are written over erasures of ν and μ, and the αι is cramped into the space of ε.

77. 8. ἐὰν τοῦ B pr.

78. 5. αὐτὸν B (? or b?).

80. 19. 'φορῶν' recens 'b.'

81. 24. ἄλλω (not ἄλλωι) b.

85. 11. B began to write a colon (:) after ἀπεροῦμεν, then added γέπω instead, without the colon (:), and without accentuating μεν of ἀπεροῦμεν.

85. 12. 'ἀπαγορεύης B, sed η ex emend.' Fuit ει.

85. 28. αὔτη : τῶν (not αὔτη τῶν) B.

86. 14. *δικαστηρια* sine accentu B pr.

87. 11. *αυτῶν* sine spiritu B.

88. 31. ‘*ἐνεργέστατα* B.’ Sed alterum *ε* correctum ex *a*.

92. 9. b (marg.) would add *ἔχης* (sic) after *μέρη*. What Schanz reads *ἔστιν* is the mark of reference *·/·*, corresponding to the mark over *μέρη·/·* : in the text.

93. 6. *αυτῆ* B.

93. 9. The *ᾶ* of *ἄγνωστον* seems to have been blotted off by the first hand.

99. 7. There is no division of the persons, and the accents in B are even fewer than is noticed by Schanz. *ἔσκοτωμένωι εἰ γε δη τι νυν δη ὠσερῶν* B pr.

99. 23. *ῆ* B : *ῆ* b.

More really important than Schanz's re-collation of the Bodleian is the work which he has done at Venice. By singling out the Venetian MS. App. 4, 1, (T), as the archetype of all MSS. of the lesser dialogues not copied from the Bodleian, he has greatly simplified the task of settling the text of this part of Plato. And his use of Ven. II (Schanz's D) as a witness to the earlier reading, where the Bodleian has been made illegible by correction or otherwise, is also very judicious.

While consulting Schanz throughout, however, I have by no means always followed him. He has introduced into the text, without marking them, several conjectural readings, which appear to me unnecessary. And he has adopted some rules of orthography, which, even if proved correct, would hardly be convenient in a work like the present.

Dr. W. H. Thompson, the Master of Trinity College, Cambridge, is so high an authority on the interpretation of Plato, that an opinion which he has kindly communicated to me must not be neglected, although his expression of it came too late to be inserted in the proper place. In the difficult passage 153 C: Καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις τὸν κολοφῶνα, κ.τ.λ., he agrees with the late Mr. James Riddell and myself in taking τὸν κολοφῶνα as an ‘accusative of the effect:’—(he would print καὶ—ἐπὶ τούτοις τὸν κολοφῶνα—ἀναγκάζω προσβιβάζων):—but he prefers to understand ἀναγκάζω προσβιβάζων, sc. σε, ‘I get or force you to admit.’ He observes that προσβιβάζειν in the sense of πείθειν is not unfrequent, and that the accumulation of ἀναγκάζω προσβιβάζων, when either seems sufficient, is characteristic of Plato. Dr. Thompson concurs in rejecting the old interpretation, which made τὸν κολοφῶνα accusative in regimen, and προσβιβάζων = ἐπιτιθείς.

I have also to acknowledge the kindness of Professor Jebb, of the University of Glasgow, in calling my attention to the oration of Lysias *pro Mantitheo* (xvi. §§ 13–17),—referred to also by Grote,—as an illustration of the keen interest which the Athenians of all classes felt in the battle of Corinth (B. C. 394), in which Dexilaus fell and Theætetus probably received his wounds. The inscription on the monument of Dexilaus, by naming the archonship of Eubulides, leaves no doubt as to

the year in which he died; although we may never know in what way he and his four comrades were distinguished from the rest of the Athenian six hundred.

Mr. F. A. Paley, in a note on 202 A, says that *αὐτό* is ‘necessarily emphatic, being in the nominative.’ This is hard to understand. Why may not the construction be the same as in Rep. 5. 472 D: *Ὡς καὶ δυνατόν γενέσθαι τοιοῦτον ἄνδρα?*—Mr. Paley adopts the readings of 204 C, 209 C, suggested by me in 1861.

Lastly, I may be allowed to make here a correction in the text of the Sophist, which had not occurred to me at the time of publishing my edition of that dialogue. In Soph. 226 C, the word *διακρίνειν* has rightly been condemned as introducing the general notion inopportunately, and where a specific term is obviously required. Read *δίνειν*, ‘to thresh out corn,’ and compare Hesiod, Op. et D. 595, 6,

*δμωσὶ δ' ἐποτρύνειν Δημήτερος ἱερὸν ἀκτὴν
διέμεν.*

This emendation, although conjectural, has had the rare felicity of being adopted by Professor Jowett.

INTRODUCTION.

ALTHOUGH the three chief lines of thought in Plato, whether to be described as practical, speculative, mystical, or as ethical, theoretical, erotic¹, are rarely quite separate, and are blended in different proportions, yet the distinction between them affords a convenient enough ground for a rough classification of his dialogues. Even the simplest, which are also presumably the earliest, of Plato's writings, such as the Laches, Charmides, and Lysis, may, without violence, be thus distinguished.

In trying to ascertain the point of view from which a particular dialogue was composed, we should therefore study it, *in the first instance*, less in relation to those of the same period but different subject matter, than to those before and after it which dwell upon a cognate theme:—(just as a student of Shakespeare may learn more in comparing *Mids. N. Dream* with the *Tempest* than with *Romeo and Juliet*, or *Romeo and Juliet* with *Ant. and Cleo.* than with *Rich. II.*)

Now as the *Gorgias* is a clear sample of the ethical and the *Symposium* of the mystical aspect of Plato's thought, so in the *Theætetus* the purely scientific tendency is in the ascendent.

Socrates' confession of ignorance was felt by Plato to ^{General aim.} imply a certain ideal of knowledge. His eager persistent search for an irrefragable definition of each term of human interest, implied that this ideal was not merely transcendent, but must be applicable to the world and to human life. His acceptance of knowledge as the sole test of authority pointed the same way. And his resolution of blameworthy

¹ More generally one might speak of the good, the true, the beautiful, or of conduct, knowledge, and æsthetic enthusiasm. But the words used in the text are more directly descriptive of Plato.

conduct into intellectual error added a religious sanction to the pursuit of Truth.

In the simpler dialogues Plato is contented with representing Socrates as engaged in his life-work of detecting contradiction in others, and so bringing into strong relief at once their ignorance and his own,—pointing only from afar off to the conception of a Science which shall be an infallible guide. The questions, Can Virtue be taught? Are the Virtues many or one? are dimly felt to run up into the higher question, Is Virtue one with Knowledge? Once in the *Charmides*, where Temperance has been defined as Self-Knowledge, some difficulties concerning Knowledge itself are started by the way, as whether there can be a Knowledge of Knowledge—must not this be a Knowledge of ignorance as well?—and so on. But the problem is merely incidental and the treatment of it paradoxical and verbal. Plato knew, however, that underneath these inquiries, and behind the contrast between the Socratic and Sophistic methods, there lay deeper problems, which Socrates had not distinctly formulated, and still less fully discussed: viz. What is teaching? What is the nature of Knowledge? What is the standard of Truth? What is meant by the distinction of One and Many? In approaching the concentrated investigation of these higher problems, Plato is not content with idealizing Socrates, but enters anew into relations with the older philosophies which had possibly impressed his youth and certainly went far to constitute the intellectual atmosphere in which he lived.

In dwelling afresh upon the work of Socrates he (in common probably with Euclides) saw in it a striving towards certain general forms, which, in their perfect abstraction, could only be thought of as eternal. To Plato that was a vision which enlightened all his subsequent thoughts: but on any theory except that which denies all growth and change in him, it must be acknowledged that there was progress also in his conception of the Ideas. How far he was ever satisfied with the half-mythological presentation of them which appears in the *Cratylus*, *Meno*, and *Phædo*, may be left for those to determine who seem to know him better than he knew himself. However this may have been, we need not wonder, if, in passages avowedly mythical, like those in the *Phædrus*,

Timæus, and Politicus, such crude unscientific notions tend to reappear.

But the new vision of Truth, however inspiring, was sometimes felt to 'raise more questions than it solved.' And it was in consequence of these questionings that Plato was led to reconsider his own and his master's relation to Hellenic thought. In order to interpret Socrates and to advance beyond the position gained by him, it was necessary to draw back in order to spring forwards, *reculer pour mieux sauter*, and to examine into the first principles not only of the inquiries of Socrates, but of all inquiry. In undertaking this new 'Kritik of Pure Reason,' Plato did not desert the Socratic spirit. He only carried into a region which Socrates had declined to enter, the same process of self-examination and of unwearied converse with others which Socrates practised and enjoined. In destroying dogmatism Socrates had seemed to get rid of metaphysics; but he had only made more fruitful the metaphysics of the future. In exposing the conceit without the reality of Knowledge he had only provoked the question, 'What, then, is the reality?' In controverting particular fallacies, he had set one at least of his disciples thinking, 'What then is the *πρῶτον ψεῦδος*—the main source of error?'

While passing his hand, so to speak, over the tangle which he had to solve, Plato found two main threads, which were often twisted into one:—the tendency to postulate in all inquiry either the non-existence or the absoluteness of difference,—the identity of opposites, or the incommunicability of attributes: either to say, Black is white, or That which is white can have no tinge of yellow.

In this more condensed treatment of first principles, Plato still retains much of the spirit as well as the form of dramatic dialogue. In the *Theætetus*, indeed, they are retained to the full. Only the conversation is now not merely between Socrates and his respondent for the hour, but also between Plato and other philosophers old and new. They are brought upon the stage and made to explain themselves. They are confronted with each other. They are treated with the utmost urbanity, and with a searching criticism, ironical and unsparing, until they are compelled, as it were, to give in their contributions to the sum of Truth. Philosophic

Dialogue thus becomes the vehicle of a sort of historic fiction, containing, with the criticism of the present, at once a reproduction and an interpretation of the past. This 'History of Philosophy' is, however, penetrated with original thought, and each actual phase is represented as typical of a universal tendency and necessary moment in the realization of true ideas.

Dialectical dialogues.

The dialogues in which Plato adopts this comprehensive standpoint are thought by some to indicate a later phase of Greek speculation generally, which is supposed to have passed out of a rhetorical into a more logical mode. But Plato's conception of what is opposed to philosophy may naturally have moved together with the aspect of philosophy which was uppermost in his own mind. And until it can be shown by some independent proof that the *Euthydemus* is later than the *Phædrus*¹, it is best to steer clear of such assumptions. It is antecedently by no means improbable that the *Phædrus* and the *Parmenides* represent, not different periods, but different moods. The less known cannot throw light on the more known: and Plato's thoughts are better known to us than the particular incidents of Athenian life which gave occasion to them.

The *Euthydemus* and *Parmenides* may be regarded as, in different ways, preparatory to the dialectical effort which is commenced in the *Theætetus*, and continued in the *Sophist*, *Statesman*, and *Philebus*.

The *Euthydemus* is a broad caricature of reigning logical fallacies.

The *Parmenides*.

The *Parmenides* is a serious statement of the difficulties which beset Idealism, whether (1) in the post-Socratic, or (2) in the Eleatic form. At the same time it contains the most uncompromising assertion of Idealism.

This is not the place for a full exposition of the *Parmenides*, which Professor Jowett's Introduction has rendered superfluous. But it may not be amiss to point out the significance of the dramatic situation in that dialogue.

Socrates is there represented as in early youth anticipating the theory of *εἶδη*, which has since been generally associated

¹ From the allusion to Isocrates in the *Phædrus* L. Spengel infers a very early date. But this presumption is balanced by other considerations.

with the name of Plato, and would be naturally attributed to him by the reader of the *Cratylus*, or the *Phædo*, or of the fifth and tenth books of the *Republic*.

By means of this theory the young Socrates successfully refutes the thesis of Zeno, which that philosopher blushingly acknowledges to have been a polemical effort of his own early youth. But the aged Parmenides subjects Socrates in turn to criticism, and the wonderful boy, whose speculative impulse is praised by the old philosopher as Divine, answers each objection with a new hypothesis, which always corresponds to some actual form of idealism. He fails, however, to establish any of them: whereupon Parmenides puts him through an exercise not unknown to Zeno, in which, by the application of ordinary logic to his own transcendental theory of the One Being, he develops a series of antinomies, which Socrates is compelled at once to admit, and to declare impossible.

Is it reading too much between the lines to understand Plato here to mean: (1) that the current mode of applying the principle of contradiction, however much it might rest on the authority of Zeno, was, as he says in the *Sophist* (259 D), unworthy of any one who is come to man's estate; (2) that although the Platonic theory based on the practice of Socrates gave promise of a mighty grasp on truth, yet, as hitherto held and stated, it was still immature; and (3) that, in order to complete and strengthen it, it was necessary to go back once more to the great fountain of speculative thought, and appeal from the disciple to the master, from the method of Zeno to the spirit of Parmenides, who must be approached in the truth-seeking temper of Socrates?

In the *Theætetus*, Socrates declines to examine Parmenides. That task is reserved for the Neo-Eleatic friend who appears with Theodorus and Theætetus on the following day. The present dialogue is chiefly occupied with the consideration of what may be loosely spoken of as Heraclitean doctrines, but which, as Plato says, are really 'older than Homer.' In developing these doctrines Socrates makes use of more than one saying which is still to be found amongst the fragments of Heraclitus.

It is remarkable that Plato nowhere speaks of Heraclitus

with unqualified respect, although much in his own teaching was consciously or unconsciously a repetition or expansion of truths stated or anticipated by that great mind¹. If we may trust Aristotle, Plato had first known Heracliteanism in the exaggerated form in which it was taught by Cratylus, and certainly he has more to tell us of the followers, whether in Ephesus or Athens, than of their master.

Yet it is not fanciful to say that in idealizing Socrates, and connecting the remembrance of him with the great thoughts of the first philosophic age, he saw in the *Elenchus* an illustration in the sphere of mind, on the one hand of actual mutability and fluctuation, and on the other of an absolute standard,—in so far justifying both Heraclitus and Parmenides. Socrates can make any opinions move; no position remains fixed when he comes near. But he cannot and will not argue unless allowed to assume the reality of knowledge.

In the foregoing general exposition it has been assumed that the main body of the Platonic writings, and the dialectical dialogues in particular, are from the hand of the master.

The position so held is intermediate between that of Mr. Grote, who maintains the Alexandrian tradition in its integrity and defends even the *Axiochus* and the *Epistles*, and that of Schaarschmidt, who acknowledges only nine dialogues. The work of Schaarschmidt appeared in 1866, when my edition of the *Sophistes* and *Politicus* was in the press. He had previously given some indication of his views in the pages of *Rheinische Museum* and elsewhere. He, and Socher before him, have succeeded in showing the remarkable disparity which exists between the purely dialectical dialogues and those which these writers leave unquestioned²—a disparity both in the mode of handling and in the substance of the thought. The difference is not here denied,

¹ The following statement of Platonic doctrine, by one of the most zealous of modern Platonists, contains the sum and substance of Heraclitus' teaching: 'Ohne Stillstand in fortwährenden Kriege wie in Schachspiele Alles in geregelte Weise seine Plätze Wechselt, so dasz das Lebende zum Todten, das Todte zum Lebendens wird und nichts verlsengeht,

indem nichts sich gleich bleibt. In diesen ewigen Prozesse des Werdens is das einzige Constante das Gesetz.' Teichmüller, *Die Platonische Frage*, p. 54. Only, in the inchoate thought of Heraclitus, the Law is not distinguishable from the Process.

² Schaarschmidt carries his scepticism much further than Ast or Socher did.

but, as in the edition of the *Sophist*, etc. (1867) and in Professor Jowett's introductions (1st ed. 1871), the dialogues in question are assigned to a different period of Plato's literary activity, in which, as Professor Jowett observes¹, 'the style begins to alter, and the dramatic and poetical element has become subordinate to the speculative and philosophical. In the development of abstract thought great advances have been made on the *Protagoras* and the *Phædrus*, and even on the *Republic*. But there is a corresponding diminution of artistic skill, a want of character in the persons, a laboured march in the dialogue, and a degree of confusion and incompleteness in the general design.' . . . 'The play of humour and the charm of poetry have departed never to return'².

Schaarschmidt's three great tests, viz. literary excellence, the presence of a moral purpose, and quotation by Aristotle, are more plausible than some which previous critics have applied. And in his application of his method there is much acute criticism, although a suspicion now and then arises that insufficient grounds are being eked out by vigorous writing.

But (1) (to take first the external test) the argument from silence is especially fallacious in the criticism of ancient writings, and the question of Aristotle's testimony to Platonic dialogues is complicated with doubts as to the genuineness of the Aristotelian treatises³.

(2) For masterly skill in composition, is there any comparison, for example, between the *Symposium* or *Republic* and the *Timæus* or the *Laws*? Is there not also in both of these last named 'a laboured march in the dialogue, and a degree of confusion and incompleteness in the general design?' The cumbrousness and prolixity, which are so evident in the *Laws*, are accounted for on the ground that Plato is reported to have left his last work in an unfinished state. Without cavilling about the possible origin of the story, may it not be observed, in the spirit of Goethe's pregnant saying⁴, 'It is a sketch which never could have been finished?' On the other hand, if the subject is taken into account, the literary skill shown in the *Parmenides* is very great.

¹ *Introd. to Philebus*, sub init.

² *Introd. to the Statesman*.

³ The third book of the *Rhetoric*

and the eleventh of the *Metaphysics* are rejected by Schaarschmidt.

⁴ *Conversations with Eckermann*.

(3) That Plato at the meridian of his powers wrote with the consciousness of a great practical aim, may be at once conceded. But is it inconceivable that a time may have arrived when experience had shown him the distance of the goal, and, without relinquishing the end, he may have applied himself for a while to the speculative treatment of intermediate problems? There are not wanting traces, even in the Republic, of a belief that if 'Geist' was ever to be the ruling power, a severer training than Glaucon could bear must be prepared for the Kings of the future. And if the legend embodied in the Epistles is not absolutely baseless, we are led by it to conceive of a time when Plato's hopes for the Hellenic world had been rudely checked,—when he was 'weary of the hateful confusion'¹ of Greek politics. And what is more natural than that, at such a time, he should reconsider his whole position; and that even in bitterness and isolation, still remembering his practical aim, he should bethink him of a *δευτερος πλοῦς*, a second best polity, which mankind might possibly receive to their advantage, though they rejected the highest and best?

For the writer of the Politicus at least, although estranged from his contemporaries, is fully bent on bettering the world through a science of Politics. And the lines sketched out by him are precisely those which Plato in his old age, with renewed calmness and mellowness of insight, carried out at length in his last great writing—the Laws².

Protagoras. The most brilliant representative of 'ordinary thinking,' or rather of popular philosophizing, in the age of Socrates was Protagoras, whose assertion of relativity was the counterpart of Gorgias' denial of the absolute. As, in the dialogue which bears his name, he powerfully defends Hellenic education and morality against the criticism of Socrates, so here his doctrine³ is made to serve as the type of all doctrines of sensationalism and subjective relativity.

In the absence of external evidence it is difficult to determine (1) how much of what is here assigned to Protagoras is really

¹ *Μεμισηκῶς τὴν . . . πλάνην καὶ ἀτυχίαν.* Ep. 7. 350 D.

² For a more detailed attempt to support these views see the edition of the Sophistes and Politicus already referred

to. (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1867.)

³ On the real value of Protagoras' saying *ἄνθρωπος μέτρον* see Appendix B: also Jowett's Introduction, 2nd edition, iv. 256-9.

his, or again (2) whether those unnamed philosophers who are called his 'disciples' were really so or not.

(1) In three places at least we may point with some confidence to traces of the real Protagoras :—(a) in the interpretation of his saying *ἄνθρωπος μέτρον*,—*ὡς οἶα μὲν ἐμοὶ φαίνεται τοιαῦτα μὲν ἔστιν ἐμοί, οἶα δὲ σοί, τοιαῦτα δὲ αὖ σοί*, which recurs almost verbatim in the Cratylus, and which Plato would hardly have repeated so nearly in the same language if he were not quoting :—(b) in the defence of Protagoras (167, 8), where he contends that the bettering of mankind is possible without assuming an absolute standard of knowledge and truth ;—the agreement even of the language here with the representation in the Protagoras is an 'undesigned coincidence,' which may fairly strengthen our belief in the fidelity of both :—and (c) in the confession of 'agnosticism' which is introduced casually at 162 D. So much being clear, it is natural to infer that some other points, such as the illustration of 'the wind blowing hot and cold,' may be Protagoras' own. But here it becomes impossible to speak with any approach to certainty. Of one thing, however, we may be quite certain, viz. that what Protagoras is said to have 'told as a secret,' was not to be found in his writings. When he is represented as saying that Being is an unscientific term, and should be replaced by Becoming, that is only a dialectical inference from his words¹. He had asserted the Reality of Appearance, but would have been surprised to find his assertion construed into the denial of Reality.

(2) That some actual persons are alluded to as the 'disciples of Protagoras,' and that they held a sensationalist theory, is rendered probable by the further reference, which can only be construed as a sober statement of fact, to those who maintain a modified Protagoreanism. But it would be rash to assume that the *μαθηταὶ Πρωταγόρου* held the doctrine which Plato assigns to them with anything like the clearness and consistency with which it is developed by him. It is far more probable that from scattered and inarticulate hints he has evolved the subtly woven theory which he criticises. This probability is greatly enhanced by the passage of the Sophist (246 A B) in which the contest between idealism

¹ Kennedy's Theætetus, p. 231.

and materialism is described. 'The idealist in defending his serene invisible height, breaks down the earthworks of his opponents bit by bit, until what they maintain for true reality (*ἀλήθεια*) is shown by his destructive arguments as a moving process of becoming, and not as being.' This is really the manœuvre, only veiled with irony, which Plato here employs against the disciples of Protagoras. In attributing to them the refinement of acknowledging unseen processes, he 'takes them for better men than they are,' and assumes that they would make a similar admission to that which is wrung from them in *Soph.* 247¹. Those whose case is hopeless (the *αὐτόχθονες*) are left out in the cold as *ἀμνητοί*. Plato says, in short, to the sensationalist, 'You are a kind of idealist, if you only knew it. Let me take you with me as far as you can go: and then (like the dog in Jules Verne's *Voyage to the Moon*) you shall be left hanging between Earth and Heaven.'

Aristippus. In favour of supposing that Aristippus was at least included amongst the men thus designated may be urged (1) the general resemblance of the doctrine of sense to later statements of Cyrenaic theory;—it is not necessary, as Peipers imagines, that the men alluded to by Plato were so thoroughgoing as he represents them to be:—(2) the person of Theodorus, who is connected both with Protagoras and Cyrene (not that he is himself inclined to hedonism). But this point, like many others in the historical environment of the Theætetus, must be left uncertain.

Aristippus is mentioned by name only once in Plato. In the *Phædo* it is emphatically remarked that he and Cleombrotus were not present at the death of Socrates. If we connect this with the strong language in which the position that pleasure is the chief good (which Aristippus held), is met in the *Republic* (6. 509 B: *Οὐ γὰρ δήπου σύ γε ἡδονὴν αὐτὸ λέγεις. Εὐφήμει, ἦν δ' ἐγώ*), it is natural to infer that he was regarded by Plato with little sympathy, and that he was probably one of those who left Socrates too early, and gave themselves the credit of their discoveries². The tone of Xenophon's representation conveys a similar impression. Attend-

¹ J. S. Mill may in like manner be said to have made admissions against which his father and Bentham (the true *γγγενεῖς*) would have protested.

² To say (with Schleiermacher)

that Aristides in *Theæt.* 150 E is a sort of paronomasia for Aristippus may seem an extravagant suspicion, and yet it is difficult to banish it altogether.

ing, like Socrates, to the theory of human life, of knowledge and of the chief good, he seems to have been enabled, by the impulse of Socratic inquiry, to give a philosophical form to the popular doctrine, to which his easy temper and indolent life inclined him, that the Good is nothing else but pleasure. With this he consistently enough combined the sceptical assertion, The impression of the moment is the only Knowledge. He probably supported both these principles with certain physical and logical theories: adding that nothing was by nature just, but by custom and usage, and that the same word used by different men represents a different idea.

Whether his doctrine had fully developed itself into the distinct form which is given in the *Theætetus* to the hypothesis, Sense is Knowledge, it is impossible to say. That he is pointedly alluded to amongst the 'disciples of Protagoras,' if not as their chief, there seems little doubt, from what is recorded of his opinions. A comparison of the following extracts tends to establish this: although it must be remembered that the discussion of these questions by Plato and Aristotle may be supposed in some degree to modify the statements of later writers:—

Diog. L. 2. 86: Δύο πάθη ὑφίσταντο, πόνον καὶ ἡδονήν· τὴν μὲν λείαν κίνησιν τὴν ἡδονήν, τὸν δὲ πόνον τραχείαν κίνησιν.

Aristocles ap. Euseb. Pr. Ev. 14. 18: Τρεῖς γὰρ ἔφη καταστάσεις εἶναι κατὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν σύγκρασιν· μίαν μὲν καθ' ἣν ἀλγοῦμεν, εἰσκιῶν τῶ κατὰ θάλασσαν χειμῶνι, ἑτέραν δέ, καθ' ἣν ἡδόμεθα, τῶ λείῳ κύματι ἀφομοιούμενοι· εἶναι γὰρ λείαν κίνησιν τὴν ἡδονήν, οὐρίῳ παραβαλλομένην ἀνέμῳ· τὴν δὲ τρίτην μέσην εἶναι κατάστασιν καθ' ἣν οὔτε ἀλγοῦμεν οὔτε ἡδόμεθα, γαλήνῃ παραπλησίαν οὔσαν.

Sext. Emp. adv. Math. 7. 191: Φασὶν οὖν οἱ Κυρηναῖκοι κριτήρια εἶναι τὰ πάθη καὶ μόνον καταλαμβάνεσθαι καὶ ἀδιάψευστα τυγχάνειν, τῶν δὲ πεποικίωτων τὰ πάθη μηδὲν εἶναι καταληπτὸν μηδὲ ἀδιάψευστον. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ λευκαῖόμεθα, φασί,

Plat. *Theæt.* 152 D: Ἐκ δὲ δὴ φορᾶς καὶ κινήσεως καὶ κράσεως πρὸς ἄλληλα γίνεταί πάντα. 153 C: Ἐτι οὖν σοι λέγω νημερίας τε καὶ γαλήνας καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα, ὅτι αἱ μὲν ἡσυχίαι σήπουσι καὶ ἀπολλύουσι, τὰ δ' ἕτερα σώζει;

See also *Phileb.* 42 E: Μὴ κινουμένου τοῦ σώματος ἐφ' ἑκάτερα . . οὔτ' ἂν ἡδονὴ γίγνοιτ' ἂν οὔτ' ἂν τις λύπη.

Plat. *Theæt.* 152 C: Αἴσθησις ἄρα τοῦ ὄντος αἰεὶ ἐστὶ καὶ ἀψευδὴς, ὡς ἐπιστήμη οὔσα. 157 A B: Τὸ ποιοῦν εἶναι τι καὶ τὸ πάσχον αὐτῶν ἐπὶ ἐνὸς νοῆσαι, ὡς φασιν, οὐκ εἶναι παγίως. . . εἰάν τι τις στήσῃ τῶ λόγῳ, εὐέλγυκτος ὁ τοῦτο ποιῶν. 153 D: Ὁ δὲ

καὶ γλυκαζόμεθα, δυνατὸν λέγειν ἀδιαψεύστως καὶ ἀνεξελέγκτως ὅτι δὲ τὸ ἐμπειρητικὸν τοῦ πάθους λευκὸν ἐστὶν ἢ γλυκὺ ἐστίν, οὐχ οἶον τ' ἀποφαίνεσθαι.

192 : Καθὰ γὰρ ὁ μὲν σκοτωθεὶς καὶ ἰκτεριῶν ὠχρατικῶς ὑπὸ πάντων κινεῖται, ὁ δὲ ὀφθαλμῶν ἐρυθθαίνεται, ὁ δὲ παραπιέσας τὸν ὀφθαλμὸν ὡς ὑπὸ δυοῖν κινεῖται¹, ὁ δὲ μεμηνῶς δισσὰς ὄρᾳ τὰς Θήβας καὶ δισσὸν φαντάζεται τὸν ἥλιον, ἐπὶ πάντων δὲ τούτων τὸ μὲν ὅτι τὸδε τι πάσχουσιν, οἶον ὠχραίνονται ἢ ἐρυθθαίνονται ἢ δυάζονται, ἀληθές, τὸ δὲ ὅτι ὠχρόν ἐστὶ τὸ κινεῖται αὐτοῦς ἢ ἐνερευθεὶς ἢ διπλοῦν ψεῦδος εἶναι νενόμισται, οὕτω καὶ ἡμᾶς εὐλογώτατόν ἐστι πλέον τῶν οικείων παθῶν μηδὲν λαμβάνειν δύνασθαι.

195 : Ἐνθεν οὐδὲ κριτήριόν φασιν εἶναι κοινὸν ἀνθρώπων, ὀνόματα δὲ κοινὰ τίθεσθαι τοῖς κρίμασιν.

196 : Λευκὸν μὲν γάρ τι καὶ γλυκὺ καλοῦσι κοινῶς πάντες, κοινὸν δὲ τι λευκὸν ἢ γλυκὺ οὐκ ἔχουσιν· ἕκαστος γὰρ τοῦ ἰδίου πάθους ἀντιλαμβάνεται.

Diog. L. 2. 87 : Ἀλλὰ μὲν οὐδὲ κατὰ μνήμην τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἢ προσδοκίαν ἠδονὴν φασιν ἀποτελεῖσθαι, ὅπερ ἤρσεκεν Ἐπικούρῳ, ἐκλύεσθαι γὰρ τῷ χρόνῳ τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς κίνημα.

Diog. L. 2. 88 : Μηδὲν τε εἶναι φύσει δίκαιον ἢ καλὸν ἢ αἰσχρόν, ἀλλὰ νόμῳ καὶ ἔθει.

The apparent force of the above parallel must be slightly qualified by two observations. (1) Very similar language about the

¹ This argument is met by Aristotle, when he is discussing the theories of Heraclitus and Protagoras, *Met.* 10. 6. 1063a : Οὐθὲν γὰρ διαφέρει τούτ' ἀξιοῦν ἢ τὰ φαινόμενα τοῖς ὑπὸ τὴν ὕψιν ὑπο-

καλεῖς χρώμα λευκόν, κ.τ.λ. 156 E : Λευκότητος περιεπλήσθη. 159 C : Ὅταν δὴ οἶνον πίνω ὑγαιῶν, κ.τ.λ. 167 A : Οὔτε γὰρ τὰ μὴ ὄντα δυνατὸν δοξάσαι, οὔτε ἄλλα παρ' ἃ ἂν πάσχη. ταῦτα δὲ αἰεὶ ἀληθῆ. 178 B : Ἐχων γὰρ αὐτῶν τὸ κριτήριον ἐν αὐτῷ, οἷα πάσχει τοιαῦτα οἰόμενος, ἀληθῆ τε οἶεται αὐτῷ καὶ ὄντα.

157 E : Λείπεται δὲ ἐνυπνίων τε πέρι καὶ νόσων, τῶν τε ἄλλων καὶ μανίας, ὅσα τε παρακούειν ἢ παροράν ἢ τι ἄλλο παραισθάνεσθαι λέγεται.

158 A : Δοκεῖ . . πολλοῦ δεῖ τὰ φαινόμενα ἐκάστῳ ταῦτα καὶ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ πᾶν τοῦναντίον οὐδὲν ὄν φαίνεται εἶναι.

156 : Δεῖ δὲ καὶ κατὰ μέρος οὕτω λέγειν καὶ περὶ πολλῶν ἀθροισθέντων, ᾧ δὴ ἀθροίσματι ἀνθρώπων τε τίθεται καὶ λίθον καὶ καθ' ἕκαστον ζῷον τε καὶ εἶδος.

154 : Τί δέ; ἄλλῳ ἀνθρώπῳ ἄρ' ὅμοιον καὶ σοὶ φαίνεται ὅτιοῦν;

Theæt. 166 : Αὐτίκα γὰρ δοκεῖς τινὰ σοὶ ξυγχορήσεσθαι μνήμην παρ-εἶναι τῷ ὄν ἔπαθε τοιοῦτόν τι οὕσαν πάθος, οἶον ὅτε ἔπασχε, μηκέτι πάσχοντι; πολλοῦ γε δεῖ.

Theæt. 172 : Κατὰ μὲν καὶ αἰσχροὶ καὶ δίκαια, κ.τ.λ.

βάλλουσι τὸν δάκτυλον καὶ ποιοῦσιν ἐκ τοῦ ἐνὸς φαίνεσθαι δύο, δύο δ' εἶναι διὰ τὸ φαίνεσθαι τοσαῦτα καὶ πάλιν ἐν. τοῖς γὰρ μὴ κινουσί τὴν ὕψιν ἐν φαίνεται τὸ ἐν.

senses is ascribed to Democritus. Some of the expressions and illustrations, as well as the argument itself in different aspects, are thus proved to have had a wider currency. (2) In the early part of the *Theætetus*, motion is said to be good, and rest evil. In the *Cyrenaic* theory, and in the *Philebus*, three states are spoken of, smooth motion, which is pleasure, rough motion, which is pain, and the absence of both, which is a state of indifference, 'like the sea in a calm.'

But while these considerations should be allowed their full weight, it must be remembered that *Aristippus* and those who thought with him did resolve knowledge into shifting impressions of a changing world. And here the parallel of the *Philebus* affords a strong confirmation of the hypothesis we are considering. Nothing was more natural than that the boy *Theætetus* should attribute certainty to momentary impressions, and that the boy *Philebus* should petulantly assert that pleasure is the only good. Each in doing so presents a different aspect of a necessary phase of mind. But when they both (or rather *Socrates* for them) attempt to strengthen their theory by a peculiar doctrine of motion, which, however popular, must have had limits to its reception, it becomes highly probable that the two speakers drew some of their inspiration from a third, who is found to have upheld both pleasure and sensation, and to have supported them with this same doctrine of motion.

There remains therefore some ground for the hypothesis that, in the earlier part of this dialogue, Plato has these *Pseudo-Socratics* in his eye, together possibly with others. Whether *Aristippus* was really, or only by implication, a 'disciple of *Protagoras*,' and whether or not he consciously based his doctrine on the *Heraclitean* theory of the Universe, are questions which it is wisest to leave undecided.

It is more distinctly obvious that throughout the dialogue *Megarians* Plato is holding close converse with his friends of *Megara*. The *elenchus* of *Socrates* is whetted for the occasion by contact with *Megarian* logic. Both in the attack upon *Protagoras* and in his defence, weapons are plied which bear the distinct brand of that neighbouring workshop, and it is often hard to say whether Plato is laughing most at the doctrine refuted or at the method of the refutation. For reasons which will appear presently it suited his purpose to make the 'negative arm' preponderate in this dialogue. And the *Megarian* dialectic was adapted to this aim.

It may be noticed generally, that there is a peculiarity in Plato's manner of alluding to the thinkers of his own time. He speaks not of definite schools, but of 'a certain theory,' or of 'certain men.' We do not read of the friends of Antisthenes, or the disciples of Aristippus, or of Euclides and his band (*οἱ ἀμφὶ Εὐκλείδην*), but 'I have met many such men,' 'there are numbers who keep saying this,' or more familiarly, 'there are certain refined persons, to whom we must show courtesy.' Allowance must no doubt be made for the natural reticence of Plato, and for the irony of the philosopher, who 'knows nothing of his neighbour.' But it is also reasonable to infer that the schools which claimed affinity with Socrates were only in process of formation, and that their boundaries were not yet well defined. It is from later writers, and not from Plato, that we learn which of the other philosophers then living exercised an influence that could survive their age.

Euclides.

Euclides of Megara, Plato's contemporary and fellow-disciple, seems in his method to have combined the negative dialectic of the Eleatics with the cross-questioning and with the ethical definitions of Socrates. The dialogue, written and spoken, seems to have assumed with him something of a controversial form. His *ἐριστική* must have been more earnest and philosophical than the vulgar *ἀντιλογία* so often ridiculed by Plato; but it was subject to the same defects, though in a less degree. We are told further, that he used to attack the conclusion and not the premisses of an opponent.—One other fragment of his logic remains. He is said to have objected to definition by comparison, because if things are unlike, they should not be compared; and if like, it is better to deal with the thing itself than its resemblances¹.

The centre of his positive teaching was the Good, which he said was one, called by many names, as Wisdom, God, Intelligence; and to what was opposed to this he denied existence. Here also the teaching of Socrates is engrafted on that of Parmenides and Zeno. The One Being, which is above growth and decay, is to be sought for, not in the universe, but in wisdom, the mind, and virtue. The non-existent is that which is opposite to, or other than the Good.

His theory of knowledge was probably less absolute than that of Parmenides, denying reality to the impressions of sense, but relying upon a sort of dialectic and upon certain ideas or forms, amongst which some diversity was allowed, so far at least as they entered into human language.

¹ Cp. Plat. Rep. 476: Τὸ δνειρώττειν ἄρα οὐ τὸδε ἐστίν, ἐάν τ' ἐν ὑπνωτις ἐάν τε ἐρηγορῶς τὸ ὁμοίον τῷ μὴ

ὁμοίον, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ ἠγῆται εἶναι ᾧ ἕοικεν. Ar. Eth. N. 6. 3: 'Ἀκριβολογεῖσθαι, καὶ μὴ ἀκολουθεῖν ταῖς ὁμοίότησιν.

It is not easy to determine to what extent the teaching of Euclides contained the germs of the sophisms of Eubulides, or of the paradoxes of Diodorus and Stilpo. If it had such a tendency, he must have approached Antisthenes more nearly than would otherwise appear. It seems not unreasonable, however, to suppose that Eubulides may have introduced a new element into the Megarian school. At all events he gave a new and not altogether wholesome impulse to its paradoxical side.

The following are the chief points in which the *Theætetus* affords indications of its connection with the school of Megara.

(1) Its controversial tone.

Socrates more than once expresses the consciousness of such a tendency. We start indeed with the virtuous determination to conduct the argument, not as professors of word-fencing, but as lovers of knowledge, and yet presently we find ourselves in danger of being on a par with 'those skilful men¹.' Protagoras is imagined as reiterating this reproach, and confirming it by the reflection, which is dwelt upon also in the *Phædo*, that controversy leads to the hatred of inquiry. We are moreover oppressed throughout the discussion with the fear of an imaginary adversary, skilled at the same sophistical weapons². And on reflecting, at each stage of the argument, what it is that has ruled throughout, and that remains triumphant, we are compelled to answer 'a negative dialectic.' The first impression of the youth, the maxims of the old philosophers, even our second thoughts and the strained effort of the imagination to substantiate them, are raised, only to be parted from the sphere of knowledge by this sharp weapon; which in another aspect is the liberating though still dividing instrument of the man-widwife Socrates. In this sense the *Theætetus* may fairly be regarded as an 'eristic' or Megarian dialogue; since, although it is no mere sophistical sham-fight, it is characterized by the predominance of that dialectical exercise which consists in refuting theories. This is noticed by Plato himself in the passages just referred to, and is implied in the image of *μαίευτική*.

And the form of refutation used corresponds to that 'reductio ad absurdum' which is described as characteristic of Euclides. In each case the proof is not impugned, but the thing proved is laid hold of and annihilated. Man is not the measure, for, if so, then why not every other creature endowed with sense? Motion cannot be the sole principle, for, if so, language would be impossible. Protagoras is made to object to this mode of treatment. Socrates imagines him as challenging them to disprove his premiss, and complaining that they use only negative proof.

¹ *Theæt.* 164 D.

² 200 A-C.

(2) Besides this correspondence of method, there are also some coincidences of idea.

(a) The turning-point of the whole dialogue, the fulcrum, by means of which the mind is finally lifted out of the region of sense, is the mention of the good, or expedient, which Theætetus had at first unwarily included amongst the things which are not, but become. The knowledge of what is good cannot be resolved into sensation, nor into those motions on which the doctrine of sense was founded, because it regards the future.

This thought arises simultaneously with the eloquent digression, in which a just and holy life accompanied with wisdom (*μετὰ φρονήσεως*) is set forth as the way from Earth to Heaven. And the form in which this idea of good occurs, is not transcendent, as in the Republic¹, nor, as in the Philebus, arrived at by a process of reasoning upon the combination of finite and infinite in the world. It is more simple and Socratic than in either of these. And while it is conceived of as one, Socrates is not afraid of varying the name (*ἀγαθόν, καλόν, ὠφέλιμον, δίκαιον, ὄσιον, φρόνησις*).

(β) In its general aspect the Theætetus affords only a partial escape from the relative world of sense and opinion towards absolute being, terminating with the conception of *λόγος* as definition by the distinctive difference. Where it may be noticed, by the way, that the stress laid upon the perception of individual peculiarities (*πρὶν ἢ σιμότης αὐτῆ τῶν ἄλλων σιμοτήτων . . . διάφορόν τι μνημεῖον . . . κατάρθῃται*) is parallel to the saying of Euclides, that comparison does not convey knowledge.

This intermediate character of the Theætetus is indicated by Plato's own remark, that we are wavering between two factions, not siding wholly with either. Such a position is still in harmony with the philosophy of Euclides, who made some attempt to hold unity and diversity in solution together, and who rested ultimately on some form of reasoning (*λόγος*). It may be added, that the two conceptions with which the dialogue closes, of the separation of a whole into its elementary parts, and of the power of distinguishing the thing in question from all others, belong to the tendency combated in the Sophist, but more or less embodied in the Theætetus, to acquiesce in difference, falling short of the highest unity.

(3) In one or two points we are reminded of the later Megarian subtleties, and are led to suspect that they may have had their counterpart in the school of Euclides.

The humorous account of the man, from whom there is no escape, who shuts your eye, and asks if you see his cloak with it², may be

¹ 509: Οὐκ οὐσίας ὄντος τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ἀλλ' ἐτι ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας πρῆσβεία καὶ δυνάμει ὑπερέχοντος.

² 165 B.

compared with the *ἐγκεκαλυμμένος* of Eubulides. And when we are asked whether any one ever said to himself τὸ ἕτερον ἕτερον εἶναι¹, we may find a later parallel in the paradox of Stilpo, ἕτερον ἐτέρου μὴ κατηγορεῖσθαι. Such casual hints confirm the suspicion that the tendency already existed at Megara, though in a milder form than afterwards, 'to part everything from everything,' τὸ διαλύειν ἕκαστον ἀπὸ πάντων (Soph. 259 E). A more pleasing instance of the same analytical bias appears in the three *φάσματα*² or axioms of the mind, by which it suffers itself to be bound; or in the repeated difficulty, Ἄρ' οἶόν τε τὸν εἰδῶτα μὴ εἰδέναι, which in fact underlies many of the later paradoxes.

There is often no more satisfactory account to be given of variations and inconsistencies in Plato, than that in different dialogues he is consciously approaching and examining different contemporary theories, adopting their tone, putting on their dress, as it were proving their armour, not without a latent confidence in the unaided strength of Mind.

This philosophical side of the dramatic genius of Plato is as real as and more important than the poetical. The dialogue is not only a convenient artistic form for bringing out the different aspects of a question; Plato is himself continually holding converse with some one: and dramatic propriety is preserved not only in minute points, but in the tone pervading a whole dialogue. Those in which an Eleatic stranger is the chief spokesman may still be Plato's, although they seem pervaded by a pedantic consciousness of method not found in others: a similar remark applies to the *Parmenides*: and even amongst those in which Socrates holds the first place a marked difference is perceptible; which may be accounted for by saying, (1) that Socrates is not Socrates, but Plato becoming all things to all philosophies: (2) that Socrates is not altogether Plato, but a part-representation, part-creation of Plato's, which he contemplates and converses with, and even criticises: (3) that Socrates himself has different faces, reflected partially in his different followers, the most characteristic of which, the negative 'elenchus,' was reflected in Euclides of Megara.

Recent critics, both in England and Germany, have denied all connection between the part played by Euclides in the Preface and the Megarian element of the dialogue which is generally admitted. And yet the significance of such indications in other dialogues can hardly be questioned.

¹ 190 A.² 155 A.

The prominence of Simmias and other Pythagorizing Socratics in the *Phædo* affords an obvious parallel. And supposing that the Preface were merely equivalent to a dedication, even a dedication often implies the acknowledgment of special affinities. That one motive is to awaken interest in the person of Theætetus is perfectly true; but this could have been done equally by other means, for Theætetus had many friends in Athens. In representing this dialogue as having been preserved and read at Megara by the head of the Megarian school, Plato makes a departure from his usual practice analogous to the more striking innovation of making a friend from Elea the chief speaker in the dialogues which follow.

Plato's criticism of Protagoras, both here and in the *Protagoras*, is friendly and respectful,—rather indicating certain necessary stages in the pursuit of truth, than destroying fatal error. But for other professed thinkers he has less tolerance. And if it were possible to ascertain who those were with whom he found it impossible to argue,—who were beyond the pale of dialectic, in short,—the fact would be of no less interest than the evidence of his close intercourse with the school of Megara.

Heracliteans.

(1) Of the enthusiasts of Ephesus, who profess to be deeply read in the wisdom of Heraclitus, it is unnecessary to say more than is contained in the description of Theodorus, whose exact soul is naturally vexed by their inconsecutiveness. 'They support their master's theory of a flux, only by the absence of fixity in their own thoughts. They are fond of explaining "ignotum per ignotius;" each follows his own inward light, regardless of the rest, and every one of them despises his fellow.' This picture, the oriental features of which are noticeable, may be illustrated from the *Cratylus*,—which is partly written in imitation of the same school,—where Socrates professes himself puzzled to determine what is intended by their symbol, Fire. By one it is interpreted to mean the Sun, by another the principle of Heat, by another Mind¹.

Antisthenes.

(2) The Cynics are probably the *ὄψιμαθεις* of *Soph.* 251,

¹ *Crat.* 43.

who are admitted to discussion *ex gratia* for form's sake, who deny predication, and 'will not have it that a man is to be called good. Man, they insist, is man, and good is good.' And it has been usual to identify these persons with the men from whom Socrates has heard 'in a dream' that prime elements cannot be defined¹. But the latter doctrine is surely very different from such crude nominalism, and belongs to some one who believed too much rather than too little in the 'formal cause,' since he asserts that the essence which corresponds to definition is a definite ratio between units which are undefinable. The opinion quoted, if properly examined, is not a denial of predication, but rather the denial that anything can be predicated of *the prime elements*, ἐξ ὧν ἡμεῖς τε συγκείμεθα καὶ τὰλλα, which is by no means the same thing, and merely amounts to saying that matter is formless, or that substance in the abstract is without attributes.

The conjecture which identifies notions so different would hardly have been entertained but for some misunderstanding of a passage of Aristotle, *Metaph.* 2. 3. 1043 b, where 'the Antistheneans and such rude persons' are mentioned in connection with a theory of essence as a complex (*συλλαβή*) of elements (*ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων*). Aristotle says that his own view, in which *οὐσία* is the concrete, of which matter and form are the component elements, may be thought to give a certain colour to the error of those coarse thinkers who denied the possibility of definition. But *οὐσία* (the object of definition) is really neither matter nor form, although these elements in their separate abstractedness are undefinable.

Aristotle in writing thus may have had this part of the *Theætetus* in his mind. But the allusion to the Cynics is a mere excrescence on his argument, and, if closely examined, is seen to have but a remote bearing on the distinction of *στοιχείον* and *συλλαβή*. A suggestion put forth by the present editor in 1861 is more defensible, viz. that Socrates here as in other places, where he 'speaks from hearsay' (*Phæd.* 62, *Phil.* 20), is quoting some Pythagorean. The whole tenor of the passage, and the illustrations from number, measure, and music in the pages which follow, are in favour of this. He and *Theætetus*, however, have not heard from

¹ 201, 2.

the same source, and the man who, using the term *ἐπιστητά*, said that what was definable was knowable, but that the undefinable was also unknowable, must have been a Socratic philosopher, and probably (as Schleiermacher also thought) was a Megarian.

Another thesis of Antisthenes, the denial of contradiction, *μη̄ εἶναι ἀντιλέγειν*, has a certain bearing on several parts of the *Theætetus*, and in particular on the question, 'Is false opinion possible?' But a fallacy which entered so deeply into all the controversies of the time, and which Socrates acknowledges to have had a disturbing influence on his own (i. e. on Plato's) mind, is not to be exclusively attributed to men of whom Plato speaks as he does of the *ὀψιμαθεῖς* in the *Sophist*. It is safer and more profitable to pass by Antisthenes and his master Gorgias, and to refer the fallacy at once to its origin in the Eleatic logic. The same may be said of the 'eristic' difficulty which occurs both here and in the *Meno*, 'How will you inquire about that which you do not know?'

If the deniers of predication, who are introduced under protest, in *Soph.* 251, are the followers of Antisthenes, it is beforehand highly improbable that the same persons had been spoken of under another aspect in *Soph.* 246. And if it is true that the Cynics preferred logical and ethical discussion to physical inquiries, their nominalism can hardly be made to represent downright materialism. Thus, on two independent grounds, it is unlikely that the *αὐτόχθονες* of the *Sophist*, and the *σκληροὶ καὶ ἀντίτυποι ἄνθρωποι* of *Theæt.* 155 E, who are, to say the least, closely related to each other, have any connection with Antisthenes.

More features of the personal character of Antisthenes are preserved than of Euclides and Aristippus, but fewer of his philosophy. From the way in which the grave Xenophon treats him, and from the calm epithets of Aristotle, he seems to have been the butt of the Socratic school, a sort of mixture of Ajax and Thersites. He regarded Socrates with a rude half-appreciating fondness, which was reciprocated with good-humoured pleasantry. But he boasted, justly enough, of a certain strength of character, which was in fact the piece of Socrates that was continued in him. He is praised for his pure and nervous Attic style, of which we have a specimen,

possibly genuine, in a rhetorical contest between Ajax and Ulysses. His genius, however, seems to have been opposed to abstract speculation. Hence he followed rather the form than the spirit of the Socratic teaching, both on human life and on the significance of terms. His views on the latter subject were probably influenced also by his previous intercourse with Gorgias.

There are, as might have been expected, several points of outward coincidence between his teaching and that of Euclides on the ethical side. They agree that virtue is one, that wisdom (*φρόνησις*) is the chief good, and so on.

But the dialectic of Antisthenes seems to have been at once more rhetorical and more sceptical: approaching much more nearly to the later Megarian paradoxes, with which it finally coalesced in the teaching of the Stoics. He has been called a materialist, and no doubt the term applies to him so far as he denied ideas, but his scepticism had nothing to do with physical inquiries, which he abjured. It was a part-practical, part-logical nominalism. 'I see a horse, equine properties I cannot see.'—'There is only one term applicable to one thing¹.' Hence controversy is impossible, and every assertion equally true. Definition is only a complex term², and accordingly no single thing can be defined, except in the imperfect way of comparison. You cannot say what a thing is, except by naming it, but only what it is like. Connected in some way with this theory was the saying, in which he agrees with Prodicus, that the first principle of education is the study of names. He was thus related to Aristippus in philosophy much as Gorgias had been to Protagoras: denying the absolute, while the other asserted the relative, —or rather contending that nothing existed absolutely but facts and individual things.

The one great philosophy of which Plato takes no account is Atomism. Democritus, though a contemporary of Socrates

Democritus.

¹ See Isocrates, 'Ελένης ἐγκώμιον ad init. καταγεγραάκασιν οἱ μὲν οὐ φάσκοντες οἶόν τ' εἶναι ψευδῆ λέγειν, οὐδὲ ἀντιλέγειν, οὐδὲ δύο λόγῳ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν πραγμάτων ἀντειπεῖν, οἱ δὲ διεξίοντες ὡς ἀνδρία καὶ σοφία καὶ δικαιοσύνη ταῦτόν ἐστι, καὶ φύσει μὲν οὐδὲν αὐτῶν ἔχομεν, μία δ' ἐπιστήμη καθ' ἀπάντων

ἔστιν. Socrates seems to be alluded to in the latter part of this. In the former part Protagoras and Antisthenes seem to be opposed.

² Μακρὸς λόγος. In which there is probably the same derisive force as in Σιμωνίδου μακρὸς λόγος, ὅταν μηδὲν ὑγιὲς λέγωσιν, Ar. Met. N. 3.

and Protagoras, is nowhere named by him, although he is continually quoted by Aristotle, who speaks of him as 'comprising in his definitions the material only.' The question is at least worth raising, whether the believers in *gross matter*, whose views Plato felt to be so alien to his own, were followers of Democritus and Leucippus in whole or in part. If the passage of the *Theætetus* only were in question, the 'uninitiated' might be supposed to be mere ordinary thinkers, the unregenerate mass of mankind. But the men in the *Sophist* are clearly philosophers who are ready to maintain their principles against the world, although the description may be generalized from more than one school.

The supposition that the Atomists are referred to in these passages has been rejected on the ground that according to *Ar. Met.* 1. 4, in upholding their 'Void,' they asserted the existence of 'Not-Being,' and not-being is of course bodiless and unseen.

The collection of the very numerous allusions to Democritus in Aristotle would be a valuable contribution to the History of the earlier Greek Philosophy. They would be found to present the student with this difficulty, that while occasionally, as in the passage above quoted, the Atomistic doctrine is spoken of as a kind of purely speculative dualism, it is much more frequently referred to in terms which indicate a distinctly physical theory. It is happily unnecessary to argue here at length a point which has been clearly established by Dr. Zeller in his *History of Greek Philosophy* (2nd edition), that the chief characteristic of the Atomistic philosophy from the first was the firm grasp with which it held the ideas (which to most contemporary schools were so unreal) of space, extension, solidity, and weight.

It is not hard to believe that the abstract foundation of mechanical science should thus have been laid in an age when geometry was rapidly growing to maturity: the real difficulty for us is to conceive in what manner a mechanical theory was united with, if not occasioned by, the dialectical recoil from the Eleatic Undivided Whole. Yet in the earlier stages even of modern science such a confusion of phisic and metaphisic was not impossible. The 'Plenum' of Descartes has probably not been without its influence on the Interpretation of Nature.

The Absolute Being of the Eleatics, although the object of Pure Mind and identical with it, was not yet free from the associations of extension. 'Being is full of being, it is continuous, for being touches being.' Against this aspect of their doctrine the polemic of the Atomists was directed, when they asserted the existence of the non-existent. It was the non-existent, as the space in which the existent moves: and their Existence, while uncreated and unchangeable, was also that which has extension, solidity, and weight. Parmenides and Democritus both sought for something absolute behind phenomena: the Eleatic found it in the Unity of Being: the Atomist resolved this into Space and body. The relations between these made it possible to conceive of motion and of primordial differences of bulk and form.—The weight of atoms of equal bulk was supposed uniform.—All else was relative and subjective (*νόμφ*): depending on the impression produced on us by the Atoms in various combinations.

How far is this view of their theory consistent with the conjecture that some friends of Democritus may be alluded to in the passages of the Theætetus and Sophist already mentioned?

(1) It does not seem impossible that Plato should accuse such persons of denying the existence of anything 'bodiless' or 'unseen.' For the 'bodiless existence' which they are represented as denying is the 'immaterial essence' of the *εἰδῶν φίλοι*; and the 'unseen process,' which they will not believe in, is the movement of the Heraclitean fire which annihilates all that is stable or tangible. Both these are very different from the 'void space' of the Atomist, which is only asserted as the necessary condition of matter and motion. And (except polemically) he would rather say that *ἄτομον* and *κενόν* together constitute the reality of sensible existence, than that Being exists and Not-being also exists. Aristotle speaks of the Atomistic principle as *τὸ ὑποκείμενον σῶμα*. And this, to use Plato's language, is at least *κατὰ φύσιν ὁρατόν* (Tim. 30 B).

(2) A presumption in favour of such an allusion is afforded by the manner in which the sense of touch and of resistance is dwelt upon. It is true that the atoms could not literally

be either seen or handled : but they had all the mechanical properties of things visible and tangible, and Plato was at least as likely as Aristotle to represent them as the objects of sense. See Ar. de Sensu, 4 : Δημόκριτος δὲ καὶ οἱ πλείστοι τῶν φυσιολόγων ἀποπώτατόν τι ποιούσι· πάντα τὰ αἰσθητὰ ἀπὸ ποιούσι.

The sense of touch or resistance (which the Ancients hardly distinguished) is naturally referred to those 'primary' qualities of body which the Atomists upheld. Now these are dwelt upon in the two passages in question more than in the whole discussion of the doctrine of sense in the Theætetus, and in language which is much more suggestive of something *hard*. Note especially the words, Theæt. 155 E : Ἀπρίξ τοῖν χεροῖν λαβέσθαι. Soph. 246 : Εἰς γῆν . . ἔλκουσι, ταῖς χερσὶν ἀτεχνῶς πέτρας καὶ δρυὸς περιλαμβάνοντες. τῶν γὰρ τοιούτων ἐφαπτόμενοι πάντων διῆσχυρίζονται τοῦτ' εἶναι μόνον ὃ παρέχει προσβολὴν καὶ ἐπαφήν τινα. 247 : Πότερον ὄρατόν καὶ ἀπτόν τι αὐτῶν; Ib. : Πᾶν ὃ μὴ δυνατοὶ ταῖς χερσὶ συμπίεζεν εἰσί.

(3) It may be observed further that in the Sophist the men are driven into a corner by being pressed to define (*a*) whether the Soul is material, which they are not afraid to admit, and (*b*) whether justice and wisdom are so. Might not this mode of attack be suggested to a Socratic philosopher by the apparent contradiction between the moral sayings of Democritus and his material system?

The materialists are then imagined as retiring upon a more abstract conception of Being :—'Everything in which there is either an active or a passive *power*;'—i. e. they are supposed to rise from the idea of matter to that of force. The tendency thus recognized surely indicates a different materialism from that of Antisthenes, and the close sequence of the reasoning by which it is developed is not unworthy of the tenacity and penetration which seem to be justly ascribed to Democritus. See Ar. de An. I. 2 : Δημόκριτος περὶ αὐτῶν τούτων γλαφυρωτέρως εἶρηκεν :—an expression which anticipates Bacon's praise of him.

(4) It may be urged against the above conjecture (*a*) that, although Democritus might fairly (from Plato's standpoint) be called *ἄμουσος*, as the spirit of his inquiry was alien to

rhetoric and poetry, and ἀμύητος, for he is known to have written against the Protagorean maxim, yet the imputation of *coarseness* which Plato's picture conveys could not attach to him.—This objection may be partly met, however, by supposing his theory to have degenerated in the hands of his followers.—(b) That the elenchus of the εἰδῶν φίλοι is described as levelled at the ἀλήθεια of these materialists, who would thus seem to be identified with the disciples of Protagoras in the Theætetus. To which it may be replied, that the account in the Sophist appears to be generalized from more schools than one, not all of whom would deserve the title of 'sprung from the ground' (σπαρτοὶ καὶ αὐτόχθονες). This last therefore alone strictly answers to the title 'hard and repellent' in the Theætetus. The difficulty must, however, be acknowledged, and it remains, whatever hypothesis with regard to the allusion is adopted¹.

If these passages really contain any allusion even to degenerate followers of Democritus (who might be related to him as the Ephesian enthusiasts to Heraclitus), the fact is interesting as confirming the anticipation that no Greek thought of any permanent value failed to obtain some recognition from Plato, though it might be recognized only to be rejected. We are also reminded of Aristotle's saying, that Plato's dialectical bias unfitted him for physical studies; and of Lord Bacon's, that Time brings down the lighter goods of antiquity but drowns what is of solid worth, which may be thought no unfitting comment from the physical point of view.

(5) Democritus would also rank with those who argued from dreams and madness that nothing which appears is real (οὐδὲν ὧν φαίνεται εἶναι)².

Plato's relation to other Greek thinkers, although of great importance, especially in connection with the dialectical dia-

¹ Another ἀλήθεια is spoken of in the Cratylus, which may perhaps be that of Antisthenes, but the reference there is evidently to a logical and not a physical theory.

² It is possible that the δυσχερεῖς of the Philebus, 44, 46, who are said to be very clever in physical science, and have an account to give of pleasure while they deny its reality, may

also have been in some way related to the Atomistic school. Compare, for instance, the fragment *Ἐυόμενοι ἄνθρωποι ἡδονταί, κ.τ.λ.* and the minute way in which the causes of sensation are analyzed by Democritus while its reality is denied: also the words *τῶ τὰ συγκεκριμένα βίᾳ διαχεῖν ἢ τὰ διακεκριμένα συγχεῖν*, Phil. 46 ad fin.

logues, ought not to be conceived of in a narrow or literal way. Contemporary theories must not be suffered to crowd in upon him, so as to cramp the freedom and originality of his thoughts, of which they are not the substance but the occasion. It may be impossible always to trace the threads which he has taken up and woven into the fabric of his philosophy, but this defect in our knowledge need seldom leave us in doubt of his meaning. He views existing opinions in different lights and in different combinations as he moves amongst them, just as natural objects group themselves differently according to the point at which we stand. The materialist and sensationalist, who in the *Theætetus* are ironically contrasted, in the *Sophist* appear to be combined as the enemies of ideas, differing only in the degree of their unregenerate hardness. In the *Cratylus*, again, *Heraclitus* and *Protagoras* are opposed.

Plato had certain men in his eye, but what interested him far more were the different aspects of philosophy. And these could not be limited to this or that individual, or extended so as to embrace his inconsistencies. A great name in the past might be wholly identified with one of the great streams of thought; but from the speculative height whence Plato surveyed the present, rival doctrines might at one time be generalized in a single view, and at another time by a change of position might be seen as wholly distinct.

The general significance of the *Theætetus* has been fully treated by Professor Jowett in his Introduction. In what follows I propose to touch separately on the following points: (1) Philosophy and Education, (2) The Doctrine of Sense, (3) Plato's appeal to Experience, (4) the Ideas as Categories, (5) Connection of *Theætetus*, *Sophistes*, *Politicus*, (6) Plato's psychology, (7) The digression or episode in pp. 172-7, (8) The date assigned by Plato to the reading of the dialogue at the house of *Euclides*.

The discussion of these topics will give an opportunity of illustrating the *Theætetus* from other dialogues besides those already quoted.

1. Philosophy in Plato is inseparable from the higher education, i.e. from the evolution of true thought by the action of mind on mind. This general notion is expressed under various imagery, in each case symbolizing the development of an inherent power. (a) *ἀνάμνησις* (Meno, Phædo, Phædrus). The soul is led by questions, or by the sense of imperfection, or by the vision of beauty, or by intercourse with a sympathetic mind, to the reminiscence of ideas or of an ideal, perceived by her in her prenatal state. (b) *τόκος ἐν καλῷ* (Symp.). The soul of man when he approaches maturity aspires to break the limits of the individual being. This is a kind of puberty or potential pregnancy of the soul, which, through contact with what is beautiful either in persons, actions, or thoughts, attains to the object of her longing, the birth of lasting truth. (c) *κάθαρσις, λύσις* (Phædo, Republic). The soul is bound by the force of desire in a prison of sense, until philosophy or dialectic gradually breaks her bonds, and purifies her from the earthly elements amidst which she has been compelled to live, and also lifts the eye of the soul from looking downwards on dark shadows to contemplate the ideas, as they are illumined by the good. Then thought attains its highest energy, the light within is married to its kindred light, and Reason and Truth are born. (d) Harmonic motion (Timæus). The soul is plunged in a turbid stream of growth and decay, and the circle of the Diverse in her is wheeling all ways, until she is steadied by the perception of number in the movements of the planets as organs of Time, and this perception gives predominance to the motion of the Same in her.

The humorous image of *μαιευτική*, 'the art of delivering,' which is peculiar to the Theætetus, brings several of these different figures into a single form. It combines more completely than any of them the positive and negative aspect of the elenchus, the stimulating and the benumbing effect of Socrates. These no longer appear separately, as in the Charmides and Meno, but exist together in harmonious unity. The Charmides ends with the contradiction that temperance or modesty is inconceivable, and yet Charmides, the modest youth, is ready to commit violence upon Socrates, that he may gain modesty from him.

(a) Theætetus, like the slave in the *Meno*, is led by questions to express what is not merely his own private thought, but, as appears from the history of Philosophy, a necessary step in the progress from unconsciousness to the possession of truth. As each hypothesis is evolved and put away, he is prepared and induced to rise naturally to the stage next following. And as he becomes more aware of the difficulty of the subject, he is more eager to proceed with the inquiry.

Socrates, who has the discernment of spirits which the Phædrus requires in the educator, perceives in Theætetus the true philosophic nature. Although 'there is no reason to doubt that Theætetus was a real person¹,' yet we may suppose that, like Socrates, he is more or less idealized. The qualities which are postulated in the sixth book of the *Republic* as necessary for the pupils of philosophy are one and all expressly attributed to him. And when he acknowledges the unity of the mind as the organ for perceiving general truths, Socrates—although the features of the youth are far from regular—declares him to be beautiful as well as good. On the other hand, the figure of Socrates himself, as the man-midwife, combines with the familiar characteristics of the real man much that is Platonic and ideal. Whilst he holds in reserve the sharp dividing instrument of the *Elenchus*, which separates between the mind and her offspring and discerns the false birth from the true, he also presides, as the Spirit of Dialectic, over the mental intercourse which alone can satisfy the legitimate longings of the soul.

(b) The condition which Socrates by his art perceives in Theætetus, is that on which Diotima expatiates in the *Symposium*:—*κνοῦσι γάρ, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, πάντες ἄνθρωποι . . . καὶ ἐπειδὴν ἔν τινι ἡλικίᾳ γένωνται, τίττειν ἐπιχειρεῖ ἡμῶν ἡ φύσις.* The signs of this travail (which Socrates alternately aggravates and allays) are the discontented consciousness of ignorance and the irrepressible desire of knowing the Truth. In *Theætetus* it already takes the highest form, not love or ambition, but a passion for ideas, and Socrates, with a skill which is comparable to that of Diotima, sets before him successive courses of wisdom, which excite or slake his

¹ Jowett's *Plato*, iv. 226.

'fancies,' but do not appease them. The humour of this conception is kept up to the end¹.

(c) At the same time Socrates is liberating Theætetus from the prison of sense and clearing his vision that he may look steadily at the Ideas.

At first he is only permitted to distinguish each individual sensation from every other, though binding them together in bundles for the convenience of naming them. Presently, perception and memory are shown to be separable from sensation; but they are still occasioned by it. The bonds are further loosened by the observation that in judging what is expedient for the future, the present impression of sense is worthless in comparison with reflection: but still the future is relative to the present and the past, and the test of past wisdom is the impression of the moment when it arrives.—Theætetus now seizes the great truth that the mind does perceive some things (unity, number, sameness, difference, etc.), without the instrumentality of the senses; but still it perceives them as attributes of the object of sense. Further inquiry is made into this process of thought. The mind can think truly and also falsely. What difference is implied in this? An attempt is made to conceive of it by reasoning from an abstract alternative,—(knowledge or ignorance, being or not-being), but we are compelled to fall back upon the conception of a process between sensation and the recollection of former sensations, or between different abstractions of the world of sense laid up in the memory. Lastly, there is allowed to float before the mind the thought of an abstract whole; first as consisting of the combination of indefinite elements, then as an indivisible elementary unit arising out of them. But if the combination is known, the elements must also be known. And even the power of analysis is an inadequate test of Knowledge. Nor is the desired criterion fully attained, even when the complete whole

¹ In the notes on p. 143 a doubt has been raised concerning the description of the appearance of Socrates, which adds piquancy to the humorous image of his 'art,'—viz. whether τὸ ἔξω τῶν ὀμμάτων means 'prominence of the eyes,' or 'width between the eyes.' It is true that in Xen. Equ. 1.

1. 9 ἐξόφθαλμος is opposed to κοιλόφθαλμος. But in Ar. H. A. 1. 8. 5 the words ἐκτός and ἐντός seem to refer more naturally to the position of the eyes in the face. And the new meaning suggested is rather more in accordance with the allusions in Aristophanes and in Plato's Symposium.

which is the object of thought, has been distinguished, by its characteristic difference, from every other.

Socrates (in the language of Rep. B. 7) has gone down into the cave, and is leading Theætetus upwards, step by step, till towards the end he gives him just a far-off glimpse of the summit to be attained hereafter,—*μη̄ τὰ στοιχεῖα, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἐκείνων ἐν τι γεγονὸς εἶδος, ἰδέαν μίαν αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ ἔχον*. But he is not himself groping his way. Each footstep is firmly planted, as by one who has tried every inch of the path and knows the country well. In other words, Plato is no longer satisfied with anticipations of truth, but is striving to bridge the chasm between ideas and facts, between crude experience and complete theory. But of this more presently. Here only remains to say (*d*) that in this upward progress that which most steadies the thought of Theætetus, who is a trained geometer, is the perception of number and an adumbration of the idea of good.

2. Much of what is rejected in the Theætetus as a theory of Knowledge reappears in the Timæus as a 'probable' account of the physiology of sense. The same interflow of active and passive motions, especially in vision, of which the same phenomena are mentioned, the carrying about of qualities from place to place, and several points even of minute terminology, are repeated there. This helps to show that the theory here developed as that of the disciples of Protagoras who rest their doctrine on Heraclitean principles, is not a mere occasional Essay written for the special purpose of this dialogue, but a serious piece of work having a real place in the history of thought.

There is one point of this doctrine as stated in the Theætetus, on which some obscurity still rests, viz. the distinction between quicker and slower motions in 156 C D. The text is not quite free from uncertainty, although the reading of Cornarius is probably a consequence and not merely a cause of confused interpretation. The Scholiast not unnaturally understood the slower motions to be the sensations of touch and taste as distinguished from those of sight and hearing. Sight might naturally be supposed to have more of fire, and touch more of the nature of earth. But this distinction has no relevancy to what precedes, and is nowhere applied in

what follows. And in the MS. text the words *φέρεται γάρ . . πέφυκεν* appear to refer, not to all the motions, but to the swifter only. Now in the example of wine being distasteful to the sick palate (159 D), the term *φέρεσθαι*, which is here introduced in formulating the theory, is deliberately applied. So that if the MSS. are right, the sensation of taste is not one of the slower motions. And the same illustration makes it manifest that in any case the subject and object, *πάσχον* and *ποιούν*, on the one hand, and on the other hand the sensation and quality together, are opposed, if not as slow and swift, yet certainly as producer and produced (*γεννῶντα καὶ γεννώμενα*). And the word *πλησιάζω*, which belongs to the slower elements, is applied not to the tongue, but to the eye.

Recent editors are agreed (even Dr. Kennedy yielding a doubtful assent) in adopting another interpretation, according to which the slower elements are the *ποιούντα* and *πάσχοντα*, the quicker elements being the qualities and sensations. Professor Kennedy's doubt is thus expressed: 'I am unable to discern the use of discriminating between agent-patient and their products as to slowness and swiftness.' This remark hits the point of the obscurity, and ought to be met. The answer turns upon the motive which Socrates here attributes to the Protagoreans, viz. to develop a sensational doctrine that shall not too obviously violate common experience. With this motive, for example, they are supposed to invent the term *ἄθροισμα*, and to speak of each kind of concrete objects as 'an aggregate of motions.' Thus, to speak with Aristotle for the sake of clearness, they get rid of the categories of quantity and quality. But there is another category, not less surely given in experience, which they find it still more difficult to dispose of, the category of substance. There is an ineradicable prejudice in favour of thinking that *I* am more lasting than my impressions, the chameleon than his colours, the moon than her phases, etc. Thus, when sensations and attributes have been shown to be ever so momentary, the doubt lingers, whether there is not still something permanent, viz. the subject and object in which these severally inhere (in the language of Scoto-German Metaphysics, the Ego and the External World). To which doubt the theorists reply by saying, 'Oh, substance is only a slower motion.' It would

Elimination of Substance.

have been clearer certainly to have introduced the distinction between *ἀλλοίωσις* and *φορά*, and to have said expressly that substance is altered, while sensation and quality are in locomotion. But this distinction is wanted afterwards for a serious use, and would have taken from the humour of the present passage, where the Protagorean is represented as simply bent on reducing all as far as possible to motion as such. Where he is obliged to admit a difference, it suits his purpose to call it a difference of degree. For it is not his cue in any case to recognize differences of kind. But the implied admission is turned against him by the Elenchus in the passage referred to (181 D).

Mr. J. S. Mill's 'Permanent Possibilities' may be cited as a metaphysical expedient having a similar motive.

Philosophy
and Expe-
rience.

3. Plato is well aware that philosophy, to be fruitful, must begin and end with experience. This is the note, which chiefly distinguishes his method, not only from the dogmatic anticipations of the fifth century, but still more from the comparatively barren idealism of his Megarian friends. The whole spirit of Socrates, with his common instances and his resolute preference for human questions, in spite of his love of paradox, pointed in this direction. And the reader of the Platonic dialogues is often surprised, when he seems to have been carried into a region of mere abstractions, to be suddenly met by an argument drawn directly from the facts of ordinary life. The truth is that Plato is perpetually striving to reconcile thought with reality both in the individual and in the world. And although in spite of all his efforts his thought remains abstract still, and never entirely penetrates the subtlety of Nature, he continually acknowledges in practice that while all things are to be tested by logic, the conclusions of logic must be tested again by fact. 'That sensations differ is a matter of fact' (154 A), 'the illusions of dreams and madness are facts of experience' (157 E), 'Protagoras must be wiser than others, else he would have no fees' (161 D), 'the world is full of examples of the truth that knowledge is power' (170 A, B), 'any one must acknowledge this' (171 D), 'States make laws with a view to future expediency' (177 E), 'Protagoras himself knows better than his pupil the effect which will be produced

by a particular speech' (178 E). All these are direct appeals to experience. And therefore the student need not be surprised when, after the subtle inconclusive argument about false opinion, the claims of true opinion are cut short with the example of the law-courts (201 A), or the question whether the knowledge of the simple or the compound comes first is settled by the experience of Theætetus in learning to read (206 A). A similar collocation of fact and logic occurs in Soph. 264 A, where, after it has been proved with incredible difficulty by a long chain of metaphysical proof that communion is possible between not-being and some kinds of being, the further question, whether not-being in the shape of falsehood enters into speech, is decided in a moment by the mere repetition of the statement 'Theætetus is flying.' So in the Republic, when the definition of justice has been reached, it is tested by vulgar instances,—*τα φορτικὰ αὐτῷ προσφέρουτες* (4. 442 E).

It is said in the Parmenides, and the thought recurs in the Sophist and Politicus, that the mature mind despises no phenomenon in which there are the traces of a law. In the Philebus the dialectician is said to carry subdivision as far as there are forms to guide him. In the Phædrus—where Plato's transcendentalism is most apparent—individual experience is not forgotten: *Δεῖ γὰρ ἄνθρωπον συνιέναι κατ' εἶδος λεγόμενον, ἐκ πολλῶν ἰὸν αἰσθήσεων εἰς ἓν λογισμῷ συναιρούμενον—δεῖ δὲ τὰ ταῦτα ἱκανῶς νοήσαντα, μετὰ τὰ ταῦτα θεώμενον αὐτὰ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσιν ὄντα καὶ πραττόμενα, ὀξέως τῇ αἰσθήσει δύνασθαι ἐπακολουθεῖν* (271 E). Indeed the Phædrus sounds every note in Plato's compass. And his struggle to reach the individual while holding fast the universal is nowhere more evident than in the passage just quoted. The same purpose is evinced in the remark at the end of the Theætetus: *'Ἄλλ' οὐ πρότερόν γε, οἶμαι, Θεαίτητος ἐν ἐμοὶ δοξασθήσεται, πρὶν ἂν ἡ σιμότης αὐτῆ τῶν ἄλλων σιμοτήτων ὧν ἐγὼ ἐώρακα διάφορόν τι μνημεῖον παρ' ἐμοὶ ἐνσημηναμένη καταθήται, καὶ τᾶλλα οὕτως ἐξ ὧν εἰ σύ, κ.τ.λ.*

4. In accordance with this clinging to experience, Plato's ideal theory, so far as it is allowed to appear in the Theætetus, deals not with hypostatized entities, but rather with necessary forms of thought, which are as inseparable from percep-

tion as from reasoning. In the digression indeed, which, however luminous, has still something of a mythical tone, the philosopher is described in language which recalls the Republic, as contemplating everything as a whole and as taking men up out of the sphere of personal questions into the higher region, where justice and injustice, kingship as kingship, human nature as human nature, are discussed apart from particulars. But in the dialectical argument, the relative aspect which has been suggested by Protagoras is nowhere lost sight of. The mind perceives by herself the being of *objects, their* identity, difference, likeness and unlikeness, also unity and number *concerning them*. She also reaches after the good and beautiful, *reviewing and comparing her perceptions* with this aim. Knowledge is not to be sought for in particular impressions, but in generalizations *drawn from them*. The numbers eleven and twelve are forms upon the waxen block, i.e. they are remembered, or rather abstracted from perceptions of sense. In the aviary there fly innumerable birds, some gathered in groups (*κατ' εἶδη*), some flying everywhere about (i.e. modes of thought universally applicable). Whether the whole is separable from the parts or not (*χωριστόν* or *ἀχώριστον*) it bears some relation to them, and for the present we are disposed to think that the parts must be included in perfect knowledge.

This manner of conceiving knowledge and being is not a mere concession to Protagoras or Heraclitus, nor is it only due to the intentionally subjective aspect of the whole dialogue. It rather marks Plato's advance to a more definite conception of his own meaning.

He is not now engaged, as in the Republic, with sketching a vague outline of philosophic method, but has entered upon the 'longer way' of dialectical inquiry, in which the highest generalizations, when he really grapples with them, are found to be conceivable, if at all, only in relation to an actual world to which they give light and order, and where affirmation and negation, to have any meaning, must have reference to one another, and to the content as well as to the form of propositions¹.

¹ The obvious fact, that *ὄντα* in the Theaetetus is equivalent to *Daseyn* rather than to *Wesen* has not been sufficiently observed by those who

question the genuineness of the Sophist because there Being = the sum of positive realities.

5. This aspect of the *Theætetus* is closely connected with the *Sophistes* and *Politicus* which follow it. Relation to
Sophist and
Politicus.

In the *Sophistes* the criticism of sense and motion is followed up with a no less thorough criticism of the Immutable Being, and the question 'How is falsehood possible?' is answered through an examination of the idea of falsehood and of negation. In the *Politicus* an attempt is made to sketch an ideal outline of the application of Science to human societies, and of the false or imperfect forms of society, from which the immediate guidance of Science is withdrawn. These dialogues were to have led up to the *Philosopher*, in which, probably apart from controversy, Plato's ideal of Theory and Practice would have been bodied forth.

It does not appear that at the time of writing the *Theætetus* Plato had distinctly planned the other three. The terms in which Socrates declines to examine Parmenides might certainly lead the reader to expect a separate treatment of the Eleatic principle. And the conversation ends with an appointment to meet at the same palæstra on the following day. But the Preface only contemplates Socrates, *Theætetus*, and *Theodorus* as the interlocutors. These alone are mentioned by *Euclides* as having taken part. Still less is there any hint of another than Socrates having taken the lead. And although the opening of the *Sophist* links on that dialogue to the conversation of the previous day, yet there is no direct reference to the unfinished talk about Parmenides, nor is the figure of *μαιευτική* in any way kept up, while the concrete form in which the question is bluntly put by Socrates, 'What are the Sophist, Statesman, Philosopher?' is strikingly different from the 'What is Knowledge?' of the previous day. Had Plato written the *Theætetus* and *Sophist* continuously, it is hardly to be supposed that he would not have woven them together with more art.

There are other grounds for believing that the *Sophistes* and *Politicus* were written somewhat later than the *Theætetus*. In my edition of those two dialogues (Oxford, 1867) I have proved by 'quantitative criticism' that in point of diction, as well as in other important respects, they are intermediate between the *Republic* and the *Laws*, while the *Theætetus* stands between the *Phædrus* and *Republic*. And in a more

general way Professor Jowett, whose judgment on such a question is of the highest value, remarks emphatically on the difference of style which separates the *Philebus*, *Sophist*, *Politicus*, *Laws*, and in some degree the *Timæus*, from the earlier dialogues. (See his Introduction to the *Sophist*, sub init.) Pure Eleaticism has no doubt a great effect in drying up the springs of imaginative expression. The second part of the *Parmenides*, and the passage in the *Theætetus* about the whole and its parts, may be contrasted in this way with other portions of the same dialogues. But this remark does not dispose of the criticisms here referred to, which relate to the whole tenour of the dialogues now in question, nor does it account for the change of manner both in *Theætetus* and *Socrates*.

These and other reasons have led some to doubt the genuineness of the *Sophistes* and *Politicus*. I have attempted to meet such doubts by showing, as above stated, that in the same degree in which these writings diverge from the *Gorgias* or *Republic*, they approximate to the *Laws*. The discussion may now be summed up in the words of the English translator of Plato: 'There would have been little disposition to doubt the genuineness of the *Sophist* and *Politicus*, if they had been compared with the *Laws* rather than with the *Republic*, and the *Laws* had been received, as they ought to be, on the authority of Aristotle, as an undoubted work of Plato.' Schaarschmidt, the latest enemy of the two dialogues, is as inconsistent in accepting the *Laws*, as he is consistent (however paradoxical) in rejecting the *Philebus*¹.

But to return. However different from the *Theætetus* in style and external treatment, the *Sophist* and *Statesman* are connected with it in subject, and also in their point of view.

The theory of Knowledge, which at the end of the *Theætetus* remains indeterminate, is completed by the discussion of first principles in the *Sophist*. And although the subject of the *Statesman* is not the nature, but the

¹ An important contribution to the more exact definition both of the place of the dialectical dialogues and of the growth of Plato's central doctrine has been made quite recently by Mr. H.

Jackson, in his elaborate papers on the *Philebus* and the *Parmenides* in the *Journal of Philology*, Nos. 21 and 22: 'Plato's later Theory of Ideas.'

application of Knowledge, yet there is a distinct advance in the conception of Knowledge or Science, on which the discussion is based.

The relation of Knowledge to Experience, and the nature of the ideas as categories (supr. 4, 5), have come out in the *Theætetus*. But the chief conceptions of Knowledge there put forth are those (*a*) of rising from particulars to universals and so contemplating each thing as a whole, (*b*) of analyzing a whole into its parts, and (*c*) of being able to describe an object by its difference.

In the *Sophist* it is shown that to generalize, distinguish, and analyze is not enough. Ideas must not be seen only in their separate abstraction, but also in their combinations and correlations. And in the course of the *Politicus* it appears further that Knowledge, in order to be fruitful, must take a grasp of the actual world, where the ideas are not found in elementary simplicity, but are transferred into the long and difficult syllables of action. Logical analysis must follow the lines of nature. Dichotomy must not be forced where it is inapplicable. And rash generalization (misplaced *συναγωγή*) is to be equally avoided. Every nature is to be separately interrogated, until each has yielded all that its peculiar experience enables it to contribute to the sum of wisdom. It is not enough to define an art by some distinguishing mark. To know its boundaries aright, we must also know the kindred arts from which it is distinguished. There are categories not only of things in general, but of social facts: seven departments, for example, of human industry. Plato nowhere shows a deeper conviction of the extent and comprehensiveness of Science.

6. Another growth which may be traced in these three dialogues, and also in the *Philebus* and *Timæus*, is the increasing clearness and minuteness of Plato's psychology. Such hints towards a study of the phenomena of mind as occur in the *Phædo*, *Meno*, *Gorgias*, *Republic*, or even in the *Phædrus*, are comparatively vague. In the *Theætetus* Plato is for the first time continuously employed in the close analysis of mental operations. The nearest parallel in the *Republic* is the description, in Book 7, of the effect of number

in awakening reason by giving distinctness to contradictory perceptions. But in the *Theætetus* we have a whole series of similar observations:—the connection of *αἴσθησις* and *φαντασία* in the case of the wind (p. 152), the analysis of vision (153 E foll.), the logical postulates, which we are asked to contemplate steadily as ‘facts of consciousness’ (155), the further analysis of vision (156, 7), the account given of illusory perceptions (158, 159), the case of letters and sounds seen and heard but not understood (163), the relation of *μνήμη* to *αἴσθησις* (*ibid.*), the illustration of degrees of perception (165), the distinction between the organ and the percipient mind (184), the whole attempt to give a subjective account of false opinion (187–200), and, in particular, the description of thought as self-dialogue (189, 190), the image of the waxen-block, accounting for confusions of sense and memory (191 foll.), that of the aviary, for confusions of pure thought, (198 foll.), the three definitions of *λόγος* (206 foll.);—all these are instances of the working of a new spirit, which is not found in equal strength in the *Republic* or *Phædrus*.

Now to the same reflective tendency may be referred several passages of the *Sophist* and *Philebus*, and the effect of it may be traced also in the *Politicus* and *Timæus*. The following points may be especially noted:—the acknowledgment obtained from the idealists that Knowledge is a *process* (*Soph.* 248), the description of the process of dialectic (254), the meaning of denial (*ἀπόφασις*) (257), the distinction of *λόγος*, *διάνοια*, *φαντασία*, *αἴσθησις* (263, 4):—the origin of *γραμματική* (*Phil.* 8), the description of *ἡδονή*, *δόξα*, *μνήμη*, *ἀνάμνησις*, *φαντασία* (37–39):—the passage about *μετρητική* (*Polit.* 285), the reason for the argument from example (277):—the account of sensation, and the distinction of *νοῦς* from *δόξα ἀληθής* in the *Timæus*.

The question raised towards the end of the *Theætetus*, whether knowledge is not of simple parts as well as of the complex whole, corresponds to various *ἀπορίαι* in the *Parmenides*, and also to the place in the *Sophist* (245) where it is shown that *Becoming* as well as *Being* partakes of completeness and unity. A cognate point is also touched upon, *viz.* whether the *εἶδη* are *χωριστὰ* or *ἀχώριστα*. The theory that the *Element* (or simple idea) is unknowable, forms

the opposite extreme to the 'Protagorean' assertion that single impressions only are known. The truth is indicated that an apprehension of unity and universality is present even in the simplest distinct perception. The passage which prepares the way for this conclusion may be compared with the similar 'propædeutik' in Rep. 4. 436.

7. The Episode or Digression, 172-177.

Throughout the earlier part of the dialogue Plato's moral enthusiasm has been held under a severe restraint. It here bursts forth in a passage of still chastened and subdued eloquence. Socrates is represented as having hitherto found it difficult to be quite serious, while delivering the boyish mind of Theætetus of its first crude notions, and refuting with indirect arguments, which he himself occasionally suspects of sophistry, a popular philosophy which dressed up men's ordinary thoughts with subtle notions borrowed from past thinkers. He has accordingly been using various arts to draw the grave Theodorus into the discussion. In this he at last succeeds. But even so, his attempt at seriousness at first breaks down. He is still haunted by the humour of the previous argument, and Theodorus rebukes him for 'running Protagoras too hard.' On this Socrates lays hold of the admission, implied in Protagoras' teaching, that there is a difference, if not between truth and falsehood, right and wrong, yet between better and worse conditions of individuals and communities. On this he is about to base the argument that since legislation aims at bettering the condition of states, it is proved true or false, right or wrong, as it succeeds or fails. But at this point he seems to catch the tone of his respondent, and indulges the inclination of Theodorus by interposing a pause in the game of question and answer. In the presence of the deeper subject which now awaits discussion he suspends the argument for a while, and allows his eye to range over the whole position,—reconnoitring as it were before engaging at close quarters,—contrasting the life of the philosopher with that of the lawyer and the man of the world. After this (177 D) he resumes the argument at the point where it was broken off, and, still in conversation with Theodorus, disposes finally of Protagoras and the Heracliteans. And in all that follows, although

The Di-
gression in
172-7.

Socrates does not relinquish his playfulness, a deeper note is clearly perceptible. The productive power of Knowledge, the universal striving toward the good, the independence of mind in perceiving the true relations of things, the difficulty about false opinion, and other weighty topics, are handled with essential gravity and sobriety.

Thus the poetical and dialectical aspects are fused together more completely than in the Phædrus. And the correspondence is unmistakable between the contrasted lives on the one hand and the contrasted theories on the other:—as the philosopher is to the lawyer, so is the *ἐπιστήμη τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ* to the *φαντασία τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ*. But Peipers (*Untersuchungen*, i. pp. 472 ff.) is too matter-of-fact, when he treats the digression as an integral part of the discussion, and as directly suggested by the mention of *δίκαια καὶ καλά*.

Teichmüller, on the other hand, would treat such semi-mythical passages in Plato as wholly secondary and subordinate to the dialectical, concessions to popular sentiment, or to 'the child in us.' I cannot think that Plato would endorse this view of the imaginative portions of his own writings. They express a different but not a lower aspect of the truth; and at least equally vindicate his claim to have surveyed 'all time and all existence.' 'Reason touched with emotion' need not have less hold of reality than reason pure and simple. And abstract thought without such aid is not merely less effectual (*διάνοια γὰρ αὐτῇ οὐθὲν κινεῖ, ἀλλ' ἡ ἔνεκά του καὶ πρακτικῆς*), but is also less complete.

The digression approaches very closely in style and substance to many passages in the Republic, as will appear in the notes. But it contains no allusion to the philosopher's relation to an ideal state, whether (as in the Gorgias) because Plato had not yet enounced his conception of the philosophizing, or because he had withdrawn again into isolation,—or more probably because of the difference of the subject. The philosopher here is not merely useless to his city, but looks down upon it as from a distant height. He knows nothing of his neighbour, but is engaged in contemplating human nature in general. The conception is more ironical than in the Sophist (in this approaching the Republic), and less embittered than in the Politicus; although the con-

tempt with which the legal spirit is described is sufficiently biting.

8. The solemnity of this passage, and the shadow which it casts over the remainder of the dialogue, is in keeping with the time when the whole conversation is imagined to have taken place. Socrates, as he tells Theodorus casually at the end, is going presently to answer the indictment of Meletus; —to show, therefore, in his own person what a poor figure the philosopher makes in a law-court. This life-and-death occasion, however (*ὀλίγον πρὸ τοῦ θανάτου αὐτοῦ*), sits very lightly on him, and he is as ready as at any moment of his life to engage in philosophical discussion. Not only so, but his inexhaustible humour, if less irrepressibly exuberant than in his intercourse with Phædrus by the Ilissus, is no less ready to spring forth in the presence of a youth who is gifted with the philosophic nature. Yet there is an undercurrent of more than usual earnestness, which takes advantage from the grave presence of Theodorus, but is profoundly in keeping with the actual crisis.

Imaginary
date.

Another shadow mingles with that cast by the death of Socrates, and helps to give a further personal interest to the discourse. For the reader is to imagine that at the moment when this record of his brilliant promise is being read at Megara, Theætetus himself, who has been wounded in battle at Corinth, has just been carried back to Athens, that he may die at home. The memory of one thus distinguished in action as well as in thought is intended to consecrate the whole dialogue.

The date of the battle mentioned in the Preface can only be fixed within certain limits. The suggestion of E. Munk (whose arrangement of the dialogues in the order of the lifetime of Socrates of course gives a late place to the Theætetus) that the occasion meant was in the year 369, when the allied forces under Chabrias disputed the Isthmus with Epaminondas, is sufficiently disposed of by the remark¹ that Terpsion cannot be supposed to have waited thirty years before ful-

¹ Wohlrab, 1869.

filling his intention of asking to see the writing of Euclides. So late a date also, as Professor Jowett observes, 'a little impairs the beauty of Socrates' remark, "that he would be a great man if he lived."' These are strong reasons for preferring the battle of B.C. 394, which seems to have stirred the hearts of the Athenians in a peculiar way, as the first great national effort after the restoration of the democracy¹. In that year Theætetus would be at most twenty-one. And this date does not seem impossible, for the praise of his conduct in the fight would be all the louder if he then saw service for the first time. The supposition which alone remains, that of an uncertain date between B.C. 390 and 387 (the limits of the Corinthian war), has the doubtful advantage of giving time for the distinctions mentioned by later writers as attaching to Theætetus,—at all events for the discovery of the five regular solids, which he might have hit upon even sooner than this (*μαθητὸς γὰρ καὶν παῖς γένοιτ' ἄν*²).

Time of
composition.

9. In any case, therefore, the Preface cannot have been written earlier than B.C. 394, when Plato was about thirty-five, and in all probability was written much later, for in fiction (unlike politics) the mention of an event is none the worse for being 'ancient history.' But even so much cannot be decisively maintained respecting the dialogue as a whole, —for the preface, and the concluding words, and other passages, may *possibly* have been written long after the main portion had been composed. Internal evidence, however, as has been already indicated, would seem to assign to the Theætetus a place, though earlier than the Sophist, yet not much, if at all, earlier than the Republic.

Teichmüller has recently, with great confidence, set up a new criterion, by which he thinks to separate once for all between the earlier and later writings of Plato. This is afforded by the simple statement of Euclides, that in finishing his transcript of the conversation he has omitted the interlocutory words. By which Teichmüller understands Plato

¹ The beautiful monument to the young knight Dexilaus in the Ceramicus at Athens (*ἀπέθανεν ἐπ' Εὐβου-*

λίδου ἐν Κορίνθῳ, τῶν πέντε ἰππέων) is commonly attributed to this year.

² Ar. Eth. N. I.

to signify that the admixture of narrative in the *Parmenides*, *Symposium*, and *Republic* had been a mistake, and that this method should be abandoned by him henceforth. Our critic also assumes that Plato kept this resolution, and that consequently no narrated dialogue is later than the *Theætetus*, and no dialogue in which the several persons are directly introduced is to be considered as earlier. The form of the *Euthydemus*, *Protagoras*, and *Phædo*, where a narrated dialogue is enclosed in a dramatic setting, is regarded as intermediate, and these dialogues are therefore assumed to come shortly before the *Theætetus*.

That the words of Euclides are not without significance may at once be admitted. The *Theætetus* is the only dialogue which is supposed to have been written down¹. This takes from the improbability of so close and subtle an argument being repeated from memory. And the omission of 'said I' and 'said he' certainly adds to the continuity of the effect, without destroying the illusion that we have the authority of Socrates for the minute accuracy of the report. It may further be conceded that of the dialogues which are similarly dramatic in form, several of the most important are on other grounds probably the last of all,—the *Sophist*, *Politicus*, *Philebus*, *Timæus*, *Laws*. But, not for the present to state objections to an hypothesis which makes the *Gorgias* a later dialogue than the *Republic*,—not only is the *Phædrus* thus placed inordinately late, but the *Laches*, *Io*, *Euthyphro*, *Crito*, *Meno*, and *Cratylus* must either be rejected, or assumed to belong to the later half of Plato's career. A theory which undertakes so much is somewhat heavily weighted, and this one happens to be not very securely based. For the Preface shows, not that the *Theætetus* is like some dialogues in its dramatic form, but that (in having a formal introduction) it is unlike all. And the inference to be drawn from this is rather that Plato was willing to vary his style in such external respects, than that he now adopted a hitherto unthought of plan to be henceforward uniformly followed by him. Indeed, if he had laid so much stress upon this point as Teichmüller supposes, there was nothing

¹ Jowett's *Plato*, iv. 225.

to prevent him from revising the whole series of his writings in the same sense.

Genuine-
ness, and
place in
the series
of the
Platonic
Dialogues.

10. In the *Theætetus*, the various *notes* of the most undoubted of Plato's writings are present in felicitous harmony. While rivalling the *Symposium* in perfection of form, and containing touches of humour and of enthusiastic insight which recall the *Phædrus*, it is, of all the dialectical dialogues, the most exact in philosophical expression. And in the subdued eloquence of moral earnestness it is comparable only to the *Phædo*, *Gorgias*, and *Republic*.

To return once more to the vexed question of its position in the series. The *Symposium* cannot have been written before the division of Arcadia in B.C. 384. But in the *Symposium*, Plato has not yet broken with the poets (p. 209), and the *Republic* is therefore later than the *Symposium*. Now it has been seen that the indications of style in the *Theætetus* bring it very near indeed to the *Republic*, while it has close relations with dialogues which are later still. The combined maturity and freshness, complexity, subtlety, and lightness of the *Theætetus* are consistent with the result thus indicated, that when he wrote it Plato 'had on his back' years (at least) forty-eight. He has himself indicated (at 180 E) the point of view from which the dialogue was composed. The battle of the philosophies was not yet over. Socrates had set up a standard of knowledge, which, supported by his dialectic as preserved at Megara, was sufficient to overthrow the popular doctrine of mere relativity, and to cast a shadow of 'philosophic doubt' over the scepticism of the day. But the ground gained hitherto had been mainly in the region of negative proof. In order to win an entrance for Science upon the 'terra firma' of positive reality, it was still necessary to criticise afresh the first principles of dialectic itself, and to come to a final reckoning with Parmenides.

What came of this final reckoning need not be considered here. But it may be observed that the difficulties raised in the *Theætetus*, no less than those in the *Parmenides*, tend to show the inadequacy of merely formal reasoning, and to prepare the way for a provisional solution, in which an indeterminate element, whether to be known as *θᾶτερον*, *ἄπειρον*,

πολλά, or ἀπειρος δυνάς, is to be admitted into the region of speculative truth ;—in which the composite nature of οὐσία is also to be admitted, and the correlation of or communion of different categories postulated¹. In working out this problem, 'new weapons' have to be introduced into the Platonic armoury, while some of those here exhibited are retained in use.

¹ See H. Jackson, On Plato's later Theory of Ideas, *Journal of Philology*, Nos. 21 and 22. This discussion throws additional light on *Theæt.* 201, 2.

CONSPECTUS.

THE dialogue has been written down by Euclides and is produced by him on the occasion of Theætetus' expected death. The persons are, SOCRATES, THEODORUS of Cyrene, and the boy THEÆTETUS.

Time, just before the trial of Socrates.

Theodorus introduces Theætetus to Socrates as a youth who has all the essential qualities of the philosophic nature. Socrates acknowledges the authority on such a point of Theodorus as an accomplished teacher. He begins to question Theætetus. 'You go to Theodorus for wisdom, i. e. Knowledge. But what is Knowledge?' 'Geometry, arithmetic, astronomy; shoemaking and other handicrafts.' 'That is an enumeration of Knowledges, not a definition of Knowledge.' 'I see, you want a general expression, such as I and young Socrates here lately invented for irrational quantities.' 'Excellent, only try.' 'I want to do so all the while, but cannot.' 'Then come to me, who am the man-midwife of young minds.'

Socrates proceeds to expound the nature of his art in such a way as effectually to encourage Theætetus, whom he once more exhorts to try his best. The youth now answers,

I. KNOWLEDGE IS SENSATION.

This (1) is shown to be the same with the dictum of Protagoras, 'Man the Measure,' i. e. Things *are* to each man as they *appear* to him:—which again is proved to rest (2) on the mysterious doctrine of Heraclitus and other great men that *All is Motion* and that things *are not* but *become*.

(3) Sensible perception is then explained as the momentary outcome of the meeting of action and passive motions. Sensation is an instantaneous process; all attributes are absolutely relative.

(4) Sensation and quality are twin vibrations, perpetually shifting from place to place, whilst agent and patient (object and subject) change their attributes indeed, but are comparatively (though never entirely) stationary. They are slow motions, whereas the others are swift.

(5) What are known as the illusions of dreams and madness and the disordered taste of the sick palate are accounted for by this hypothesis. The unpleasantness of wine is as real to Socrates ill, as its pleasantness is to Socrates when well.

(6) Thus the doctrines of Heraclitus and Protagoras unite to substantiate the answer of Theætetus, of which they are the objective and subjective counterparts.

I. (a) 1. But the theory, if consistent, is somewhat strange.

Does it not make all percipients equally wise, and make discussion purposeless? Protagoras is no wiser than an ape: Theætetus is as wise as any god.

(2) This is perhaps a superficial objection. Let us examine the statement 'Knowledge is Sensation.'

Then to see without understanding is to know: to remember without seeing is not to know.

Further, one may know and not know the same thing, know it near but not far off, know it faintly and strongly, dimly and vividly, and the like.

(3) To this Protagoras would reply by deprecating mere verbal quibbles, and boldly accepting the facts, that memory is indistinct, that each man differs infinitely from himself, and may at the same moment both know and not know the same thing.

In supporting his thesis, he would maintain that men's perceptions differ not as *true* and *false*, since all alike are real; but as *better* and *worse*. And the wise man is he who can change them from worse to better, whether in men or vegetables, in individuals or states.

I. (β) Theodorus being now the respondent, Protagoras' own maxim is examined, as explained by himself:—What seems to each man is real to him to whom it seems.

Does it not seem to each man that other men are wiser than he?

If all think always truly, some think falsely.

Theodorus has trouble in maintaining his opinions. Are they false to his opponents, but true to him?

Most men dissent from the opinion of Protagoras. But his opinion justifies them in their dissent. Is the one 'measure'

here to be preferred to the many? Or does not the one confirm the many, by asserting that they are right in thinking him wrong?

I. (γ) Protagoras is not in life, and would not be convinced if he were. But his followers will hardly maintain that all men are equally wise in knowing what is *wholesome* for the individual or *expedient* for the state. So much indeed has been already hinted in Socrates' defence of Protagoras (I. (a) 3).—

(At this point the argument is interrupted with an eloquent digression, in which the life of the philosopher, who has leisure for many arguments, which he can drop and take up again at will, is contrasted with the life of the politician).

—Well, the state makes laws with a view to expediency, of which experience is the only test. And the same is true of every judgment which regards the *future*. Protagoras professed himself a better judge than his disciple could be of the persuasiveness of a rhetorical speech. So far, then, the doctrine of absolute subjectivity is disproved.

I. (δ) But what of the immediate perceptions of warmth, white, and sweetness? Are they always true for the percipient at the moment? Even this cannot be maintained by those (I. (3)), who base the doctrine of Sensation upon the doctrine of Motion.

All motion is either change of place (*φορά*) or change of nature (*ἀλλοίωσις*). And if motion is absolute, all things are always moved in both these ways. Therefore the perception and the quality which flit between subject and object, as before described, must also change their nature in the instant of sensation, so that they cannot be so much as named. Each thing no sooner *is*, but it *is not*; it is no more *thus* than *not thus*; or rather it is anyhow and nohow.

In the course of this argument Theodorus has expressed his abhorrence of the Heracliteans of Ephesus, whose doctrine is as unstable as the Universe in their conception of it. Theætetus now asks that the opposite doctrine,—that of Parmenides, Zeno, and Melissus, may be discussed.

II. Socrates avoids this task for the present, but takes Theætetus again in hand and resumes the previous question about the nature of Perception. The sensible qualities of objects are perceived *not with* but *through* the organs of sense. And there are some attributes which the mind herself perceives without a separate organ,—number, difference, sameness, being. The mind's own judgment of these things is called Opinion.

Now Opinion is either true or false, and KNOWLEDGE IS TRUE OPINION.

But how is false opinion possible? We have already felt this difficulty within the sphere of sense. It now returns upon us in a more abstract form.

Three answers are proposed, and each is followed into various ramifications. False opinion is (1) to think without Knowledge, or (2) to think what is not, or (3) to mistake one thing for another. For thought is the mind's dialogue, and opinion is a silent proposition.

But each of these answers leads to insuperable difficulties, and, finding ourselves in a strait, we are driven to seek aid from the imagination.

(a) Shall we say that the mind takes impressions like a waxen block, and that mistake occurs in the process of identifying new impressions with the old, i. e. at the meeting-point of sensation and memory?

This image does not extend to mistakes in abstract reasoning.

(β) Then shall we compare the mind to an aviary containing birds, some of which are gregarious, some grouped in families, some solitary and ranging over all? We have caught them all, and have them all within the mind, but as they fly about we may get the wrong bird by the wing, and so may take a rock-pigeon for a turtle-dove, and this is false opinion. Even here the image comes short of the reality. For so far as we take hold of the wild pigeon we have it actually in hand as known, and cannot err about it.

However, leaving this subsidiary question unsolved, we find a short cut to answering the main question, whether True Opinion is or is not Knowledge. The judges in a law-court have often been brought by rhetoric to form a true opinion of matters of fact, which no arguments can demonstrate. They have True Opinion but not Knowledge, which in such cases cannot exist without ocular demonstration.

III. Wherein then does Knowledge differ from True Opinion? If we can find this, perhaps we shall at last find the definition of Knowledge.

(a) KNOWLEDGE IS TRUE OPINION WITH AN ACCOUNT of the object. That of which no account can be given is unknowable.

(β) The prime elements are unknowable, while their complex or combination is known. The element can only be named. The

nature of language implies that an *account* comprises more elements than one.

Here are two statements, which may be considered together.

True Opinion with an account or reason is a plausible definition of Knowledge. But how can the complex be known if the element is unknown? In learning to read, we learned the letters first, then syllables. In learning music, we first learn the notes.

Yet, on the other hand, the syllable may be regarded as an independent unity springing from this combination of the letters. And this leads up to the general question of the relation of parts to a whole. Is the whole identical with all the parts, or separable from them? Is 'All' in the singular identical with 'All' in the plural? So far from simple unity being unknowable, we find that the object of Knowledge is always one and indissoluble.

But, to return to the former of our two statements, If Knowledge is true Opinion with an *account*, what is meant by the latter term? Three answers are again proposed:—

1. Statement in words. But this is universally attainable.
2. Enumeration of parts or elements. (Definition by analysis.)

But I may enumerate the parts, having only true opinion of them and not Knowledge.

3. Definition by the characteristic difference.

But here again the question rises, Does such definition rest on Knowledge or on True Opinion? And if the former, then we have once more to ask ourselves, What is Knowledge?

The art of Socrates condemns all the answers hitherto given. But Theætetus, who has been delivered of more than he knew was in him, will be more fruitfully inventive, or at least more intellectually modest, in the time to come.

ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ.

ΤΑ ΤΟΥ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΥ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ.

ΕΥΚΛΕΙΔΗΣ, ΤΕΡΨΙΩΝ, ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ,
ΘΕΟΔΩΡΟΣ, ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ.

ἌΡΤΙ, ὦ Τερψίων, ἢ πάλαι ἐξ ἀγροῦ; 5

ΤΕΡ. Ἐπιεικῶς πάλαι. καὶ σέ γε ἐζήτουν κατ' ἀγορὰν καὶ ἐθαύμαζον, ὅτι οὐχ οἴός τ' ἦ εὐρέϊν.

ΕΥ. Οὐ γὰρ ἦ κατὰ πόλιν.

ΤΕΡ. Ποῦ μὴν;

ΕΥ. Εἰς λιμένα καταβαίνων Θεαιτήτῳ ἐνέτυχον 10
φερομένῳ ἐκ Κορίνθου ἀπὸ τοῦ στρατοπέδου Ἄθη-
ναῖε.

*The
Preface.*
Terpsion
and Eucli-
des meet
before
Euclides'
house in
Megara.
They con-
verse about
the danger-
ous state of
Theætetus,

3. ΕΥΚΛΕΙΔΗΣ, ΤΕΡΨΙΩΝ] Euclides and Terpsion appear also in the Phædo as the Megarians who were present at the death of Socrates, p. 59 C: Καὶ Μεγαρόθεν Εὐκλείδης τε καὶ Τερψίων. Compare with the preservation of this dialogue by Euclides, and the introduction of Theodorus of Cyrene, the preservation of the Pythagorean dialogue by Phædo, and the introduction in it of Simmias and Cebes (Φιλολάφ συγγεγονότων). See also Tim. 27 A.

5. For the ellipse (of ἦκεις or some such word) cp. the omission of εἰ with ἄξιος, infr. 143

E. This idiom suits the conversational style.

6. Ἐπιεικῶς πάλαι] 'A good while ago.' Cp. Phæd. 80 C: ἐπιεικῶς συχνὸν ἐπιμένει χρόνον.

7. καὶ ἐθαύμαζον] It is perhaps intimated that Euclides, like his master Socrates, was to be found daily in the market-place.

9. 'Where, then?' μὴν expresses surprise.

11. ἐκ Κορίνθου ἀπὸ τοῦ στρατοπέδου] For the expression compare Charm. 153 A: Ἐκ Ποτιδαίας ἀπὸ τοῦ στρατοπέδου. For the probable date of this battle see Introduction.

of whom Socrates had truly prophesied great things. Euclides has preserved the conversation, which Socrates a little while before his death held with Theætetus, who was then a boy.

ΤΕΡ. Ζῶντι ἢ τετελευτηκότι;

ΕΥ. Ζῶντι καὶ μάλα μόλις· χαλεπῶς μὲν γὰρ ἔχει καὶ ὑπὸ τραυμάτων τινῶν, μᾶλλον μὴν αὐτὸν αἰρεῖ τὸ γεγονός νόσημα ἐν τῷ στρατεύματι.

5 ΤΕΡ. Μῶν ἢ δυσεντερία;

ΕΥ. Ναί.

ΤΕΡ. Οἶον ἄνδρα λέγεις ἐν κινδύνῳ εἶναι.

ΕΥ. Καλόν τε καὶ ἀγαθόν, ὃ Τερψίων, ἐπεὶ τοὶ καὶ νῦν ἤκουόν τινων μάλα ἐγκωμιαζόντων αὐτὸν περὶ
10 τὴν μάχην.

ΤΕΡ. Καὶ οὐδέν γ' ἄτοπον, ἀλλὰ πολὺ θαυμαστότερον εἰ μὴ τοιοῦτος ἦν. ἀτὰρ πῶς οὐκ αὐτοῦ
Μεγαροῖ κατέλυνε;

ΕΥ. Ἐπείγετο οἴκαδε· ἐπεὶ ἔγωγ' ἐδεόμην καὶ
15 συνεβούλευον, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἤθελε. καὶ δῆτα προπέμφας

1. Ζῶντι ἢ τετελευτηκότι] Terpsion's fears are excited by the word φερομένην.

2. Ζῶντι καὶ μάλα μόλις] 'Indeed, only just alive.'

χαλεπῶς . . τινῶν] Observe the anticipatory καί, contrasting the wounds with the disease.

3. μὴν] 'However.'

4. αἰρεῖ] 'Affects him.' Compare Soph. Ant. 606: τὰν οὐθ' ὑπνος αἰρεῖ ποθ' ὁ παντογῆρος. ἐν τῷ στρατεύματι completes the sense of γεγονός: i. e. τὸ νόσημα τὸ ἐν τῷ στρατεύματι γεγονός; but the expression is less formal.

7. Οἶον ἄνδρα λέγεις ἐν κινδύνῳ εἶναι] 'What a noble life is then in peril!' The worth of Theætetus is acknowledged by his Megarian friends, and is further confirmed (though confirmation was needless, ll. 11, 12) by the praise of him which Euclides has just heard (καὶ

νῦν, l. 9).

9. ἤκουον] The imperfects here and below, ll. 14, 15, refer to the time spent by Euclides in company with Theætetus and those who carried him.

11. θαυμαστότερον] Sc. ἦν ἄν. The conversational ellipse, continuing the idiom from οὐδέν γε ἄτοπον, avoids the awkwardness of repeating ἦν. (θαυμαστότερον ἦν Schol., Thom. Mag.)

14. ἐπεὶ . . ἐδεόμην] Wohlrab compares infr. 150 A B, 158 A, 167 A, etc. ἐπεὶ . . γε in such places marks the necessity of the foregoing explanation. It was not for want of friendly insistence that Theætetus did not stay, but because he longed to be at home.

15. δῆτα implies that there is something important to be said. 'And, I may tell you.'

p. 142. αὐτόν, ἀπιὼν πάλιν ἀνεμνήσθη καὶ ἐθαύμασα Σωκράτους, ὡς μαντικῶς ἄλλα τε δὴ εἶπε καὶ περὶ τούτου. δοκεῖ γάρ μοι ὀλίγον πρὸ τοῦ θανάτου ἐντυχεῖν αὐτῷ μεираκίῳ ὄντι, καὶ συγγενόμενός τε καὶ διαλεχθεὶς πάνυ ἀγασθῆναι αὐτοῦ τὴν φύσιν. καί μοι 5 ἐλθόντι Ἀθήναζε τούς τε λόγους οὓς διελέχθη αὐτῷ
D διηγήσατο, καὶ μάλα ἀξιόους ἀκοῆς, εἶπέ τε ὅτι πᾶσα ἀνάγκη εἴη τοῦτον ἐλλόγιμον γενέσθαι, εἴπερ εἰς ἡλικίαν ἔλθοι.

TEP. Καὶ ἀληθῆ γε, ὡς ἔοικεν, εἶπεν. ἄτὰρ τίνες 10 ἦσαν οἱ λόγοι; ἔχouis ἂν διηγήσασθαι;

EY. Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, οὐκουν οὕτω γε ἀπὸ στό-

p. 143. ματος· ἀλλ' ἐγραψάμην μὲν τότε εὐθύς οἴκαδ' ἐλθὼν

1. ἀπιὼν πάλιν] 'As I returned.'

ἀνεμνήσθη] Sc. ἃ εἶπε Σ. περὶ τούτου. The sentence is modified by the introduction of the verb ἐθαύμασα. 'I recalled the words of Socrates about him, and marvelled at the prophetic insight, which, like many sayings of Socrates, they showed.'

3. δοκεῖ γάρ μοι] δοκεῖ gives a slight uncertainty to the expression. It here qualifies rather the mark of time ὀλίγον πρὸ τοῦ θανάτου than the infinitive ἐντυχεῖν. So below, 144 C, δοκοῦσι belongs more in sense to ἀλειψάμενοι than to ἰέναι. 'I think it was a little while before his death that he met with him.'

8. εἴπερ εἰς ἡλικίαν ἔλθοι] 'If he lived long enough.' These words also, as interpreted by the event, have a prophetic sound.

εἰς ἡλικίαν] Sc. τοῦ ἐλλόγιμος γενέσθαι.

10. Καὶ ἀληθῆ γε . . εἶπεν] In the editions before Heindorf these words were given to EY. But in the Bodleian MS. they are properly assigned to Terpsion.

12. The particles οὐκουν . . γε imply, 'Not, at least, in the way you mean.'

οὕτω] Compare the use of νῦν οὕτως. Heindorf quotes Xen. Mem. 3. 6. 9: Οὐκ ἂν ἔχοιμί σοι οὕτω γε ἀπὸ στόματος εἰπεῖν.

13. ἐγραψάμην . . ἔγραφον] 'I wrote for my own use—I went on writing.' So the change of voice may be rendered. But ἐγραψάμην . . τὸν λόγον below, 143 B, has a different force, 'I made my transcript.' And in 143 C, where the notion of writing recurs without any personal reference, the middle voice is dropped. Such variations belong to the freedom of Greek idiom, and must be noticed, although of slight significance. The Bodleian MS. omits μὲν, and Schanz formerly

ὑπομνήματα, ὕστερον δὲ κατὰ σχολὴν ἀναμνησκόμενος ἔγραφον, καὶ ὁσάκις Ἀθήναζε ἀφικοίμην, ἐπανηρώτων τὸν Σωκράτη ὃ μὴ ἐμεμνήμην, καὶ δεῦρο ἐλθὼν ἐπηνωρθούμην· ὥστε μοι σχεδὸν τι πᾶς ὁ λόγος γέγραπται. p. 143.

ΤΕΡ. Ἀληθῆ· ἤκουσά σου καὶ πρότερον, καὶ μέντοι αἰὲ μέλλων κελεύσειν ἐπιδειῖξαι διατέριφα δεῦρο. ἀλλὰ τί κωλύει νῦν ἡμᾶς διελθεῖν; πάντως ἔγωγε καὶ ἀναπαύσασθαι δέομαι, ὡς ἐξ ἀγροῦ ἦκων.

(1871) proposed ἔγραψα μέν. But both the middle voice and the particle are idiomatic and expressive. And although μέν at first opposes the written notes to an extempore repetition, it is quite Greek, though not quite logical, to utilize it for the minor opposition (with ὕστερον δέ) of the fair copy to the notes or rough draft.

1. ὑπομνήματα] 'Notes.' See Phædr. 275 A, where letters are called ὑπομνήσεως φάρμακον: ib. 276 D.

3. ὃ μὴ ἐμεμνήμην] = εἴ τι μὴ ἐμεμνήμην. μὴ gives indefiniteness to ὃ.

6. Ἀληθῆ· ἤκουσα] The clauses are parallel and not consequent; hence the ἀσύνδετον. Heindorf's conjecture, adopted by Schanz, ἀλλ' ἤδη ἤκουσά σου καὶ πρότερον, although most ingenious, is less idiomatic than the MS. text.

καὶ μέντοι, κ. τ. λ.] μέντοι opposes Terpsion's present confession to his question in 142 D, which implied ignorance of the story. 'And, now I think of it, I have always meant to ask you to show it me, but have let opportunities slip till now.' That which is really most emphatic is expressed by the participle. It has been

objected to this rendering, (α) that δεῦρο is not used as an adverb of time except with μέχρῃς or αἰεί, (β) that διατέριβειν, meaning 'to delay,' could not have been used here without an adverb of place. But, (α) such transference of adverbs from place to time is not unusual, and it occurs in the case of δεῦρο in Plat. Tim. 21 D: Ἦν ἦδε ἡ πόλις ἔπραξε μέν, διὰ δὲ χρόνον καὶ φθορὰν τῶν ἐργασαμένων οὐ διήρκεσε δεῦρο ὁ λόγος. In the present passage, the deviation from common use is softened by the neighbourhood of αἰεί. Comp. Æsch. Eum. 596: Καὶ δεῦρό γ' αἰεί τὴν τύχην οὐ μέμφομαι. Such a refinement upon a common phrase is in the manner of Plato. And (β) διατέριβειν is elsewhere used absolutely, with a touch of blame in it, as meaning not simply 'to delay,' but 'to waste time.' See Rep. 5. 472 B: Δέγε, καὶ μὴ διάτριβε: Thuc. 7. 42, 43, 47: also Aristoph. Eq. 515: Φησὶ γὰρ ἀνὴρ οὐχ ὑπ' ἀνοίας τοῦτο πεπονηθὼς διατέριβειν, where it occurs together with a participle, as here.

8. πάντως ἔγωγε . . . δέομαι] 'Besides, as I have walked in from the country, I should in

p. 143.

ΕΥ. Ἄλλὰ μὲν δὴ καὶ αὐτὸς μέχρι Ἐρινοῦ Θεαιτήτον προῦπεμψα, ὥστε οὐκ ἂν ἀηδῶς ἀναπαυοίμην. ἀλλ' ἴωμεν, καὶ ἡμῖν ἅμα ἀναπαυομένοις ὁ παῖς ἀναγνώσεται.

ΤΕΡ. Ὅρθῶς λέγεις.

5

ΕΥ. Τὸ μὲν δὴ βιβλίον, ὃ Τερψίων, τουτί· ἐγραψάμην δὲ δὴ οὕτωςι τὸν λόγον, οὐκ ἐμοὶ Σωκράτη διηγούμενον ὡς διηγείτο, ἀλλὰ διαλεγόμενον οἷς ἔφη διαλεχθῆναι. ἔφη δὲ τῷ τε γεωμέτρῳ Θεοδώρῳ καὶ τῷ Θεαιτήτῳ. ἵνα οὖν ἐν τῇ γραφῇ μὴ παρέχοιεν 10 πράγματα αἱ μεταξὺ τῶν λόγων διηγῆσεις περὶ αὐτοῦ τε, ὅποτε λέγοι ὁ Σωκράτης οἶον Κἀγὼ ἔφην ἢ

They enter the house, and Euclides produces the roll, which his servant reads to them.

any case be glad of a rest.' This asyndeton is frequent, πάντως having the force of a particle. Infr. 162 A: Πάντως καὶ νῦν δὴ μάλ' ἐμμελῶς σοι ἐφαίνετο ὑπακούειν. Polit. 268 E: Πάντως οὐ πολλά ἐκφεύγεις παιδιᾶς ἔτη.

1. Ἐρινοῦ] Ἐρινεόν was a spot on the Cephisus, close to Eleusis, where it was fabled that Pluto had descended with Proserpine. Paus. 1. 92. There were other places of the name.

3. ὁ παῖς] Euclides' servant.

7. οὐκ ἐμοὶ Σωκράτη διηγούμενον κ.τ.λ.] These words are parallel to οὕτωςι τὸν λόγον, depending on ἐγραψάμην. Compare Apol. 19 C: Ταῦτα . . ἐωρᾶτε . . Σωκράτη . . περιφερόμενον.

9. τῷ τε γεωμέτρῳ Θεοδώρῳ] Theodorus the mathematician of Cyrene, with whom, according to a doubtful tradition, Plato once studied. He is a geometrician, and stands thus on the threshold of philosophy; and he is of Cyrene, the city of Aristippus, with

whom he may be also connected as being one of the friends of Protagoras. See infr. 164 E: Οἱ ἐπίτροποι οὓς Πρωταγόρας κατέλιπεν . . ὦν Θεόδωρος εἰς ἔδε.

10. ἵνα οὖν ἐν τῇ γραφῇ, κ.τ.λ.] Imitated by Cicero, de Amic. c. 1: 'Quasi enim ipsos induxi loquentes, ne inquam et inquit sæpius interponerentur.' Teichmüller finds in these words the transition from the earlier to the later manner of Plato. But this seems to prove too much. See Introduction.

11. αἱ μεταξὺ . . διηγῆσεις] 'The bits of narration interrupting the dialogue.'

περὶ αὐτοῦ τε] περὶ αὐτοῦ depends immediately on διηγῆσεις, and ὅποτε λέγοι is epeexegetic. Editors have preferred αὐτοῦ, placing the comma at διηγῆσεις, which makes the syntax more regular, though with an awkward inversion. The MSS. often err in reading αὐτοῦ for αὐτοῦ, but it is safer to follow them where there is no manifest error.

Καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον, ἢ αὖ περὶ τοῦ ἀποκρινομένου, ὅτι p. 143.
 Συνέφη ἢ Οὐχ ὠμολόγει, τούτων ἕνεκα ὡς αὐτὸν αὐ-
 τοῖς διαλεγόμενον ἔγραψα, ἐξελὼν τὰ τοιαῦτα.

ΤΕΡ. Καὶ οὐδέν γε ἄπο τρόπου, ὦ Εὐκλείδη.

5 ΕΥ. Ἀλλά, παῖ, λαβὲ τὸ βιβλίον καὶ λέγε.

The
 Dialogue.
 Socrates
 meeting

ΣΩ. Εἰ μὲν τῶν ἐν Κυρήνῃ μᾶλλον ἐκηδόμην, ἢ
 ὦ Θεόδωρε, τὰ ἐκεῖ ἄν σε καὶ περὶ ἐκείνων ἀνηρώτων,

1. ἢ αὖ περὶ τοῦ ἀποκρινομένου] sc. λέγοι. ἢ, κ.τ.λ. referring to ὅποτε λέγοι is introduced instead of the regular καί, κ.τ.λ. answering to περὶ αὐτοῦ τε. This helps to confirm the reading and punctuation, for the change from καὶ to ἢ is more natural, if the epexegetis begins with ὅποτε. 'The interruptions both concerning Socrates himself,—when he said, for instance, "I remarked," or "I replied;"—or again, when he told of the respondent, that "he assented," or "he did not agree."' Cp. infr. 203 B. The forms here quoted are commonly reserved for the more emphatic places in narrated dialogue: cp. esp. Rep. 427 B, Prot. 317 D.

4. οὐδέν γε ἄπο τρόπου] Comp. Rep. 5. 470 B: Καὶ οὐδέν γε, ἔφη, ἄπο τρόπου λέγεις. . . Ὅρα δὴ καὶ τόδε εἰ πρὸς τρόπου λέγω. Also the emphatic use of the prep. 'from' in Elizabethan poetry: e. g. Jul. Cæs. 2. 3, 'Why bird and beast *from*' (i. e. contrary to) 'quality and kind.' (ἄπο is the Bodleian reading.)

5. λέγε] 'Let us hear.' Not said facetiously, as Wohlrab supposes, but more vivid and conversational than ἀναγίγνωσκε.

In this Preface we have been introduced to Theætetus as a man already distinguished among his fellow-citizens. In what follows we are to see the promise of his youth. We are told of Theætetus by late writers (besides the fact that he heard Socrates and followed Plato) that he taught mathematics at Heracleia, and that he was the author of the first treatise on the five regular solids. The interval which this seems to require between the trial of Socrates and the death of Theætetus (to which it is difficult not to suppose an allusion here) increases the uncertainty of the date. But see Introduction.

6. Εἰ μὲν. .] 'If my heart were in Cyrene.' There is an imperfect sequence of clauses, arising out of the interposition of the clause ἦττον γὰρ . . ἐπιεικέις. The last words form a transition to the main thought, to which the speaker gradually returns. The opening is characteristic of Socrates. He begins by putting an analogous case, in which the person addressed is interested.

7. τὰ ἐκεῖ ἄν . . ἀνηρώτων]

p. 143. εἴ τινες αὐτόθι περὶ γεωμετρίαν ἢ τινα ἄλλην φιλοσοφίαν εἰς τῶν νέων ἐπιμέλειαν ποιούμενοι· νῦν δέ —ἦττον γὰρ ἐκείνους ἢ τούσδε φιλω̄, καὶ μᾶλλον ἐπιθυμῶ εἰδέναι τίνες ἡμῖν τῶν νέων ἐπίδοξοι γενέσθαι ἐπιεικείς· ταῦτα δὴ αὐτός τε σκοπῶ καθ' ὅσον 5 δύναμαι, καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἐρωτῶ οἷς ἂν ὀρώ τοὺς νέους ἐθέλοντας συγγίγνεσθαι. σοὶ δὴ οὐκ ὀλίγιστοι
E πλησιάζουσι, καὶ δικαίως· ἄξιος γὰρ τά τε ἄλλα καὶ γεωμετρίας ἔνεκα. εἰ δὴ οὖν τι ἐνέτυχες ἀξίῳ λόγου, ἠδέως ἂν πυθοίμην. 10

ΘΕΟ. Καὶ μὴν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐμοί τε εἰπεῖν καὶ
'I should have examined you about things there and persons there.' ἐκείνων is masc. The Bodleian MS. reads ἄν ἡρώτων (sic), in which the repetition of ἄν may be defended by comparing Rep. 7. 526 C: οὐκ ἂν ῥαδίως οὐδέ πολλά ἂν εὔροις. But the other reading, which is supported by T, is on the whole more probable, and the compound is expressive of the thorough-going, persistent questioning of Socrates.

1. ἢ τινα ἄλλην φιλοσοφίαν] 'Or other liberal pursuit.' Comp. Tim. 88 C: Μουσικῇ καὶ πάσῃ φιλοσοφίᾳ προσχρώμενοι. This word, like ἐπιστήμη, σοφιστής and others, is used by Plato sometimes in the more general and familiar, and sometimes in a more restricted and technical sense.

2. νῦν δέ, κ. τ. λ.] It makes little difference whethor νῦν δέ is joined immediately with ταῦτα δὴ, κ. τ. λ., or with a suppressed apodosis of which these words are a resumption. In the latter case we should omit the break with Wohlrab, Schanz and H. Schmidt.

4. τίνες ἡμῖν τῶν νέων] ἡμῖν (sc. τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις) is not emphatic. The emphasis is anticipated in τούσδε.

ἡμῖν τῶν νέων . . (8.) 1. ὑμῖν τῶν πολιτῶν] Comp. Thuc. 1. 6: Οἱ πρεσβύτεροι αὐτοῖς τῶν εὐδαιμόνων.

γενέσθαι ἐπιεικείς] 'To make a good figure.' ἐπιεικής in Plato seems frequently to mean simply 'excellent' (*laudabilis*, Ast. Lex.), cp. Legg. 12. 957 A: "Ἔστ' ἐν πόλεσιν οὐκ ἀσχήμονα ἐπιεικῶν ἀνδρῶν οὐκ ὀλίγα νομοθετήματα. Symp. 210 B: "Ὅστε καὶ εἰς ἐπιεικῆς ἂν τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ εἰς μικρὸν ἄνθος ἔχη, ἐξαρκεῖν αὐτῷ, κ. τ. λ. Rep. 3. 398 E: "Ἀχρηστοὶ γὰρ καὶ γυναιξίν ἄς δεῖ ἐπιεικείς εἶναι, μὴ ὅτι ἀνδράσιν. (Cp. 387 E: Γυναιξὶ δὲ ἀποδιδόμεν, καὶ οὐδὲ ταύταις σπουδαίαις.)

8. ἄξιος γάρ] The adjective receives greater emphasis by the omission of the substantive verb. Comp. Soph. Œd. Col. 758: Τήνδε τὴν πόλιν φίλως εἰπὼν, ἐπαξία γάρ. Also Rep. 6. 499 D: Περὶ τούτου ἔτοιμοι (sc. ἐσμέν) τῷ λόγῳ διαμάχεσθαι.

11. εἰπεῖν refers to λόγου in l. 9.

Theodorus in an Athenian palaestra, asks what youth of promise he has met with, not in Cyrene, but in Athens.

Theodorus speaks warmly in praise of Theætetus, who, though not beautiful, is at once bold and

gentle and intelligent, a rare combination! Like a stream of oil, flowing smoothly and swiftly without a murmur.

σοὶ ἀκούσαι πάνυ ἄξιον, οἶω ὑμῖν τῶν πολιτῶν μει- p. 143.
 ρακίῳ ἐντετύχηκα. καὶ εἰ μὲν ἦν καλός, ἐφοβούμην
 ἂν σφόδρα λέγειν, μὴ καὶ τῷ δόξω ἐν ἐπιθυμίᾳ αὐτοῦ
 εἶναι· νῦν δέ, καὶ μὴ μοι ἄχθου, οὐκ ἔστι καλός,
 5 προσέεικε δὲ σοὶ τήν τε σιμότητα καὶ τὸ ἔξω τῶν
 ὀμμάτων· ἦττον δὲ ἢ σὺ ταῦτ' ἔχει. ἀδεῶς δὴ λέγω.
 εἶ γὰρ ἴσθι ὅτι ὦν δὴ πῶποτε ἐνέτυχον, καὶ πάνυ p. 144.
 πολλοῖς πεπλησίακα, οὐδένα πω ἠσθόμην οὔτω
 θαυμαστῶς εἶ πεφυκότα. τὸ γὰρ εὐμαθῆ ὄντα, ὡς

3. μὴ καὶ τῷ δόξω] The expression is softened by the impersonal τῷ. 'Lest it should be thought.' This indirect reference to persons is common in Plato, as in other Greek. Cp. *infr.* 175 B: "Ὅταν δέ γέ τινα . . . ἐλκύσῃ ἄνω, viz. τὸν δικανικὸν ἐκείνον. *Phaed.* 63 A: 'Αεὶ ὁ Κέβητος λόγους τιῶς ἀνερευνᾷ, sc. ἐμούς.

4. καὶ μὴ μοι ἄχθου] καὶ introduces what is suddenly interposed. *Comp.* l. 7, and *Gorg.* 486 A: Καίτοι, δὲ φίλε Σώκρατες—καὶ μοι μηδὲν ἀχθεσθῆς· εἰνοία γὰρ ἐρῶ τῇ σῆ—οὐκ αἰσχρὸν δοκεῖ σοι, κ. τ. λ. The outline of the sentence is εἰ μὲν ἦν . . ., ἐφοβούμην ἂν . . . νῦν δέ . . . οὐκ ἔστι . . . ἀδεῶς δὴ λέγω. δὴ has an illative force = 'wherefore.' In οὐκ ἔστι the sentence breaks from the subordinate form. Cp. *Euthyphr.* 11 C: καὶ εἰ μὲν . . . σκόμματος.

5. τήν τε σιμότητα καὶ τὸ ἔξω τῶν ὀμμάτων] This passage and the speech of Alcibiades in the *Symposium*, p. 215: "Ὅτι μὲν τὸ εἶδος ὁμοῖος εἶ τούτοις (τοῖς Σειληνοῖς . . . καὶ τῷ Μαρσύᾳ) οὐδ' αὐτὸς δὴ πού ἀμφισβητήσεις—are the chief allusions to Socrates' personal appearance in Plato. Cp. *infr.* 209 C: Τὸν σιμόν τε καὶ

ἐξόφθαλμον. An imitation of this passage occurs in the *Symposium* attributed to Xenophon, c. 5.

τὸ ἔξω τῶν ὀμμάτων] (1) 'In having prominent eyes.' So this point in the description of Socrates has been commonly understood. But may it not rather mean (2) 'in the width between the eyes,'—a conformation sometimes accompanying a powerful brain? This suits with the τῶφθαλμῷ παραβάλλον of Aristophanes quoted by Plato in *Symp.* 221 B (cp. *Phaed.* 86 D). As ἔξω with the article takes the place of an adjective, so it is used here, like a neuter adjective, for the abstract notion of 'outwardness.' Cp. τὸ σφόδρα, *Symp.* 210 B, *Phil.* 45 C.

9. τὸ γὰρ εὐμαθῆ ὄντα . . . γιγνομένους] The anacoluthon adds to the expression of surprise. *Comp.* *Protag.* 317 A: Τὸ οὖν ἀποδιδράσκοντα μὴ δύνασθαι ἀποδρᾶναι, ἀλλὰ καταφανῆ εἶναι, πολλή μωρία καὶ τοῦ ἐπιχειρήματος. *Parm.* 128 B: Τὸ οὖν . . . οὕτως ἐκάτερον λέγειν ὥστε μηδὲν τῶν αὐτῶν εἰρηκεῖν δοκεῖν σχεδόν τι λέγοντας ταῦτά, ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς τοὺς ἄλλους φαίνεται ὑμῖν τὰ εἰρημένα εἰρησθαι.

ὡς ἄλλῳ χαλεπόν] The simple

p. 144. ἄλλω χαλεπὸν, πρᾶον αὖ εἶναι διαφερόντως, καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις ἀνδρείον παρ' ὄντινούν, ἐγὼ μὲν οὐτ' ἀν φόμην γενέσθαι οὔτε ὀρῶ γιγνομένους· ἀλλ' οἷ τε ὀξείς ὥσπερ οὗτος καὶ ἀγχίνοι καὶ μνήμονες ὡς τὰ πολλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὰς ὀργὰς ὀξύρροποι εἶσι, καὶ ἄττον- 5

and obvious meaning of these words, 'as it is hard for another to be,' i. e. 'in a degree hardly to be equalled,' has been questioned by critics because it was thought that χαλεπὸν could not be applied to qualities that are not acquired. But the word is not tied down to this preciseness of meaning. It has passed out of it even in Homer. Cp. Od. II. 156: Χαλεπὸν δὲ τάδε ζωοῖσιν ὀρᾶσθαι (which may be similarly explained as = χαλεπὸν ἐστὶ τοῖς ζωοῖς τάδε ὀρᾶσθαι). So elsewhere in Plato χαλεπός occurs where human agency is not in question to signify 'next to impossible.' See Rep. 6. 502 C: Χαλεπὰ γενέσθαι, οὐ μέντοι ἀδύνατά γε—viz. that philosophers should be kings, a consummation requiring, as a precedent condition, the combination of qualities which is indicated here. What Plato would think of this grammatical refinement may be inferred from his caricature of it in the Protagoras, 344 E: Σὺ δὲ φῆς, ὦ Πίττακε, χαλεπὸν ἐσθλὸν ἔμμεναι τὸ δὲ . . ἀδύνατον.

3. γενέσθαι (τοιούτῳν τινα), 'I should not have thought there could have been an instance of this combination, nor do I find it usual.'

γίγνομένους] Sc. τοιούτους. Cf. Rep. 6. 492 E: Οὔτε γὰρ γίγνεται οὔτε γέγονεν οὔτ' οὐν μὴ γένηται ἀλλοῖον ἤθους, κ. τ. λ.

ἀλλ' οἷ τε, κ. τ. λ.] The

thought is exactly paralleled in the Republic, where the same combination of qualities is described as essential to the philosophic nature, and its rarity is dwelt upon in similar words. Rep. 6. 503 C: Εὐμαθεῖς καὶ μνήμονες καὶ ἀγχίνοι καὶ ὀξείς οἶσθ' ὅτι οὐκ ἐθέλουσιν ἄμα φύεσθαι καὶ νεανικοὶ τε καὶ μεγαλοπρεπεῖς τὰς διανοίας, οἷοι κοσμίως μετὰ ἡσυχίας καὶ βεβαιότητος ἐθέλειν ζῆν, ἀλλ' οἱ τοιοῦτοι ὑπ' ὀξύτητος φέρονται ὅπῃ ἂν τύχωσι, καὶ τὸ βέβαιον ἅπαν αὐτῶν ἐξοίχεται. Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις. Οὐκοῦν τὰ βέβαια αὖ ταῦτα ἦθη καὶ οὐκ εὐμετάβολα, οἷς τις μᾶλλον ὡς πιστοῖς χρήσασατο, καὶ ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ πρὸς τοὺς φόβους δυσκίνητα ὄντα, πρὸς τὰς μαθήσεις αὖ ποιεῖ ταυτόν, δυσκινήτως ἔχει καὶ δυσμαθῶς, καὶ ὕπνου τε καὶ χύσσης ἐμπίπτανται, ὅταν τι δέη τοιοῦτον διαπονεῖν; So the difficulty of combining bravery with gentleness is dwelt upon, ib. 375, 6. See also Polit. 309, 310, Legg. 6. 773. The essentials of the philosophic nature enumerated in the 6th Book of the Republic are, love of truth, quickness in learning, good memory, liberality, justice and gentleness, temperance, courage. Theætetus is the embodiment of this nature.

4. ὀξείς] 'Quick.' Cp. Rep. 6. 503 C: Εὐμαθεῖς καὶ μνήμονες καὶ ἀγχίνοι καὶ ὀξείς—quoted above.

5. πρὸς τὰς ὀργὰς ὀξύρροποι] 'Impetuous.' 'Quick in temper as in mind.'

τες φέρονται ὡσπερ τὰ ἀνερμάτιστα πλοῖα, καὶ μανι- p. 144.
κώτεροι ἢ ἀνδρείότεροι φύονται, οἳ τε αὖ ἐμβριθεστε-^B
ροι νωθροὶ πως ἀπαντῶσι πρὸς τὰς μαθήσεις καὶ λή-
θης γέμοντες. ὁ δὲ οὕτω λείως τε καὶ ἀπταιστως καὶ
5 ἀνυσίμως ἔρχεται ἐπὶ τὰς μαθήσεις τε καὶ ζητήσεις
μετὰ πολλῆς πραότητος, οἷον ἐλαίου ρεῦμα ἀψοφητὶ
ρέοντος, ὥστε θαυμάσαι τὸ τηλικούτον ὄντα οὕτω
ταῦτα διαπράττεσθαι.

ΣΩ. Εὐ ἀγγέλλεις. τίνος δὲ καὶ ἔστι τῶν πολι-
10 τῶν;

ΘΕΟ. Ἀκήκοα μὲν τοῦνομα, μνημονεύω δὲ οὐ.
ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἔστι τῶνδε τῶν προσιόντων ὁ ἐν τῷ μέσῳ. C
ἄρτι γὰρ ἐν τῷ ἕξῳ δρόμῳ ἠλείφοντο ἐταῖροί τέ τινες

2. φύονται] Rep. 6. 503 C :
Οὐκ ἐθέλουσι . . φύεσθαι. 'Have
more the nature of madmen
than of courageous men.'

3. λήθης γέμοντες] Rep. 6. 486
C : Εἰ μηδὲν ὄν μάθοι σώξειν δύ-
ναιτο, λήθης ὦν πλέως, ἄρ' ἂν οἴος
τ' εἴη ἐπιστήμης μὴ κενὸς εἶναι.

5. ἀνυσίμως] 'Successfully'—
'Making rapid progress.'

7. ὥστε θαυμάσαι] Soph. El.
394 : Καλὸς γὰρ οὐμὸς βίωτος,
ὥστε θαυμάσαι. Aristoph. Plut.
810 : Τὰ σκευάρια πλήρη 'στίν,
ὥστε θαυμάσαι. By an expan-
sion, the particular cause of
wonder is here expressed and
made to depend on θαυμάσαι.

9. καί asks for further in-
formation.

11. Ἀκήκοα μὲν τοῦνομα, μνημο-
νεύω δὲ οὐ] Theodorus takes the
interest of a teacher in the
youth himself, Socrates that
of a fellow-citizen in his father.

12. ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἔστι . . ἀλλὰ σκό-
πει] This double ἀλλὰ is fre-
quent in Plato. Comp. also
Soph. Phil. 520 : Ἄλλ' αἰσχρὰ

μέντοι σοῦ γ' ἔμ' ἐνδεέστερον | ξένοφ
φανῆναι πρὸς τὸ καίριον πονεῖν. |
ἀλλ' εἰ δοκεῖ, πλέωμεν. The second
ἀλλά puts definitely forward the
proposition for which the first
ἀλλά has cleared the way.

13. ἐν τῷ ἕξῳ δρόμῳ] The
scene then is a gymnasium,
perhaps the Lyceum. Compare
Euthyphr. 2 A : Σὺ τὰς ἐν
Λυκείῳ καταλιπὼν διατριβὰς ἐνθάδε
νῦν διατρίβεις περὶ τὴν τοῦ βασι-
λέως στοάν; taken in connection
with infr. 210 D : Νῦν . .
ἀπαντητέον μοι εἰς τὴν τοῦ βασι-
λέως στοάν. Theodorus had
seen the young men in the
portico as he entered. The
word δρόμος seems to have been
applied to several parts of the
gymnasium. Euthyd. 273 A :
'Ἐν τῷ καταστέγῳ δρόμῳ. (See
the whole passage.) Aristias
ap. Polluc. 9. 43 : Ἦν μοι
παλαιάστρα καὶ δρόμος ξυστός πέλας.
Archæologists are not agreed
as to the exact part of the πα-
λαιάστρα which is here indicated.
ἐταῖροί τέ τινες] One of these,

p. 144. οὔτοι αὐτοῦ καὶ αὐτός, νῦν δέ μοι δοκοῦσιν ἀλειψάμενοι δεῦρο ἶναί. ἀλλὰ σκόπει εἰ γιγνώσκεις αὐτόν.

ΣΩ. Γιγνώσκω· ὁ τοῦ Σουνιέως Εὐφρονίου ἐστὶ, καὶ πάνν γε, ὦ φίλε, ἀνδρὸς οἶον καὶ σὺ τούτον διηγεί, καὶ ἄλλως εὐδοκίμου, καὶ μέντοι καὶ οὐσίαν μάλα 5 πολλὴν κατέλιπε. τὸ δ' ὄνομα οὐκ οἶδα τοῦ μειρακίου.

D ΘΕΟ. Θεαίτητος, ὦ Σώκρατες, τό γε ὄνομα· τὴν μέντοι οὐσίαν δοκοῦσί μοι ἐπίτροποί τινες διεφθάρκεναι· ἀλλ' ὅμως καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῶν χρημάτων ἐλευθεριότητα θαυμαστός, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Γεννικὸν λέγεις τὸν ἄνδρα. καὶ μοι κέλευε αὐτὸν ἐνθάδε παρακαθίζεσθαι.

ΘΕΟ. Ἔσται ταῦτα. Θεαίτητε, δεῦρο παρὰ Σωκράτη.

ΣΩ. Πάνν μὲν οὖν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἵνα καὶ γὰρ ἐμαυτὸν 15 ἀνασκέψωμαι, ποῖόν τι ἔχω τὸ πρόσωπον. φησὶ γὰρ E Θεόδωρος ἔχειν με σοὶ ὅμοιον. ἀτὰρ εἰ νῶν ἐχόντων ἐκατέρου λύραν ἔφη αὐτὰς ἠρμόσθαι ὁμοίως, πότερον εὐθύς ἂν ἐπιστεύομεν ἢ ἐπεσκεψάμεθ' ἂν εἰ μουσικὸς ὢν λέγει;

the gymnasium with some companions. Theodorus adds that, although impoverished, the youth is most liberal. He is made to sit by Socrates. They converse.

10

'If Theodorus were a draughtsman, he would be an authority on the subject of our personal appearance.

20

Νέος Σωκράτης, is named in this dialogue, and is an interlocutor in the Politicus. The others remain mute. Such κῶφα πρόσωπα occur in many dialogues; e.g. Lysias, Charmantides, etc., in the Republic. Observe the idiomatic use of δοκεῖν here and infr. D. Cp. supr. 142 C.

4. καὶ πάνν] καὶ is intensive.

5. καὶ μέντοι] 'And surely, now I think of it.' This is a reason why the youth should have been better known. The construction returns to the indicative.

9. ἐλευθεριότητα] Rep. 6. 485 E: Καὶ μὴν που καὶ τότε δεῖ

σκοπεῖν, ὅταν κρίνειν μέλλης ψυχὴν φιλόσοφόν τε καὶ μὴ. Τὸ ποῖον; Μὴ σε λάθη μετέχουσα ἀνελευθερίας.

11. τὸν ἄνδρα] Not μειρακίου. 'He must be a capital fellow.' καί, as elsewhere, adds a touch of earnestness to the imperative.

13. Θεαίτητε] The abrupt vocative, without ὦ, is the address of the master to the pupil.

15. καὶ γὰρ] καὶ is to be taken closely with ἵνα and the verb. Cf. Soph. Antig. 280: Παῦσαι, πρὶν ὀργῆς καμὲ μεστῶσαι λέγων (where join πρὶν καὶ μεστῶσαι).

19. εἰ μουσικὸς ὢν λέγει] The

‘As he is a cultivated man, we must respect his judgment of our mental endowments.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐπεσκεψάμεθ' ἄν.

p. 144.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τοιοῦτον μὲν εὐρόντες ἐπειθόμεθ' ἄν,
ἄμουσον δέ, ἠπιστοῦμεν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθῆ.

5 ΣΩ. Νῦν δέ γ' οἶμαι, εἴ τι μέλει ἡμῖν τῆς τῶν
προσώπων ὁμοιότητος, σκεπτέον εἰ γραφικὸς ὢν λέγει p. 145.
ἢ οὐ.

ΘΕΑΙ. Δοκεῖ μοι.

ΣΩ. Ἦ οὖν ζωγραφικὸς Θεόδωρος;

10 ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐχ, ὅσον γ' ἐμέ εἰδέναί.

ΣΩ. Ἦ ἄρ' οὐδὲ γεωμετρικός;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάντως δὴ που, ὦ Σώκратες.

ΣΩ. Ἦ καὶ ἀστρονομικὸς καὶ λογιστικὸς τε καὶ
μουσικὸς καὶ ὅσα παιδείας ἔχεται;

15 ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Εἰ μὲν ἄρα ἡμᾶς τοῦ σώματος τι ὁμοίους
φησὶν εἶναι ἐπαινῶν πη ἢ ψέγων, οὐ πάνυ αὐτῷ
ἄξιον τὸν νοῦν προσέχειν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἦ ἴσως οὐ.

20 ΣΩ. Τί δ', εἰ ποτέρου τὴν ψυχὴν ἐπαινοῖ πρὸς B

man then is not the measure of the likeness of musical sounds! Yet afterwards Theætetus is wholly unconscious of contradicting this his first admission.

1. Ἐπεσκεψάμεθ' ἄν] Cp. esp. Crit. 47 B: Γυμναζόμενος ἀνὴρ καὶ τοῦτο πρᾶττων πότερον παντὸς ἀνδρὸς ἐπαίνω καὶ ψόγω καὶ δόξῃ τὸν νοῦν προσέχει, ἢ ἐνὸς μόνου ἐκείνου, ὅς ἂν τυγχάνη ἱατρὸς ἢ παιδοτρίβης ὢν; Lach. 184 D E.

10. Οὐχ, ὅσον γ' ἐμέ εἰδέναί] The Cesena MS., with a few others, has γ' ἐμέ, but the greatest number (including the Bodl.) read γέ με. ἐμέ seems more pointed, 'not that I know

of,' but με is possibly right.

11. Ἦ ἄρ' οὐδὲ γεωμετρικός;] 'Nor a geometrician, neither, eh?' There is an archness in the question, which affects to make doubtful what is matter of notoriety.

13. Ἦ καὶ ἀστρονομικός] 'I wonder if he is also an astronomer.'

20. εἰ ποτέρου] 'The mind of one of us two.' The indefinite πότερος occurs several times in Plato. Cp. Soph. 252 A: Ἔσται πότερον αὐτῶν, οὐσίας μὴ προσκοινώνου; Though not common in other writers, it is precisely analogous to the

p. 145. ἀρετὴν τε καὶ σοφίαν; ἄρ' οὐκ ἄξιον τῷ μὲν ἀκούσαντι προθυμῆσθαι ἀνασκέψασθαι τὸν ἐπαινεθέντα, τῷ δὲ προθύμως ἑαυτὸν ἐπιδεικνύναι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. ὦρα τοίνυν, ὦ φίλε Θεαίτητε, σοὶ μὲν ἐπι- 5
δεικνύναι, ἐμοὶ δὲ σκοπεῖσθαι ὡς εὖ ἴσθι ὅτι Θεό-
δωρος πολλοὺς δὴ πρὸς με ἐπαινέσας ξένους τε καὶ
ἄστους οὐδένα πω ἐπήγεσεν ὡς σὲ νῦν δῆ.

ΘΕΑΙ. Εὖ ἂν ἔχοι, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἀλλ' ὅρα μὴ
c παίζων ἔλεγεν. 10

ΣΩ. Οὐχ οὗτος ὁ τρόπος Θεοδώρου· ἀλλὰ μὴ
ἀναδύου τὰ ὠμολογημένα σκηπτόμενος παίζοντα λέ-
γειν τόνδε, ἵνα μὴ καὶ ἀναγκασθῆ μαρτυρεῖν· πάντως
γὰρ οὐδεὶς ἐπισκήψει αὐτῷ. ἀλλὰ θαρρῶν ἔμμενε τῇ
ὁμολογίᾳ. 15

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἄλλὰ χρὴ ταῦτα ποιεῖν, εἰ σοὶ δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Λέγε δῆ μοι· μανθάνεις που παρὰ Θεοδώρου
γεωμετρίας ἅττα;

'Therefore, Theætetus, you must be catechized by me; for he has praised you to me very highly.

'You learn from Theodorus several things.

indefinite use of τις, πού, ποθέν, etc.

9. Εὖ ἂν ἔχοι] 'That is good!'—'I am glad to hear it.' Or rather, perhaps, more hypothetically, 'It is well, if it is so.' For (1) cp. Menex. 249 E: Χάριν ἔχω τῷ εἰπόντι. Σ. Εὖ ἂν ἔχοι. ἀλλ' ὅπως μου μὴ κατερεῖς. And for (2) Polit. 277 A: Κινδυνεύει τέλεως ἂν ἡμῖν ἔχειν. Σ. Καλῶς ἂν, ὦ Σ., ἡμῖν ἔχοι. δεῖ δὲ μὴ σοὶ μόνῳ ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ καὶ μοι—ξυνδοκεῖν.

11. μὴ ἀναδύου τὰ ὠμολογημένα] 'Do not shrink from what you have agreed to.' Cp. Hom. Il. 13. 225: Οὔτε τις ὄκνη Εἴκων ἀνδύεται πολέμου κακοῦ. Euthyd. 302 E: Οὐκ ἔστι γάρ μοι ἀνά-
δυσις.

14. ἐπισκήψει αὐτῷ] 'Will be found to impugn him.' The verb ἐπισκήπτειν, to accuse of murder or false witness (φόνου, ψευδομαρτυρίων), is commonly found in the middle voice, because the accuser in such cases is generally an interested party. The passage of Aeschines contr. Timarch., formerly quoted in support of the active, is found to have the middle in the best MSS., and Wohlrab tries to substantiate a different meaning here, while Schanz writes ἐπισκήψετ' αὐτῷ from conjecture. Neither is really necessary.

17. μανθάνεις] There is a stress upon the word, preparing for what follows.

'To learn is to become wiser. To be wise is to know.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐγώ γε.

ΣΩ. Καὶ τῶν περὶ ἀστρονομίαν τε καὶ ἀρμονίας D καὶ λογισμούς;

ΘΕΑΙ. Προθυμοῦμαι γε δῆ.

5 ΣΩ. Καὶ γὰρ ἐγώ, ὦ παῖ, παρά γε τούτου καὶ παρ' ἄλλων, οὓς ἂν οἶωμαι τι τούτων ἐπαίειν. ἀλλ' ὅμως, τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ἔχω περὶ αὐτὰ μετρίως, μικρὸν δέ τι ἀπορώ, ὃ μετὰ σοῦ τε καὶ τῶνδε σκεπτέον. καί μοι
10 σθαι περὶ ὃ μανθάνει τις;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΣΩ. Σοφία δέ γ' οἶμαι σοφοὶ οἱ σοφοί.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τοῦτο δὲ μὴ διαφέρει τι ἐπιστήμης; E

15 ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. Ἡ σοφία. ἢ οὐχ ἅπερ ἐπιστήμονες, ταῦτα καὶ σοφοί;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μῆν;

ΣΩ. Ταῦτ' ἄρα ἐπιστήμη καὶ σοφία;

20 ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τοῦτ' αὐτὸ τοῖνυν ἐστὶν ὃ ἀπορώ καὶ οὐ δύ-

2. τῶν περὶ ἀστρονομίαν] 'Astronomy, and what relates to it.'

4. Προθυμοῦμαι γε δῆ] 'I certainly do my endeavour.' He is more modest about these higher subjects.

5. παρά γε τούτου] γε (the MS. reading) may be defended: 'certainly when I have such a master,' referring to προθυμοῦμαι: although τε, the correction of Heindorf, which is supported by the version of Ficinus, perhaps reads more harmoniously; and the change is slight. Cp. Crat. 384 E.

6. ἀλλ' ὅμως, τὰ μὲν ἄλλα . . μικρὸν δέ τι ἀπορώ] For the parataxis cp. Rep. 2. 367 E: Καὶ ἐγὼ ἀκούσας, αἰεὶ μὲν δῆ—ἡγάμην, ἅπαρ οὐν καὶ τότε πάννυ γε ἦσθην.

7. For the ironical μικρὸν τι cp. Charm. 154 D.

16. ἅπερ ἐπιστήμονες, ταῦτα καὶ σοφοί] For the indefinite plural cp. Georg. 457 C: Οὐ βραδίως δύνανται—διοριστέμενοι πρὸς ἀλλήλους—οὕτω διαλύεσθαι τὰς συνουσίας. And for the sense cp. Xen. Mem. 4. 6. 7: Ὅ ἄρα ἐπίσταται ἕκαστος, ταῦτα καὶ σοφός ἐστίν.

'What, then, is Knowledge?'

p. 145. ναμαι λαβεῖν ἰκανῶς παρ' ἑμαντῶ, Ἐπιστήμη ὅ τί ποτε
 p. 146. τυγχάνει ὄν. ἄρ' οὖν δὴ ἔχομεν λέγειν αὐτό; τί
 φατέ; τίς ἂν ἡμῶν πρῶτος εἴποι; ὁ δὲ ἁμαρτῶν,
 καὶ ὃς ἂν αἰεὶ ἁμαρτάνῃ, καθεδεῖται, ὥσπερ φασὶν οἱ
 παῖδες οἱ σφαιρίζοντες, ὄνος. ὃς δ' ἂν περιγένηται 5
 ἀναμάρτητος, βασιλεύσει ἡμῶν καὶ ἐπιτάξει ὅ τι ἂν
 βούληται ἀποκρίνεσθαι. Τί σιγᾶτε; οὐ τί που, ὦ
 Θεόδωρε, ἐγὼ ὑπὸ φιλολογίας ἀγροικίζομαι, προθυ-
 μούμενος ἡμᾶς ποιῆσαι διαλέγεσθαι καὶ φίλους τε
 καὶ προσηγόρους ἀλλήλοις γίνεσθαι;

A pause.

B ΘΕΟ. Ἦκιστα μὲν, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ τοιοῦτον ἂν
 εἶη ἀγροικον, ἀλλὰ τῶν μεираκίων τι κέλευέ σοι ἀπο-
 κρίνεσθαι. ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ ἀήθης τῆς τοιαύτης δια-
 λέκτου, καὶ οὐδ' αὖ συνεθίζεσθαι ἡλικίαν ἔχω. τοῖσδε 10

1. λαβεῖν ἰκανῶς] 'To grasp adequately.' 'To get a clear conception of.'

λαβεῖν ἰκανῶς παρ' ἑμαντῶ] Phileb. 50 D: λαβόντα δὲ τοῦτο παρὰ σαντῶ ἀφείναι με, κ.τ.λ.

3. ὁ δὲ . . ἁμαρτάνῃ] 'But he who makes a blunder, or whoever is in error from time to time.'

4. καθεδεῖται . . ὄνος] Schol. Τῶν οὖν παιζόντων ταῦτα τοὺς μὲν νικῶντας βασιλεῖς ἐκάλουν, καὶ ὅ τι ἂν προσετάρτων τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐπήκουον, τοὺς δὲ ἠττώμενους ὄνους. Cp. Hor. Ep. 1. 1. 59: 'At pueri ludentes, Rex eris, aiunt, Si recte facies.' 'Mant. Prov. 1. 34: βασιλεὺς ἢ ὄνος' ἤγουν νικῶν ἢ ἠττώμενος.' Wohlrab.

9. ἡμᾶς] So the Bodleian MS. Others (including Ces.) have ὑμᾶς by a common error. The first person is obviously more in keeping with the urbanity of Socrates.

10. προσηγόρους] The active

and passive meanings are combined. 'Mutually conversable.' Cp. Republic 8. 546 C: Πάντα προσήγορα καὶ ῥητὰ πρὸς ἀλλήλα ἀπέφηναν. There is possibly an allusion to the mathematical meaning here: 'to make you friends, and bring you into relations with one another.' Cp. Republic 7. 534 D: 'Ἀλόγους ὄντας ὥσπερ γραμμάς, and the phrases Σύμφωνα καὶ ποτάγορα,—'Ὅμοια καὶ ποτάγορα, in later Pythagorean writings.

11. μὲν is omitted in T.

12. τῶν μεираκίων τι] Steph. conj. τινά, which is also found as a correction in one MS., but cp. Euthyd. 277 D: Γνοὺς βαπτίζομενον τὸ μεираκίον, βουλόμενος ἀναπαῦσαι αὐτό.

13. διαλέκτου] 'Conversation,' with something of the more technical meaning of 'abstract discussion.' Cp. Republic 5. 454 A: Ἐριδι, οὐ διαλέκτῳ, πρὸς ἀλλήλους χρώμενοι.

δὲ πρόποι τε ἂν τοῦτο καὶ πολὺ πλείον ἐπιδιδόειν· p. 146.
 τῷ γὰρ ὄντι ἡ νεότης εἰς πᾶν ἐπίδοσιν ἔχει. ἀλλ',
 ὡσπερ ἤρξω, μὴ ἀφίεσο τοῦ Θεαιτήτου, ἀλλ' ἐρώτα.

ΣΩ. Ἀκούεις δὴ, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἃ λέγει Θεόδωρος,
 5 ὧ ἀπιστεῖν, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, οὔτε σὺ ἐβλήσεις, οὔτε ὁ
 θέμις περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀνδρὶ σοφῷ ἐπιτάττοντι νεώ-
 τερον ἀπειθεῖν. ἀλλ' εὖ καὶ γενναίως εἶπέ· τί σοι δο-
 κεῖ εἶναι ἐπιστήμη;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ χρῆ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐπειδήπερ ὑμεῖς
 10 κελεύετε. πάντως γάρ, ἂν τι καὶ ἀμάρτω, ἐπανορ-
 θώσετε.

ΣΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἂν πέρ γε οἰοί τε ὦμεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Δοκεῖ τοίνυν μοι καὶ ἃ παρὰ Θεοδώρου ἂν
 τις μάθοι ἐπιστήμαι εἶναι, γεωμετρία τε καὶ ἅς νῦν δὴ
 15 σὺ διῆλθες, καὶ αὖ σκυτοτομική τε καὶ αἱ τῶν ἄλλων ὁ
 δημιουργῶν τέχνηαι, πᾶσαι τε καὶ ἐκάστη τούτων, οὐκ
 ἄλλο τι ἢ ἐπιστήμη εἶναι.

ΣΩ. Γενναίως γε καὶ φιλοδώρως, ὦ φίλε, ἐν αἰτη-
 θεῖς πολλὰ δίδως καὶ ποικίλα ἀντὶ ἀπλοῦ.

2. ἐπίδοσιν ἔχει] Rep. 7. 536
 D: Σόλωνι γὰρ οὐ πειστέον, ὡς
 γηράσκων τις πολλὰ δυνατὸς μαν-
 θάνειν, ἀλλ' ἦττον ἢ τρέχειν, νέων
 δὲ πάντες οἱ μεγάλοι καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ
 πόνου.

3. μὴ ἀφίεσο τοῦ Θεαιτήτου,
 ἀλλ' ἐρώτα] Cp. Lach. 184 C:
 Χρῆ δ' ὅπερ σοι ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἔλεγον,
 καὶ Σωκράτη τόνδε μὴ ἀφίεσαι, ἀλλὰ
 δεῖσθαι συμβουλεύειν. Rep. 5.
 449 C.

5-7. ἀπιστεῖν, 'to disobey';
 ἀπειθεῖν, 'to be disobedient.'

5. οὔτε θέμις . . νεώτερον ἀπει-
 θεῖν] Instead of making ἀπιστεῖν
 depend on θέμις, a new clause is
 introduced expressing the particu-
 lar points in this disobedi-

ence which make it unlawful.
 The like change occurs often in
 Plato, and is part of the fulness
 of his style. See above, 144
 B: Ὅστε θαυμάσαι, κ.τ.λ., and
 note.

10. πάντως γάρ, κ.τ.λ.] Theæ-
 tetus is not yet alive to the dif-
 ficulty of the subject. He is
 sure that Theodorus and So-
 crates have entire command
 of it.

14-17. ἐπιστήμαι . . ἐπιστήμη]
 Theætetus does not distinguish
 between 'sciences' and 'sci-
 ence.' Grammatically, the va-
 riation is caused by the intro-
 duction of the singular ἐκάστη.

18. Γενναίως γε] Referring to

Theætetus
 is at length
 encouraged
 to attempt
 an answer.
 'Geometry
 and other
 branches of
 education,
 shoe-mak-
 ing and the
 other use-
 ful arts, all
 and each
 of these is
 know-
 ledge.'

But these
 are many
 and vari-
 ous; know-

ledge is one and simple. To enumerate is not to define. This is illustrated.

p. 146.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς τί τοῦτο λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες ;

ΣΩ. Ἴσως μὲν οὐδέν· ὁ μέντοι οἶμαι, φράσω. ὅταν λέγῃς σκυτικήν, μή τι ἄλλο φράξεις ἢ ἐπιστήμην ὑποδημάτων ἐργασίας ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδέν.

ΣΩ. Τί δ', ὅταν τεκτονικήν ; μή τι ἄλλο ἢ ἐπιστήμην τῆς τῶν ξυλίνων σκευῶν ἐργασίας ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδὲ τοῦτο.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐν ἀμφοῖν, οὐ ἑκάτερα ἐπιστήμη, τοῦτο ὀρίζεις ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τὸ δ' ἐπερωτηθέν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, οὐ τοῦτο ἦν,

5

10

εἶ καὶ γενναίως above, and to Theodorus's praise, supr. 144 D.

19. ποικίλα] Either 'a rich variety of things,' or 'many complex notions for one simple one.' The analysis of terms which follows points rather to the latter meaning; but the former is more natural, and is supported by comparing Philebus 12 C (at the opening of the dialogue): Τὴν δὲ ἡδονὴν οἶδα ὡς ἐστὶ ποικίλον. . . ἔστι γὰρ ἀκούειν μὲν οὕτως ἀπλῶς ἔν τι, μορφὰς δὲ δῆπου παντοίας εἴληφε καὶ τινα τρόπον ἀνομοίας ἀλλήλων. The two objections (πολλά, ποικίλα) are discussed in the reverse order. See below: Τίνων . . . ὀπίσαι, Πρῶτων γέ που . . . Ἐπειτά γέ που, κ.τ.λ.

1. Πῶς τί] What (τί), and with what meaning (πῶς). Cp. Soph. 261 E: Πῶς τί τοῦτ' εἶπες; ὅπερ ᾗθηθη, κ.τ.λ. Some editors interpunctuate in all such cases (πῶς; τί, κ.τ.λ.). But the Greek idiom often combines two interrogations in a single clause.

2. Ἴσως μὲν οὐδέν] Sc. λέγω, 'perhaps I am talking nonsense.'

ὁ μέντοι οἶμαι] Sc. λέγειν.

3. σκυτικήν] This is said to have differed from σκυτοτομική (above); and the change of word is an instance of Plato's love of variety (cp. supr. C: ἀπιστεῖν . . . ἀπειθεῖν). Perhaps the one was a generic, the other a specific term. At least they do not exclude each other in Plato. See Rep. 2. 374 B: Ἦ οὖν σκυτικῆς δεῖ μᾶλλον κήδεσθαι ἢ πολεμικῆς; Οὐδαμῶς. Ἄλλ' ἄρα τὸν σκυτοτόμον, κ.τ.λ. Ib. 10. 601 C: Ποιήσει δέ γε σκυτοτόμος καὶ χαλκεύς; . . . οὐδ' ὁ ποιήσας ὃ τε χαλκεύς καὶ ὁ σκυτεύς;

ὅταν . . . φράξεις] 'You express by the term "shoemaking."'

12. Τὸ δ' ἐπερωτηθέν] 'But what I went on to ask you.' Cp. supr. p. 16. l. 3, μὴ ἀφίεσο, κ.τ.λ. Τὸ δὲ γ' ἐρωτηθέν is a MS. conjecture ('τὸ δέ γε, t mg. τὸ δέ γε ἐρωτηθέν, Vind. suppl. 7.' Schanz).

τίνων ἢ ἐπιστήμη, οὐδὲ ὅποσαι τινές. οὐ γὰρ ἀριθμῆ- ρ. 146.
σαι αὐτὰς βουλόμενοι ἠρόμεθα, ἀλλὰ γινῶναι ἐπιστή-
μην αὐτὸ ὃ τί ποτ' ἐστίν. ἢ οὐδὲν λέγω;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν ὀρθῶς.

5 ΣΩ. Σκέψαι δὴ καὶ τόδε. εἴ τις ἡμᾶς τῶν φαύλων ρ. 147.
τι καὶ προχείρων ἔροιτο, οἷον περὶ πηλοῦ, ὃ τί ποτ'
ἐστίν, εἰ ἀποκρινάμεθα αὐτῷ πηλὸς ὁ τῶν χυτρώων
καὶ πηλὸς ὁ τῶν ἵπνοπλαθῶν καὶ πηλὸς ὁ τῶν πλι-
θουργῶν, οὐκ ἂν γελοῖοι εἴμεν;

10 ΘΕΑΙ. Ἴσως.

ΣΩ. Πρῶτον μὲν γέ που οἴομενοι συνιέναι ἐκ τῆς
ἡμετέρας ἀποκρίσεως τὸν ἐρωτῶντα, ὅταν εἴπωμεν

1. τίνων ἢ ἐπιστήμη, οὐδὲ ὅπο-
σαι τινές] The first answer of
Meno to the question, 'What is
virtue?' is exactly analogous to
this of Theætetus about know-
ledge. Instead of attempting
to generalize, he enumerates
the several kinds of virtue.
Men. 71 E: Ἄνδρὸς ἀρετὴν . . .
γυ. αἰκὸς ἀρετὴν . . . παιδὸς ἀρετὴ,
κ.τ.λ. Socrates replies (Men.
72 A): Πολλὴ γέ τιμι εὐτυχία
ἔοικα κεχρησθαι, ὦ Μένων, εἰ μίαν
ζητῶν ἀρετὴν σμῆνός τι ἀνεύρηκα
ἀρετῶν παρὰ σοὶ κειμένων, κ.τ.λ.
The whole passage should be
compared with this. See also
Lach. 191, 192, where Socrates
finds a similar difficulty in lead-
ing the respondent to the con-
ception of a general notion,—
and Soph. 240, where Theæt-
etus is again entrapped into a
similar mistake in defining the
word εἶδωλον.

2. ἐπιστήμην αὐτό] Rep. 472
C: Ἐζητοῦμεν αὐτὸ τε δικαιοσύνην
οἷόν ἐστι.

5. εἴ τις ἡμᾶς—εἰ ἀποκρινά-
μεθα] For the double εἰ comp.

Rep. 331 C: Εἴ τις λάβοι παρὰ
φίλου ἀνδρὸς σωφρονούντος ὅπλα,
εἰ μανείς ἀπαίτοί, κ.τ.λ.

τῶν φαύλων τι καὶ προχείρων]
'Some trivial and obvious mat-
ter.'

8. ἵπνοπλαθῶν] For this, the
reading of all the MSS., κοροπλα-
θῶν has been substituted in the
margin of some MSS., for the
sake of the uniformity which
Plato avoided. See below, note
on κοροπλαθῶν, p. 19. l. 1.

11. οἴομενοι συνιέναι] Cp.
Rep. 505 C: Εἰ δνειδίζοντές γε
ὅτι οὐκ ἴσμεν τὸ ἀγαθόν, λέγουσι
πάλιν ὡς εἰδότες φρόνησιν γὰρ αὐτό
φασιν εἶναι ἀγαθόν, ὡς αὖ συνιέντων
ἡμῶν ὃ τι λέγουσιν, ἐπειδὴν τὸ τοῦ
ἀγαθοῦ φθέγγωνται ὄνομα. Soph.
244 A: Τί ποτε βούλεσθε σημά-
νειν ὅποταν ἴν φθέγγησθε; We
find ourselves involved in a
further stage of the same ab-
surdity at the end of the
dialogue, p. 210 A: Καὶ παν-
τάπασι γε εἴηθες, ζητούντων ἡμῶν
ἐπιστήμην, δόξαν φάνα ὀρθὴν εἶναι
μετ' ἐπιστήμης εἴτε διαφορότητος
εἴτε ὄνουδον.

p. 147. πηλός, εἴτε ὁ τῶν κοροπλαθῶν προσθέντες εἴτε ἄλλων
 B ὠντινωοῦν δημιουργῶν. ἢ οἶε τίς τι συνήσιν τινος
 ὄνομα, ὃ μὴ οἶδε τί ἐστίν ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδαμῶς.

ΣΩ. Οὐδ' ἄρα ἐπιστήμην ὑποδημάτων συνήσιν ὃ 5
 ἐπιστήμην μὴ εἰδώς.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ γάρ.

ΣΩ. Σκυτικὴν ἄρα οὐ συνήσιν ὃς ἂν ἐπιστήμην
 ἀγνοῇ, οὐδέ τινα ἄλλην τέχνην.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔστιν οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Γελοία ἄρα ἢ ἀπόκρισις τῷ ἐρωτηθέντι ἐπι-
 C στήμη τί ἐστίν, ὅταν ἀποκρίνηται τέχνης τινὸς ὄνομα.
 τινὸς γὰρ ἐπιστήμην ἀποκρίνεται, οὐ τοῦτ' ἐρωτηθεῖς.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔοικεν.

ΣΩ. Ἐπειτά γέ που ἐξὸν φαύλως καὶ βραχεῶς 15
 ἀποκρίνασθαι περιέρχεται ἀπέραντον ὄδόν. οἶον καὶ
 ἐν τῇ τοῦ πηλοῦ ἐρωτήσει φαῦλόν που καὶ ἀπλοῦν

1. εἴτε ὁ τῶν κοροπλαθῶν προσ-
 θέντες] It is in Plato's manner
 to surprise us with a fresh ex-
 ample at each step of the argu-
 ment, instead of dwelling upon
 one already adduced. Rep. 3.
 333 B: Ὡσπερ ὁ κιθαριστικός,
 κ.τ.λ. Prot. 312 D: Ὡσπερ ὁ
 κιθαριστής, κ.τ.λ., and in this
 dialogue, p. 161 D: Βατράχου
 γυρίνου. 169 B: Σὺ δὲ κατ'
 Ἄνταϊον, κ.τ.λ. 178 D: Οὐχ ἢ
 τοῦ κιθαριστοῦ. 190 C: Ὑγμιαί-
 νοντα ἢ μανόμενον.

2. ἢ οἶε τίς τι] tis is made
 oxytone here because of τι fol-
 lowing. οἶε is parenthetical,
 and therefore does not affect
 the position of the enclitics.
 For the sense cp. Men. 80
 D: Καὶ τίνα τρόπον ζητήσεις, ὃ
 Σώκρατες, τοῦτο, ὃ μὴ οἶσθα τὸ
 παράπαν ὃ τι ἐστί.

12. ὅταν . . ὄνομα] 'When he
 gives as an answer the name
 of a particular art.' The ac-
 cusative is cognate.

15. Ἐπειτά γέ που] This
 ought strictly to refer to the
 illustration: to which the sen-
 tence presently returns. But
 Socrates had reverted to the
 main subject in the preceding
 instances.

16. περιέρχεται ἀπέραντον ὄδόν]
 Ar. Met. 3. 1007 a: Ἀδύνατον
 ἀπειρά γ' ὄντα τὰ συμβεβηκότα δι-
 ελθεῖν ἢ οὖν ἅπαντα διελλέτω ἢ
 μηθέν.

17. ἐν τῇ τοῦ πηλοῦ ἐρωτήσει]
 For the form of reference with
 ἐν cp. Thucyd. 1. 9: Ἐν τοῦ
 σκίπτρου τῇ παραδόσει. Phileb.
 33 B: Ἐν τῇ παραβολῇ τῶν βίων.
 The frequency of this idiom
 perhaps assists the genitive

εἰπεῖν ὅτι γῆ ὑγρῶ φυραθείσα πηλὸς ἂν εἴη, τὸ δ' p. 147.
 ὅτου ἔαν χαίρειν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ῥάδιον, ὦ Σώκρατες, νῦν γε οὕτω φαίνε-
 ται· ἀτὰρ κινδυνεύεις ἐρωτᾶν οἷον καὶ αὐτοῖς ἡμῖν
 5 ἔναγχος εἰσηλθε διαλεγομένοις, ἐμοί τε καὶ τῶ σῶ
 ὁμωνύμῳ τούτῳ Σωκράτει.

ΣΩ. Τὸ ποῖον δῆ, ὦ Θεαίτητε;

πηλοῦ, which is descriptive rather than objective. 'In the question of the clay.'

1. πηλὸς ἂν εἴη] Either, (1) 'earth, if tempered with moisture, will be (ἂν εἴη) mud,' or (2), 'moistened earth would seem to be (ἂν εἴη) the definition of mud.'

2. ὅτου is masculine (supr. A B), although τινός above (p. 19, l. 13) was neuter.

3. νῦν γε οὕτω] 'Now as you put it.' So far Theætetus has appeared wholly unfamiliar with the conception of a universal notion. But Socrates' illustration reminds him of the comprehensive simplicity of geometrical expressions. And thus he finds a clue in what he knows to the new labyrinth of inquiry into which Socrates invites him. Mathematical ideas, being the first pure abstractions obtained by the mind, are peculiarly fitted to guide it to the contemplation of abstractions generally. So at least thought Plato: Rep. 7. 522-531. On the minuteness of such illustrations see Hegel, *Gesch. d. Phil.* (1840) p. 197: 'A number of Plato's dialogues are intended merely to produce the consciousness of a general notion, which we possess without the trouble of acquiring it. Hence his dis-

cursiveness has often the effect of tediousness to us.'

In reading what follows, it must be borne in mind that, by the ancients, arithmetic was studied through geometry. If a number was regarded as simple, it was a line. If as composite, it was a rectangular figure, whether plane or solid. To multiply was to construct a rectangle, to divide was to find one of its sides. Traces of this usage still remain in terms like square, cube, common measure, but the method itself is obsolete. Hence it requires an effort to conceive of the square root, not as that which multiplied into itself produces a given number, but as the side of a square, which either is the number, or is equal to the rectangle which is the number. The use of the Arabic notation and of algebra has greatly assisted in expressing and conceiving the properties of numbers without reference to form.

6. Σωκράτει] Young Socrates becomes the respondent in the Politicus. To introduce him here by name is quite in the manner of Plato. Naber's proposal to cancel this word, and Μεγαροί supr. 142 B, is surely erroneous. To do so would be to blur the outlines which Plato has made distinct.

Theætetus perceives that the answer required is analogous to a geometrical expression;

D

p. 147.

ΘΕΑΙ. Περὶ δυνάμεων τι ἡμῖν Θεόδωρος ὅδε ἔγραφε, τῆς τε τρίποδος πέρι καὶ πεντέποδος ἀποφαίνων ὅτι μήκει οὐ ξύμμετροι τῇ ποδιαίᾳ, καὶ οὕτω

i. e. simple and comprehensive. He relates the discovery of the integral and potential root.

Ι. Περὶ δυνάμεων τι, κ. τ. λ.] See Eucl. B. 10. Def. 3-11 : Εὐθείαι δυνάμει σύμμετροί εἰσιν, ὅταν τὰ ἀπ' αὐτῶν τετράγωνα τῶ αὐτῶ χωρίῳ μετρήται. Ἄσύμμετροι δέ, ὅταν τοῖς ἀπ' αὐτῶν τετραγώνοις μηδὲν εὐδέχεται χωρίον κοινὸν μέτρον γενέσθαι. Τούτων ὑποκειμένων δείκνυται ὅτι τῇ προτεθείσῃ εὐθείᾳ ὑπάρχουσιν εὐθείαι πλήθει ἄπειροι ἀσύμμετροι αἱ μὲν μήκει μόνον, αἱ δὲ καὶ δυνάμει, (v. l. σύμμετροι καὶ ἀσύμμετροι, αἱ μὲν μήκει καὶ δυνάμει, αἱ δὲ δυνάμει μόνον.) Καλείσθω οὖν ἡ μὲν προτεθείσα εὐθεία ῥητή. Καὶ αἱ ταύτης σύμμετροι, εἴτε μήκει καὶ δυνάμει, εἴτε δυνάμει μόνον, ῥηταί. Αἱ δὲ ταύτης ἀσύμμετροι, ἄλογοι καλεῖσθωσαν. Καὶ τὸ μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς προτεθείσης εὐθείας τετράγωνον, ῥητόν. Καὶ τὰ τοῦτῳ σύμμετρα, ῥητά. Τὰ δὲ τοῦτῳ ἀσύμμετρα, ἄλογα καλεῖσθω. Καὶ αἱ δυνάμενα αὐτά, ἄλογοι· εἰ μὲν τετράγωνα εἴη, αὐταὶ αἱ πλευραί, εἰ δὲ ἕτερα ἅτινα εὐθύγραμμα, αἱ ἴσα αὐτοῖς τετράγωνα ἀναγράφουσαι. B. 7. 17. 19 : Τετράγωνος ἀριθμὸς ἐστὶν ὁ ἰσάκις ἴσος, ἢ ὁ ὑπὸ δυοῦ ἴσων ἀριθμῶν περιεχόμενος. Ὅταν δὲ δυοῦ ἀριθμοὶ πολλαπλασιάσαντες ἀλλήλους ποιῶσι τινα, ὁ γενόμενος ἐπίπεδος καλεῖται· πλευραὶ δὲ αὐτοῦ οἱ πολλαπλασιάσαντες ἀλλήλους ἀριθμοί. Prop. 21 : Τὸ ὑπὸ ῥητῶν δυνάμει μόνον συμμέτρων εὐθειῶν περιεχομένον ὀρθογώνιον ἄλογόν ἐστι. καὶ ἡ δυναμένη αὐτὸ ἄλογός ἐστι. Καλείσθω δὲ μέση.

δυνάμεων] In mathematical language δυνάμει, or 'powers,' are commonly understood to be the squares, cubes, etc., of simple quantities. And the word has been so interpreted here.

But it is not clear that in Plato's time this point of terminology was fixed. And on comparing 148 A it would rather seem that δύναμις is here an abbreviation for ἡ δυναμένη γραμμὴ εὐθεία, i. e. to speak arithmetically, not (1) the 'power' but (2) the 'root,' and the same term is presently limited by Theætetus and young Socrates to irrational roots. Cp. Eucl. B. 7. Def. : Ἐκ δύο ὀνομάτων πρώτη, δευτέρα, etc. ἀποτομή πρώτη, δευτέρα, etc. This explanation suits the context best. But the question is not one of much consequence. For just as the sides of the squares which are equal to 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17 are δυνάμει σύμμετροι, the squares themselves may be described as μήκει ἀσύμμετροι τῇ ποδιαίᾳ, i. e. having irrational sides.

2. H. Schmidt, who is followed in this by Schanz, has deleted the comma which was placed after πεντέποδος in previous editions.

3. τῇ ποδιαίᾳ] Sc. (1) δυνάμει, or (2) εὐθείᾳ :—the unit of measurement for integer quantities. The meaning is that the line $=\sqrt{1}$ or 1 is incommensurable with the line $=\sqrt{3}$.

H. Schmidt takes τῇ ποδιαίᾳ (δυνάμει) for an instrumental dative, 'commensurable by the "unit,"' This is less natural than 'commensurable with unity,' and particularly awkward if δύναμις is the square. For how can a square be the measure of a line? If the words τῇ ποδιαίᾳ were cancelled as a gloss, they

p. 147. τὸ σχῆμα ἀπεικάσαντες τετράγωνόν τε καὶ ἰσόπλευρον προσείπομεν.

ΣΩ. Καὶ εὖ γε.

p. 148. ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸν τοίνυν μεταξὺ τούτου, ὧν καὶ τὰ τρία καὶ τὰ πέντε καὶ πᾶς ὃς ἀδύνατος ἴσος ἰσάκεις 5 γενέσθαι, ἀλλ' ἢ πλείων ἐλαττονάκεις ἢ ἐλάττων πλεονάκεις γίγνεται, μείζων δὲ καὶ ἐλάττων αἰὲ πλευρὰ αὐτὸν περιλαμβάνει, τῷ προμήκει αὐτῷ σχήματι ἀπεικάσαντες προμήκη ἀριθμὸν ἐκαλέσαμεν.

ΣΩ. Κάλλιστα. ἀλλὰ τί τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο; 10

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὅσαι μὲν γραμμαὶ τὸν ἰσόπλευρον καὶ ἐπίπεδον ἀριθμὸν τετραγωνίζουσι, μῆκος ὠρισάμεθα, ὅσαι δὲ τὸν ἑτερομήκη, δυνάμεις, ὡς μήκει μὲν οὐ

1. τετράγωνόν τε καὶ ἰσόπλευρον] The expression is amplified and varied for the sake of non-mathematical readers.

9-13. προμήκη . . ἑτερομήκη] These terms were distinguished by the later Pythagoreans. Nicomachus says that ἑτερομήκης ἀριθμός has one factor greater than the other by 1, προμήκης by more than 1.

12. τετραγωνίζουσι] 'Form as their squares.' This use of τετραγωνίζειν is enough to show that geometrical terminology was not yet fixed. See the notes on δυνάμεων . . προμήκη . . ἑτερομήκη.

13. ὅσαι δὲ τὸν ἑτερομήκη] Sc. τετραγωνίζουσι. See Eucl. 2. 14.

ὡς μήκει μὲν οὐ ξυμμέτρους ἐκείναις, τοῖς δ' ἐπιπέδοις ἠδύναται] Translate either, (1) 'not commensurable with the former in linear measurement, but in the superficial content of their squares,' or (2) 'not commensurable with them in linear measurement, while they are mu-

tually commensurable in the surfaces of which they are severally roots.' I. e. the lines which are (or stand for) the irrational roots are not commensurable with the integral roots or with unity (τῇ ποδιαίᾳ), but their squares, being integers, have a common measure. They are commensurable not in themselves, but in their squares, that is, they are potentially commensurable (δυνάμει μόνον σύμμετροι). For the construction ἠδύναται comp. αἰ δυνάμεναι αὐτὰ in the Def. of Euclid quoted above; also, Eucl. 10. 22 : 'Ἡ δυναμένη αὐτό. It remains doubtful whether the one set of roots (δυνάμεις) or both are the nominative to δύναται, and consequently, whether τοῖς ἐπιπέδοις refers (1) only to oblong number, or (2) to both oblong and square number. The former alternative may be adopted as the simpler; although the latter would be the more accurate expression. Instead of enumerating all the

ξυμμέτρους ἐκείναις, τοῖς δ' ἐπιπέδοις ἃ δύνανται· καὶ p. 148.
περὶ τὰ στερεὰ ἄλλο τοιοῦτον. B

ΣΩ. Ἄριστά γ' ἀνθρώπων, ὧ παῖδες· ὥστε μοι
δοκεῖ ὁ Θεόδωρος οὐκ ἔνοχος τοῖς ψευδομαρτυρίοις
ἔσεσθαι.

irrational roots, which seemed infinite, they conceived the idea of finding an expression which should embrace them all. They first went for assistance from arithmetic to the less abstract forms of geometry (*Ar. Met.* 1. 2: Αἱ γὰρ ἐξ ἐλαττόνων ἀκριβέστεραι τῶν ἐκ προσθέσεως λεγόμενων, οἷον ἀριθμητικῆ γεωμετρίας). Here they at once found a generalization. All numbers which can be produced by equal integers they called square numbers. The rest, formed of un-

equal factors, they called oblong. The roots of the former can be measured by unity, the roots of the latter cannot, though the numbers themselves can. Hence a general distinction, and a simple nomenclature. The roots of square numbers they called μήκη, i. e. μήκει σύμμετροι, commensurable in whole numbers, the roots of oblong numbers, δυνάμεις, i. e. δυνάμει μόνον συμμέτρους. And similarly, in regard to solid quantity, i. e. the cube roots of numbers.

In other words, $\sqrt{16} = 4$ or $16 = \begin{array}{|c|} \hline 4 \\ \hline \end{array}$;
and $4 = \sqrt{1 \cdot 2 \cdot 3 \cdot 4}$ = the line forming one of its sides.

On the other hand

$\sqrt{12} = 3.464$ or $12 = 2 \begin{array}{|c|} \hline 6 \\ \hline \end{array}$ and $2 \begin{array}{|c|} \hline 6 \\ \hline \end{array} = 3.464 \begin{array}{|c|} \hline 3.464 \\ \hline \end{array}$;

and $3.464 = \sqrt{1 \cdot 2 \cdot 3 \cdot \dots}$, which is not commensurable with the side of the former square, although the squares are commensurable. The boys ended with the term with which they started; and yet they had gained much: they saw now as one, what they had seen as many; as a whole, what they had seen as infinite; and this by limiting the application of the term and distinguishing the thing from that with which they had confused it. In like

manner an advance is made towards a true conception of knowledge, when we have distinguished it from sense and from true opinion, although we fail to define it as it is in itself.

4. οὐκ ἔνοχος τοῖς ψευδομαρτυρίοις ἔσεσθαι] 'Will not be found guilty of perjury.' Cp. *supr.* 145 C, οὐδεὶς ἐπισκῆψει, and note. The article refers to what has been already mentioned. The feminine form ψευδομαρτυριῶν is used in *Legg.* 11. 937 B.

p. 148.

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ μὴν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὃ γε ἐρωτᾷς περὶ ἐπιστήμης, οὐκ ἂν δυναίμην ἀποκρίνασθαι, ὥσπερ περὶ τοῦ μήκους καὶ τῆς δυνάμεως· καίτοι σύ γέ μοι δοκεῖς τοιοῦτόν τι ζητεῖν· ὥστε πάλιν αὖ φαίνεται ψευδῆς ὁ Θεόδωρος.

But he fears that the question about knowledge is not so easy.

ΣΩ. Τί δαί; εἴ σε πρὸς δρόμον ἐπαινῶν μηδενὶ οὔτω δρομικῶ ἔφη τῶν νέων ἐντετυχηκέαι, εἶτα διαθέων τοῦ ἀκμάζοντος καὶ ταχίστου ἠττήθης, ἦττόν τι ἂν οἶε ἀληθῆ τόνδ' ἐπαινέσαι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκ ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην, ὥσπερ νῦν δὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, σμικρὸν τι οἶε εἶναι ἐξευρεῖν καὶ οὐ τῶν πάντη ἄκρων;

ΘΕΑΙ. Νῆ τὸν Δί' ἔγωγε καὶ μάλα γε τῶν ἀκροτάτων.

ΣΩ. Θάρρει τοίνυν περὶ σαντῶ καὶ τι οἴου Θεόδωρον λέγειν, προθυμήθητι δὲ παντὶ τρόπῳ τῶν τε ἄλλων πέρι καὶ ἐπιστήμης λαβεῖν λόγον, τί ποτε τυγχάνει ὄν.

Socrates still urges him.

3. καί] τε καὶ Τ.

7. διαθέων] Running a course. Comp. Prot. 335 E: Νῦν δ' ἐστὶν ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ δέοιό μου Κρίσωνι τῷ ἡμεραίῳ δρομεῖ ἀκμάζοντι ἔπεσθαι, ἢ τῶν δολιχοδρόμων τῷ ἢ τῶν ἡμεροδρόμων διαθεῖν τε καὶ ἔπεσθαι.

9. ἀληθῆ is cognate or adverbial accusative, as in Menex. 242 D: Ὅτι οὐκ ἀληθῆ ἀμφισβητοῖεν.

11. ὥσπερ νῦν δὴ] Viz. above, 145 D: Σμικρὸν δέ τι ἀπορῶ.

12. τῶν πάντη ἄκρων] The Bodl. MS. has ἀκριβῶν, with an accent over the α, and a dot over each of the letters ι, β. ἄκρων is required by the words which follow. Cp. Lach. 192 C: Τῶν πάντων καλῶν πραγμάτων ἡγεῖ σύ ἀνδρίαν εἶναι; Εἰ μὲν οὖν ἴσθι ὅτι

τῶν καλλίστων. The mistake perhaps originated in not perceiving that ἄκρων is masculine. 'Knowledge is no trifling matter to find out, but it belongs to men every way complete;' i. e. not, like the runner, accomplished in one thing only.

14. καὶ μάλα γε τῶν ἀκροτάτων] 'Most certainly, to men complete in the highest degree.' The superlative of ἄκρος, *summus*, is a kind of double superlative. Cp. Legg. 10. 906 B: Τῶν παντάσῃν ἀκροτάτων δεσποτῶν.

17. προθυμήθητι] Supr. 145 D.

18. ἐπιστήμης is governed partly by πέρι, but chiefly by λόγον.

He answers that he has tried ineffectually before; but is still anxious. 'This is a sign, dear lad, that there is something in you, and that you ought to be made to feel the power of my art. You have heard that I am a strange fellow, but you were not aware that I practised my

ΘΕΑΙ. Προθυμίας μὲν ἔνεκεν, ὃ Σώκρατες, φα- p. 148:
νείται.

ΣΩ. Ἴθι δὴ· καλῶς γὰρ ἄρτι ὑφηγήσω· πειρῶ
μιμούμενος τὴν περὶ τῶν δυνάμεων ἀπόκρισιν, ὥσπερ
5 ταύτας πολλὰς οὔσας ἐνὶ εἵδει περιέλαβες, οὕτω καὶ
τὰς πολλὰς ἐπιστήμας ἐνὶ λόγῳ προσειπεῖν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἄλλ' εὖ ἴσθι, ὃ Σώκρατες, πολλάκις δὴ E
αὐτὸ ἐπεχείρησα σκέψασθαι, ἀκούων τὰς παρὰ σοῦ
ἀποφερομένας ἐρωτήσεις· ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὔτ' αὐτὸς δύ-
10 ναμαι πείσαι ἐμαυτὸν ὡς ἱκανῶς τι λέγω, οὔτ' ἄλλου
ἀκούσαι λέγοντος οὕτως ὡς σὺ διακελεύει· οὐ μὲν δὴ
αὐ οὐδ' ἀπαλλαγῆναι τοῦ μέλειν.

ΣΩ. Ὡδίνεις γάρ, ὃ φίλε Θεαίτητε, διὰ τὸ μὴ
κενὸς ἀλλ' ἐγκύμων εἶναι.

1. Προθυμίας . . ἔνεκεν] Cp. Phædr. 272 C: Πειρῶ λέγειν . . Ἐνεκα μὲν . . πείρας ἔχοιμ' ἄν. Polit. 304 A: Πείρας μὲν τοίνυν ἔνεκα.

3. καλῶς γὰρ ἄρτι ἰφηγήσω] Comp. Gorg. 455 D: Αὐτὸς γὰρ καλῶς ὑφηγήσω. ὑφηγεῖσθαι is sometimes 'to set a pattern,' as in writing or drawing. Rep. 3. 403 E, Legg. 10. 890 C.

5. ἐνὶ εἵδει περιέλαβες . . ἐνὶ λόγῳ προσειπεῖν] The processes of generalizing and of defining or naming, although more clearly distinguished here than supr. 147 D (συλλαβεῖν εἰς ἓν . . ὅτῳ προσαγορεύσομεν), are still considered as different aspects of the same thing.

8. ἀκούων . . ἐρωτήσεις] Thus it is indicated that, although this is the first meeting between Theætetus and Socrates, the curiosity of the youth had been previously awakened. Those whom Socrates had puzzled, had puzzled their com-

panion in turn. See Apol. 23 C, Symp. 215 D.

12. μέλειν] The reading is doubtful. μέλειν has on the whole the best authority; but the reading of the Scholiast, εὐρείν, which is found on the margin of several MSS., supposing it to have been originally a gloss, agrees better with μέλλειν. There is an idea of uneasiness in μέλειν which suits well with the context. And although οὐδ' ἀπαλλαγῆναι τοῦ μέλλειν (sc. ἱκανῶς τι λέγειν) is sufficiently Greek, yet 'to get rid of a care' is a simpler notion than 'to get rid of an incipient act.' For μέλειν used personally comp. Aesch. Ag. 370: Θεοὺς βροτῶν ἀξιούσθαι μέλειν. Soph. Electr. 342: Κεῖνου λαθέσθαι τῆς δὲ τικτοῦσης μέλειν (where it may be impersonal, as perhaps here). Eur. H. F. 772: Θεοὶ θεοὶ τῶν ἀδίκων μέλουσι.
13. Ὡδίνεις γάρ] Rep. 6. 490 B: Καὶ οὕτω λήγοι ὠδίνος, πρὶν δ' οὔ.

p. 148. ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκ οἶδα, ὦ Σώκρατες· ὁ μέντοι πέπονθα λέγω.

mother's trade.

p. 149. ΣΩ. Εἰτά, ὦ καταγέλαστε, οὐκ ἀκήκοας, ὡς ἐγὼ εἰμι υἱὸς μαίας μάλα γενναίας τε καὶ βλοσυρᾶς, Φαιναρέτης;

5

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἦδη τοῦτό γε ἤκουσα.

ΣΩ. Ἄρα καί, ὅτι ἐπιτηδεύω τὴν αὐτὴν τέχνην, ἀκήκοας;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδαμῶς.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' εὖ ἴσθ' ὅτι· μὴ μέντοι μου κατείπης ¹⁰ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους· λέληθα γάρ, ὦ ἐταῖρε, ταύτην ἔχων τὴν τέχνην· οἱ δέ, ἅτε οὐκ εἰδότες, τοῦτο μὲν οὐ λέγουσι περὶ ἐμοῦ, ὅτι δὲ ἀτοπώτατός εἰμι καὶ ποιῶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἀπορεῖν· ἢ καὶ τοῦτο ἀκήκοας;

B ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔγωγε.

15

ΣΩ. Εἰπὼ οὖν σοι τὸ αἴτιον;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ἐννόησον δὴ τὸ περὶ τὰς μαίας ἅπαν ὡς ἔχει, καὶ ῥᾶον μαθήσει ὁ βούλομαι. οἶσθα γάρ που ὡς οὐδεμία αὐτῶν ἔτι αὐτὴ κυῖσκομένη τε καὶ τίκ- ²⁰

Consider the mid-wives; they have once had children, but

4. μάλα γενναίας τε καὶ βλοσυρᾶς] 'Truly noble and valiant,' or 'commanding,' 'of no common or feeble mould.'

γενναίας] 'Of the right sort.' βλοσυρᾶς, 'burly.' Comp. Rep. 7. 535 B: Γενναίους τε καὶ βλοσυροὺς τὰ ἦθη.

13. ἀτοπώτατος, κ.τ.λ.] 'That I am the strangest of mortals, and bring men to their wit's end.' ἀτοπώτατος is the very word to express Socrates' idea of himself,—αὐτόν τε καὶ τοὺς λόγους. Symp. 215 A: Οὐ γάρ τι ῥάδιον τὴν σὴν ἀτοπίαν ὧδ' ἔχοντι εὐπόρως καὶ ἐφεξῆς καταριθμῆσαι.

ἀτοπώτατός εἰμι καὶ ποιῶ τοὺς

ἀνθρώπους ἀπορεῖν] Comp. Men. 79, 80: Ἦκουον μὲν ἔγωγε καὶ πρὶν συγγενέσθαι σοι ὅτι σὺ οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ αὐτός τε ἀπορεῖς καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ποιεῖς ἀπορεῖν. . . καὶ δοκεῖς μοι παντελῶς, εἰ δεῖ τι καὶ σκῶψαι, ὁμοιότατος εἶναι τό τε εἶδος καὶ τᾶλλα ταύτῃ τῇ πλατεία νάρκη τῇ θαλαττία. This whole passage is at least as much in favour of the MS. reading ἀτοπώτατος, as of Stallbaum's conjecture, ἀπορώτατος, which was suggested by the former part of it. Men thought Socrates a strange being, because he made them discontented with themselves.

are now past the age. They have thus experience of child-birth and are also such as the virgin Goddess approves. They perceive the state of those they meet with. They can arouse or allay the travail of a patient; and cause abortion when they think it meet. They are also naturally the best match-makers.

τουσα ἄλλας μαιεύεται, ἄλλ' αἱ ἤδη ἀδύνατοι τίκ- p. 149.
τειν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Αἰτίαν δέ γε τούτου φασὶν εἶναι τὴν Ἄρτε-
5 μιν, ὅτι ἄλοχος οὔσα τὴν λοχεῖαν εἴληχε. στερίφαις
μὲν οὖν ἄρα οὐκ ἔδωκε μαιεύεσθαι, ὅτι ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη
φύσις ἀσθενεστέρα ἢ λαβεῖν τέχνην ὣν ἂν ἦ ἄπειρος·
ταῖς δὲ δι' ἡλικίαν ἀτόκοις προσέταξε, τιμῶσα τὴν
αὐτῆς ὁμοιότητα.

10 ΘΕΑΙ. Εἰκός.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τόδε εἰκός τε καὶ ἀναγκαῖον, τὰς
κνούσας καὶ μὴ γινώσκεισθαι μᾶλλον ὑπὸ τῶν μαιῶν
ἢ τῶν ἄλλων;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ γε.

15 ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν καὶ διδοῦσαί γε αἱ μαῖαι φαρμάκια
καὶ ἐπάδουσαι δύνανται ἐγείρειν τε τὰς ὠδύνας καὶ
μαλθακώτερας, ἂν βούλωνται, ποιεῖν, καὶ τίκτειν τε
δὴ τὰς δυστοκούσας, καὶ εἰάν νεόν ὄν δόξῃ ἀμβλί-
σκειν, ἀμβλίσκουσιν;

4. Αἰτίαν] An adjective agreeing as predicate with Ἄρτεμιν. 'Artemis is said to be responsible for this.' Cp. infr. 150 E: Τῆς μέντοι μαιείας ὁ θεὸς καὶ ἐγὼ αἴτιος.

5. ἄλοχος] Used etymologically, as if from ἀ priv., and λέχος or λοχεύω.

6. ἄρα] According to this tale. Cp. φασὶν supra.

ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη φύσις, κ.τ.λ.] 'It is not in human nature to become skilful where it is not experienced.' This point is dropped in the comparison: unless Plato means to hint that the art of Socrates was superhuman.

8. ἀτόκοις] Bodl. p.m. ἀτόποις.

The correction is by a recent hand.

τιμῶσα τὴν αὐτῆς ὁμοιότητα] 'In honour of their resemblance to herself.' τιμῶσα, 'prizing.' Cp. Symp. 179 D: Οὕτω καὶ θεοὶ τὴν περὶ τὸν ἔρωτα σπουδὴν . . . τιμῶσιν.

15. φαρμάκια] The Diminutive is noticeable. 'Gentle remedies.'

17. τίκτειν τε δὴ] Sc. ποιεῖν. Cp. Symp. 206 D: Σκυθρωπὸν τε (sc. γίγνεται) καὶ λυπούμενον συσπειράται, κ.τ.λ.

18. νεόν ὄν] Sc. τὸ βρέφος, said here of the embryo, 'At an early stage,' i. e. before abortion is dangerous. Cp. Hipp. de Morb. Mul. § 3, 97: Ἦν

p. 149.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔστι ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν ἔτι καὶ τόδε αὐτῶν ἤσθησαι, ὅτι καὶ
προμνήστριαί εἰσι δεινόταται, ὡς πάσσοφοι οὖσαι
περὶ τοῦ γινῶναι ποίαν χρῆ ποίω ἀνδρὶ συνοῦσαν ὡς
ἀρίστους παῖδας τίκτειν ;

5

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ πάνν τουτο οἶδα.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ἴσθ' ὅτι ἐπὶ τούτῳ μείζον φρονοῦσιν ἢ
ἐπὶ τῇ ὀμφαλητομίᾳ. ἐννόει γάρ· τῆς αὐτῆς ἢ ἄλλης
οἶει τέχνης εἶναι θεραπείαν τε καὶ ξυγκομιδὴν τῶν ἐκ
γῆς καρπῶν καὶ αὐτὸ γιγνώσκειν εἰς ποίαν γῆν ποίου
φυτόν τε καὶ σπέρμα καταβλητέον ;

'They are slow, indeed, to acknowledge the pride they take in this, though they bring people together lawfully, and not unlawfully.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκ, ἀλλὰ τῆς αὐτῆς.

ΣΩ. Εἰς γυναικα δέ, ὧ φίλε, ἄλλην μὲν οἶει τοῦ
τοιούτου, ἄλλην δὲ ξυγκομιδῆς ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκουν εἰκός γε.

15

p. 150.

ΣΩ. Οὐ γάρ. ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν ἀδικόν τε καὶ ἄτεχνον
ξυναγωγὴν ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικός, ἣ δὴ προαγωγεία
ὄνομα, φεύγουσι καὶ τὴν προμνηστικὴν ἅτε σεμναὶ
οὖσαι αἱ μαῖαι, φοβούμεναι μὴ εἰς ἐκείνην τὴν αἰτίαν
διὰ ταύτην ἐμπέσωσιν. ἐπεὶ ταῖς γε ὄντως μαίαις
μόναις που προσήκει καὶ προμνήσασθαι ὀρθῶς.

ΘΕΑΙ. Φαίνεται.

μηναῖον φθείρη τὸ παιδίον, where the same thing is spoken of. (This explanation is adopted by Schaarschmidt, 1874, and by H. Schmidt, 1877.) For the ellipse, which is a little difficult, cp. *infr.* p. 161 A, τό γε σόν, sc. κύμα. δύνανται is lost sight of as the sentence proceeds. The subject of ἀμβλίσκουσιν (used causatively) is still αἱ μαῖαι.

4. ποίαν χρῆ] 'What woman should be married to what man, to produce the noblest off-

spring.'

13. Εἰς γυναικα simply repeats the construction of εἰς ποίαν γῆν. In such cases the construction is often elliptical, as here.

τοῦ τοιούτου]. Sc. τοῦ ποίου σπέρμα εἰς ποίαν καταβλητέον.

16. ἀδικόν τε καὶ ἄτεχνον] 'Unlawful and skill-less' contrary to morality and nature. Socrates, according to his wont, assumes that vice is simply ignorance, so that 'vicious' and 'unscientific' are convertible terms.

ΣΩ. Τὸ μὲν τοίνυν τῶν μαιῶν τοσοῦτον, ἔλαττον p. 150.
δὲ τοῦ ἐμοῦ δράματος. οὐ γὰρ πρόσεστι γυναιξίν
ἐνίστε μὲν εἶδωλα τίκτειν, ἔστι δ' ὅτε ἀληθινά, τοῦτο^B
δὲ μὴ ῥάδιον εἶναι διαγνῶναι. εἰ γὰρ προσῆν, μέγι-
5 στόν τε καὶ κάλλιστον ἔργον ἦν ἂν ταῖς μαιαῖς τὸ
κρίνειν τὸ ἀληθές τε καὶ μῆ. ἢ οὐκ οἶει;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐγωγε.

ΣΩ. Τῆ δέ γ' ἐμῆ τέχνη τῆς μαιεύσεως τὰ μὲν

'My art is
greater still

1. ἔλαττον δέ] There is a slight irregularity in the antithesis, occasioned by the stress on *τοσοῦτον*. The balance of clauses is, however, completed with *τῆ δέ γ' ἐμῆ*, κ.τ.λ.

2. τοῦ ἐμοῦ δράματος] It is doubted whether *δρῆμα* here and *infr.* 169 B, *Rep.* 5. 451 C, is literal = 'function' or figurative = 'rôle.' In either case the unusual word ('performance' for 'work') has here a humorously imposing effect.

8. Τῆ δέ γ' ἐμῆ τέχνη τῆς μαιεύσεως] For the well-known metaphor, which is nowhere else so completely elaborated, compare *Symp.* p. 206, sqq. (where Diotima proceeds to explain the mystical expression *τόκος ἐν καλῷ*) *κυοῦσι γάρ, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, πάντες ἄνθρωποι καὶ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα καὶ κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν, καὶ ἐπειδὴν ἐν τινι ἡλικίᾳ γέγονται, τίκτειν ἐπιθυμίᾳ ἡμῶν ἢ φύσις. τίκτειν δὲ ἐν μὲν αἰσχυρῷ οὐ δύναται, ἐν δὲ τῷ καλῷ. ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο θεῖον τὸ πρᾶγμα καὶ τοῦτο ἐν θνητῷ ὄντι τῷ ζῳῷ ἀθάνατόν ἐστιν, ἢ κύησις καὶ ἢ γέννησις. . . ὅθεν δὴ τῷ κυοῦντι τε καὶ ἡδὴ σπαργῶντι πολλὴ ἢ πτοήσις γέγονε περὶ τὸ καλὸν διὰ τὸ μεγάλης ὄδιος ἀπολύειν τὸν ἔχοντα. *Ib.* 209: ὡδίων αὐ ὅταν τις ἐκ νέου ἐγκύμων ᾖ τὴν ψυχὴν θεῖος ὢν, κ.τ.λ. to the end of the speech. *Repub.* 6.*

490 B: οὐκ ἀμβλύνονται οὐδ' ἀπολήγοι τοῦ ἔρωτος, πρὶν αὐτοῦ ὁ ἔστιν ἐκάστου τῆς φύσεως ἀφασθαι ὃ προσήκει ψυχῆς ἐφάπτεσθαι τοῦ τοιούτου· προσήκει δὲ συγγενεῖ ὃ πλησιάσας καὶ μιγείει τῷ ὄντι ὄντως, γενήσας νοῦν καὶ ἀληθείαν, γνοίη τε καὶ ἀληθῶς ζῆν καὶ τρέφοιτο καὶ οὕτω λήγοι ὡδίνος, πρὶν δ' οὐ. So far of the relation of the mind to knowledge. For the relation of the teacher and the taught see *Phædr.* 276 E, 278 A: Πολὺ δ', οἶμαι, καλλίον σπουδῆ περὶ αὐτὰ γίνεταί, ὅταν τις τῆ διαλεκτικῆ τέχνη χρώμενος, λαβῶν ψυχὴν προσήκουσαν, φυτεύη τε καὶ σπείρῃ μετ' ἐπιστήμης λόγους, οἱ ἑαυτοῖς τῷ τε φυτεύσαντι βοηθεῖν ἱκανοί, καὶ οὐχὶ ἄκαρποι ἀλλὰ ἔχοντες σπέρμα . . . δεῖν δὲ τοὺς τοιούτους λόγους αὐτοῦ λέγεσθαι οἷον νιείς γησίους εἶναι, πρῶτον μὲν τὸν ἐν ἑαυτῷ, ἐὰν εὐρεθεῖς ἐνῆ, ἔπειτα εἰ τινας τούτου ἔκγονοι τε καὶ ἀδελφοὶ ἅμα ἐν ἄλλαισιν ἄλλων ψυχαῖς κατ' ἀξίαν ἐνέφυσαν. For the theory of teaching and learning thus illustrated see *Rep.* 7. 518 B: Δεῖ δὴ, εἶπον, ἡμᾶς τοιούδε νομίσει περὶ αὐτῶν, εἰ ταῦτ' ἀληθῆ, τὴν παιδείαν, οὐχ οἷαν τινας ἐπαγγελλόμενοι φασιν εἶναι, τοιαύτην καὶ εἶναι. φασὶ δὲ που οὐκ ἐνούσης ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἐπιστήμης σφεῖς ἐντιθέται, οἷον τυφλοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς ὄψιν ἐπιθέντες, κ.τ.λ.—where it occurs

p. 150. ἄλλα ὑπάρχει ὅσα ἐκείναις, διαφέρει δὲ τῷ τε ἄνδρα
 ἀλλὰ μὴ γυναικας μαιεύεσθαι καὶ τῷ τὰς ψυχὰς αὐ-
 τῶν τικτούσας ἐπισκοπεῖν ἀλλὰ μὴ τὰ σώματα. μέ-
 γιστον δὲ τοῦτ' ἐν τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ τέχνῃ, βασανίζεν
 δυνατὸν εἶναι παντὶ τρόπῳ, πότερον εἶδωλον καὶ 5
 ψεύδος ἀποτίκτει τοῦ νέου ἢ διάνοια ἢ γόνιμόν τε καὶ
 ἀληθές. ἐπεὶ τόδε γε καὶ ἐμοὶ ὑπάρχει, ὅπερ ταῖς
 μαίαις· ἄγονός εἰμι σοφίας, καὶ ὅπερ ἤδη πολλοὶ μοι
 ὠνειδισαν, ὡς τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους ἐρωτῶ, αὐτοὺς δὲ οὐδὲν
 ἀποκρίνομαι περὶ οὐδενὸς διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ἔχειν σοφόν, 10
 ἀληθές ὠνειδίζουσι. τὸ δὲ αἴτιον τούτου τόδε· μαιεύ-
 εσθαί με ὁ θεὸς ἀναγκάζει, γεννᾶν δὲ ἀπεκώλυσεν.

than theirs, for it is exercised upon the minds of men, and I can also discern the false birth from the true. I am childless of discoveries, by the will of the Deity whom I serve in this. But those we take in hand, however stupid

under a different metaphor, that of the cave.

It is always difficult to separate the Platonic from the real Socrates. In the present passage they are indissolubly blended. That men thought Socrates the strangest being, and that he brought them to their wit's end, is matter of fact. The quaint humour, perhaps even the name 'Son of a Midwife,' is Socrates' own. But it is impossible to determine how far the theory based upon his practice, that to teach is not to put something into the mind but to evolve something out of it, or to turn the mind from darkness to light, was consciously held by Socrates himself, and how far it is Plato's theory of the method Socrates pursued. It receives its full development in the seventh book of the Republic, but is not there, as here, combined with the Socratic confession of ignorance.

3. μέγιστον δὲ τοῦτ' ἐνι] 'But

as its greatest triumph my art comprises this.' δέ answers to μέν above, the former δέ being parenthetical. μέγιστον recalls μέγιστον καὶ κάλλιστον supra.

5. δυνατὸν] Sc. τὸν ἔχοντα αὐτήν.

εἶδωλον] Comp. Symp. 212 A, Rep. 7. 520 C. (From whence Bacon probably took his *Idola*.) Soph. 240 A, 264 B, 266 C.

6. ἀποτίκτει] 'Is delivered of.' ἀπο- denotes completion or result, as in ἀποσαφείν, ἀποτελεῦν.

7. ἐπεὶ τόδε γε] 'For I have the same previous condition which the midwives have, in being barren of wisdom.' ἐπεὶ implies 'This is our highest function, for like the midwives I cannot pretend to what is higher still, viz. original production.'

12. ὁ θεός] Who presides over my art as Artemis does over that of the midwives. ὁ θεός must not be identified with τὸ δαιμόνιον, though they are probably connected (see below,

at first, make wondrous progress and do great things. If they leave me too soon, their minds miscarry: unless they return to me, when, if I am permitted to receive them, they again improve.

εἰμι δὴ οὖν αὐτὸς μὲν οὐ πάνυ τις σοφός, οὐδέ τί μοι p. 150.
 ἔστιν εὕρημα τοιοῦτο γεγονός, τῆς ἐμῆς ψυχῆς ἕκ-^D
 γονον· οἱ δ' ἐμοὶ ξυγγιγνόμενοι τὸ μὲν πρῶτον φαί-
 νονται ἔνιοι μὲν καὶ πάνυ ἀμαθεῖς, πάντες δὲ προοιού-
 5 σης τῆς ξυνουσίας, οἷσπερ ἂν ὁ θεὸς παρείκη, θαν-
 μαστὸν ὅσον ἐπιδιδόντες, ὡς αὐτοῖς τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις
 δοκοῦσι· καὶ τοῦτο ἐναργὲς ὅτι παρ' ἐμοῦ οὐδὲν πώ-
 ποτε μαθόντες, ἀλλ' αὐτοὶ παρ' αὐτῶν πολλὰ καὶ
 καλὰ εὐρόντες τε καὶ κατέχοντες. τῆς μέντοι μαιείας

and cp. Apol. 40 B: τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ σημεῖον), but belongs rather to the belief expressed in Apol. 21, 23, where Socrates speaks of his cross-questioning as a Divine service, because occasioned by the oracle at Delphi; and Phæd. 85 B: Ἐγὼ δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς ἡγοῦμαι ὀμόδουλος εἶναι τῶν κύκνων καὶ ἱερὸς τοῦ αὐτοῦ θεοῦ, i. e. sacred to Apollo the god of the true μουσική (ib. 61 A: Ὁς φιλοσοφίας οὔσης μεγίστης μουσικῆς): but here, as in one or two places of the Apology, the feeling is generalized. The impression remains, however, that Apollo's part herein corresponds to that of his sister Artemis.

1. τις] This is preferred as the Bodleian reading. τι, the reading of T, etc., may possibly be right. C. F. Herm. compares Phædr. 228 B: Εἰ μὴ πάνυ τις ἦν μακρός.

οὐδέ τί μοι] 'Nor have I had such a prize of my invention born to me, the offspring of my own mind.' Perhaps there is a slight play upon the word εὕρημα. Compare Soph. Œd. Tyr. 1107: Εἴθ' ὁ Βακχεῖος θεὸς | εὕρημα δέξαι' ἕκ του | Νυμφῶν | Ἐλικωνιδῶν, αἷς πλείστα συμπταίξει; but the primary meaning is

'invention.' Cp. Phædr. 278 A: Υἱεὶς γησιούς . . . ἐαυτοῦ, ἐὰν εὔρεθεις ἐνῆ, and εὐρόντες below.

2. ἔστιν . . . γεγονός] This differs from γέγονεν as ἔχω with aor. or perf. partic. differs from the perf. act. This punctuation is upheld by Burger, De Theæt. 47, who, however, suggests that γεγονός may be interpolated. Most editors place the comma after τοιοῦτο. Cp. Lach. 186 E: Οὔτε γὰρ εὐρετῆς οὔτε μαθητῆς οὐδενὸς . . . γεγονέναι. The diorthotes of the Bodl. MS. has placed a comma after γεγονός, as in the text.

6. ἐπιδιδόντες] Sc. φαίνονται.

7. καὶ τοῦτο ἐναργὲς ὅτι] 'And that manifestly.' τοῦτο, sc. ποιούσιν: viz. ἐπιδιδάσιν.

ἐναργὲς ὅτι] A strengthened form of δῆλον ὅτι. 'As clear as day.' Plato frequently thus extends an idiom. C. F. Hermann, Wohlrab, and Schanz agree in deleting the comma after ἐναργὲς. It must be admitted, however, that καὶ ταῦτα is more usual than καὶ τοῦτο in such a connexion. The Bodl. MS. favours the punctuation of the earlier editors.

9. εὐρόντες τε καὶ κατέχοντες] 'Holding as their own dis-

150. ὁ θεός τε καὶ ἐγὼ αἴτιος. ὧδε δὲ δῆλον· πολλοὶ ἦδη
 Ε τοῦτο ἀγνοήσαντες καὶ ἑαυτοὺς αἰτιασάμενοι, ἐμοῦ δὲ
 καταφρονήσαντες, ἢ αὐτοὶ ὑπ' ἄλλων πεισθέντες,
 ἀπῆλθον πρωϊαίτερον τοῦ δέοντος, ἀπελθόντες δὲ τὰ
 τε λοιπὰ ἐξήμβλωσαν διὰ πονηρὰν ξυνουσίαν καὶ τὰ 5
 ὑπ' ἐμοῦ μαιευθέντα κακῶς τρέφοντες ἀπώλεσαν,
 ψευδῆ καὶ εἰδῶλα περὶ πλείονος ποιησάμενοι τοῦ
 ἀληθοῦς, τελευτῶντες δ' αὐτοῖς τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις
 151. ἔδοξαν ἀμαθεῖς εἶναι. ὧν εἰς γέγονεν Ἀριστείδης ὁ
 Λυσιμάχου καὶ ἄλλοι πάνυ πολλοί. οἷς, ὅταν πάλιν 10

coveries.' Schanz reads καὶ τε-
 κόντες, which is found in some
 inferior MS. authorities, and
 may possibly be right, but may
 also be due to corruption,
 through the accidental omis-
 sion of καί, or to MS. conjec-
 ture. The v.r. καὶ ἐκόντες rather
 points to this; and κατέχοντες
 gives a perfectly good sense,
 expressing the satisfaction a
 man feels in the secure pos-
 session of that which he owes
 to the exercise of his own
 powers. Those who left So-
 crates too early had no such se-
 curity. Wohlrab quotes Symp.
 175 D: Δῆλον γὰρ ἄτι εἶρες αὐτὸ
 καὶ ἔχεις.

3. ἢ αὐτοὶ ὑπ'] 'They left
 me, whether it was that they
 despised me, or were themselves
 won over by some one else.'
 The needless emphasis has
 given rise to suspicion. Hein-
 dorf read ἢ αὐτοὶ ἢ ('of their
 own accord, or through the in-
 fluence of others'), for which
 there is slight MS. authority.
 Schanz proposes ἢ αὐ, where αὐ
 is still more superfluous than
 the minute antithesis. If ἢ
 αὐτοὶ ἢ is read, the clause may
 be either joined to καταφρονή-

σαντες or (with L. Disson quoted
 by Wohlrab) to ἀπῆλθον. The
 latter is more probable.

πεισθέντες] 'Attracted,' 'cap-
 tivated;' cp. Thucyd. 6. 54.

4. τὰ . . . λοιπὰ] 'What more
 they had in them.' Cp. infr.
 210 B.

5. ἐξήμβλωσαν] Cp. Aristoph.
 Nub. 137: Φροντίδ' ἐξήμβλωκας
 ἐξευρημένην (where, however, the
 verb is used causatively as above
 149 D, ἀμβλίσκουσι).

διὰ πονηρὰν ξυνουσίαν] Symp.
 206 C: Τίκειν δ' ἐν μὲν αἰσχρῶ οὐ
 δύναται, ἐν δὲ τῷ καλῷ. Cp. infr.
 151 A B. The image of μαιευτική
 is merged in that of προμηστικ-
 ή. The word ξυνεῖναι expresses
 more than one kind of inter-
 course.

9. Ἀριστείδης ὁ Λυσιμάχου] We
 read of the introduction of this
 youth to Socrates in the Laches,
 179 A: Λυσιμ. Ἡμῖν εἰσιν νιεῖς
 οὗτοι, ὅδε μὲν τοῦδε . . . ἐμὸς δὲ αὐ
 ὅδε· παππῶν δὲ καὶ οὗτος ὄνομα
 ἔχει τοῦμοῦ πατρός, Ἀριστείδην γὰρ
 αὐτὸν καλοῦμεν. Lysimachus and
 Melesias are consulting Nicias
 and Laches, in the presence of
 Socrates, about their sons, Ari-
 stides and Thucydides.

ἔλθωσιν δεόμενοι τῆς ἐμῆς ξυνουσίας καὶ θαυμαστὰ p. 151.
 δρῶντες, ἐνίοις μὲν τὸ γιγνόμενόν μοι δαιμόνιον ἀπο-
 κωλύει ξυνεῖναι, ἐνίοις δὲ ἐᾶ, καὶ πάλιν οὗτοι ἐπι-
 διδάσι. πᾶσχοῦσι δὲ δὴ οἱ ἐμοὶ ξυγγιγνόμενοι καὶ
 5 τοῦτο ταῦτόν ταίς τικτούσαις· ὠδίνουσι γὰρ καὶ ἀπο-
 ρίας ἐμπίπλονται νύκτας τε καὶ ἡμέρας πολὺ μᾶλλον
 ἢ ἐκείναι. ταύτην δὲ τὴν ὠδίνα ἐγείρειν τε καὶ ἀπο-
 παύειν ἢ ἐμὴ τέχνη δύναται. καὶ οὗτοι μὲν δὴ οὕτως. B
 ἐνίοτε δέ, ὧ Θεαίτητε, οἱ ἄν μοι μὴ δόξωσί πως ἐγ-
 10 κύμονες εἶναι, γνούς ὅτι οὐδὲν ἐμοῦ δέονται, πάννυ
 εὐμενῶς προμῶμαι, καὶ ξὺν θεῷ εἰπεῖν, πάννυ ἰκανῶς
 τοπάξω οἷς ἂν ξυγγενόμενοι ὄναιτο. ὧν πολλοὺς μὲν
 δὴ ἐξέδωκα Προδίκῳ, πολλοὺς δὲ ἄλλοις σοφοῖς τε
 καὶ θεσπεσίοις ἀνδράσι. Ταῦτα δὴ σοι, ὧ ἄριστε,

‘My pa-
 tients also
 are in tra-
 vail, and
 my art can
 rouse or
 allay this
 pain. And
 if some
 come to me
 whom I
 perceive
 not to need
 my skill, I
 give them
 away to
 Prodicus or
 to some
 other; and
 in this de-
 partment

1. θαυμαστὰ δρῶντες] ‘Showing extraordinary solicitude.’ ‘Going on their knees to me.’ Cp. Apol. 35 A: ‘Ἐώρακά τινας . . . θαυμάσια ἐργαζομένους, ὡς δεινόν τι οἰόμενος πείσεσθαι εἰ ἀποθανοῦνται.

2. τὸ . . . δαιμόνιον] Here, as always, not commanding, but forbidding; and, as generally, neuter and impersonal. This is not the place to discuss the subject. It suits well with the intensely self-reflective nature of Socrates (lost sometimes for whole days in thought) that he should pause suddenly on the eye of doing something, without being able (at the time) to explain to himself and others the motives of reason or feeling which checked his impulse.

3. οὗτοι] This is the reading of T and most MSS. The Bodleian has αὐτοί, which is certainly admissible, and is perhaps also preferable as the more

difficult reading. ‘In some cases I am permitted to do so, and the men themselves improve.’ But οὗτοι is on the whole more probable.

7. ἢ ἐκείναι] T has ἢ κείναι. Schanz reads ἢ κείναι.

9. πως] Qualifying μὴ δόξωσι. ‘Whom, somehow, I perceive not to be,’ etc.

13. ἐξέδωκα] For the word cp. Soph. 242 D: Δυνὸ δὲ ἕτερος εἰπὼν (τὰ ὄντα), ὑγρὸν καὶ ξηρὸν ἢ θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρὸν, συνοικίζει τε αὐτὰ καὶ ἐκδίδωσι. For the thing cp. Lach. 200 D: Κἂν ἐγὼ τὸν Νικήρατον τοῦτῳ ἥδιστα ἐπιτρέπωμι, εἰ ἐθέλοι οὗτος· ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἄλλοις μοι ἐκάστοτε συνίστησιν. For the ironical hyperbole in θεσπεσίους cp. Euthyd. 289 E: Καὶ γὰρ μοι οἱ τε ἄνδρες αὐτοὶ οἱ λογοποιοί, ὅταν συγγένωμαι αὐτοῖς, ὑπέρσοφοι, ὧ Κλεινία, δοκοῦσιν εἶναι καὶ αὐτῇ ἢ τέχνη αὐτῶν θεσπεσία τις καὶ ὑψηλή.

ρ. 151. ἔνεκα τοῦδε ἐμήκυνα, ὑποπτεύων σε, ὥσπερ καὶ αὐτὸς
 οἶει, ὠδίνειν τι κυοῦντα ἔνδον. προσφέρου οὖν πρὸς
 C με ὡς πρὸς μαίας υἱὸν καὶ αὐτὸν μαιευτικόν, καὶ ἂν
 ἐρωτῶ, προθυμοῦ ὅπως οἴός τ' εἶ, οὕτως ἀποκρίνασθαι.
 καὶ ἐὰν ἄρα σκοπούμενός τι ὦν ἂν λέγῃς, ἡγήσωμαι 5
 εἶδωλον καὶ μὴ ἀληθές, εἶτα ὑπεξαιρῶμαι καὶ ἀπο-
 βάλλω, μὴ ἀγρίαυε ὥσπερ αἱ πρωτοτόκοι περὶ τὰ
 παιδία. πολλοὶ γὰρ ἤδη, ὧ θαυμάσιε, πρὸς με οὕτω
 διετέθησαν, ὥστε ἀτεχνῶς δάκνειν ἔτοιμοι εἶναι, ἐπει-
 δάν τινα λῆρον αὐτῶν ἀφαιρῶμαι, καὶ οὐκ οἴονται 10
 εὐνοία τοῦτο ποιεῖν, πόρρω ὄντες τοῦ εἰδέναι ὅτι οὐδεὶς
 D θεὸς δύσνους ἀνθρώποις, οὐδ' ἐγὼ δυσνοία τοιοῦτον
 οὐδὲν δρῶ, ἀλλὰ μοι ψεῦδός τε ξυγχωρῆσαι καὶ ἀλη-
 θές ἀφανίσαι οὐδαμῶς θέμις. Πάλιν δὴ οὖν ἐξ ἀρχῆς,
 ὧ Θεαίτητε, ὅ τί ποτ' ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη, πειρῶ λέγειν. 15
 ὡς δ' οὐχ οἴός τ' εἶ, μηδέ ποτ' εἴπῃς. ἐὰν γὰρ θεὸς
 ἐθέλῃ καὶ ἀνδρίζῃ, οἴός τ' ἔσει.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἄλλὰ μέντοι, ὧ Σώκρατες, σοῦ γε οὕτω
 παρακελευομένου αἰσχρὸν μὴ οὐ παντὶ τρόπῳ προθυ-
 E μείσθαι ὅ τί τις ἔχει λέγειν. δοκεῖ οὖν μοι ὁ ἐπιστά- 20
 μένός τι αἰσθάνεσθαι τοῦτο ὃ ἐπίσταται, καὶ ὡς γε
 νυνὶ φαίνεται, οὐκ ἄλλο τί ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη ἢ αἰ-
 σθησις.

1. ὥσπερ καὶ αὐτὸς οἶει] Cp.
 supr. 148 D E: 'Ἄλλ' εὖ ἴσθι
 ... πέπονθα λέγω.

2. προσφέρου] Charm. 165
 B: Σὺ μὲν ὡς φάσκοντος ἐμοῦ
 εἰδέναι περὶ ὧν ἐρωτῶ προσφέρει
 πρὸς με.

6. εἶτα] Cp. Apol. 23 C:
 Πολλάκις ἐμὲ μιμῶνται, εἶτα ἐπι-
 χειροῦσιν ἄλλους ἐξετάξεν.

ὑπεξαιρῶμαι] The MSS. have
 ὑπεξαιρῶμαι, Bekk. corr. See
 below, ἀφαιρῶμαι, where T and
 B pr. have ἀφαιρῶμαι.

ἀποβάλλω] ὑποβάλλω B.

10. τινα λῆρον] Some 'barren
 stuff.'

οἴονται] Plutarch in quoting
 this passage reads οἴονταί με.

11. οὐδεὶς θεός] And therefore
 not the presiding genius of my
 Art.

18. σοῦ γε] I. e. 'You, whom
 I respect so highly.'

22. ἐπιστήμη ... αἴσθησις] The
 term αἴσθησις is more simple
 and more extensive than any
 one by which it could be ren-

too I sel-
 dom fail.
 Take cou-
 rage then,
 and be not
 angry if I
 put aside
 your first-
 born as not
 worth rear-
 ing. I am
 guided in
 this also by
 the Deity,
 who desires
 your good.'

Thætetus
 now ven-
 tures to
 answer,
 I. Know-
 ledge is
 Sensation.
 1. 'Why,
 Protagoras
 meant this
 when he

said, "The Man the Measure of what is." I. e. What appears to me, is real to me.

ΣΩ. Εὖ γε καὶ γενναίως, ὦ παῖ· χρὴ γὰρ οὕτως p. 151.
ἀποφαινόμενον λέγειν. ἀλλὰ φέρε δὴ αὐτὸ κοινῇ
σκεψώμεθα, γόνιμον ἢ ἀνεμιαῖον τυγχάνει ὄν. αἴσθη-
σις, φήης, ἐπιστήμη;

5 ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Κινδυνεύεις μέντοι λόγον οὐ φαῦλον εἰρη-

dered in English or any modern language, in which the notion of the five senses has become fixed. 'Sense-perception' is too definite for it here. See below, 156 B: Αἱ μὲν οὖν αἰσθήσεις τὰ τοιάδε ἡμῖν ἔχουσιν ὄνοματα, ὄψεις τε καὶ ἀκοαὶ καὶ ὄσφρήσεις καὶ ψύξεις καὶ καύσεις καὶ ἡδοναί γε δὴ καὶ λύπαι καὶ ἐπιθυμίαι καὶ φόβοι, κ. τ. λ. Perhaps 'to see and feel is to know,' is the nearest equivalent to what Theaetetus means. But 'feeling' has ethical associations which must be excluded here. The German word 'Sinn' presents a nearer parallel.

Before reflection begins, our individual impressions are those of which we are most conscious and most certain. And subjective certainty is the primitive meaning of τὸ ἐπίστασθαι. Hence αἴσθησις seems at first sight identical with ἐπιστήμη. Cp. Phæd. 83 C: "Οτι ψυχὴ παντὸς ἀνθρώπου ἀναγκάζεται ἅμα τε ἡσθῆναι ἢ λυπηθῆναι σφόδρα ἐπὶ τῷ καὶ ἡγέσθαι, περὶ ὃ ἂν μάλιστα τοῦτο πάσχη, τοῦτο ἐναργέστατόν τε καὶ ἀληθέστατον, οὐχ οὕτως ὄν. Aristotle, Metaph. 3. 1009 b: 'Ἡ περὶ τὰ φαινόμενα ἀλήθεια ἐνίοις ἐκ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἐλήλυθεν. . . ὅλως δὲ διὰ τὸ ὑπολαμβάνειν φρόνησιν μὲν τὴν αἴσθησιν, ταύτην δ' εἶναι ἀλλοίωσιν, τὸ φαινόμενον κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀληθές εἶναι φασιν. The saying of Theæte-

tus is shown to be the meeting point of two lines of speculation; the one of which may be termed in modern language, subjective, the other objective: the one regarding all knowledge as relative and apparent to man: the other regarding things without reference to man as in a state of transience or relation: thus sense cannot be knowledge, unless knowledge is relative, and being is change. This leads to an analysis of Sensation. We are made aware of its real nature, and so taught to distinguish Knowledge from it. See Aristot. de An. 3. 3: Δοκεῖ δὲ τὸ νοεῖν καὶ τὸ φρονεῖν ὥσπερ αἰσθάνεσθαι τι εἶναι· ἐν ἀμφοτέροις γὰρ τούτοις ἡ ψυχὴ κρίνει τι καὶ γνωρίζει τῶν ὄντων· καὶ οἷ γε ἀρχαῖοι τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι ταῦτόν εἶναι φασιν, ὥσπερ καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς εἴρηκε, Πρὸς παρεὸν γὰρ μῆτις ἀέξεται ἀνθρώποισιν, καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις. . . Ὄθεν σφίσιν αἰεὶ καὶ τὸ φρονεῖν ἀλλοῖα παρίσταται. Τὸ δ' αὐτὸ βούλεται τούτοις καὶ τὸ τοῦ Ὀμήρου, Τοῖος γὰρ νόος ἐστὶν ἐπιχθονίων ἀνθρώπων, οἷον ἐπ' ἡμαρ ἄγῃσι πατὴρ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε.

1. Εὖ γε καὶ γενναίως] Supr. 146 C.

2. αὐτό here—sc. τὸ ἀποφαινόμεν—*and* supr. 148 E, has no distinctly expressed antecedent.

6. Κινδυνεύεις μέντοι] 'Well, after all, I should not wonder if . . .'

p. 152. κέναι περὶ ἐπιστήμης, ἀλλ' ὃν ἔλεγε καὶ Πρωταγόρας. τρόπον δέ τινα ἄλλον εἶρηκε τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα. φησὶ γάρ που πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἄνθρωπον εἶναι, τῶν μὲν ὄντων, ὡς ἔστι, τῶν δὲ μὴ ὄντων, ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν. ἀνέγνωκας γάρ που;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀνέγνωκα καὶ πολλάκις.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν οὕτω πως λέγει, ὡς οἶα μὲν ἕκαστα ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, τοιαῦτα μὲν ἔστιν ἐμοί, οἶα δὲ σοί, τοιαῦτα δὲ αὐ σοί. ἄνθρωπος δὲ σύ τε κἀγώ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Λέγει γὰρ οὖν οὕτως.

B ΣΩ. Εἰκὸς μέντοι σοφὸν ἄνδρα μὴ ληρεῖν. ἐπακολουθήσωμεν οὖν αὐτῷ. ἄρ' οὐκ ἐνίστε πνέοντος ἀνέμου τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὃ μὲν ἡμῶν ῥιγοῖ, ὃ δ' οὐ; καὶ ὃ μὲν ἡρέμα, ὃ δὲ σφόδρα;

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ μάλα.

ΣΩ. Πότερον οὖν τότε αὐτὸ ἐφ' ἑαυτὸ τὸ πνεῦμα

5

10

15

'E.g. When it is asked, Is the wind cold? Protagoras would say it is cold to him who feels cold. Appearance in this

3. ἄνθρωπον] Not 'Man,' i. e. collective human nature; nor yet exactly 'Each man.' As we have seen, p. 147, Thætetus is little conscious of the universal. Hence ἄνθρωπος signifies to him not humanity, nor yet the individual, as opposed to it, but this or that man, 'any man you choose.' And whether or not it was so intended by Protagoras, it would certainly appear to have been so understood by his 'disciples,' to whom Socrates presently refers.

7. ὡς οἶα μὲν, κ. τ. λ.] Cp. Cratyl. 385 E, 386 A: Ὡσπερ Πρωταγόρας ἔλεγε, λέγων πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον εἶναι ἄνθρωπον, ὡς ἄρα οἶα μὲν ἂν ἐμοὶ φαίνεται τὰ πράγματα εἶναι, τοιαῦτα μὲν ἔστιν ἐμοί, οἶα δ' ἂν σοί, τοιαῦτα δ' αὐ σοί. This repetition of

the same language affords a presumption that the explanation, as well as the original saying, is Protagoras' own.

11. μέντοι] 'Well, at all events,' εἰκὸς μέντοι . . μὴ ληρεῖν] Cp. Phædr. 260 A: Οὐκ ἀπόβλητον ἔπος εἶναι δεῖ . . ὃ ἂν εἴπωσι σοφοί, ἀλλὰ σκοπεῖν μή τι λέγωσι· καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸ νῦν λεχθὲν οὐκ ἀφετέον.

16. ἐφ' ἑαυτό] 'ἑαυτοῦ Vindob. suppl. 7. ἐαυτό B T.' Schanz. The accusative may be defended from Thucyd. i. 141: Ὅταν . . τὸ ἐφ' ἑαυτὸν ἕκαστος σπεύδῃ. 4. 28: Τὸ ἐπὶ σφᾶς εἶναι. The prep. is used in a slightly pregnant sense, = *ipsotenus*, 'As far as to itself, and no further.' Cp. infr. 160 A: Οὐδὲ . . ἐκεῖνο . . ἑαυτῷ τοιούτου γενήσεται. (Perhaps the accus. is also partly due to the idea of motion in πνεῦμα.) ἐφ' ἑαυτό is sup-

case is sensation. The wind is to me as I sensibly perceive it. i. e. Sensation discovers Being.

ψυχρὸν ἢ οὐ ψυχρὸν φήσομεν; ἢ πεισόμεθα τῷ p. 152.
 Πρωταγόρα ὅτι τῷ μὲν ριγούντι ψυχρὸν, τῷ δὲ
 μὴ οὐ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὁμοίειεν.

5 ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ φαίνεται οὕτως ἑκατέρῳ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τὸ δέ γε φαίνεται αἰσθάνεσθαι ἔστιν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὁμοίει γάρ.

ΣΩ. Φαντασία ἄρα καὶ αἴσθησις ταῦτὸν ἔν τε
 10 θερμοῖς καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς τοιούτοις. οἷα γὰρ αἰσθάνεται
 ἕκαστος, τοιαῦτα ἑκάστῳ καὶ κινδυνεύει εἶναι.

ported by H. Schmidt. For ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ, which is preferred by Wohlrab, Schanz and others, cp. Tim. 51 B: Ἄρ' ἔστι τι πῦρ αὐτὸ ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ. For the use of the reflexive pronoun cp. Rep. 4. 419 A: Καὶ ταῦτα δι' ἑαυτοῦς. This notion is carried farther by Locke, Hum. Underst. 2. 8. § 21: 'The same water may produce the sensation of cold in the one hand and heat in the other.'

7. Τὸ δέ γε φαίνεται αἰσθάνεσθαι ἔστιν] 'When you say "appears," it is that he has a sensation.' The example is kept in view throughout. There is MS. authority for αἰσθάνεται. (Cp. inf. 164 B: Τὸ δέ γε οὐχ ὄρα οὐκ ἐπίσταται ἔστιν, ἔπειρ καὶ τὸ ὄρα ἐπίσταται.) But the change of subject makes αἰσθάνεσθαι preferable. Cp. inf. 186 D: Τί οὖν δὴ ἐκείνῳ ἀποδίδωσ ὄνομα κ. τ. λ.; Αἰσθάνεσθαι ἔγωγε. Crat. 410 C: Τὸ γὰρ γεγάσι γεγενῆσθαι λέγει. And the repetition of the termination is a more probable form of corruption than the recurrence of σθ in the same word. φαίνεσθαι ap-

pears as a correction for φαίνεται in some MSS.

9. Φαντασία ἄρα] I. e. 'In regard to heat and cold and the like your theory and that of Protagoras agree.' φαντασία occurs here simply as the noun of φαίνεσθαι, = 'appearing,' rather than 'appearance,' and must be kept clear from the notion of *faculty*, and the associations due to Aristotle, (see de An. 3. 3, where he defines it, κίνησις ὑπὸ τῆς αἰσθήσεως τῆς κατ' ἐνέργειαν γιγνομένης.) Appearance (or relative being) becomes a middle term between sensation and being, so that all is merged in sensation. Thus, while the answer of Theætetus is shown to coincide with the saying of Protagoras, the reader is gently led to acquiesce for the moment in their common point of view.

ἐν τε θερμοῖς] Cp. inf. 204 D: Ἐν γε τοῖς ὅσα ἐξ ἀριθμοῦ ἔστιν. These are instances of Plato's tentative method.

10. οἷα γὰρ αἰσθάνεται] (1) Sc. αὐτά, which however is purposely omitted; viz. τὰ θερμά, κ. τ. λ.

p. 152.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔοικεν.

ΣΩ. Αἴσθησις ἄρα τοῦ ὄντος αἰεὶ ἐστὶ καὶ ἀψευδές,
ὡς ἐπιστήμη οὐσα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν πρὸς Χαρίτων πάσσοφός τις ἦν ὁ 5
Πρωταγόρας, καὶ τοῦτο ἡμῖν μὲν ἠνίξατο τῷ πολλῷ
συρφετῷ, τοῖς δὲ μαθηταῖς ἐν ἀπορρήτῳ τὴν ἀλήθειαν
ἔλεγεν;

Or, (2) while τὰ θερμά, κ. τ. λ. are subj. of κινδυνεύει, οἷα may be cogn. acc. 'For they would seem to be to each according to his sensation.' As we dwell upon the above example in support of the identification of appearance and sense, ὅτι τῷ μὲν ῥιγούντι ψυχρόν, τῷ δὲ μὴ οὐ, (where, however, ἐστὶ was carefully excluded,) we are led insensibly to substitute 'relative being' for 'appearing,' by a play of words, which may be preserved in English, 'What appears to me, is to me.' And from relative being (ἐκάστω εἶναι) we argue at once to 'being' (αἴσθησις ἄρα τοῦ ὄντος). For a similar recapitulation, in which the argument is really carried a step further (with γάρ), cp. 190 E: Οὔτε γὰρ ταύτῃ οὔτε κατὰ τὰ πρότερα φαίνεται ψευδὴς ἐν ἡμῖν οὐσα δόξα.

For γάρ, introducing as a reason what is properly an inference, cp. also Gorg. 454 D.

2. Αἴσθησις ἄρα] 'Sensation then is of Being, and is infallible, in accordance with your theory.' Certainty is here implicitly assumed as the mark of ἐπιστήμη. The genuineness of the last words has been needlessly questioned by Wolff and others. They are required in order to bring 'the wheel

full circle' and to complete the identification of Protagoras' theory with that of Theætetus. Compare with ὡς ἐπιστήμη οὐσα, infr. 160 C: Κατὰ τὸν Πρωταγόραν.

5. Ἄρ' οὖν, κ. τ. λ.] If sensation is of Being, then Being is not Being but Change. ἄρα in such questions (cp. infr. 200 C) is more emphatic than ἄρ' οὐ. Here it expresses delighted surprise. 'In the name of all that is charming, was Protagoras even wiser than we knew?' For the Graces in this connexion cp. Prot. 320 C: Δοκεῖ τοίνυν μοι . . . χαριέστερον εἶναι μῦθον ἡμῖν λέγειν.

'What? says Socrates, did Protagoras then teach an obscure exoteric doctrine to the multitude, and tell the truth in esoteric confidence to his disciples? Did he teach the one to believe in ὄντα, the others in nothing but γινόμενα?' Prof. Kennedy.

7. τοῖς δὲ μαθηταῖς ἐν ἀπορρήτῳ] He told the *real truth*, not in his book which is so entitled (Ἀλήθεια), but privately to his disciples. Cp. Crat. 413 A: Ἐγὼ δέ, ὃ Ἐρμόγενης, ἄτε λιπαρῆς ὢν περὶ αὐτοῦ, ταῦτα μὲν πάντα διαπέψσμαι ἐν ἀπορρήτοις. (Socrates has just given a derivation of the word δικαιοσύνη,

'This theory of Knowledge, then, depends upon a theory of Being, which Protagoras reserved for his disciples, to whom he

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς δὴ, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦτο λέγεις; p. 152.

ΣΩ. Ἐγὼ ἐρῶ καὶ μάλ' οὐ φαῦλον λόγον· ὡς ἄρα^D
 ἐν μὲν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ οὐδέν ἐστιν, οὐδ' ἄν τι προσ-
 εῖποις ὀρθῶς οὐδ' ὅποιονοῦν τι, ἀλλ', ἐὰν ὡς μέγα
 5 προσαγορεύης, καὶ σμικρὸν φανείται, καὶ ἐὰν βαρὺ,
 κοῦφον, ζύμπαντά τε οὕτως, ὡς μηδενὸς ὄντος ἐνὸς
 μήτε τινὸς μήτε ὅποιονοῦν· ἐκ δὲ δὴ φορᾶς τε καὶ
 κινήσεως καὶ κράσεως πρὸς ἄλληλα γίγνεται πάντα,
 ἃ δὴ φαμεν εἶναι, οὐκ ὀρθῶς προσαγορεύοντες· ἔστι
 10 μὲν γὰρ οὐδέποτ' οὐδέν, αἰὲ δὲ γίγνεται. καὶ περὶ
 τούτου πάντες ἐξῆς οἱ σοφοὶ πλὴν Παρμενίδου ζυμ-

which he thus ironically attributes to the disciples of Heraclitus as an esoteric doctrine.) By a similar irony, he says here that the 'friends of Protagoras' have learnt their doctrine from their master 'in a mystery.' Clearly then the doctrine which Socrates proceeds to develop was not to be found in the written teaching of Protagoras, but in the interpretations of his reputed followers. The question, how far the Cyrenaics are indicated by the phrase, 'disciples of Protagoras,' has been discussed in the introduction.

τὴν ἀλήθειαν] There is a slight allusion here to the work of Protagoras of this name, which is more distinctly referred to afterwards.

2. καὶ μάλ' οὐ φαῦλον λόγον] 'I will tell you, and it is indeed a high argument.' He had spoken of a λόγος οὐ φαῦλος above (151 E). Cp. infr. 179 D.

3. οὐδ' ἄν τι προσείποις] (1) 'Nor can you call anything rightly by any name.' Or (2) with H. Schmidt, making οὐδέν

the object and τί predicative, 'Nor can you rightly call it anything or any kind of thing.' But this is less probable, and is certainly not required by what follows.—Whoever the contemporaries were to whom Plato refers as the disciples of Protagoras, he aims beyond them at the whole relative side of Greek thought, of which Heraclitus was the most prominent exponent.

8. καὶ κράσεως πρὸς ἄλληλα] These words are introduced in order to include Empedocles, whose elements, however, were not subject to growth and decay, and who was probably not independent of an Eleatic influence. His Muse is called in the Sophist (242 E) μαλακωτέρα (in contradistinction to the συντονώτεραι μούσαι of Heraclitus), because his two principles of friendship and strife do not possess the world together, but alternately.

11. ξυμφέρεσθων] MS. authority preponderates (numerically) in favour of ξυμφέρεσθων, which Stallbaum and Wohlrab have

told the real truth in a mystery.

2. 'If Sensation is Knowledge, Being is Change. Things are not, but become.

Heraclitus, Empedocles, Homer, Epicurus, all agree in this.

p. 152. φερέσθων, Πρωταγόρας τε καὶ Ἡράκλειτος καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς, καὶ τῶν ποιητῶν οἱ ἄκροι τῆς ποιήσεως ἑκατέρας· κωμωδίας μὲν, Ἐπίχαρμος, τραγωδίας δέ, Ὅμηρος, [*ὸς] εἰπῶν

᾿Ωκεανόν τε θεῶν γένεσιν καὶ μητέρα Τηθύν, 5

vainly attempted to defend. Even if it were clear that Empedocles was set over against Protagoras and Heraclitus, or that these (coupled with τε καί) only counted for one, the use of the dual here would still be unnatural. Stobæus, who quotes this passage, has ξυμφέρωνται, which is possibly right. In the Bodleian MS. there is an erasure to the right of the omicron, which seems originally to have been ω. An accent on the penultimate has also been erased. Thus ξυμφέρεσθων (or συμφερέσθων) is supported by the Bodleian first hand, besides three other MSS. 'Be it assumed (since we cannot ask them) that the philosophers of all ages speak with one voice concerning this.' For the imperative, denoting a provisional assumption, cp. infr. 187 B: Καί μοι τοῦτο ἀποκεκρίσθω· 197 E: Πεποίησθω· Soph. 248 A: Πρὸς μὲν οὖν τούτους τοῦτο ἡμῖν μενέω ξυνομολογηθέν· Rep. 6. 485 A: Τοῦτο . . . ὠμολογήσθω ἡμῖν, ὅτι, κ.τ.λ. Legg. 2. 672 E: Διαπεπεράνθω. Possibly the word ξυμφερέσθων retains here something of its literal meaning, 'are gathered together,' 'move all one way.' Thuc. 7. 36. The boldness of the language, especially the word στρατόπεδον, is in favour of this.

3. Ἐπίχαρμος] Epicharmus, ed. Krüsemann, fr. 95: Συνεκρίθη, καὶ διεκρίθη, καὶ ἀπῆνθεν

ὄθεν ἦνθε πάλιν γὰ μὲν εἰς γὰν, πνεῦμα δ' ἄνω. Ib. fr. 90: Φύσις ἀνθρώπων ἀσκοὶ πεφουσημένοι. The passage quoted by Diog. Laert. 3. 10 (who says that Plato borrowed from Epicharmus), though interesting, if authentic, is too long for quotation here, except the line ἐν μεταλλαγῇ δὲ πάντες ἐντὶ πάντα τὸν χρόνον. (Cp. Mullah, Fragment. Phil. Gr. Epicharm. vv. 177-194.) Epicharmus (circ. 490 B.C.) is called a Pythagorean. One or two of his γνῶμαι remind us of Heraclitus, although, as only fragments from his Comedies are preserved, we cannot tell in any case how far the notions expressed are his own.

τραγωδίας δέ, Ὅμηρος] Where the form is in question, ἔπη are distinguished from τραγωδία: as in Rep. 3. 394 C. Where this is not the case, they are combined as tragedy, this being another name for σπουδαία μιμητική: e. g. Rep. 10. 605 C: Ἀκροώμενοι Ὅμηρου ἢ ἄλλου τινὸς τῶν τραγωδοποιῶν.

4. [*ὸς] εἰπῶν] The best MSS. read Ὅμηρος εἰπῶν. A few add γάρ, as in a similar passage, 175 D (ἰλιγγίων τε κ.τ.λ.) γάρ is added in one MS. (Ven. ζ.) ὸς εἰπῶν is Heindorf's very probable emendation. The MS. reading is to be defended, if at all, by supposing a 'return to the indicative.'

5. ᾿Ωκ. θ. γ. κ. μ. T.] Il. 14. 201, 302.

πάντα εἶρηκεν ἔκγονα ῥοῆς τε καὶ κινήσεως. ἦ οὐ p. 152.
δοκεῖ τοῦτο λέγειν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔμοιγε.

ΣΩ. Τίς οὖν ἂν ἔτι πρὸς γε τοσοῦτον στρατό- p. 153.
5 πεδον καὶ στρατηγὸν Ὅμηρον δύναιτο ἀμφισβητήσας
μὴ καταγέλαστος γενέσθαι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ ῥάδιον, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Οὐ γάρ, ὦ Θεαίτητε. ἐπεὶ καὶ τάδε τῷ λόγῳ

6. μὴ . . . γενέσθαι] A few MSS. have μὴ οὐ. But the omission of οὐ may be defended by the remoteness of the supposition. Cp. Sophist 241 E: Τούτων γὰρ μῆτε ἐλεγχθέντων μῆτε ὁμολογηθέντων σχολῆ ποτέ τις οἴος τε ἔσται . . . μὴ καταγέλαστος εἶναι: Soph. O. T. 76, 77. μὴ belongs to the adj. 'Who could prove other than ridiculous?' Compare with the whole passage Cratyl. 401 E, 402 A, where, after proposing first Ἔστία (fire) and then ὠσία (displacement), as derivations for οὐσία, Socrates says: Ὡ ἡγάθε, ἐννεόηκά τι σμήνος σοφίας. Ἐρμ. Ποῖον δὴ τοῦτο; Σω. Γελοῖον μὲν πάνυ εἰπεῖν, οἶμαι μέντοι τινὰ πιθανότητα ἔχειν. Ἐρμ. Τίνα ταύτην; Σω. Τὸν Ἡράκλειτόν μοι δοκῶ καθορᾶν παλαιᾶ ἄττα σοφὰ λέγοντα, ἀτεχνῶς τὰ ἐπὶ Κρόνου καὶ Ῥέας, ἃ καὶ Ὅμηρος ἔλεγεν. Ἐρμ. πῶς τοῦτο λέγεις; Σω. λέγει που Ἡράκλειτος ὅτι πάντα χωρεῖ καὶ οὐδὲν μένει, καὶ ποταμοῦ ῥοῆ ἀπεικάζων τὰ ὄντα λέγει ὡς δις ἐς τὸν αὐτὸν ποταμὸν οὐκ ἂν ἐμβαίης, κ. τ. λ. Two Orphic lines are then quoted besides this of Homer and Hesiod: Ὀκεανὸς πρῶτος καλλιέρους ἦρξε γάμοιο, ὅς ῥα κασιγνήτην ὁμομήτορα Τηθὴν ὄπνιεν. Socrates adds, ταῦτ' οὖν σκόπει ὅτι καὶ ἀλλήλοις συμφωνεῖ καὶ πρὸς

τὰ τοῦ Ἡρακλείτου πάντα τείνει. The last words are a good commentary on *ἐνυμφερέσθων*.

The theory of Knowledge, 'All impressions are true,' is shown to require the theory of Being, 'All things come and go.' And thus of the Protagorean and Heraclitean traditions there is woven a doctrine of sense, similar to that which was held by the Cyrenaics and perhaps others at this time. As a doctrine of sense it is received, as a doctrine of knowledge and being it is negated. Compare the way in which δόξα is treated in the Republic, 5. 479 A: Τῶν πολλῶν καλῶν μῶν τι ἔστιν, ὃ οὐκ αἰσχρὸν φανήσεται; καὶ τῶν δικαίων, ὃ οὐκ ἄδικον; καὶ τῶν ὀσίων, ὃ οὐκ ἀνόσιον; κ. τ. λ. τί δέ; τὰ πολλὰ διπλάσια ἤττόν τι ἡμίσεια ἢ διπλάσια φαίνεται; Οὐδέν. Καὶ μεγάλη δὴ καὶ σμικρὰ καὶ κοῦφα καὶ βαρέα μὴ τι μᾶλλον, ἃ ἂν φήσωμεν, ταῦτα προσρηθήσεται ἢ τὰναντία;

8. ἐπεὶ καὶ τάδε, κ. τ. λ.] The clause ὅτι . . . ἡσυχία is added in explanation of τῷ λόγῳ σημεία. 'The theory is confirmed by the following indications of the fact that,' etc. H. Schmidt quotes Menex. 237 E: Μέγα δὲ τεκμήριον τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ, ὅτι, κ. τ. λ. . . . πᾶν γάρ, κ. τ. λ. Cp.

p. 153. σημεῖα ἱκανά, ὅτι τὸ μὲν εἶναι δοκοῦν καὶ τὸ γίγνεσθαι κίνησις παρέχει, τὸ δὲ μὴ εἶναι καὶ ἀπόλλυσθαι ἡσυχία· τὸ γὰρ θερμόν τε καὶ πῦρ, ὃ δὴ καὶ τᾶλλα γεννᾷ καὶ ἐπιτροπεύει, αὐτὸ γεννᾶται ἐκ φορᾶς καὶ τρίψεως· τοῦτο δὲ κίνησις· ἢ οὐχ αὐταὶ γενέσεις 5 πυρός;

ΘΕΑΙ. Αὐταὶ μὴν οὖν.

B ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν τό γε τῶν ζώων γένος ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν τούτων φύεται.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς δ' οὐ;

Thuc. I. 2 : Καὶ παράδειγμα τὸδε τοῦ λόγου οὐκ ἐλάχιστον ἐστὶ, διὰ τὰς μετοικίας ἐς τὰ ἄλλα μὴ ὁμοίως αὐξηθῆναι· ἐκ γάρ, κ. τ. λ.

1. δοκοῦν] The expression has been thought harsh [δοκοῦν] Schanz; and Badham proposes to read *ὀτιοῦν*. But cp. *supr.* 152 D : Ἄ δὴ φαμεν εἶναι. *Infr.* 153 E : Καὶ ὃ δὴ ἕκαστον εἶναι φαμεν χρώμα; also 176 C : Δεινότητές τε δοκοῦσαι. 'Being, so esteemed.' 'What passes for Being.'

3. ὃ δὴ καὶ τᾶλλα γεννᾷ] 'Which our theory assumes to produce all other things.' The symbol of fire as the primal element is elsewhere associated with the theory of a flux. See *Cratyl.* 401 (quoted above), *ib.* 413 B (speaking of the Heracliteans): 'Ὁ μὲν γάρ τις φησι τοῦτο εἶναι δίκαιον, τὸν ἥλιον· τοῦτον γὰρ μόνον διαίοντα καὶ κάοντα ἐπιτροπεύειν τὰ ὄντα. ἐπειδὴν οὖν τῷ λέγω αὐτὸ ἄσμενος ὡς καλόν τι ἀκηκόως, καταγελᾷ μου οὗτος ἀκούσας καὶ ἔρωτᾷ, εἰ οὐδὲν δίκαιον οἶμαι εἶναι ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἐπειδὴν ὃ ἥλιος δύη. λιπαροῦντος οὖν ἐμοῦ ὃ τι αὐτὸν ἐκείνος λέγει, αὐτὸ τὸ πῦρ φησί· τοῦτο δὲ οὐ ῥᾶδιόν ἐστιν εἶδέναι. ὃ δὲ οὐκ αὐτὸ τὸ

πῦρ φησίν, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ τὸ θερμόν τὸ ἐν τῷ πυρὶ ἐνόν. ὃ δὲ τούτων μὲν πάντων καταγελᾷ φησίν, εἶναι δὲ τὸ δίκαιον ὃ λέγει Ἄναξαγόρας, νοῦν εἶναι τοῦτο, κ. τ. λ. Thus the mythology of the doctrine was rationalized by its adherents. In this dialogue every feature of it is presented, from the most sensuous symbolism (ἥλιος, χρυσῆ σειρά) to the most abstract principle (τὸ πᾶν κίνησις ἦν, 156), and its most remote application. See also the famous saying of Heraclitus (*fr.* Bywater): Κόσμον τὸν αὐτὸν ἀπάντων, οὔτε θεῶν τις οὔτε ἀνθρώπων ἐποίησεν, ἀλλ' ἔστιν ἦν τε αἰεὶ καὶ ἔσται πῦρ αἰεζῶον ἀπτόμενον μέτρα καὶ σβεννύμενον μέτρα. But the symbol fire was by no means confined to Heraclitus (cp. the Atomists, Pythagoreans, etc.).

5. τοῦτο δὲ κίνησις] This is added parenthetically with reference to *τρίψεως*. Τούτω δὲ κινήσεις has been adopted by editors on the authority of the Bodleian MS. But *τοῦτο* is also the reading of the Bodl. first hand. The marginal note *δουκῶς* is due to the corrector (b) who changed *τοῦτο* into *τούτω*, instead of restoring *κίνησις*.

rest of decay. Fire, the presiding element, is generated by friction, that is, by motion.

'Living creatures owe their origin to a similar cause.'

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; ἡ τῶν σωμάτων ἕξις οὐχ ὑπὸ ἡσυχίας μὲν καὶ ἀργίας διόλλυται, ὑπὸ γυμνασίων δὲ καὶ κινήσεων ἐπὶ πολὺ σῶζεται;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

5 ΣΩ. Ἡ δ' ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἕξις—οὐχ ὑπὸ μαθήσεως μὲν καὶ μελέτης, κινήσεων ὄντων, κτᾶταί τε μαθήματα καὶ σῶζεται καὶ γίγνεται βελτίων, ὑπὸ δ' ἡσυχίας,

3. ἐπὶ πολὺ] 'To a great extent;' or 'for a long time.' The MSS. vary between (ὡς) ἐπὶ πολὺ (T etc.), and ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ (B etc.), from which ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ has been conjectured. But ὡς in T was at first omitted, and ἐπὶ πολὺ gives a better sense. Cp. Thuc. 8. 1: 'Ἐπὶ πολὺ μὲν ἡπίστανον. Crat. 415 A: Τοῦ ἄνευ ἐπὶ πολὺ.

5. Ἡ δ' ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἕξις] ἕξις in Plato, like φαντασία, is less technical than in Aristotle. It is simply the noun of ἔχειν, whether transitive or not. The body is said ἔχειν πῶς, the mind is said ἔχειν τὰ μαθήματα; hence ἡ τοῦ σώματος ἕξις, 'the condition of the body;' but ἡ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἕξις, 'the having in the mind.' Cp. Rep. 9. 591 B: Ἡ ψυχὴ τιμωτέραν ἕξιν λαμβάνει σωφροσύνην τε καὶ δικαιοσύνην . . . κτωμένη. Ar. Met. 4. 1022. 6: Ἐξίς δὲ λέγεται ἕνα μὲν τρόπον οἷον ἐνέργειά τις τοῦ ἔχοντος καὶ ἔχομένου . . . ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον διάθεσις, κ. τ. λ.

For a similar transition from one sense of a word to another cp. 158 E: Τὰ αἰεὶ δοκοῦντα τῷ δοκοῦντι εἶναι ἀληθῆ.

'But with regard to the having the mind, is it not through learning and practice, which are motions, that it gains what it learns, and is preserved, and becomes better?' The sentence

proceeds as if ψυχὴ were the subject, at all events of the latter part. Cp. Rep. 7. 532 B: Ἡ δὲ γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, λύσις τε ἀπὸ τῶν δεσμών, κ. τ. λ.

6. κινήσεων ὄντων] Cp. Prot. 329 D: Ὅτι ἐνὸς ὄντος τῆς ἀρετῆς μούριά ἐστιν ἡ ἐρωτᾶς. ὄντων is neuter; 'things which are of the nature of motion,' like τοῦτο δὲ κίνησις above. Others suppose ὄντων to be the masculine form used for the feminine according to a well-known tendency of Attic Greek. But in this case it would be better to read κινήσειον ὄντων with Buttman and Schanz.

7. σῶζεται] (1) 'Retains' (middle), or, better, (2) 'is preserved' (passive). ἕξις, as above interpreted, the preceding κτᾶται τε . . . καί, and ἐπιλανθάνεται in the corresponding clause, may be urged in favour of the former: for which cp. 163 D: Ἐτι ἔχοντα μνήμην τούτου καὶ σωζόμενον. Rep. 455 B: Μηδ' ἂ ἔμαθε σῶζοιτο. But when σῶζεται is rendered as passive, there is a more natural progress in the thought, 'gets knowledge, is preserved, improves,' while ἐπιλανθάνεται may be as justly opposed to improvement as to retention. And we avoid the difficulty of supposing that the word is used differently here, and a few lines

p. 153. ἀμελετησίας τε καὶ ἀμαθίας οὔσης, οὔτε τι μαθηταί
 οἱ ἄ τε ἀν μάθη ἐπιλανθάνεται;

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ μάλα.

ΣΩ. Τὸ μὲν ἄρα ἀγαθόν, κίνησις, κατὰ τε ψυχὴν
 καὶ κατὰ σῶμα, τὸ δὲ τοῦναντίον;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔοικεν.

ΣΩ. Ἔτι οὖν σοι λέγω νημερίας τε καὶ γαλήνας

‘Motion,
 then, is
 good, and
 rest is evil.

5

above and below: cp. Symp. 208 A: Μελετή . . σώζει τὴν ἐπιστήμην. See the whole passage. In the indeterminate state of grammar, may there not be a real, though not unconscious, ambiguity? H. Schmidt thinks that σώζεται may be taken reflexively throughout sections B to D, ‘Es lässt sich in allen drei stetter medial fassen, in der ersten und dritter als “servat se” und in der zweiten als “servat sibi.”’ This comes practically to the same thing as (1).

4. τὸ μὲν ἄρα] ‘The one, then, namely, motion, is good.’

There seems no reason to suspect a gloss. There would be a want of Plato’s usual explicitness without κίνησις; and the variety of genders presents no difficulty. Cp. Rep. 433 D: Ἐνάμιλλον ἄρα—ἡ—δύναμις; inf. 156 B: Τὸ δὲ αἴσθησις.

7. Ἔτι οὖν σοι λέγω . . ὄτι] (1) ‘Must I go on to mention still weather and calms, and the like, showing how quietness in every case corrupts and destroys, whilst its opposite preserves: and for my crowning instance, pressing it into the service, shall I insist upon it that by his golden chain Homer means the sun?’ For προσβιβάζων, ‘making it

yield to my theory,’ cp. Phædr. 229 E: Αἷς εἴ τις ἀπιστῶν προσβιβᾷ κατὰ τὸ εἶκος ἕκαστον.—‘If one is to force each of them (the mythes) to harmonize with probability.’ Cratyl. 427 C: Καὶ τὰλλα οὕτω φαίνεται προσβιβάζων—ὁ νομοθέτης, ‘forcing the sound of words to square with the sense.’ Mythology, poetry, nature, body, mind, the elements, had already been ‘pressed into the service.’ But this final instance requires still greater force. Thus Plato glances, as he does elsewhere, at the absurd allegorical interpretations of Homer which were current (amongst Heracliteans and others) in his day. The position of the accusative τὴν χρυσὴν σειρᾶν is possibly due to the attraction of the active προσβιβάζων, and to the previous accusative, τὸν κολοφῶνα, which is in apposition to the sentence (Riddell, Digest of Idioms, §§ 11, 13). For the transitive clause with ἀναγκάζω cp. Symp. 202 A: Μὴ τοίνυν ἀνάγκαζε, ὃ μὴ καλόν ἐστιν, αἰσχρὸν εἶναι. Parm. 133 C: Ὁ ἄγνωστα ἀναγκάζων αὐτὰ εἶναι. Or (2) ‘And finally, shall I clinch the proof (or shall I compel assent) by bringing on my crowning argument (and showing) that by his golden chain Homer means

Water and air are preserved by motion. The whole may be clinched with Homer's golden chain.

καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα, ὅτι αἱ μὲν ἡσυχίαι σήπουσι καὶ ἀπολλύασι, τὰ δ' ἕτερα σώζει; καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις τὸν κολοφῶνα ἀναγκάζω προσβιβάζων τὴν χρυσοῦν σειρὰν ὡς οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ τὸν ἥλιον Ὅμηρος λέγει, καὶ δηλοῖ
5 ὅτι ἕως μὲν ἂν ἡ περιφορὰ ἦ κινουμένη καὶ ὁ ἥλιος, D

the sun?' For ἀναγκάζω here cp. Rep. 10. 611 B: "Οτι . . . ἀνάπατον ψυχὴ καὶ ὄριτι λόγος καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἀναγκάσειαν ἄν. In (2) προσβιβάζων is not used as in Phædr. 229 E, Crat. 427 C, and the Bodleian reading προσβιβάζων would do equally well. In either case ἀναγκάζω, like λέγω supra, is deliberative subjunctive. Schanz brackets ἀναγκάζω, and reads προσβιβάζω ('Shall I adduce?'). Dobree conjectures ἀναγαγὼν προσβιβάζω.

1. αἱ μὲν ἡσυχίαι] There is a slight redundancy of expression in order to bring the instance in question under the general theory. Here, as elsewhere, Hirschig prunes the text.

3. τὴν χρυσοῦν σειρὰν] Pl. 8. 18, foll. At this point Socrates has entered fully into the Heraclitean vein; as when he says of himself in the Cratylus, 407 D: "Ὁφρα ἴδῃαι οἴοι Εὐθύφρονος ἵπποι, or in the Phædrus, 238 D: Οὐκέτι πόρρω Διθυράμβων φθέγγομαι. This is the crowning argument, because it adduces the capital fact of nature witnessed to by the oldest and gravest authority (στρατηγὸν Ὅμηρον). The lines chiefly adverted to are 23-26: 'Ἄλλ' ὅτε δὴ κεν ἐγὼ πρόφρων ἐθέλοιμι ἐρύσσαι, | αὐτῇ κεν γαίῃ ἐρύσαιμι | αὐτῇ τε θαλάσσῃ | σειρὴν μὲν κεν ἔπειτα περὶ ρίον Οὐλύμπου | δησαίμην, τὰ δέ κ' αὐτε μετῆρα πάντα γένοιτο. Cp. Heracl. fr. 31, By-

water: Εἰ μὴ ἥλιος ἦν, εὐφρόνη ἂν ἦν. Fr. 29: ἥλιος οὐχ ὑπερβήσεται μέτρα, εἰ δὲ μὴ, Ἐρινύες μιν Δίκης ἐπίκουροι ἐξευρήσουσι. See also Eur. Orest. 982-4. As fire was the symbol of motion, so the sun was the still more concrete symbol of fire. See Rep. 6. 508, where the sun is allowed to be paramount in the region of sense; being essential to vision and to life. For the way in which the authority of Homer and the poets is used, ironically by Plato, but seriously by those whom he imitates, cp. Cratyl. 391, where an argument is based upon the line ἄνδρες δὲ Σκάμανδρον, καλέουσι θεοί, ἄνδρες δὲ Σκάμανδρον, and infr. 194 E: "Ὅταν τοίνυν λάσιόν του τὸ κέαρ ἦ, ὃ δὴ ἐπήνεσεν ὁ πάντα σοφὸς ποιητής.

5. ἡ περιφορὰ ἢ κινουμένη καὶ ὁ ἥλιος] The motion of the whole universe, and the perpetual interchange of the different elements, was symbolized in the Heraclitean theory by the revolution of the sun, who not only rose and descended, traversing the sky, but was also quenched and rekindled daily, Νέος ἐφ' ἡμέρη (fr. 32). Lassalle compares Ar. Meteor. 1. 9: 'Ἡ μὲν οὖν ὡς κινουσα καὶ κυρία καὶ πρώτη τῶν ἀρχῶν ὁ κύκλος ἐστίν· ἐν ᾧ φανερώς ἡ τοῦ ἡλίου φορὰ διακρίνουσα καὶ συγκρινουσα τῶ γίγνεσθαι πλησίον ἢ πορρώτερον, αἰτία τῆς γενέσεως καὶ τῆς φθορᾶς ἐστὶ . . . Ἔστι δ' ἡ μὲν ἐξ ὕδατος ἀναθυμία-

153. πάντα ἔστι καὶ σώζεται τὰ ἐν θεοῖς τε καὶ ἀνθρώποις· εἰ δὲ σταίη τοῦτο ὥσπερ δεθέν, πάντα χρήματ' ἂν διαφθαρείη καὶ γένοιτ' ἂν τὸ λεγόμενον ἄνω κάτω πάντα;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἄλλ' ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ταῦτα δηλοῦν, ἅπερ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Ὑπόλαβε τοῖνυν, ὦ ἄριστε, οὕτωςί. κατὰ τὰ

σας, ἀτμίς' ἢ δ' ἐξ ἀέρος εἰς ὕδωρ, νέφος. . . Γίνεται δὲ κύκλος οὗτος μιμούμενος τὸν τοῦ ἡλίου κύκλον, ἅμα γὰρ ἐκείνος εἰς τὰ πλάγια μεταβάλλει, καὶ οὗτος ἄνω καὶ κάτω. Δεῖ δὲ νοῆσαι τοῦτον ὥσπερ ποταμὸν ῥέοντα κύκλω ἄνω καὶ κάτω, κοινὸν ἀέρος καὶ ὕδατος. . . Ὡστ' εἴπερ ἡγίττοντο τὸν Ὠκεανὸν οἱ πρότερον, τάχ' ἂν τοῦτον τὸν ποταμὸν λέγοιεν τὸν κύκλω ῥέοντα περὶ τὴν γῆν. Cp. infr. 181 D: Τὴν δὲ περιφορὰν, and note: Phil. 28 E.

2. εἰ δὲ σταίη] Cp. Phædr. 245 C (where the point of view is nearer to Plato's own): Τὸ ἀεικίνητον ἀθάνατον, τὸ δ' ἄλλο κινεῖται καὶ ὑπ' ἄλλον κινούμενον, παύσαν ἔχον κινήσεως, παύσαν ἔχει ζωῆς. . . οὕτω δὴ κινήσεως μὲν ἀρχὴ τὸ αὐτὸ αὐτὸ κινεῖται. τοῦτο δ' οὐτ' ἀπόλυσθαι οὔτε γίγνεσθαι δυνατόν, ἢ πάντα τε οὐρανὸν πᾶσάν τε γένεσιν συμπεσοῦσαν στήναι καὶ μήποτε αὐθις ἔχειν ὅθεν κινήθεται γενέσθαι. In the text all is made to depend on change; in the above passage all change depends on that which is self-moving; but in both, motion is essential to being. Cp. also Legg. 10. 895 A: Εἰ σταίη πως τὰ πάντα ὁμοῦ γενόμενα, καθάπερ οἱ πλείστοι τῶν τοιούτων τολμῶσι λέγειν, τίς ἄρα ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀνάγκη πρώτην κίνησιν γενέσθαι τῶν αἰρημένων; Ar. Met. 1. 994 A: Τὸν μὲν ἀνθρώπων ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀέρος κινήθηναι, τοῦτον δ' ὑπὸ τοῦ ἡλίου, τὸν δὲ ἡλίον ὑπὸ τοῦ νεύκου, καὶ τούτου μηδὲν εἶναι πέρας. Ib. 11.

6-10. Simpl. in Aristot. Cat. p. 1056. Bas. (quoted by Lassalle): Εἰ γὰρ τὸ ἔτερον τῶν ἐναντίων ἐπιλείπει, οἴχοιτο ἂν πάντα ἀφανισθέντα· διὸ καὶ μέμφεται Ὁμήρω Ἡράκλειτος εἰπόντι, Ὡς ἔρις κ.τ.λ. Οἰχήσεσθαι, γάρ, φησι, πάντα. Schol. Ven. ad Iliad. 18. 107: (Ὡς ἔρις ἕκ τε θεῶν ἕκ τ' ἀνθρώπων ἀπόλοιτο) Ἡράκλειτος τὴν τῶν ὄντων φύσιν κατ' ἔριν συνεστάναι νομίζων μέμφεται Ὁμήρω, σύγχυσιν κόσμον δοκῶν αὐτὸν εὐχεσθαι. In the words ἄνω κάτω there is perhaps an allusion to Heraclitus' ὁδὸς ἄνω κάτω μία. See also Phædo 72 C.

Some of the latest guesses at truth have sometimes had a real or fanciful resemblance to the earlier ones. See Comte in Miss Martineau's abridgment, vol. 1. p. 429: 'Amidst the confusion and obscurity which exist on this subject, I think we may conclude that no organism, even the simplest, could live in a state of complete immobility. The double movement of the earth, and especially its rotation, may probably be as necessary to the development of life as to the periodical distribution of heat and light.'

6. Ὑπόλαβε] If being then is motion, how are we to conceive of knowledge, i. e. of sensible perception? This is now evolved, a fresh appeal to experience being made at every

If the revolution of the sun and of the heaven were stopped, the order of the universe would be overthrown.'

5

3. The theory is now applied. (1) Colour is not something without nor in the eye, it arises between, when the eye encounters a particular motion. Hence it is different to man and other animals, to different men, and

ὄμματα πρῶτον, ὃ δὴ καλεῖς χρῶμα λευκόν, μὴ εἶναι p. 153.
 αὐτὸ ἕτερόν τι ἔξω τῶν σῶν ὀμμάτων μῆδ' ἐν τοῖς
 ὀμμασι· μῆδέ τιw' αὐτῷ χῶραν ἀποτάξις· ἤδη γὰρ E
 ἂν εἴη τε *ὄν που ἐν τάξει καὶ μένοι καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἐν
 5 γενέσει γίγνοιτο.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἄλλὰ πῶς;

ΣΩ. Ἐπώμεθα τῷ ἄρτι λόγῳ, μῆδὲν αὐτὸ καθ'
 αὐτὸ ἐν ὃν τιθέντες· καὶ ἡμῖν οὕτω μέλαν τε καὶ
 λευκόν καὶ ὀτιοῦν ἄλλο χρῶμα ἐκ τῆς προσβολῆς
 10 τῶν ὀμμάτων πρὸς τὴν προσήκουσαν φοράν φανεῖται
 γεγενημένον, καὶ ὃ δὴ ἕκαστον εἶναί φαμεν χρῶμα,
 οὔτε τὸ προσβάλλον οὔτε τὸ προσβαλλόμενον ἔσται, p. 154.
 ἀλλὰ μεταξύ τι ἕκαστῳ ἴδιον γεγονός· ἢ σὺ διῶσχυρί-

step. Each sensation is the result of a double movement from within and from without. Hence all sensations are, (1) relative to the individual (ἐκάστω ἴδιονγεγονός); (2) relative to each other. (1) is proved chiefly of the sensations of colour, warmth, etc.: (2) of the perceptions of size and number.

κατὰ τὰ ὄμματα] 'In the sphere of vision.'

2. ἕτερόν τι] 'A separate thing.'

3. χῶραν] Cp. infr. 156 C.

4. *ὄν] MSS. ἄν. Heind. corr. ὄν που ἐν τάξει = εἴ τις αὐτῷ χῶρα ἀποταχθείη. The change from ἄν to ὄν is more probable than the repetition of ἄν in this place. For ἤδη = 'if that were done,' cp. infr. 201 E: "Ἦδη γὰρ ἂν οὐσίαν . . . προστίθεσθαι.

10. πρὸς τὴν προσήκουσαν φοράν] The theory does not consider the origin of this motion. The instinctive belief in the reality of external things is already weakened.

11. ὃ δὴ ἕκαστον εἶναί φαμεν] Cp. 152 D: *Α δὴ φάμεν εἶναι. τὸ προσβάλλον, sc. ἡ φορά. τὸ προσβαλλόμενον, sc. τὰ ὄμματα. Cp. infr. ἄλλω τῷ προσπεσόν . . ἄλλου προσελθόντος.

12. οὔτε τὸ προσβάλλον οὔτε τὸ προσβαλλόμενον] 'Neither that which strikes, nor that which is struck,' i. e. Neither the motion from within nor that which meets it from without. Here, as elsewhere, 'sight' is conceived of as an act, and not as a passive impression. And τὸ προσβαλλόμενον is the object, τοῦτο, ᾧ προσβάλλει τὰ ὄμματα. This is a curious use of the passive voice. But the comparison of other passages, esp. Tim. 45 C: ὅπῃπερ ἂν ἀντερείδη τὸ πρόσπιπτον εὐδοθεὶς πρὸς ὃ τῶν ἔξω ξυνέπεσε, excludes the possibility of doubt, although the expression so understood is inconsistent with the theory of active and passive elements, which is afterwards introduced (infr. 156 A).

p. 154. *σαιο ἂν ὡς οἶον σοὶ φαίνεται ἕκαστον χρώμα, τοιοῦτον καὶ κυνὶ καὶ ὄφροῦν ζῶω;*

ΘΕΑΙ. *Μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔγωγε.*

ΣΩ. *Τί δέ; ἄλλω ἀνθρώπῳ ἂρ' ὅμοιον καὶ σοὶ φαίνεται ὅτιοῦν; ἔχεις τοῦτο ἰσχυρῶς, ἢ πολὺ μᾶλλον, 5 ὅτι οὐδὲ σοὶ αὐτῷ ταῦτον διὰ τὸ μηδέποτε ὁμοίως αὐτὸν σεαυτῷ ἔχειν;*

ΘΕΑΙ. *Τοῦτο μᾶλλον μοι δοκεῖ ἢ ἐκείνο.*

B ΣΩ. *Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὲν ᾧ παραμετρούμεθα ἢ οὐ ἔφαπτόμεθα, μέγα ἢ λευκὸν ἢ θερμὸν ἦν, οὐκ ἂν ποτε 10 ἄλλω προσπεσὸν ἄλλο ἂν ἐγεγόνει, αὐτό γε μηδὲν μεταβάλλον· εἰ δὲ αὐτὸ παραμετρούμενον ἢ ἐφαπτόμενον ἕκαστον ἦν τούτων, οὐκ ἂν αὐτὸ ἄλλου προσελθόντος ἢ τι παθόντος αὐτὸ μηδὲν παθὸν ἄλλο ἂν ἐγένετο. ἐπεὶ νῦν γε, ὦ φίλε, θαυμαστά τε καὶ γελοῖα 15*

to the same man in different states.

(2) Warmth in like manner is relative to the touch, and size and number are wholly relative. For want of observing this,

9. ᾧ παραμετρούμεθα] Cornarius, followed by most editors, reads *ὁ*, taking *παραμετρούμεθα* actively. Although (as H. Schmidt remarks) in the example given *infr.* 155 B the case is altered by the supposition that Theætetus has grown, I still adhere to the MS. text and interpret (with Jowett) 'that with which we compare ourselves in size.' The instance most in point is that adduced in the *Phædo*, 102 B, where Simmias is shorter than Socrates, but taller than *Phædo*. There is in any case some confusion between relativity and subjectivity. This is partially evaded by making self the subject of comparison, but would be increased if τὸ παραμετρούμενον meant 'that which perceives size,' as it must if *ὁ* is read. None of the examples given are such as

to suggest the notion that bigness is in the eye.

We are introduced to a new class of objects, and make a transition in the argument at the same time. All that I can see, hear, feel, etc., is seen, heard, felt, etc. by me alone, and arises solely in relation to me. Again, I view the size of other bodies in relation to my own, or I compare different quantities. I cannot think of any magnitude or number as great or small, except in relation to some other magnitude or number.

12. τὸ παραμετρούμενον ἢ ἐφαπτόμενον] I. e. 'I, the subject in the one case of self-measurement, in the other of sensation.' Cp. 182 A, τὸ . . πάσχων. *Ar. Eth. N. 10. 4. § 5: Αὐτὴν δὲ (τὴν αἴσθησιν) λέγειν ἐνεργεῖν ἢ ἐν ᾧ ἔστι μηδὲν διαφερέτω.*

we allow ourselves to fall into manifest contradictions.

E.g. We say that six dice are more and fewer; more than four, fewer than twelve.

Can anything become more unless increased?

εὐχερῶς πως ἀναγκαζόμεθα λέγειν, ὡς φαίη ἂν Πρω- p. 154.
ταγόρας τε καὶ πᾶς ὁ τὰ αὐτὰ ἐκείνω ἐπιχειρῶν
λέγειν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς δὴ καὶ ποῖα λέγεις ;

5 ΣΩ. Σμικρὸν λαβὲ παράδειγμα, καὶ πάντα εἶσει ἂ ο
βούλομαι. ἀστραγάλους γάρ που ἕξ, ἂν μὲν τέτταρας
αὐτοῖς προσενέγκης, πλείους φαιμέν εἶναι τῶν τεττάρων
καὶ ἡμιολίους, ἐὰν δὲ δώδεκα, ἐλάττους καὶ ἡμίσεις·
καὶ οὐδὲ ἀνεκτὸν ἄλλως λέγειν. ἢ σὺ ἀνέξει ;

10 ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκ ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν ; ἂν σε Πρωταγόρας ἔρηται ἢ τις
ἄλλος, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἔσθ' ὅπως τι μείζον ἢ πλεόν
γίγνεται ἄλλως ἢ αὐξηθέν ; τί ἀποκρινεῖ ;

15 ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐὰν μὲν, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ δοκοῦν πρὸς τὴν
νῦν ἐρώτησιν ἀποκρίνωμαι, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν· ἐὰν δὲ πρὸς δ
τὴν προτέραν, φυλάττων μὴ ἐναντία εἶπω, ὅτι ἔστιν.

ΣΩ. Εὐ γε νῆ τὴν Ἑραν, ὦ φίλε, καὶ θείως. ἀτάρ,
ὡς εἴκειν, ἐὰν ἀποκρίνη ὅτι ἔστιν, Εὐριπίδειόν τι ξυμ-
βήσεται· ἢ μὲν γὰρ γλῶττα ἀνέλεγκτος ἡμῖν ἔσται,
20 ἢ δὲ φρήν οὐκ ἀνέλεγκτος.

1. εὐχερῶς πως ἀναγκαζόμεθα] 'We allow ourselves to be drawn into using strange and ridiculous expressions.' Protagoras would not find fault with us for calling the six dice more than the four, but for using the verb εἶναι to express the relation.

6. ἀστραγάλους γάρ που ἕξ] The difficulty has been stated with regard to size, it is now illustrated with regard to number.

14. τὸ δοκοῦν] Cp. p. 157 C: Δοκοῦντά σοι.

16. φυλάττων] Not exactly 'avoiding' (φυλαττόμενος), but

'being careful': keeping watch on one point only. Cp. Gorg. 461 D: Ἐάν μοι ἐν μόνον φυλάττης. Τί τοῦτο λέγεις ; Τὴν μακρολογίαν . . ἢν καθείρηξῃς: infr. p. 180 A: Εὐ πάνυ φυλάττουσι τὸ μηδὲν βέβαιον εἶναι. Also infr. 169 C: πάνυ τήρει τὸ τοῖόνδε, μή, κ.τ.λ.

17. Εὐ γε . . καὶ θείως] Theaetetus' answer showed great dialectical aptitude. He perceives the contradiction, and yet will not answer παρὰ τὸ δοκοῦν αὐτῷ. Cp. Rep. I. 346 A: καὶ, ὦ μακάριε, καὶ παρὰ δόξαν ἀποκρίνου, ἵνα τι καὶ περαίνωμεν.

19. ἢ μὲν γὰρ γλῶττα] 'Our

p. 154. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθῆ.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὲν δεινοὶ καὶ σοφοὶ ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ ἡμεν, πάντα τὰ τῶν φρενῶν ἐξητακότες, ἥδη ἂν τὸ λοιπὸν ἐκ περιουσίας ἀλλήλων ἀποπειρώμενοι, ξυνελθόντες σοφιστικῶς εἰς μάχην τοιαύτην, ἀλλήλων τοὺς 5 λόγους τοῖς λόγοις ἐκρούομεν· νῦν δὲ ἅτε ἰδιῶται πρῶτον βουλευσόμεθα θεάσασθαι αὐτὰ πρὸς αὐτά, τί ποτ' ἐστὶν ἃ διανοούμεθα, πότερον ἡμῖν ἀλλήλοις ξυμφωνεῖ ἢ οὐδ' ὅπωςτιοῦν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν ἔγωγε τοῦτ' ἂν βουλοίμην. 10

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν ἔγωγε. ὅτε δ' οὕτως ἔχει, ἄλλο τι ἢ ἡρέμα, ὡς πάνυ πολλὴν σχολὴν ἄγοντες, πάλιν ἐπανασκεψόμεθα, οὐ δυσκολαίνοντες, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι ἡμᾶς

Let us consider this, not in the spirit of controversy, but with calm inquiry.

What are these apparitions that have been raised within us?

tongue will be unconvinced, but not our mind.' Eur. Hipp. 612: 'Ἡ γλῶσσ' ὁμώμοχ', ἣ δὲ φρήν ἀνάματος.

3. πάντα . . ἐξητακότες] 'Having ransacked every mental problem.'

4. ἐκ περιουσίας] 'Out of our superfluity,' for mere pastime.' Dem. de Cor. 226: Οὗτος δ' ἐκ περιουσίας ἐμοῦ κατηγορεῖ.

5. τοιαύτην] Sc. σοφιστικὴν. Cp. Symp. 210 B C: "Ὅστε καὶ εἰν ἐπιεικῆς ὦν τὴν ψυχὴν τις καὶ σμικρὸν ἄνθος ἔχη, ἐξαρκεῖν αὐτῷ καὶ ἐρᾶν καὶ κήδεσθαι καὶ τικτεῖν λόγους τοιούτους, νῆξ. ἐπιεικέις. Plato is thinking of such encounters as those which he has satirized in the Euthydemus.

τοὺς λόγους τοῖς λόγοις ἐκρούομεν] Ar. Nub. 321: Καὶ γνωμίδιῳ γνώμην νύξασ', ἐτέρω λόγῳ ἀντιλογήσω.

6. ἐκρούομεν] 'Would have knocked our arguments together,' like swords in a sham fight; 'would have banded arguments.'

7. αὐτὰ πρὸς αὐτά] 'Compared with one another.' The reading of the old edd., αὐτὰ πρὸς αὐτά, might be defended, but αὐτά is the Bodleian reading.

8. ἡμῖν] Cp. Rep. I. 343 A.

11. Καὶ μὴν ἔγωγε] V. r. Καὶ μὴν ἐγώ (B pr. TII.) The abruptness of ἐγώ without γε may be defended from Rep. 6. 500 A: Καὶ ἐγώ, ἀμέλει, ἔφη, συνοίσομαι, infr. 164 A, Eur. Med. 1375: Καὶ μὴν ἐγώ σήν. Alcest. 369: Καὶ μὴν ἐγώ σοι πένθος . . συνοίσω. But the correction of the Bodleian MS. is in the ancient hand. In either case καὶ belongs to the pronoun.

12. ὡς πάνυ πολλὴν σχολὴν ἄγοντες] Plato does not forget, either here or infr. 172 E, that Socrates has been summoned to appear before the King Archon.

13. οὐ δυσκολαίνοντες] 'With no feeling of impatience.' Cp. Men. 75 C D: Εἰ μὲν γε τῶν σοφῶν τις εἶη καὶ ἐριστικῶν ὁ ἐρόμενος, εἴποιμ' ἂν αὐτῷ, ὅτι Ἐμοὶ

One voice says, Nothing can become more or fewer, greater or less, while it is equal to itself. Another: —That to which nothing is added, and from which nothing is taken, remains equal to itself.

αὐτοὺς ἐξετάζοντες, ἅττα ποτ' ἐστὶ ταῦτα τὰ φάσματα p. 155.
 ἐν ἡμῖν; ὧν πρῶτον ἐπισκοποῦντες φήσομεν, ὡς ἐγὼ
 οἶμαι, μηδέποτε μηδὲν ἂν μειζρον μηδὲ ἔλαττον γενέ-
 σθαι μήτε ὄγκῳ μήτε ἀριθμῷ, ἕως ἴσον εἴη αὐτὸ
 5 εἶναυτῷ. οὐχ οὕτως;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Δεύτερον δέ γε, ᾧ μήτε προστίθεται μήτε
 ἀφαιροῖτο, τοῦτο μήτε αὐξάνεσθαι ποτε μήτε φθίνειν,
 αἰεὶ δὲ ἴσον εἶναι.

10 ΘΕΑΙ. Κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν οὐ καὶ τρίτον, ὃ μὴ πρότερον ἦν, Β

μὲν εἴρηται· εἰ δὲ μὴ ὀρθῶς λέγω, σὸν ἔργον λαμβάνει λόγον καὶ ἐλέγχειν· εἰ δὲ ὡσπερ ἐγὼ τε καὶ σὺ νυνὶ φίλοι ὄντες βούλουτο ἀλλήλοις διαλέγεσθαι, δεῖ δὴ πραότερόν πως καὶ διαλεκτικώτερον ἀποκρίνεσθαι.

1. φάσματα] These mental phenomena (that have started into prominence). The ἀπορία just stated have made us aware of certain 'facts of consciousness' or postulates of our own minds. These are here called φάσματα, but presently, when they have been expressed and assented to, ὁμολογήματα. Cp. Polit. 268 E: Τὸ περὶ τὴν Ἀτρέως τε καὶ Θυέστου λεχθεῖσαν ἔριν φάσμα. Meno 85 C: Ὡσπερ ὄναρ ἄρτι ἀνακείνηται αἰ δόξαι αὐται, κ.τ.λ. For the thought cp. infr. 203 A: Βασανίζωμεν δὴ αὐτὰ ἀναλαβόντες, μᾶλλον δὲ ἡμᾶς αὐτούς. Prot. 331 C: Οὐδὲν γὰρ δέομαι τὸ εἰ βούλει τοῦτο καὶ εἴ σοι δοκεῖ ἐλέγχεσθαι ἀλλ' ἐμέ τε καὶ σέ.

2. ὧν πρῶτον . . φήσομεν] 'The first of which, as we look steadily at it, we shall thus put into words.'

8. ἀφαιροῖτο] Sc. ἀπ' αὐτοῦ.

Or, possibly, the pronoun is here the subject: 'And it suffers no diminution.' Cp. infr. B: ἀφαιρεθέντος.

11. ὃ μὴ πρότερον ἦν] This may be construed in two ways. (1) 'What existed not before, but (exists) afterwards, this cannot be, without production and a process of becoming.' (2) 'What was not before, neither can that be afterwards, without production,' etc.

The latter is the more subtle interpretation, but is probably right. Schol.: Ὁ Πρόκλος τὸ ἀλλὰ παρέλκει λέγει. 'Prorsus quod ita Latine dixeris quod non prius erat at postea id esse.' Heindorf.—'Nay but, if it was not before, it cannot be afterwards.' Cp. Soph. 265 B: Ἦτις ἂν αἰτία γίγηται τοῖς μὴ πρότερον οὖσιν ὑστερον γίγνεσθαι. The position of ἀλλὰ in the MSS., however (ὑστερον ἀλλὰ libri omnes, W.), throws some doubt upon the reading, and ἄρα may be suggested. Ὑστερον *ἄρα τοῦτο εἶναι, κ.τ.λ., 'that, as our postulate runs, this cannot afterwards be with-

ρ. 155. *ἀλλὰ ὕστερον τοῦτο εἶναι ἄνευ τοῦ γενέσθαι καὶ γί-
γνεσθαι ἀδύνατον;

ΘΕΑΙ. Δοκεῖ γε δῆ.

ΣΩ. Ταῦτα δῆ, οἶμαι, ὁμολογήματα τρία μάχεται
αὐτὰ αὐτοῖς ἐν τῇ ἡμετέρα ψυχῇ, ὅταν τὰ περὶ τῶν 5
ἀστραγάλων λέγωμεν, ἢ ὅταν φῶμεν ἐμὲ τηλικόνδε
ὄντα, μήτε ἀυξηθέντα μήτε τούναντίον παθόντα, ἐν
ἐνιαυτῷ σου τοῦ νέου νῦν μὲν μείζω εἶναι, ὕστερον δὲ
ἐλάττω, μηδὲν τοῦ ἐμοῦ ὄγκου ἀφαιρεθέντος ἀλλὰ
C σου ἀυξηθέντος. εἰμὶ γὰρ δῆ ὕστερον ὁ πρότερον οὐκ 10
ἦ, οὐ γενόμενος· ἄνευ γὰρ τοῦ γίγνεσθαι γενέσθαι

out becoming and having become.' For the addition of γίγνεσθαι cp. infr. C.

H. Schmidt observes that the contradiction is not between the assumptions themselves, but between the assumption and the fact. But μάχεται αὐτὰ αὐτοῖς can only mean 'fight amongst themselves,' and if the logic of such a half-humorous passage is to be pressed, No. 3 may be supposed to say 'Socrates is what he was not; he must have changed.' 'No,' says No. 2, 'he cannot have changed, for nothing has been taken from him, therefore he is not diminished.' No. 1 then comes to the aid of No. 2.

6. τηλικόνδε] 'Of the height you see me.'

7. ἐν ἐνιαυτῷ] 'In the space of a year.' 'Within a year.' This very natural expression has somehow given offence, and Madvig conj. παθόντα ἐν ἐμαυτῷ, an emendation which appears to have been anticipated by the copyist of Par. 1814.

9. μηδὲν τοῦ ἐμοῦ ὄγκου ἀφαι-
ρεθέντος] 'My size having been stripped of nothing,' i.e. 'Without anything being taken from my height.' Badham conjectures μηδὲν ἐμοῦ τοῦ ὄγκου ἀφαι-
ρεθέντος. But this is unnecessary.

11. ἄνευ γὰρ τοῦ γίγνεσθαι γενέ-
σθαι ἀδύνατον] This axiom is supplementary to the three former. In the first, the aorist was used (γενέσθαι), the present in the second (αὐξάνεσθαι, φθίνειν). Both (γενέσθαι καὶ γίγνεσθαι) are accordingly combined in the third, by means of which the two former are applied. It is now shown that the aorist implies the present. To us such refinements are difficult, because needless. The subtlety is carried still further in the Parmenides, until it is reduced to the formula, 'That which is, is.' Parm. 156 C: 'Ἐστὸς τε πρότερον ὕστερον κινεῖσθαι καὶ πρότερον κινούμενον ὕστερον εἶσταναι, ἄνευ μὲν τοῦ μεταβάλλειν οὐχ οἶόν τε ἔσται ταῦτα πάσχειν' . . . ἀλλ' οὐδὲ μὲν μεταβάλλει ἄνευ τοῦ μεταβάλλειν.

A third :
Nothing
can be
what it was
not, with-
out be-
coming.
These seem
to jar, when
we say that
the dice
which were
fewer are
now more
without
being in-
creased ;
or that I,
who was
taller than
you, am

now shorter, without becoming so.

ἀδύνατον, μηδὲν δὲ ἀπολλύς τοῦ ὄγκου οὐκ ἂν ποτε p. 155-
 ἐγιγνόμεν ἑλάττων. καὶ ἄλλα δὴ μυρία ἐπὶ μυρίοις
 οὕτως ἔχει, εἴπερ καὶ ταῦτα † παραδεξόμεθα. *ἔπει
 γάρ που, ὦ Θεαίτητε· δοκεῖς γοῦν μοι οὐκ ἄπειρος
 5 τῶν τοιούτων εἶναι.

Theatetus is full of wonder and bewilderment at this contradiction:—a sign of his philosophic nature.

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ νῆ τοὺς θεοὺς γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὑπερ-
 φυῶς ὡς θαυμάζω τί ποτ' ἐστὶ ταῦτα, καὶ ἐνίοτε ὡς
 ἀληθῶς βλέπων εἰς αὐτὰ σκοτοδινῶ.

ΣΩ. Θεόδωρος γάρ, ὦ φίλε, φαίνεται οὐ κακῶς D
 10 τοπάξειν περὶ τῆς φύσεώς σου. μάλα γὰρ φιλοσόφου
 τοῦτο τὸ πάθος, τὸ θαυμάζειν· οὐ γὰρ ἄλλη ἀρχὴ

3. καί, which implies a subtle connexion between ταῦτα and ἄλλα μυρία, can only be expressed in English by the emphasis on 'these.' Cp. Soph. Œd. Col. 276: Ὡσπερ με κἀνεστήσαθ', ὧδε σῶζετε.

† παραδεξόμεθα] Sc. παρὰ τοῦ Πρωταγόρου. 'If we are to take this at his hands;' i. e. not only accept, but adopt this as our own difficulty. Cp. infr. 161 B, Charm. 162 E: Εἰ οὖν ξυγχαρεῖς τοῦτ' εἶναι σωφροσύνην ὅπερ οὔτοσι λέγει, καὶ παραδέχει τὸν λόγον, ἔγωγε πολὺ ἂν ἦδιον μετὰ σοῦ σκοποῖμην. . . Ἀλλὰ πάνν ξυγχαρῶ, ἔφη, καὶ παραδέχομαι. But it must be admitted that εἴπερ καὶ ταῦτ' *ἄρ' *ἀποδεξόμεθα would give a plainer sense.

*ἔπει γάρ που] 'I assume this (δῆ), for I suppose I take you with me.' Cp. Euthyph. 12 C: Ἐπει γάρ που νῦν γε: Εὐθ. πᾶν γε. The MSS. have εἶπέ, but there can be little doubt of the truth of Heindorf's emendation. The six dice are more when compared with four. They were fewer when compared with twelve. They cannot be more

without having become more, and they cannot have become more without increase. Protagoras would say: It is true the same thing cannot be more without addition, but the dice in the two cases are not the same thing, for they are in a different relation.—The distinction between relative and absolute quantity is so familiar to us, that this is apt to appear a mere verbal quibble. But the solution of such difficulties was one of the steps by which the Greeks arrived at that distinction.

9. οὐ κακῶς τοπάξειν] 'Theodorus is evidently right in his surmise about you. For this Wonder is a true symptom of the philosophic nature.'

11. οὐ γὰρ ἄλλη ἀρχὴ φιλοσοφίας ἢ αὐτῆ] Arist. Metaph. 1. 2: Διὰ τὸ θαυμάζειν οἱ ἄνθρωποι καὶ νῦν καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἤρξαντο φιλοσοφεῖν, κ. τ. λ.

Aristotle also observes that if wonder is the beginning, cessation of wonder is the end of philosophy;—so reconciling Plato's saying with that of

155. φιλοσοφίας ἢ αὐτή, καὶ ἔοικεν ὁ τὴν Ἴριν Θαύμαντος ἔκγονον φήσας οὐ κακῶς γενεαλογεῖν. ἀλλὰ πότερον μανθάνεις ἤδη δι' ὅ ταῦτα τοιαῦτ' ἔστιν ἐξ ὧν τὸν Πρωταγόραν φημὲν λέγειν, ἢ οὐπω;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐπω μοι δοκῶ.

ΣΩ. Χάριον οὖν μοι εἶσει, εἰάν σοι ἀνδρός, μᾶλλον
 Ε δὲ ἀνδρῶν ὀνομαστώων τῆς διανοίας τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἀπο-
 κερυμμένην συνεξερευνησώμαι αὐτῶν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐκ εἶσομαι, καὶ πάννυ γε πολλήν;

ΣΩ. Ἄθρει δὴ περισκοπῶν, μή τις τῶν ἀμνήτων 10
 ἔπακούῃ. εἰσὶ δὲ οὗτοι οἱ οὐδὲν ἄλλο οἰόμενοι εἶναι ἢ
 οὐδ' ἂν δύνωνται ἀπρὶξ τοῖν χεροῖν λαβέσθαι, πράξις

4. To meet these and other difficulties the 'Protagorean' doctrine is further developed. It must be concealed, however, from the uninitiate,

Democritus, who made ἀθανασία his aim. See K. F. Herm. Gesch. d. Plat. Phil. p. 153.

1. τὴν Ἴριν Θαύμαντος ἔκγονον] Hes. Theog. 265: Θαύμας δ' Ὀκεανοῖο βαθυρρέϊταιο θυγάτρα | ἠγάγετ' Ἠλέκτρην ἢ δ' ὠκεΐαν τέκεν Ἴριν' cp. v. 780.

2. πότερον μανθάνεις ἤδη] 'Do you begin to perceive what is the reason of this, according to the theory we attribute to Protagoras?'

Aristotle, Met. 10. 1063 A, points out that the Protagorean doctrine rests very much on the relativity of quantity: φαίνονται γὰρ οὐχ ἤκιστα τὰ κατὰ τὰς ἀντιφάσεις ταύτου κατηγορεῖν ἐκ τοῦ τὸ ποσὸν ὑπεληφέναι μὴ μένειν ἐπὶ τῶν σωμάτων διὰ τὸ καὶ εἶναι τετράπηχυν τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ οὐκ εἶναι. ἢ δ' οὐσία κατὰ τὸ ποῖον, τοῦτο δὲ τῆς ὀρισμένης φύσεως, τὸ δὲ ποσὸν τῆς ἀόριστου.

6. Χάριν, κ. τ. λ.] 'Shall I then earn your gratitude, if in regard to a man, or rather men, of high renown, I help you to elicit the truth of their

meaning from its hidingplace in their minds?'

μᾶλλον δὲ ἀνδρῶν] Viz. Heraclitus, Homer, and the others mentioned above, 152 E.

7. ἀνδρῶν . . αὐτῶν] The two genitives are not precisely in the same construction: ἀνδρῶν is governed by διανοίας, αὐτῶν by ἐξ ἰν συνεξερ. The pronoun αὐτός, however, is frequently used to recall a noun, which, for the sake of emphasis, has been placed in the forepart of the sentence, e. g. Rep. 5. 477 D: Ἐπιστήμην πότερον δύνάμιν τινα φῆς εἶναι αὐτήν, κ. τ. λ. Cp. Shak. Winter's Tale, 5. 1: 'Whom | Though bearing misery, I desire my life | Once more to look on him.'

ἀποκερυμμένην is to be taken closely with συνεξερ., as the order shows. Cp. Phæd. 89 A: πεφηνγώτας ἀνεκαλέσατο.

12. ἀπρὶξ τοῖν χεροῖν λαβέσθαι] What may be 'grasped thus.' The extreme materialists are here discarded; in the Sophist they are made better for the

those 'impenetrable' men, who believe in no unseen operations, but only in what they can clutch with both hands.

δὲ καὶ γενέσεις καὶ πᾶν τὸ ἀόρατον οὐκ ἀποδεχόμενοι p. 155.
ὡς ἐν οὐσίας μέρει.

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ μὲν δὴ, ὦ Σώκρατες, σκληροὺς γε λέγεις καὶ ἀντιτύπους ἀνθρώπους.

p. 156.

5 ΣΩ. Εἰσὶ γάρ, ὦ παῖ, μάλ' εὖ ἄμουσοι. ἄλλοι δὲ

argument's sake, that we may be able to discourse with them. The description there is very similar. Soph. 246 A B: Οἱ μὲν εἰς γῆν ἐξ οὐρανοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἀοράτου πάντα ἔλκουσι, ταῖς χερσὶν ἀτεχνῶς πέτρας καὶ δρυὲς περιλαμβάνοντες. τῶν γὰρ τοιούτων ἐφαπτόμενοι πάντων δυσχυρίζονται τούτο εἶναι μόνον ὃ παρέχει προσβολὴν καὶ ἐπαφὴν τινα, ταῦτόν σῶμα καὶ οὐσίαν ὀριζόμενοι, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων εἴ τις φησὶ μὴ σῶμα ἔχον εἶναι, καταφρονούντες τὸ παράπαν καὶ οὐδὲν ἐθέλοντες ἄλλο ἀκούειν. 247 C: τούτων οὐδ' ἂν ἐν ἐπισχυμβέειν οἷ γε αὐτῶν σπαρτοὶ τε καὶ αὐτόχθονες, ἀλλὰ διατείνουτ' ἂν πᾶν ὃ μὴ δυνατοὶ ταῖς χερσὶ ξυμπιέξουσιν εἰσὶν, ὡς ἄρα τούτου οὐδὲν τὸ παράπαν ἐστίν.

πράξεις] E. g. δικάια καὶ ἄδικος πρᾶξις. Cp. Soph. 247 A B.

1. γενέσεις] E. g. αἴσθησις, κίνησις, ἡδονή.

Sensationalism is here treated as already a kind of idealism, whereas in the corresponding passage of the Sophist, p. 246, the doctrine of an unseen γένεσις is regarded as an inference which the idealist by his dialectic compels the reluctant materialist to accept. See Introduction.

3. σκληροὺς . . . καὶ ἀντιτύπους] 'Hard and repellent,' i. e. stubborn and impenetrable. Cp. Soph. 246 B: Ἡ δεινοὺς εἴρηκας ἀνδρας· ἤδη γὰρ καὶ ἐγὼ τούτων συχνοῖς προσέτευχον. For the verbal climax cp. Tim. 62 B C:

Σκληρὸν δέ, ὅσοις ἂν ἡμῶν ἡ σὰρξ ὑπέικη . . . τὸ δὲ ἐκ τετραγῶνων ὄν βάσεων . . . ἀντιτυπώτατον εἶδος. There is perhaps a humorous intention in the application of these material attributes to the men in question, similar to the play of words by which the Heracliteans are called *ρέοντες*, *infr.* 181 A.

5. ἄλλοι δὲ πολὺ κομψότεροι] In comparison with these advocates of gross bodily 'matter,' Protagoras is almost an idealist. His disciples believe not indeed in a world of *νοητὰ εἶδη*, but in a hidden process underlying appearances. Cp. Rep. 5. 477 C: *δυνάμειος γὰρ ἐγὼ οὔτε τινα χροῖαν ὄρω οὔτε σχῆμα, κ. τ. λ.*

ἄλλοι δέ] Viz. the *μαθηταὶ Πρωταγόρου*, to whom he communicated his doctrine ἐν ἀπορρήτῳ, 152 C. Schleiermacher (who is followed by Schanz) conjectured *ἀλλ' οἶδε*: but the men would then be apt to be confused with the *ἄνδρες ὀνομαστοὶ* above. The 'disciples of Protagoras' are evidently contemporaries of Plato. Aristippus is probably included. (*Κομψός* and *συρφετός* are opposed, Hippias Maj. 288 D: *Οὐ κομψὸς ἀλλὰ συρφετός.*) The word *κομψός* is used similarly of certain nameless (Pythagorean?) philosophers in Polit. 284 E, 285 A: *Πολλοὶ τῶν κομψῶν λέγουσιν ὡς ἄρα μετρητικὴ περὶ πάντ' ἐστὶ γιγνώμενα.* Cp. Phil. 53 C: *κομψοὶ γὰρ δὴ τινες* (Megarians?) *αὐ*

p. 156. πολὺ κομψότεροι, ὧν μέλλω σοι τὰ μυστήρια λέγειν.
 ἀρχὴ δέ, ἐξ ἧς καὶ ἂ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν πάντα ἤρτηται,
 ἦδε αὐτῶν, ὡς τὸ πᾶν κίνησις ἦν καὶ ἄλλο παρὰ τοῦτο
 οὐδέν, τῆς δὲ κινήσεως δύο εἶδη, πλήθει μὲν ἄπειρον
 ἐκάτερον, δύναμιν δὲ τὸ μὲν ποιεῖν ἔχον, τὸ δὲ πά- 5
 σχειν. ἐκ δὲ τῆς τούτων ὁμιλίας τε καὶ τρίψεως πρὸς
 Β ἄλληλα γίγνεται ἔκγονα πλήθει μὲν ἄπειρα, δίδυμα
 δέ, τὸ μὲν αἰσθητόν, τὸ δὲ αἰσθησις, αἰὲ συνεκπί-
 πτουσα καὶ γεννωμένη μετὰ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ. αἱ μὲν
 οὖν αἰσθήσεις τὰ τοιαύδε ἡμῖν ἔχουσιν ὀνόματα, ὄψεις 10
 τε καὶ ἀκοαὶ καὶ ὄσφρήσεις καὶ ψύξεις τε καὶ καύσεις
 καὶ ἡδοναί γε δὴ καὶ λῦπαι καὶ ἐπιθυμίαι καὶ φόβοι
 κεκλημένα καὶ ἄλλα, ἀπέραντοι μὲν αἱ ἀνώνυμοι,

Far more refined are those whose mysteries we now reveal. Their first principle, upon which the whole depends, is that All is motion. Motion is active and passive, and each kind is infinite. These meet and produce innumerable twin births:

τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἐπιχειροῦσι μνη-
 σκεῖν ἡμῖν οἷς δεῖ χάριν ἔχειν.

3. ἦν] 'Really is,'—according to the well-known idiom, which becomes more frequent in Aristotle. What a thing proves to be when an inquiry is finished, that it *was* before the inquiry began. It is a transference of the reality of history to a general statement. H. Schmidt's argument for taking ἦν literally, 'In the beginning all was motion,' is not convincing.—The doctrine asserted above is now more minutely developed.

ἄλλο . . οὐδέν] Sc. ἦν.

8. συνεκπίπτουσα] 'Tumbling forth to light at the same moment.' Compare the lively expression in Rep. 4. 432 D, when justice is discovered: *πάλαι, ὦ μακάριε, φαίνεται πρὸ ποδῶν ἡμῖν ἐξ ἀρχῆς κυλινοῦσθαι*. For the insertion of *καὶ γεννωμένη* cp. Soph. Ant. 537: *Καὶ ξυμμετίσχω καὶ φέρω τῆς αἰτίας*. Aesch. Prom. 331: *Πάντων μετασχῶν καὶ τετολημκῶς ἐμοί*. The present

tense denotes a process that is always in transition.

10. τὰ τοιαύδε . . ἔχουσιν ὀνόματα, ὄψεις . . κεκλημένα] The slight redundancy helps to connect the sentence.

11. The senses of taste and touch are added in the version of Ficinus: 'olfactus, gustus, tactusque frigidorum et calidorum,' and Cornarius inserted *καὶ γεύσεις καὶ θίξεις* after *ὄσφρήσεις*, perhaps with reference to the false interpretation of *infr.* C D, *βραδὺν . . θάττω*.

12. ἡδοναί γε δῆ] The particles mark the transition to a class of things less familiarly known by the name *αἰσθησις*.

13. αἱ ἀνώνυμοι] See Locke, Hum. Und. b. 2. c. 3: 'I think it will be needless to enumerate all the particular simple ideas belonging to each sense, nor indeed is it possible if we would, there being a great many more of them belonging to most of the senses than we have names for.' Also Spinoza, Eth. 3

sensation and sensible thing springing forth together. Sensations include pleasures, pains, desires and fears, and there are many without a name. Sensible things are colours, sounds, and the like. All the things now spoken of

παμπληθεῖς δὲ αἱ ὀνομασμένοι· τὸ δ' αὖ αἰσθητὸν p. 156.
 γένος τούτων ἐκάσταις ὁμόγονον, ὅψεσι μὲν χρώματα
 παντοδαπαῖς παντοδαπά, ἀκοαῖς δὲ ὡσαύτως φωναί, c
 καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις αἰσθήσεσι τὰ ἄλλα αἰσθητὰ ξυγγενῆ
 5 γιγνόμενα. Τί δὴ οὖν ἡμῖν βούλεται οὗτος ὁ μῦθος,
 ὃ θεαίτητε, πρὸς τὰ πρότερα; ἄρα ἐννοεῖς;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ πάνν, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ἄθρει ἐάν πως ἀποτελεσθῆ. βούλεται
 γὰρ δὴ λέγειν ὡς ταῦτα πάντα μὲν, ὥσπερ λέγομεν,
 10 κινεῖται, τάχος δὲ καὶ βραδυτῆς ἐν τῇ κινήσει αὐτῶν.
 ὅσον μὲν οὖν βραδύ, ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ πρὸς τὰ πλησιάζοντα τὴν κίνησιν ἴσχει καὶ οὕτω δὴ γεννᾶ, τὰ δὲ d

(quoted by H. Schmidt): 'uniquique ex jam dictis clare constare credo, affectus tot variationes oriri, ut nullo numero definiri queant . . . pleræque animi fluctuationes nomina non habent.'

2. The Bodleian, with most other MSS., has ἐκάστης.

5. οὗτος ὁ μῦθος] Cp. Soph. 242 C: Μῦθόν τινα ἕκαστος φαίνεται μοι διηγέσθαι παισιν ὡς οὖσιν ἡμῖν, κ. τ. λ. For the spirit with which all this is done compare Rep. 8. 545 D E: Φῶμεν αὐτὰς τραγικῶς, ὡς πρὸς παῖδας ἡμᾶς παιζούσας καὶ ἐρσεχηλούσας, ὡς δὴ σπουδῇ λεγούσας, ὑψηλολογουμένας λέγειν;

6. πρὸς τὰ πρότερα] 'In relation to what came before,' viz. from 153 D, Ὑπόλαβε—to 155 C, παραδεξόμεθα.

8. Ἄλλ' ἄθρει ἐάν] 'Well, look attentively; perhaps we shall be able to finish it.' Cp. infr. 192 E: Ἴδε δὴ, ἐάν τι μᾶλλον νῦν ἐπισπῆ. ἐάν='in the hope that.'

9. ταῦτα] ποιούντα, πάσχοντα, αἰσθητά, αἰσθήσεις.

πάντα . . . κινεῖται] Cp. Locke: 'The next thing to be considered is, how bodies produce ideas in us, and that is manifestly by impulse, the only way which we can conceive bodies operate in.'

11. ὅσον μὲν οὖν βραδύ] 'The slower have their motion in one spot, and in relation to what is in contact with them, and are thus the producing elements; but those which are [thus] produced are swifter; for they are carried about, and their motion is from place to place.'

For ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ cp. infr. 181 CD: Ὅταν ἡ μὲν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, κ. τ. λ.

12. τὰ δὲ γεννώμενα οὕτω δὴ] Schol.: Εἰς τὸ δὴ ὑποστικτέον. This only means that οὕτω δὴ is to be taken with the preceding words. The phrase has been felt to be somewhat harsh; and perhaps the second οὕτω may have crept in from the preceding clause. The (probably conjectural) interpolation of Cornarius after οὕτω δὴ [βραδυτέρα ἔστω· ὅσον δὲ αὖ

156. γεννώμενα τούτω δὴ θάπτω ἐστί· φέρεται γὰρ καὶ ἐν φορᾷ αὐτῶν ἢ κίνησις πέφυκεν. ἐπειδὴν οὖν ὄμμα καὶ ἄλλο τι τῶν τούτω ξυμμέτρων πλησιάσαν γεν-

are in motion. But the motion of some is swift and

ταχύ, πρὸς τὰ πόρρωθεν τὴν κίνησιν ἴσχει καὶ οὕτω γεννᾷ, τὰ δὲ γεννώμενα οὕτω δὴ] is quite unnecessary, and confuses the real sense. It was occasioned by the condensation of the language and the inversion or 'chiasm' in what follows, which, to correspond exactly, should have been τὰ δ' αὖ θάπτω φέρεται καὶ γεννᾶται. The slower motions are the ποιούντα and πάσχοντα, which, when in contact, produce (without changing place) the αἰσθητά and αἰσθήσεις (i. e. qualities and sensations), which are the 'quicker motions,' and pass to and fro between the ποιούν and πάσχον. Cp. inf. p. 159 C D: Ἐγέννησε γὰρ δὴ ἐκ τῶν προωμολογημένων τό τε ποιούν καὶ τὸ πάσχον γλυκύτητά τε καὶ αἰσθησιν, ἅμα φερόμενα ἀμφότερα. Qualities and sensations are in locomotion, because existing merely in the act of flowing from subject to object, and from object to subject, perhaps also because they are realized now here, now there. Cp. 153 D E. When it is said that they are the swifter motions, the theory is vaguely connected with Heraclitean doctrine. Sensations and qualities are drops in the ever-flowing river of succession. The man or the tree is like the dull weed that clogs it, itself to be carried down in time. Subject and object are more of the nature of Earth, sensation and quality are sparks of the everliving Fire. That the ποιούν and πάσχον are both

γεννῶντα appears from 159 C D: Ἐγέννησε γὰρ δὴ . . τό τε ποιούν καὶ τὸ πάσχον, quoted above.

Sensational idealism is hampered by the necessity of dissolving 'substance' (whether matter or mind) into a series of transient processes, without too violently contradicting experience. An instance of this logical necessity has appeared since the above note was written, in Mr. J. S. Mill's 'Permanent possibilities' (Mill on Hamilton, ch. XI.), a device which unintentionally throws a vivid light on Plato's meaning here. Perception and attribute are conceived as momentary; things and persons are imagined as a gradual growth and decay. By 'slow' and 'swift' are really meant 'lasting' and 'momentary.' The distinction of kinds of motion (ἀλλοιώσεις, φορά) is purposely slurred over here, that it may come in as a fresh point at a later stage of the discussion, 181 C. Cp. 157 B. See also Kant, Krit. d. r. Vern. B, 230.

3. τῶν τούτω ξυμμέτρων] Men. 76 D: Ἐστὶ γὰρ χροῖα ἀπορροή σχήματος ὄψει σύμμετρος καὶ αἰσθητός. This definition is said to be 'κατὰ Γοργίαν.' In Tim. 67 C Plato calls colour φλόγα ὧν σωμάτων ἐκάστων ἀπορρέουσιν, ὄψει ξύμμετρα μόρια ἔχουσιν πρὸς αἰσθησιν. Cp. ib. 45, 6. Plato's account of sensation in the Timæus coincides in many points with this part of the Theætetus, showing that, al-

of others slow. Those which produce are slow, and their motion depends on juxtaposition. The things produced are swifter, for they are in locomotion, and do not merely

νήση τὴν λευκότητά τε καὶ αἴσθησιν αὐτῇ ξύμφυτον, p. 156.
 ἃ οὐκ ἄν ποτε ἐγένετο ἐκατέρου ἐκείνων πρὸς ἄλλο
 ἐλθόντος, τότε δὴ μεταξὺ φερομένων τῆς μὲν ὄψεως
 πρὸς τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν, τῆς δὲ λευκότητος πρὸς τοῦ
 5 συναποτίκτοντος τὸ χρῶμα, ὃ μὲν ὀφθαλμὸς ἄρα
 ὄψεως ἔμπλεως ἐγένετο καὶ ὄρᾶ δὴ τότε καὶ ἐγένετο
 οὗ τι ὄψις ἀλλὰ ὀφθαλμὸς ὄρων, τὸ δὲ ξυγγενήσαν
 τὸ χρῶμα λευκότητος περιεπλήσθη καὶ ἐγένετο οὐ
 λευκότης αὖ ἀλλὰ λευκόν, εἴτε ξύλον εἴτε λίθος εἴτε

though rejected as a theory of knowledge, the hypothesis is retained as a 'probable' doctrine of sense. See also Phil. 34.

3. τότε δῆ, κ.τ.λ.] 'Then it is that while these are issuing in the midst, sight from the eyes, whiteness from that which helps to create the colour, the eye is filled with seeing, and sees now, and becomes not sight indeed, but seeing eye, and that which helps to give the colour birth is covered with whiteness, and it too becomes not whiteness but white, whether stick or stone, or whatever it is that happens to have been coloured with this hue.'

μεταξὺ φερομένων] It is doubtful whether this means 'whilst they are moving,' or 'as they are moving in the midst.' The former is idiomatic Greek, but the latter seems preferable if we turn to 154 A: Μεταξύ τι ἐκάστῳ ἴδιον γενοῦς, and infr. 182 A: Φέρεσθαι ἕκαστον τούτων ἅμα αἰσθήσει μεταξὺ τοῦ ποιούντος τε καὶ τοῦ πάσχοντος. And the idiomatic use of μεταξύ belongs rather to cases in which one action supervenes upon another, than where both are

simultaneous, as here.

9. εἴτε *ὄφουον, κ.τ.λ.] The MS. reading is *δοουον ξ. χρῶμα*. Heind. who receives *δοιῶν* . . *χρῆμα* from Cornarius, adds, 'ne ipso quidem *χρῆμα* opus fuerit, h. l.' But *δοιῶν* has scarcely more authority than *χρῆμα*. One MS. (Par. H.) has *σῶμα* on the margin, but *δοουον* . . *σῶμα*, though it has thus some slight authority, is not satisfactory. The real text is perhaps restored by dropping *χρῶμα*, and reading *ὄφουον* as in the text (*ὄσῶον* Par. F.) 'White, whether stick or stone, or whatsoever happens to be coloured with that colour.' The repetition of similar consonants is a frequent form of corruption; cp. esp. 158 C; *ὄφα χρή, κ.τ.λ.*; where three MSS. (Bodl. Vat. Ven. Π.) read *ὄφα χρόνφ χρή, κ.τ.λ.* (*Χρόνου, χρόνον, χρόνου, χρόνου*, occurring within the next few lines.) Also, 149 C, *ἀτόποις* for *ἀτόκοις* Bodl. pr. Vat. pr. Ven. Π. with *ἀτοπώτατος* a few lines above.

Another way is opened by the ingenious conjecture of Schanz, who reads *δοουον* . . *σχῆμα*. Cp. esp. Men. 75 B: "Ἔστω γὰρ δὴ ἡμῖν τοῦτο σχῆμα, δ

156. *ὄφρουν ξυνέβη χρωσθῆναι τῷ τοιούτῳ χρώματι.
καὶ τὰλλα δὴ οὕτω, σκληρὸν καὶ θερμὸν καὶ πάντα
τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ὑποληπτέον, αὐτὸ μὲν καθ' αὐτὸ
157. μὴδὲν εἶναι, ὃ δὴ καὶ τότε ἐλέγομεν, ἐν δὲ τῇ πρὸς
ἄλληλα ὁμιλίᾳ πάντα γίνεσθαι καὶ παντοῖα ἀπὸ 5
τῆς κινήσεως· ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ ποιοῦν εἶναί τι καὶ τὸ
πάσχον αὐτῶν ἐπὶ ἐνὸς νοῆσαι, ὡς φασιν, οὐκ εἶναι
παγίως· οὔτε γὰρ ποιοῦν ἐστὶ τι, πρὶν ἂν τῷ πά-
σχοντι ξυνέλθῃ, οὔτε πάσχον, πρὶν ἂν τῷ ποιούντι·
τό τέ τιμι ξυνελθὸν καὶ ποιοῦν ἄλλῳ αὐ προσπεσὸν 10
πάσχον ἀνεφάνη. ὥστε ἐξ ἀπάντων τούτων, ὅπερ ἐξ

become.
—The eye and its appropriate active motion come in contact. Then sight begins to fit from the eye and colour from the object of sight; the eye becomes a seeing eye, and the object becomes coloured.

μόνον τῶν ὄντων τυγχάνει χρώματι αἰεὶ ἐπόμενον. But the language is clearer and simpler without introducing the notion of 'form.' For εἴτε ξύλος εἴτε λίθος cp. infr. ἄνθρωπόν τε καὶ λίθον καὶ ἕκαστον ζῳόν τε καὶ εἶδος. Hipp. Maj. 292 D: Καὶ λίθῳ καὶ ξύλῳ καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ θεῷ, κ.τ.λ. The sentence is turned like Phædr. 237 A: Εἴτε δι' ἄφθης εἶδος λιγείαι, εἴτε διὰ γένος μουσικόν τὸ Διγῶν ταύτην ἔσχετε τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν. Rep. 10. 612 A: Εἴτε πολυειδῆς εἴτε μονοειδῆς εἴτε ὅπῃ ἔχει καὶ ὅπως. The aorists, while marking the momentariness of each act of sense, give picturesqueness to the expression, referring, as in the Homeric similes, to an imaginary case.

4. τότε] Supr. 152 D.

6. ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ ποιῶν] A further effort is here made to melt away the 'category of substance' into thin air. The 'permanent possibility' (which is only relatively permanent) is incognizable in itself. 'For it is impossible to have a firm notion (they say) even of the

active and passive elements as existing separately in any single case.' αὐτῶν, sc. τῶν κινουμένων, 'To distinguish in them the active or passive element as existing.' αὐτῶν refers, as H. Schmidt points out, to σκληρὸν καὶ θερμὸν καὶ πάντα, κ.τ.λ., i. e. sense-phenomena generally. It depends rather on τὸ ποιῶν καὶ τὸ πάσχον than on ἐνός. Cp. Arist. Met. 5. 20: Μηδὲν ἀξίων λέγεσθαι πλὴν τῷ οἰκείῳ ἐν ἐφ' ἐνός. For αὐτῶν Cornarius suggested αὐ τι. If a change were necessary, αὐ τῶν would seem more probable. τῶν ἐπὶ ἐνός, 'of things taken singly,' might then be compared with τῶν ἐν ἐκείνων, Phil. 16 D. (Wohlrab joins ἐπὶ ἐνός αὐτῶν, 'in the case of any one of them.') For ἐπὶ ἐνός cp. infr. 186 A, ἐπὶ πάντων.

7. νοῆσαι . . παγίως] Rep. 5. 479 C: Καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα ἐπαμφοτερίζειν, καὶ οὐτ' εἶναι οὔτε μὴ εἶναι οὐδὲν αὐτῶν δυνατὸν παγίως νοῆσαι, οὐτ' ἀμφοτέρα οὔτε οὐδέτερον. The word is used by Aristotle.

11. πάσχον ἀνεφάνη] E. g. The same eye, when seen, is active, when seeing, passive.

Neither seeing eye nor coloured object can be thought of as existing independently of this mutual process. We must not speak of anything as existing, but only as becoming this or that, arising, perishing, or changing. This applies not only to single things, but to those

ἀρχῆς ἐλέγομεν, οὐδὲν εἶναι ἐν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό, ἀλλά p. 157.
 τινι αἰεὶ γίνεσθαι, τὸ δ' εἶναι πανταχόθεν ἐξαιρετέον, β
 οὐχ ὅτι ἡμεῖς πολλὰ καὶ ἄρτι ἠναγκάσμεθα ὑπὸ συνη-
 5 θείας καὶ ἀνεπισημοσύνης χρῆσθαι αὐτῷ. τὸ δ' οὐ
 δεῖ, ὡς ὁ τῶν σοφῶν λόγος, οὔτε τι ξυγχωρεῖν οὔτε
 του οὔτ' ἐμοῦ οὔτε τὸδε οὔτ' ἐκείνο οὔτε ἄλλο οὐδὲν
 ὄνομα ὃ τι ἂν ἰσθῆ, ἀλλὰ κατὰ φύσιν φθέγγεσθαι
 γιγνόμενα καὶ ποιούμενα καὶ ἀπολλύμενα καὶ ἀλλοι-
 οὔμενα. ὡς εἰάν τις στήσῃ τῷ λόγῳ, εὐέλεγκτος ὁ
 10 τοῦτο ποιῶν. δεῖ δὲ καὶ κατὰ μέρος οὕτω λέγειν καὶ
 περὶ πολλῶν ἀθροισθέντων, ᾧ δὴ ἀθροίσματι ἀνθρω-
 πόν τε τίθενται καὶ λίθον καὶ ἕκαστον ζῶόν τε καὶ c
 εἶδος. Ταῦτα δὴ, ὧ Θεαίτητε, ἄρ' ἡδέα δοκεῖ σοι
 εἶναι, καὶ γένοιο ἂν αὐτῶν ὡς ἀρεσκόντων ;

3. οὐχ ὅτι ἡμεῖς] 'Though, as I need not observe.' The irony of this appears very clearly, if we compare 197 A: *Εἰ μέντοι ἦν ἀντιλογικός, κ.τ.λ.*

4. τὸ δ' οὐ δεῖ] Sc. ποιεῖν. Or rather τὸ is an accusative in opposition to the active of *ξυγχωρεῖν, κ.τ.λ.*

5. οὔτε του] The genitive is a point of transition to ἐμοῦ.

7. φθέγγεσθαι . .] 'To use the expression.' ('Man muss Ausdrücke wie *γιγνόμενα* ff. brauchen.' H. Schmidt.)

9. ὁ τοῦτο ποιῶν] For the redundancy cp. Rep. 6. 506 A: *Δίκαια καὶ καλὰ ἀγροούμενα ὅπη ποτέ ἀγαθὰ ἐστίν, οὐ πολλοῦ τινος ἄξιον φύλακα κεκτῆσθαι τὸν τοῦτο ἀγροοῦντα.*

11. ᾧ δὴ ἀθροίσματι . . τίθενται] Sc. ὄνομα. The subject of τίθενται is indefinite. From our Protagorean point of view, that which answers to a common name, or which counts for one, is not ἐν ἐπὶ πολλῶν, nor ἐν παρὰ

τὰ πολλά, but an arbitrary or conventional aggregate of phenomena. Cp. Parm. 165 A, where the word *ἄγκος* answers to *ἀθροίσμα* here, but implies something even more vague and formless. The same terminology recurs infr. 182 A, *οὐ μανθάνεις ἀθρόον λεγόμενον*, where it denotes genus as opposed to species. A doubt may be raised whether the *wholes* here intended are general (a class = an aggregate of individuals) or particular (a thing or person = an aggregate of attributes). The former is preferable. Cp. however Tim. 56 C: *Ξυναθροισθέντων δὲ πολλῶν τοὺς ἄγκους αὐτῶν ὀραῖσθαι* (of the invisible particles of bodies).

12. καὶ ἕκαστον ζῶόν τε καὶ εἶδος] These words, which have occasioned needless difficulty, are to be explained by the common ellipse of ἄλλο. 'Men and other animals,' 'animals and other forms.'

157. ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκ οἶδα ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες· καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲ περὶ σοῦ δύναμαι κατανοῆσαι, πότερα δοκοῦντά σοι λέγεις αὐτὰ ἢ ἐμοῦ ἀποπειρᾶ.

ΣΩ. Οὐ μνημονεύεις, ὦ φίλε, ὅτι ἐγὼ μὲν οὐτ' οἶδα οὔτε ποιοῦμαι τῶν τοιούτων οὐδὲν ἐμόν, ἀλλ' 5 εἰμὶ αὐτῶν ἄγονος, σὲ δὲ μαιεύομαι καὶ τούτου ἔνεκα ἐπάδω τε καὶ παρατίθημι ἐκάστων τῶν σοφῶν ἀπο-
D γεύσασθαι, ἕως ἂν εἰς φῶς τὸ σὸν δόγμα ξυνεξαγάγω· ἔξαχθέντος δέ, τότε ἤδη σκέψομαι εἴτ' ἀνεμιαῖον εἶτε γόνιμον ἀναφανήσεται. ἀλλὰ θαρρῶν καὶ καρτερῶν 10 εὖ καὶ ἀνδρείως ἀποκρίνου ἅ ἂν φαίνηταί σοι περὶ ὧν ἂν ἐρωτῶ.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐρώτα δῆ.

ΣΩ. Λέγε τοίνυν πάλιν, εἴ σοι ἀρέσκει τὸ μή τι εἶναι ἀλλὰ γίγνεσθαι αἰεὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ καλὸν καὶ πάντα 15 ἅ ἄρτι διῆμεν.

5. ποιῶμαι] 'Tanquam proprium mihi vindico, velut dicitur ποιείσθαι τινα υἷον.' Heind. Is it not rather, 'give birth to?' 'Produce as mine?' Cp. Rep. 2. 372 C: Ποιούμενοι τοὺς παῖδας. Crit. 45 D: Ἡ γὰρ οὐ χρὴ ποιείσθαι παῖδας.

7. παρατίθημι] Supr. 149 C: Διδούσαι γε αἱ μαῖαι φαρμάκια καὶ ἐπάδουσαι. See the description of the education of a Greek youth in the Protagoras, 325 E: Παρατιθέωσιν αὐτοῖς ἐπὶ τῶν βάθρων ἀναγιγνώσκειν ποιητῶν ἀγαθῶν ποιήματα. The genitive is perhaps partitive with παρατίθημι, but more probably governed by ἀπογεύσασθαι.

10. καὶ καρτερῶν] 'And with perseverance.' Boldness was all he required at first; 148 C, θάρρει: 151 D, ἐὰν . . ἀνδρίζη.

14. εἴ σοι ἀρέσκει] 'Whether

you are pleased with the idea that nothing is, but is ever becoming, good and noble, as well as what we have just enumerated.'

15. ἀγαθὸν καὶ καλόν] As in 156 Βαῖσθησις is made to include desire, fear, etc., so, by the subtle introduction of these words, the doctrine is pushed to its farthest limits, and thus its chief fallacy is hinted at—that of arguing from sense to higher things. So afterwards Protagoras is made to assume that the doctrine applies to states as well as individuals.

ἀγαθὸν καὶ καλόν are brought in as it were accidentally, merely as a fresh example, like κοροπλαθῶν supr. 147 B. But this, to the Platonic reader, was already a tacit 'reductio ad absurdum,' and for all readers

bundles of things, which men call sorts or natures.

Theætetus is invited to acknowledge the theory so far developed. Socrates disclaims having any share in it, except that he has helped to bring it to the birth. The Good and Noble must be thought of with other things, as not existing, but arising continually.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἄλλ' ἔμοιγε, ἐπειδὴ σοῦ ἀκούω οὕτω δι- p. 157.
 ξιόντος, θαυμασίως φαίνεται ὡς ἔχειν λόγον καὶ ὑπο-
 ληπτέον ἤπερ διελέλυθας.

ΣΩ. Μὴ τοίνυν ἀπολίπωμεν ὅσον ἐλλείπον αὐτοῦ. E
 5 λείπεται δὲ ἐνυπνίων τε πέρι καὶ νόσων, τῶν τε ἄλλων
 καὶ μανίας ὅσα τε παρακούειν ἢ παρορᾶν ἢ τι ἄλλο
 παραισθάνεσθαι λέγεται. οἶσθα γάρ που ὅτι ἐν πᾶσι
 τούτοις ὁμολογουμένως ἐλέγχεσθαι δοκεῖ ὃν ἄρτι διη-
 10 ἐν αὐτοῖς γιγνομένης, καὶ πολλοῦ δεῖ τὰ φαινόμενα p. 158.
 ἐκάστῳ ταῦτα καὶ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ πᾶν τούναντίον οὐδὲν
 ὧν φαίνεται εἶναι.

5. A formidable class of objections is now disposed of. It is commonly said that in dreams and madness

it prepares the way for the pivot-argument from the δόξα τοῦ ὠφελίμου in what follows, 177 ff. H. Schmidt, however, approves of Heindorf's proposal to cancel these significant words.

2. θαυμασίως φαίνεται ὡς ἔχειν] The order is φαίνεται θαυμασίως ὡς ἔχειν. θαυμασίως ὡς is stronger than θαυμασίως, and is formed by attraction of the antecedent from θαυμάσιόν ἐστιν ὡς.

4. Μὴ τοίνυν] The doctrine is now so far developed that we have only to notice an objection, and it will be complete. As false opinion is our stumbling-block afterwards, so now false impressions have to be accounted for. The solution is a simple one, and confirms our theory—they are not false to him who is the subject of them. The position, Sense is knowledge, was at first made equivalent to the reality of the object of sense (p. 152). But are dreams real? Are the illusions of madness true? Is that

really bitter which tastes so to the diseased palate?—If truth is wholly relative, if nothing is but what becomes, this must be so.

5. καὶ νόσων, τῶν τε ἄλλων καί] 'And disease, especially madness and its delusions of sight, hearing, and other senses.' μανία is the subject of λέγεται, and ὅσα is cogn. accus. Cp. Soph. Trach. 406: Λεύσσω ματαία.

6. ὅσα . . τί ἄλλο] The double cognate accusative is also noticeable. 'The cases in which it is said—to have any other illusory impression.'

10. πολλοῦ δεῖ] This phrase has become equivalent to an adverb. Hence it is unnecessary to adopt δεῖν from Heindorf's conjecture.

11. ἀλλὰ πᾶν τούναντίον οὐδὲν ὧν φαίνεται εἶναι] E. g. Democritus (who is believed to have written against Protagoras) said of all sensations except hardness and weight: Σημίον δ' ὡς οὐκ εἰσὶ φύσει τὸ μὴ ταῦτ' ἅπασιν φαίνεσθαι τοῖς ζώοις, ἀλλ' ὃ ἡμῖν γλυκύ, τοῦτ'

158. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Τίς δὴ οὖν, ὦ παῖ, λείπεται λόγος τῷ τῆν αἴσθησιν ἐπιστήμην τιθεμένῳ καὶ τὰ φαινόμενα ἐκάστω ταῦτα καὶ εἶναι τούτῳ ᾧ φαίνεται;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐγὼ μὲν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁκνῶ εἰπεῖν ὅτι 5 οὐκ ἔχω τί λέγω, διότι μοι νῦν δὴ ἐπέπληξας εἰπόντι αὐτό. ἐπεὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς γε οὐκ ἂν δυναίμην ἀμφισβητήσαι ὡς οἱ μαινόμενοι ἢ οἱ ὀνειρώττοντες οὐ ψευδῆ δοξάζουσιν, ὅταν οἱ μὲν θεοὶ αὐτῶν οἴωνται εἶναι, οἱ δὲ πτηνοὶ τε, καὶ ὡς πετόμενοι ἐν τῷ ὕπνῳ διανο- 10 ὦνται.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν οὐδὲ τὸ τοιόνδε ἀμφισβήτημα ἐννοεῖς περὶ αὐτῶν, μάλιστα δὲ περὶ τοῦ ὄναρ τε καὶ ὕπαρ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. Ὁ πολλάκις σε οἶμαι ἀκηκοέναι ἐρωτῶντων 15 τί ἂν τις ἔχοι τεκμήριον ἀποδείξαι, εἴ τις ἔροιτο νῦν οὕτως ἐν τῷ παρόντι, πότερον καθεύδομεν καὶ πάντα ἃ διανοοῦμεθα ὀνειρώττομεν, ἢ ἐγρηγόραμέν τε καὶ 20 ὕπαρ ἀλλήλοις διαλεγομεθα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ μὴν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀπορόν γε ὅτῳ χρῆ 20

ἄλλοις πικρὸν καὶ ἐτέροις ὀξύ καὶ ἄλλοις δριμύ, τοῖς δὲ στρυφνόν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα δὲ ὡσαύτως.

6. νῦν δὴ] Supr. 151 D.

9. οἱ μὲν . . αὐτῶν] I. e. the madmen.

10. πτηνοὶ τε] Sc. οἴωνται εἶναι. Cp. supr. 149 D: τίκτειν τε δὴ, and note.

15. Ὁ πολλάκις] ὁ is not exactly governed by ἀκηκοέναι ἐρωτῶντων, but is cognate accusative in apposition with the whole sentence which follows. 'What question do you allude to? This. I dare say you have often heard it asked, etc.' *Riddell's Digest*, § 15, b. Cp. 165

D: Ὁ ἄλλοχῶν ἂν πελταστικὸς ἀνὴρ μισθοφόρος ἐν λόγοις ἐράμενος, κ.τ.λ. Rep. 4. 443 B: Τὸ ἐνύπνιον, ὃ ἔφαμεν ὑποπτεῦσαι, κ.τ.λ.

Arist. Met. 3. 6. 1011 A: Τὰ δὲ τοιαῦτα ἀπορήματα ὁμοιά ἐστι τῷ ἀπορεῖν πότερον καθεύδομεν νῦν ἢ ἐγρηγόραμεν. Ib. 7. 5.

20. ἀπορόν γε ὅτῳ χρῆ ἐπιδείξαι] Descartes de la Méthode, p. 164 (Cousin): 'Et que les meilleurs esprits y étudient tant qu'il leur plaira, je ne crois pas qu'ils puissent donner aucune raison, qui soit suffisante pour ôter cette doute, s'ils ne présupposent l'existence de Dieu.' Descartes, however, would not say

nothing of what appears is real. Protagoras says, All that appears to me is real to me. What account does he then give of these phenomena?

There is a doubt which is often raised about them: e. g. when it is asked, Can we prove that we are not dreaming now?

ἐπιδειῖξαι τεκμηρίω. πάντα γὰρ ὡσπερ ἀντίστροφα p. 158.
τὰ αὐτὰ παρακολουθεῖ. ἃ τε γὰρ νυκτὶ διειλέγμεθα,
οὐδὲν κωλύει καὶ ἐν τῷ ὕπνῳ δοκεῖν ἀλλήλοις διαλέ-
γεσθαι. καὶ ὅταν δὴ ὄναρ ὀνειράτα δοκῶμεν διηγεί-
5 σθαι,—ἄτοπος ἢ ὁμοιότης τούτων ἐκείνοισ.

Dreams
have as
much real-
ity to the
dreaming
mind, as
daylight
impressions
have to

ΣΩ. Ὅρας οὖν ὅτι τό γε ἀμφισβητῆσαι οὐ χαλε-
πόν, ὅτε καὶ πότερόν ἐστιν ὕπαρ ἢ ὄναρ ἀμφισβητεῖ-
ται, καὶ δὴ ἴσου ὄντος τοῦ χρόνου ὃν καθεύδομεν $\bar{\omega}$ D
ἐγρηγόραμεν, ἐν ἐκατέρῳ διαμάχεται ἡμῶν ἢ ψυχῇ
10 τὰ αἰεὶ παρόντα δόγματα παντὸς μᾶλλον εἶναι ἀληθῆ,

ὁμοίως ἐφ' ἐκατέροις διῦσχυρίζομεθα.
Attention was of course early
attracted by the phenomena of
dreams. See esp. Π. 22. 199 :
'Ὅς δ' ἐν ὀνειρῷ οὐ δύναται φεύ-
γοντα διώκειν.

B has ὄτῳ χρόνῳ χρῆ, whence
Schanz formerly conjectured ὄτῳ
χρώμενον χρῆ, and now reads ὄτῳ
χρεῶν. But T gives χρῆ, and
χρόνου occurs a few lines below.
ἄπορον] Sc. τὸ ἀμφισβήτημα
γίγνεται. ὄτῳ, κ.τ.λ., explains the
point of the difficulty.

1. πάντα γὰρ ὡσπερ ἀντίστροφα
τὰ αὐτὰ παρακολουθεῖ] 'For
everything corresponds in each
exactly, as if one series was the
counterpart of the other.'

3. ἐν τῷ ὕπνῳ] This is the
reading of the best MSS., though
ἐνυπνίῳ is supported by the
greater number. If the latter
reading were adopted, ἐν τῷ
must be changed to εἰν τῷ.

4. καὶ ὅταν δὴ] 'And when in a
dream we do seem to be relating
dreams,—it is strange, the re-
semblance of this state to that.'

ὀνειράτα . . διηγείσθαι] Either
(1) 'to tell dreams,' or (2) 'to
give utterance to thoughts
which are only dreams.' Cp.
supr. πάντα ἃ διανοούμεθα ὀνειρώτ-

τομεν. ὀνειράτα in (2) is a sort
of cognate accusative, or rather,
is in apposition to the suppress-
ed object of διηγείσθαι. ὄναρ is
adverbial to δοκῶμεν. (Meno 85
C: "Ὅσπερ ὄναρ ἄρτι ἀνακεκίνηται
αἱ δόξαι αὐται). But the former
explanation (1) is simpler and
is really free from objection.
ὅταν δὴ has a different force in
(1) and (2). Either, (1) 'When
it comes to this,' marking a
climax, or, (2) 'When in fact,'
marking the correspondence to
the previous clause. The second
interpretation (2), although in
some ways plausible, seems to
require Hirschig's emendation
διαλέγεσθαι for διηγείσθαι. τού-
των refers to the waking, ἐκεί-
νοισ to the sleeping state, like
ἐνθάδε and ἐκεῖ of the visible
and invisible world. There is
a slight break in the sentence
before ἄτοπος, κ.τ.λ. Heindorf's
conjecture ἄττα (for ὀνειράτα),
approved by Cobet, and adopted
by Schanz, ('and when in
dreams we do seem to be re-
lating something'), is rather
flat, but is more plausible if we
adopt Hirschig's emendation :
'when we seem to have a con-
versation in our dream.'

158. ὥστε ἴσον μὲν χρόνον τάδε φαμὲν ὄντα εἶναι, ἴσον δὲ ἐκείνα, καὶ ὁμοίως ἐφ' ἑκατέρους διῶσχυριζόμεθα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ νόσων τε καὶ μανιῶν ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος, πλὴν τοῦ χρόνου, ὅτι οὐχὶ ἴσος;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὅρθῶς.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; πλήθει χρόνου καὶ ὀλιγότητι τὸ ἀληθὲς ὀρισθήσεται;

ΘΕΑΙ. Γελοῖον μὲν' ἂν εἴη πολλαχῆ.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλά τι ἄλλο ἔχεις σαφὲς ἐνδείξασθαι, 10 ὅποια τούτων τῶν δοξασμάτων ἀληθῆ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ μοι δοκῶ.

ΣΩ. Ἐμοῦ τοίνυν ἄκουε οἷα περὶ αὐτῶν ἂν λέγοιεν οἱ τὰ ἀεὶ δοκοῦντα ὀριζόμενοι τῷ δοκοῦντι εἶναι ἀληθῆ.

λέγουσι δέ, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, οὕτως ἐρωτῶντες, ὦ Θεαί- 15 τητε, ὃ ἂν ἕτερον ἢ παντάπασι, μὴ πῆ τινα δύναμιν τῆν αὐτὴν ἔξει τῷ ἐτέρῳ; καὶ μὴ ὑπολάβωμεν τῆ μὲν ταῦτόν εἶναι ὃ ἐρωτῶμεν, τῆ δὲ ἕτερον, ἀλλ' ὅλως ἕτερον.

7. πλήθει χρόνου καὶ ὀλιγότητι] The supporters of the same doctrine as quoted by Aristotle extended this argument to meet that from general consent. Met. 3. 5. 1009 B: Τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀληθὲς οὐ πλήθει κρίνεσθαι οἴονται προσήκειν οὐδὲ ὀλιγότητι.

10. τι ἄλλο . . σαφές] 'Any other certain test.'

14. ὀριζόμενοι] 'Who determine.' Perhaps there is a touch of irony in the application of this word to the Protagoreans.

17. μὴ ὑπολάβωμεν τῆ μὲν ταῦτόν] These words expand παντάπασι, and are required in order to place Theætetus at the right point of view. Megarian subtlety is here ironi-

cally brought to the help of Protagoras, by the introduction of a fallacy in the Euthydemus vein. The language of logic is applied to the sensible world: the language of ideas to things which admit of degrees. And the idea dwelt upon throughout is that of difference. The language is humoured accordingly. Socrates ill can hardly be said to be ὅλως ἕτερον, wholly different, from Socrates well, but they differ when taken each as a whole, ὅλον τοῦτο ὅλω ἐκείνω (159 B). Cp. Democritus ap. Ar. de Gen. et Cor. 1. 2: Καὶ ὅλως ἕτερον φαίνεσθαι ἐνὸς μετακινήεντος· ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν γὰρ τραγωδία καὶ κωμῶδία γίγνεται γραμμάτων.

the waking mind.

And half our life is spent in dreaming.

The impressions of madness, too, though more short-lived, are real at the time to him who experiences them.

In both cases it is impossible to demonstrate which is the real world.

Our theory resolves this doubt as follows:

That which is different has a different power,

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀδύνατον τοίνυν ταῦτόν τι ἔχειν ἢ ἐν δυνάμει ἢ ἐν ἄλλῳ ὄντων, ὅταν ἢ κομιδῇ ἕτερον. p. 158.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὐν οὐ καὶ ἀνόμοιον ἀναγκαῖον τὸ τοιοῦτον ὁμολογεῖν; p. 159.

5 ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Εἰ ἄρα τι ξυμβαίνει ὁμοίον τῷ γίνεσθαι ἢ ἀνόμοιον, εἴτε ἑαυτῷ εἴτε ἄλλῳ, ὁμοιούμενον μὲν ταῦτον φήσομεν γίνεσθαι, ἀνομοιούμενον δὲ ἕτερον;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀνάγκη.

Whether this be active or passive.

10 ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν πρόσθεν ἐλέγομεν ὡς πολλὰ μὲν εἶη τὰ ποιούντα καὶ ἄπειρα, ὡσαύτως δέ γε τὰ πάσχοντα;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

And the same thing in combination with different

15 ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν ὅτι γε ἄλλο ἄλλῳ συμμιγνύμενον καὶ ἄλλῳ οὐ ταῦτὰ ἀλλ' ἕτερα γεννήσει;

1. τοίνυν] 'Then,' i.e. taking the question as you put it in their behalf. The particle is added with reference to the words καὶ μὴ, κ.τ.λ., above.

2. ὅταν] Hirschig and Schanz read ὅ ἄν from Badham's conjecture. But the subject of ἔχειν is easily supplied from the preceding sentence, leaving τι joined to ταῦτόν as the object.

6. Εἰ ἄρα] 'What is the same is like, therefore what is like is the same.' This is one of many examples of the imperfect state of logic, which puts Socrates' respondent at his mercy. He does not always escape unchecked, however, see Prot. 350 C: "Ἐγωγε ἐρωτηθεὶς ὑπὸ σοῦ εἰ οἱ ἀνδρείοι θαρραλέοι εἰσίν, ὡμολόγησα· εἰ δὲ καὶ οἱ θαρραλέοι ἀνδρείοι, οὐκ ἠρωτήθην· εἰ γάρ με τότε ἤρουν, εἶπον ἂν ὅτι οὐ πάντες. And Socrates is not now speaking in his own name.

8. ἀνομοιούμενον] ἀνομοῖω is used several times by Plato, but is not found in other writers. It seems to be a coinage of some philosopher. See esp. Rep. 8. 547 A.

10. πρόσθεν ἐλέγομεν] Soph. 259 C: "Ὁ καὶ πρόσθεν εἴρηται.

14. ἄλλο ἄλλῳ. . . καὶ ἄλλῳ] Cp. Rep. 2. 369 C: Παραλαμβάνων ἄλλος ἄλλον ἐπ' ἄλλον, τὸν δ' ἐπ' ἄλλου χρεία. 'The combination of one element with this and another with that, and again with another different from all.' Compare with what follows, Ar. Met. 5. 2. 1026 B: Εἰσὶ γὰρ οἱ τῶν σοφιστῶν λόγοι περὶ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς ὡς εἰπεῖν μάλιστα πάντων, πότερον ἕτερον ἢ ταῦτόν . . . μουσικός Κορίσκος καὶ Κορίσκος, κ.τ.λ.

15. γεννήσει] The future is used because συμμιγνύμενον = εἶν συμμίσηται.

- p. 159. **ΘΕΑΙ.** Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
B **ΣΩ.** Λέγωμεν δὴ ἐμέ τε καὶ σέ καὶ τὰλλ' ἤδη
κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον· Σωκράτη ὑγιαίνοντα καὶ Σω-
κράτη αὖ ἀσθενοῦντα· πότερον ὅμοιον τοῦτ' ἐκείνω ἢ
ἀνόμοιον φήσομεν ; 5
- ΘΕΑΙ.** Ἐρα τὸν ἀσθενοῦντα Σωκράτη, ὅλον τοῦτο
λέγεις ὅλω ἐκείνω, τῷ ὑγιαίνοντι Σωκράτει ;
- ΣΩ.** Κάλλιστα ὑπέλαβες· αὐτὸ τοῦτο λέγω.
- ΘΕΑΙ.** Ἀνόμοιον δὴ που.
- ΣΩ.** Καὶ ἕτερον ἄρα οὕτως ὥσπερ ἀνόμοιον ; 10
- ΘΕΑΙ.** Ἀνάγκη.
- C** **ΣΩ.** Καὶ καθεύδοντα δὴ καὶ πάντα ἅ νῦν διήλ-
θομεν, ὡσαύτως φήσεις ;
- ΘΕΑΙ.** Ἐγωγε.
- ΣΩ.** Ἐκαστον δὴ τῶν πεφυκότων τι ποιεῖν, ἄλλο 15
τι, ὅταν μὲν λάβῃ ὑγιαίνοντα Σωκράτη, ὡς ἐτέρω μοι
χρήσεται, ὅταν δὲ ἀσθενοῦντα, ὡς ἐτέρω ;
- ΘΕΑΙ.** Τί δ' οὐ μέλλει ;
- ΣΩ.** Καὶ ἕτερα δὴ ἐφ' ἑκατέρου γεννήσομεν ἐγώ
τε ὁ πάσχω καὶ ἐκείνο τὸ ποιοῦν ; 20
2. Λέγωμεν δὴ] Phæd. 100
C : Καὶ πάντα δὴ οὕτω λέγω.
Σωκράτης is in an imperfect con-
struction, governed partly by
λέγωμεν, partly by φήσομεν. The
object here is to impress us
with the assumption of the ab-
soluteness of difference.
- ἤδη] I. e. Having laid down
these premises. We now ven-
ture to apply our theory uni-
versally : not as supr. 153 D :
Κατὰ τὰ ὄμματα πρώτον.
12. καθεύδοντα] Par. F. marg.
add. καὶ ἐγρηγοροῦντα. Bodl.
καθεύδοντι. Is it possible that
καθεύδοντα δὴ ἐγρηγοροῦσι may
be the true reading ? But cp.
- supr. 149 E : Eis γυναῖκα δέ, and
see Riddell's Digest, § 232.
—'Platoni satis visum est res
quasdam significasse.' Wohl-
rab.
13. ὡσαύτως φήσεις] Sc. ἀνό-
μοιον καὶ ἕτερον εἶναι τοῦ ἐγρηγορό-
τος, κ.τ.λ.
15. τι ποιεῖν] 'To act upon
something ;' to be agents. So
τὸ ποιοῦν ἐμέ, below. Soph.
247 D : Εἴτε εἰς τὸ ποιεῖν ἕτερον
ὄτιοῦν.
19. ἐφ' ἑκατέρου] In either
case. Cp. Parm. 130 A : Δέ-
γοντος δὴ τοῦ Σωκράτους . . ἐφ'
ἐκάστου ἀχθεσθαι τὸν τε Παρμενί-
δην καὶ τὸν Ζήνωνα.

things has
different
products.

Socrates
ill, is a dif-
ferent man
from So-
crates well,

Socrates
sleeping
from So-
crates wak-
ing, and so
on.

Therefore,
in combi-
nation with
the same
active mo-
tion they
will pro-
duce dif-
ferent re-
sults.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μήν;

ΣΩ. Ὅταν δὴ οἶνον πίνω ὑγιαίνων, ἡδύς μοι φαίνεται καὶ γλυκύς;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

5 ΣΩ. Ἐγέννησε γὰρ δὴ ἐκ τῶν προωμολογημένων τὸ τε ποιοῦν καὶ τὸ πάσχον γλυκύτητά τε καὶ αἴσθη-
 σιν, ἅμα φερόμενα ἀμφότερα, καὶ ἡ μὲν αἴσθησις
 πρὸς τοῦ πάσχοντος οὔσα αισθανομένην τὴν γλώσ-
 σαν ἀπειργάσατο, ἡ δὲ γλυκύτης πρὸς τοῦ οἴνου περὶ
 10 αὐτὸν φερομένη γλυκὺν τὸν οἶνον τῇ ὑγιαίνουσῃ
 γλώττῃ ἐποίησε καὶ εἶναι καὶ φαίνεσθαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν τὰ πρότερα ἡμῖν οὕτως ὁμολόγητο.

ΣΩ. Ὅταν δὲ ἀσθενοῦντα, — ἄλλο τι πρῶτον μὲν
 15 τῇ ἀληθείᾳ οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν ἔλαβεν; ἀνομοίω γὰρ δὴ
 προσῆλθεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἔτερα δὴ αὐτὴ ἐγεννησάτην ὃ τε τοιοῦτος Σω-
 κράτης καὶ ἡ τοῦ οἴνου πόσις, περὶ μὲν τὴν γλώτταν
 20 αἴσθησιν πικρότητος, περὶ δὲ τὸν οἶνον γιγνομένην
 καὶ φερομένην πικρότητα, καὶ τὸν μὲν οὐ πικρότητα
 ἀλλὰ πικρόν, ἐμὲ δὲ οὐκ αἴσθησιν ἀλλ' αἰσθανόμενον;

ΘΕΑΙ. Κομιδῆ μὲν οὖν.

9. ἀπειργάσατο] 'The sensation, arising on the side of the subject, renders the tongue percipient.'

14. ἀσθενοῦντα] The former construction is resumed from ὅταν . . λάβη, supr. C.

18. ἐγεννησάτην] The use of the third pers. helps to support the notion of 'Socrates being a different man.' Observe, too, the accuracy with which not the wine, but the drinking of the wine, is spoken of as the

'active motion.' The dual is expressive. 'They produce when paired.'

For this whole example cp. Symp. 186 B, where the same thing is briefly stated by Eryximachus: τὸ γὰρ ὑγιὲς τοῦ σώματος καὶ τὸ νοσοῦν ὁμολογούμενος ἕτερόν τε καὶ ἀνόμοιον ἐστὶ, τὸ δὲ ἀνόμοιον ἀνομοίων ἐστὶ, καὶ ἐρᾷ. ἄλλος μὲν οὖν ὁ ἐπὶ τῷ ὑγιεινῷ ἔρωσ, ἄλλος δὲ ὁ ἐπὶ τῷ νοσῶδει.

Accordingly, wine both seems and really is pleasant to me when well.

But the same wine both seems and really is distasteful to me when ill. For I am then a different man.

p. 159. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐγὼ τε οὐδὲν ἄλλο ποτὲ γενήσομαι
οὕτως αἰσθανόμενος· τοῦ γὰρ ἄλλου ἄλλη αἴσθησις,
p. 160. καὶ ἄλλοιον καὶ ἄλλον ποιεῖ τὸν αἰσθανόμενον· οὗτ'
ἐκεῖνο τὸ ποιοῦν ἐμὲ μήποτ' ἄλλω συνελθὸν ταύτων
γεννήσαν τοιοῦτον γένηται· ἀπὸ γὰρ ἄλλου ἄλλο 5
γεννήσαν ἄλλοιον γενήσεται.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔστι ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Οὐδὲ μὴν ἔγωγε ἐμαυτῷ τοιοῦτος, ἐκεῖνό τε
ἐαυτῷ τοιοῦτον γενήσεται.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ἀνάγκη δέ γε ἐμέ τε τινὸς γίνεσθαι, ὅταν
αἰσθανόμενος γίγνομαι· αἰσθανόμενον γάρ, μηδεὶν δὲ
αἰσθανόμενον ἀδύνατον γίνεσθαι· ἐκεῖνό τε τινὶ γί-

I should never receive the same impression from anything else. And it would never produce the same impression upon another person. Nor could either subject become separately what they become together.

10

1. οὐδὲν ἄλλο . . γενήσομαι οὕτως αἰσθανόμενος] 'There is nothing else from which I can receive the same sensation.' That ἄλλο is the object of αἰσθανόμενος is evident from what follows. For the accusative see 185 A: Ἄ δι' ἑτέρας δυνάμεως αἰσθάνει, ἀδύνατον εἶναι δι' ἄλλης ταῦτ' αἰσθέσθαι, and elsewhere. There is a stress on οὕτως. For γενήσομαι . . αἰσθανόμενος see a few lines below, ὅταν αἰσθανόμενος γίγνομαι. The words γίνεσθαι, αἰσθανόμενος, have become in a manner technical; cp. infr. 182. γενήσομαι αἰσθανόμενος answers to ἐγεννησάτην . . αἰσθανόμενον above. The point insisted on is not the identity of the subject while in the same combination, but the difference which arises with every new combination. For ἄλλον ποιεῖ (the Bodleian reading) cp. supr. οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν ἔλαβεν. 'For a different object implies a different sensation, and makes him who per-

ceives it a different man:' i. e. I and my sensation become different with every change in the object of sense.

The intention of these words is to mark the incommunicable individuality of every act of sense: i. e. not *wine* or *bitterness*, but the peculiar bitterness of a particular wine to a particular palate at a particular moment. (This view of the passage is disputed by H. Schmidt, but accepted by Wohlrab and Prof. Jowett.)

4. τὸ ποιῶν ἐμέ] 'Which (in this case) affects me.' It is unnecessary to supply αἰσθανόμενον. Supr. 159 C. As the sensation changes with the object, so the quality changes with the subject.

8. τοιοῦτος] Viz. οὕτως αἰσθανόμενος.

11. τινός] The genitive is caused by αἰσθανόμενος, but cp. Rep. 4. 438 A: Τοιαῦτα οἶα εἶναι του. Cp. also ib. 5. 478 B: Δοξάζειν μὲν, δοξάζειν δὲ μηδέ.

I become percipient of some-thing. It becomes sweet or bitter or the like to some one. Subject and object in perception are thus mutually dependent and inseparable.

That which sensibly affects me, is to me alone and I alone perceive it. My sensation therefore is true, for it is inseparable from my present

γενεσθαι, ὅταν γλυκὸν ἢ πικρὸν ἢ τι τοιοῦτον γίγνηται. ^{p. 160.}
 γλυκὸν γάρ, μηδενὶ δὲ γλυκὸν, ἀδύνατον γενέσθαι. ^B

ΘΕΑΙ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Λείπεται δὴ, οἶμαι, ἡμῖν ἀλλήλοις, εἴτ' ἐσμέν,
 5 εἶναι, εἴτε γιγνόμεθα, γίγνεσθαι, ἐπεὶπερ ἡμῶν ἡ
 ἀνάγκη τὴν οὐσίαν συνδεῖ μὲν, συνδεῖ δὲ οὐδενὶ τῶν
 ἄλλων, οὐδ' αὖ ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς. ἀλλήλοις δὲ λείπεται
 συνδεδέσθαι. ὥστε εἴτε τις εἶναι τι ὀνομάζει, τινὶ εἶναι
 ἢ τινὸς ἢ πρὸς τι ῥητέον αὐτῷ, εἴτε γίγνεσθαι αὐτὸ
 10 δὲ ἐφ' αὐτοῦ τι ἢ ὅν ἢ γιγνόμενον οὔτε αὐτῷ λεκτέον
 οὔτ' ἄλλου λέγοντος ἀποδεκτέον, ὡς ὁ λόγος ὅν διελη-
 λύθαμεν σημαίνει.

ΘΕΑΙ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὅτε δὴ τὸ ἐμὲ ποιοῦν ἐμοὶ ἐστὶ καὶ
 15 οὐκ ἄλλω, ἐγὼ καὶ αἰσθάνομαι αὐτοῦ, ἄλλος δ' οὔ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΣΩ. Ἀληθῆς ἄρα ἐμοὶ ἢ ἐμῇ αἴσθησις. τῆς γὰρ

2. ἀδύνατον γενέσθαι] 'It is impossible a thing should ever become, etc.' Heindorf and others would change γενέσθαι here to γίγνεσθαι, to avoid the change of tense. But, as H. Schmidt points out, such variations are too common to allow room for objection here. And it may fairly be maintained that the aorist has the effect of making the negation more absolute in the second statement.

8. εἶναι τι ὀνομάζει] 'Uses the term Being in reference to anything.' Infr. 201 D: Οὐτωςὶ καὶ ὀνομάζων. Parm. 133 D: Ὡν ἡμεῖς μετέχοντες, εἶναι ἕκαστα ἐπονομαζόμεθα. Cp. Phæd. 92 D: Ἡ οὐσία ἔχουσα ἐπωνυμίαν τοῦ ὅ ἔστιν. The alternative is repeated below,

D: τὰ ὄντα ἢ γιγνόμενα. Schanz, from Frei's conjecture, unnecessarily repeats γίγνεσθαι. The ellipse is easily supplied. The doctrine at first rejected the verb 'to be' (157 B). Now, grown bolder, it professes indifference as to the language employed, seeing that the fact has been made so clear, and the consideration of the most formidable objection has ended in triumph.

14. ὅτε δὴ] 'Since it is so.' Cp. supr. 154 E, Symp. 206 A: ὅτε δὴ τούτου ὁ ἔρως ἐστίν.

17. τῆς γὰρ ἐμῆς οὐσίας αἰεὶ ἐστὶ] (1) 'Since it is inseparable from my being at the particular time.' Cp. supr. B: Ἡμῶν ἡ ἀνάγκη τὴν οὐσίαν συνδεῖ μὲν, συνδεῖ δὲ οὐδενὶ τῶν ἄλλων. 'Denn sie ist immer ein Stück

p. 160. ἐμῆς οὐσίας αἰεὶ ἔστι. καὶ ἐγὼ κριτῆς κατὰ τὸν Πρωταγόραν τῶν τε ὄντων ἐμοί, ὡς ἔστι, καὶ τῶν μὴ ὄντων, ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔοικεν.

D ΣΩ. Πῶς ἂν οὖν ἀψευδῆς ὦν καὶ μὴ πταίων τῇ 5
διανοίᾳ περὶ τὰ ὄντα ἢ γιγνόμενα οὐκ ἐπιστήμων ἂν
εἶην ὧνπερ αἰσθητής;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδαμῶς ὅπως οὔ.

ΣΩ. Παγκάλως ἄρα σοι εἶρηται ὅτι ἐπιστήμη οὐκ
ἄλλο τί ἐστίν ἢ αἴσθησις, καὶ εἰς ταῦτὸν συμπέ- 10
πτωκε, κατὰ μὲν Ὅμηρον καὶ Ἡράκλειτον καὶ πᾶν
τὸ τοιοῦτον φύλον οἷον ρεύματα κινεῖσθαι τὰ πάντα,
κατὰ δὲ Πρωταγόραν τὸν σοφώτατον πάντων χρη-
μάτων ἄνθρωπον μέτρον εἶναι, κατὰ δὲ Θεαίτητον
E τούτων οὕτως ἐχόντων αἴσθησιν ἐπιστήμην γίνεσθαι. 15
ἢ γάρ, ὦ Θεαίτητε; φῶμεν τοῦτο σὸν μὲν εἶναι οἷον
νεογενὲς παιδίον, ἐμὸν δὲ μαίευμα; ἢ πῶς λέγεις;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὕτως ἀνάγκη, ὦ Σώκρατες.

meines *Seins*. Deutchle. Other-
wise (2), making οὐσίας a geni-
tive of the object:—'For it is
conversant with the Being of
that which is to me.' Supr.
152 C: Αἴσθησις ἄρα τοῦ ὄντος
ἔστι καὶ ἀψευδές. For a some-
what similar use of οὐσία (with
a play upon the word) cp.
Gorg. 472 B: Ψευδομάρτυρας
πολλοὺς κατ' ἐμοῦ παρασχόμενος
ἐπιχειρεῖς ἐκβάλλειν με ἐκ τῆς οὐ-
σίας καὶ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς.

7. αἰσθητής] The newly-coined
word helps to celebrate the
establishment of the theory.
Cp. infr. 208 E: Αὐτοῦ ἐπιστή-
μων γεγονὸς ἔσται, οὐ πρότερον ἦν
δοξαστής.

13. Πρωταγόραν τὸν σοφώτατον]
Prot. 309 D: Σοφωτάτω μὲν οὖν
δήπου τῶν γε νῦν, εἰ σοι δοκεῖ

σοφώτατος εἶναι Πρωταγόρας.
Perhaps Plato is ironically
preparing the way for what
follows, p. 161 D, 162 C.

15. αἴσθησιν ἐπιστήμην γίνε-
σθαι] The proposition which
Theætetus ventured 'out of his
own consciousness' now ap-
pears as the resultant of pre-
existent tendencies of thought.
The doctrine 'Sense is know-
ledge' is the meeting-point of
the two theories 'Man is the
measure,' and 'All is motion.'
The several topics are recapitu-
lated in the reverse order.
So Ar. Eth. N. 1, 3, 8: Περὶ μὲν
ἀκρατοῦ καὶ πῶς ἀποδεκτέον καὶ τί
προτιθέμεθα.

γίνεσθαι here nearly = συμ-
βαίνειν. Cp. Soph. 260 C:
Δόξα ψευδῆς γίγνεται καὶ λόγος.

being: and
I am the
judge, as
Protagoras
says, of
what is
and is not
to me.
Surely
what I thus
perceive I
may be
said to
know.

Theætetus
then was
right. Sen-
sation is
knowledge.
And in this
formula the
doctrines
of Heracli-
tus and
Protagoras
meet.

I. a. First criticism the doctrine of sense.

ΣΩ. Τοῦτο μὲν δὴ, ὡς ἔοικε, μόλις ποτέ ἐγεννήσα- p. 160.
μεν, ὃ τι δὴ ποτε καὶ τυγχάνει ὄν. μετὰ δὲ τὸν τόκου
τὰ ἀμφιδρόμια αὐτοῦ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἐν κύκλῳ περιθρε-
κτέον τῷ λόγῳ, σκοπομένους μὴ λάθῃ ἡμᾶς οὐκ
5 ἄξιον ὄν τροφῆς τὸ γιγνόμενον, ἀλλὰ ἀνεμαίων τε p. 161.

I. Τοῦτο μὲν δὴ . . . ἐγεν-
νήσαμεν] Our theory is now
complete. (1) First the hy-
pothesis was ventured, Sensa-
tion is knowledge. (2) This
was at once identified with the
axiom of Protagoras, 'The man
the measure of what is:' and
their common meaning was
brought home to us by the
analysis of a familiar example.
(3) The mystery was revealed
which lay beneath this saying,
but had been reserved for
certain 'disciples of Protago-
ras,' the Heraclitean theory of
the universe that 'All is mo-
tion;' in which all philosophers
save Parmenides concur: which
is witnessed to by poetry; and
confirmed by the observation of
nature. (4) This theory of be-
ing was then applied to the
phenomena of sense; by which
means the contradictions of
common language were re-
moved; and (5) in meeting
the formidable objection drawn
from what are commonly called
false impressions, the doctrine
was still further developed,
and shown to be universally
applicable.

At each step it has grown in
distinctness, and boldness, and
apparent certainty. At first
only warmth, colour, and the
like were spoken of; gradually
our eyes were opened to the
relativeness of size and number.
By and by it was assumed that
the term *αἴσθησις* includes plea-

sure, pain, hope, fear, etc. Then
we are quietly asked to concede
that things good and beautiful
have only a relative existence.
And, being now fairly at the
mercy of the argument, we can-
not resist the admission that
the illusions of dreams and
madness are as real as our
waking and sane impressions.
They are real to us at the time
when we experience them;
which is all the reality any
thing is permitted to claim.

3. τὰ ἀμφιδρόμια αὐτοῦ] Accu-
sative in apposition to the action
of περιθρεκτέον, κ.τ.λ., like τὸν
κολοφῶνα, supr. 153 C. 'And
now to celebrate its birth in
due form, we must really in our
argument "run round about"
with it, and consider, etc.'
Schol.: 'Ἡμέρα πέμπτη τοῖς βρέ-
φειν ἐκ γενέσεως οὕτω κληθεῖσα
παρ' ὅσον ἐν ταύτῃ καθάιρουσι τὰς
χεῖρας αἱ συνεφασάμενοι τῆς μαι-
εύσεως, καὶ τὸ βρέφος περὶ τὴν
ἔστιαν φέρουσι τρέχουσαι κύκλῳ,
καὶ τοῦνομα τίθενται τούτῳ, δῶρά
τε πέμπονσι τῷ παιδίῳ, ὡς ἐπὶ
πλείστον πολυπόδας καὶ σηπίας, οἱ
τε φίλοι καὶ οἰκείοι καὶ ἀπλῶς οἱ
προσῆκοντες.

ἐν κύκλῳ περιθρεκτέον] 'All
round;' i. e. leaving out no
point of view.

4. τῷ λόγῳ] 'In our argu-
ment.'

5. τὸ γιγνόμενον] 'That which
is now born to us.' In this
and in some other cases where
the reading has been ques-

161. καὶ ψεύδος. ἢ σὺ οἶε πάντως δεῖν τό γε σὸν τρέφειν καὶ μὴ ἀποτιθέναι; ἢ καὶ ἀνέξει ἐλεγχόμενον ὄρων, καὶ οὐ σφόδρα χαλεπανεῖς, εἴαν τις σοῦ ὡς πρωτοτόκου αὐτὸ ὑφαιρῇ;

ΘΕΟ. Ἀνέξεται, ὦ Σώκρατες, Θεαίτητος· οὐδαμῶς 5 γὰρ δύσκολος. ἀλλὰ πρὸς θεῶν εἰπέ, ἢ αὖ οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει;

ΣΩ. Φιλολόγος γ' εἶ ἀτεχνῶς καὶ χρηστός, ὦ Θεόδωρε, ὅτι με οἶε λόγων τινὰ εἶναι θύλακον καὶ ῥαδίως ἐξελόντα ἐρεῖν ὡς οὐκ αὖ ἔχει οὕτω ταῦτα· τὸ 10 δὲ γιγνόμενον οὐκ ἐννοεῖς, ὅτι οὐδεὶς τῶν λόγων ἐξέρχεται παρ' ἐμοῦ ἀλλ' αἰεὶ παρὰ τοῦ ἐμοὶ προσδιαλεγόμενου, ἐγὼ δὲ οὐδὲν ἐπίσταμαι πλέον πλὴν βραχέος, ὅσον λόγον παρ' ἑτέρου σοφοῦ λαβεῖν καὶ ἀποδέξασθαι μετρίως. καὶ νῦν τοῦτο παρὰ τοῦδε πειρά- 15 σομαι, οὗ τι αὐτὸς εἰπεῖν.

tioned, the present or imperfect tense really gives additional vividness.

3. *τις σοῦ*] The Bodl. first hand gave *τίστου*?

ὡς πρωτοτόκου] Although these words are added to the second clause, they belong in sense rather to the first, i. e. *χαλεπανεῖς ὡς πρωτοτόκος*. Cp. *supr.* 151 C.

5. *οὐδαμῶς δύσκολος*] 144 B: *Μετὰ πολλῆς πραότητος*. 155 A: *Οὐ δυσκολαίνοντες, κ.τ.λ.*

6. *αὖ*] 'You have proved that it is so.—Is this position now to be reversed?'

8. *Φιλολόγος γ' εἶ ἀτεχνῶς καὶ χρηστός, ὦ Θεόδωρε*] Phædr. 235 E: *Φίλτατος εἶ καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς χρυσούς, ὦ Φαῖδρε*. Ib. 264 B: *Χρηστός εἶ, ὅτι, κ.τ.λ.* *χρηστός* is said in a tone of good-humoured pleasantry.

'You are truly a patient

inquirer and an ingenuous person, Theodorus, if you take me for a sack full of different theories; and expect me without any difficulty to pull out the refutation of what has been now stated. But you do not perceive what is really taking place all the while (*τὸ γιγνόμενον*).'

10. *οὐκ αὖ*] The transposition of *αὖ* (to vary the expression and emphasize the negative) has caused needless embarrassment. Cp. Rep. 3. 393 D, 4. 442 A, 6. 499 E, Crat. 391 C, *infr.* 195 E, *μόνον αὖ*.

13. *ἐγὼ δὲ οὐδέν*] 'But I have no advantage in wisdom beyond this simple skill, to receive a theory from some wise person, and accept it on fair conditions.' Cp. Rep. 7. 531 E.

15. *μετρίως*] 'In a spirit of

ΘΕΟ. Σὺ κάλλιον, ὦ Σώκρατες, λέγεις· καὶ ποίει p. 161.
οὔτως.

ΣΩ. Οἶσθ' οὖν, ὦ Θεόδωρε, ὃ θαυμάζω τοῦ ἐταίρου
σου Πρωταγόρου;

5 ΘΕΟ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. Τὰ μὲν ἄλλα μοι πάνυ ἡδέως εἶρηκεν, ὡς τὸ
δοκοῦν ἐκάστῳ τοῦτο καὶ ἔστι· τὴν δ' ἀρχὴν τοῦ
λόγου τεθαύμακα, ὅτι οὐκ εἶπεν ἀρχόμενος τῆς ἀλη-
θείας ὅτι πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἐστὶν ὅς ἢ κυνο-

i. Why
did not
Protagoras
say that a
pig or a
tadpole was
the mea-
sure of

fairness.' 179 A: Μετρίως ἄρα
ἡμῖν πρὸς τὸν διδάσκαλόν σου εἰρή-
σεται.

παρὰ τοῦδε] From Theætetus.
Or is Protagoras meant?

3. ὦ Θεόδωρε] Theodorus is
now gradually drawn into the
discussion, but proves a shy
respondent. He shrinks from
being made the instrument of
his friend's defeat (162 A), is
not moved by Socrates' hu-
morous challenge (ib. C), will
not accept the responsibility of
'guarding the orphan' (165
A),—he is a mere geometrician
and unused to dialectic (ibid.),
and only when Socrates de-
clares that with no one else
can he conduct the argument
with becoming gravity (168
D E) is he induced to come
forward and discuss the ques-
tion so far as his own subject
is involved in it, but no further
(169 C). He listens quietly to
the long digression (172-177),
but evinces some impatience
when the discussion is resumed
(177 C), and although at one
point (181 B) he shows un-
expected eagerness, he refuses
to be drawn into further argu-
ment (183 D).

ὃ θαυμάζω] A courteous way

of expressing strong dissent.
Prot. 329 B: Ἐπερ ἄλλω τῷ
ἀνθρώπων πειθοίμην ἄν, καὶ σοὶ
πέιθομαι· ὃ δ' ἐθαύμασα σοῦ λέγον-
τος . . . Gorg. 458 E: "Ἄκουε
δὴ, ὦ Γοργία, ἃ θαυμάζω ἐν τοῖς
λεγομένοις ὑπὸ σοῦ. No fault is
found with the arguments of
Protagoras, only if we follow
his doctrine to its results, all
creatures that have sense must
be equally infallible. Hence
there can be no teaching and
no discussion.

6. Τὰ . . ἄλλα . . εἶρηκεν, ὡς]
'For the most part I am
charmed with his statement of
the theory that, etc.' ὡς, κ.τ.λ.
explains εἶρηκεν and not the
whole clause.

8. τῆς ἀληθείας] 'Ἀλήθεια
seems to have been the title,
or at least one title, of Prota-
goras' work. It is often co-
vertly alluded to in this and
other dialogues. See esp.
supr. 152 C, and cp. Cratyl.
391 C: Εἰ τὴν μὲν ἀλήθειαν τὴν
Πρωταγόρου ὄλωσ οὐκ ἀποδέχομαι,
τὰ δὲ τῇ τοιαύτῃ ἀληθείᾳ ῥηθέντα
ἀγαπῶν ὡς τοῦ ἄξια.

9. ὅς] The type of stupidity.
Lach. 196 C: Κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν
οὐκ ἂν πᾶσα ὅς γνοίῃ.

κυνοκέφαλος] Something more

161. κεφάλος ἢ τι ἄλλο ἀτοπώτερον τῶν ἐχόντων αἰσθη-
 σιν, ἵνα μεγαλοπρεπῶς καὶ πάνυ καταφρονητικῶς
 ἤρξατο ἡμῖν λέγειν, ἐνδεικνύμενος ὅτι ἡμεῖς μὲν αὐτὸν
 ὡσπερ θεὸν ἐθαυμάζομεν ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ, ὁ δ' ἄρα ἐτύγ-
 χανεν ὦν εἰς φρόνησιν οὐδὲν βελτίων βατράχου γυρί- 5
 νου, μὴ ὅτι ἄλλου του ἀνθρώπων. ἢ πῶς λέγωμεν,
 ὦ Θεόδωρε; εἰ γὰρ δὴ ἐκάστῳ ἀληθὲς ἔσται ὁ ἂν δι'
 αἰσθήσεως δοξάζῃ, καὶ μήτε τὸ ἄλλου πάθος ἄλλος
 βέλτιον διακρινεῖ, μήτε τὴν δόξαν κυριώτερος ἔσται
 ἐπισκέφασθαι ἕτερος τὴν ἐτέρου, ὀρθὴ ἢ ψευδής, ἀλλ' 10
 ὁ πολλάκις εἴρηται, αὐτὸς τὰ αὐτοῦ ἕκαστος μόνος
 δοξάσει, ταῦτα δὲ πάντα ὀρθὰ καὶ ἀληθῆ, τί δή ποτε,
 ὦ ἐταῖρε, Πρωταγόρας μὲν σοφός, ὥστε καὶ ἄλλων
 15 διδάσκαλος ἀξιούσθαι δικαίως μετὰ μεγάλων μισθῶν,
 ἡμεῖς δὲ ἀμαθέστεροί τε καὶ φοιτητέον ἡμῖν ἢν παρ'
 ἐκείνῳ, μέτρῳ ὄντι αὐτῷ ἐκάστῳ τῆς αὐτοῦ σοφίας;
 ταῦτα πῶς μὴ φῶμεν δημούμενον λέγειν τὸν Πρωτα-

things? His principle clearly includes all creatures that have sense; and destroys his own pretension to superior wisdom:—

remote even than the Μυσῶν ἔσχατος, infr. 209 B. As we might say, Why not the lemur or the chimpanzee?

2. πάνυ καταφρονητικῶς] 'Showing a magnificent contempt for our opinion of him.'

3. ἤρξατο] This use of the aorist indicative with ἵνα, ὅπως, etc., is not infrequent. Euthyd. 304 D: Καὶ μὴν, ἔφη, ἀξιόν γ' ἦν ἀκοῦσαι. Τί δέ; ἦν δ' ἐγώ. Ἴνα ἤκουσας ἀνδρῶν διαλεγόμενων, οἱ νῦν σοφώτατοί εἰσιν. Æsch. Prom. 749: Ὅπως πέδῳ σκήψασα τῶν πάντων πόνον | ἀπηλλάγην.

5. βατράχου has been rejected by several editors as a gloss on γυρίνου. It is sufficiently defended by Stallbaum, who quotes Bernhardy, Syntax, p. 193. The introduction of γυρίνου alone would be too abrupt, and the

reference in infr. 167 B would not be clear.

7. ἀληθὲς ἔσται, κ.τ.λ.] The future indicative with εἰ is often used in dwelling on a supposition which is unendurable. Cp. Sophocl. Philoct. 988: Εἴ μ' οὗτος ἐκ τῶν σῶν μ' ἀπάξεται βία; 10. ὀρθὴ ἢ ψευδής] For εἴτε omitted cp. infr. 169 D, 203 A.

13. σοφός] Sc. ἦν, anticipated from below.

ὥστε καὶ ἄλλων διδάσκαλος] The negative form of the same saying, viz. Οὐκ εἶναι ἀντιλέγειν, is in like manner turned against itself, Euthyd. 287 A: Εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἀμαρτάνομεν μήτε πράττοντες μήτε λέγοντες μήτε διανοούμενοι, ὑμεῖς, ὦ πρὸς Διός, εἰ οὕτως ἔχει, τίνος διδάσκαλοι ἦκετε;

15. ἦν] Viz. in his life-time.

17. ταῦτα] The old edd. with

Not to say that it cuts at the root of dialectic and of all discussion.

γόραν; τὸ δὲ δὴ ἐμόν τε καὶ τῆς ἐμῆς τέχνης τῆς p. 161.
 μαιευτικῆς σιγῶ, ὅσον γέλωτα ὀφλισκάνομεν· οἶμαι
 δὲ καὶ ξύμπασα ἢ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι πραγματεία. τὸ
 γὰρ ἐπισκοπεῖν καὶ ἐλέγχειν τὰς ἀλλήλων φαντασίας
 5 τε καὶ δόξας, ὀρθὰς ἐκάστου οὔσας, οὐ μακρὰ μὲν καὶ p. 162.

some inferior MSS. read καὶ ταῦτα.

1. τῆς μαιευτικῆς.] Here Naber would again prune the text.

2. οἶμαι δὲ καὶ ξύμπασα.] Locke, Hum. Und. 13. § 88: 'But if it should so happen that two thinking men have different ideas, I do not see how they could argue or discourse with one another.'

3. ἢ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι πραγματεία.] Ar. Met. 3. 4. 1006: Τὸ γὰρ μὴ ἔν τι σημαίνει οὐδὲν σημαίνει ἐστίν, μὴ σημαίνοντων δὲ τῶν ὀνομάτων ἀνήρηται τὸ διαλέγεσθαι πρὸς ἀλλήλους, κατὰ δὲ τὴν ἀλήθειαν καὶ πρὸς αὐτόν· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐνδέχεται νοεῖν μὴ νοοῦντα ἔν. Euthyd. 286 C: Τοῦτόν γε τὸν λόγον πολλῶν δὴ καὶ πολλάκις ἀκηκῶς αἰεὶ θαυμάζω. καὶ γὰρ οἱ ἀμφὶ Πρωταγόραν σφόδρα ἐχρῶντο αὐτῷ καὶ οἱ ἔτι παλαιότεροι· ἐμοὶ δὲ αἰεὶ θαυμαστός τις δοκεῖ εἶναι καὶ τοὺς τε ἄλλους ἀνατρέπων καὶ αὐτὸς αὐτόν. οἶμαι δὲ αὐτοῦ τὴν ἀλήθειαν παρὰ σοῦ κάλλιστα πείσεσθαι. ἄλλο τι ἢ ψευδῆ λέγειν οὐκ ἔστι; τοῦτο γὰρ δύναται ὁ λόγος. Gorg. 481 C: Εἰ μὴ τι ἦν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις πάθος, τοῖς μὲν ἄλλο τι, τοῖς δ' ἄλλο τι, τὸ αὐτό, ἀλλὰ τις ἡμῶν ἰδίον τι ἔπασχε πάθος ἢ οἱ ἄλλοι, οὐκ ἂν ἦν ῥάδιον ἐνδείξασθαι τῷ ἑτέρῳ τὸ ἑαυτοῦ πάθημα.

4. ἐπισκοπεῖν.] 'To contemplate,' or 'consider.' Supr. 155 A, infr. 207 C.

5. μακρὰ μὲν καὶ διωλύγιος]

'Great, nay enormous.' μὲν points forwards to the alternative implied in ἀλλὰ μὴ παίξουσα, κ.τ.λ. 'But then perhaps he was in jest.' Others, with Buttmann on Men. 82 A, "Ελλην μὲν ἐστι, take μὲν to mean, 'I presume.' But in that and similar passages the question is the first of a series, or at least preliminary to something which is to follow. διωλύγιος, Schol.: Μεγάλη, ἢ ἐπὶ πολὺ δῆκουσα, ἀντὶ τοῦ περιβόητος . . . σημαίνει δ' ἔσθ' ὅτε καὶ τὸ σκοτεινὸν καὶ τὸ νυκτερινόν. The meaning, 'loud' (if it really existed, but it is perhaps due to a fanciful derivation from ὀλολύζω), must have been derived from the meaning 'long.' Cp. Μακρὸν αὐτεῖν, φωνὴ οὐρανομήκης. The idea of vast size, or length, may again have arisen from the association of infinity with gloom. If so, the word is possibly related to ἡλυγή, λυγή. Compare ῥάξ, ῥώξ· πτήσσω, πτώσσω, etc. 'Vast in extent' is the only meaning admissible here and in de Legg. 10. 890 D: Τί δ' οὐ χαλεπά τε ἐστὶ ξυνακολουθεῖν λόγοις οὕτως εἰς πλήθη λεγόμενα, μήκη τε αὐ κέκτηται διωλύγια; This, too, is the meaning in which it is used by Neoplatonist writers. For the climax with καὶ compare 155 E: Σκληροῦς τε . . . καὶ ἀντιτύπους. 173 E: Σμικρὰ καὶ οὐδέν. Rep. 5. 449 D: Μέγα καὶ ὄλον.

162. διωλύγιος φλναρία, εἰ ἀληθῆς ἢ ἀλήθεια Πρωταγόρου, ἀλλὰ μὴ παίζουσα ἐκ τοῦ ἀδύτου τῆς βίβλου ἐφθέγξατο;

ΘΕΟ. ὦ Σώκρατες, φίλος ἀνὴρ, ὥσπερ σὺ νῦν δὴ εἶπες. οὐκ ἂν οὖν δεξαίμην δι' ἐμοῦ ὁμολογοῦντος 5 ἐλέγχεσθαι Πρωταγόραν, οὐδ' αὖ σοὶ παρὰ δόξαν ἀντιτείνειν. τὸν οὖν Θεαίτητον πάλιν λαβέ· πάντως καὶ νῦν δὴ μάλ' ἐμμελῶς σοι ἐφαίνετο ὑπακούειν.

ΣΩ. Ἄρα κὰν εἰς Λακεδαίμονα ἐλθῶν, ὦ Θεόδωρε,

2. ἐκ τοῦ ἀδύτου τῆς βίβλου] 'If the Truth of Protagoras is sincere, and was not laughing when she uttered this from behind her impenetrable screen of written words.' There is an allusion to the etymology of ἀδύτου.

Cp. the celebrated passage in the Phædrus, about written teaching, 275 D: Δεινὸν γάρ που, ὦ Φαῖδρε, τοῦτ' ἔχει γραφή, καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς ὅμοιον ζωγραφίᾳ· καὶ γὰρ τὰ ἐκείνης ἔκγονα ἔσθηκε μὲν ὡς ζῶντα, εἰάν δ' ἀνέρη τι, σεμνῶς πάνυ σιγᾶ, κ.τ.λ. For the imagery which is here resumed see above, 152 C: Τοῦτο ἡμῖν μὲν ἠνίξατο τῷ πολλῶν συρφετῷ, τοῖς δὲ μαθηταῖς ἐν ἀπορρήτῳ τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἔλεγε. 155 E: Τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἀποκεκρυμμένην. . . μή τις τῶν ἀμνήτων ἐπακούη. . . ὦν μέλλω σοὶ τὰ μυστήρια λέγειν. . . οὗτος ὁ μῦθος. At first Protagoras himself spoke in riddles—now his 'Truth' is personified, and speaks obscurely from her hidden shrine. Plato often thus follows up a metaphor. Compare the well-known image of the wave Rep. 4. 441 C: Ταῦτα μὲν μόγις διανενοῦκαμεν. 5. 453 D: "Ἄν τέ τις εἰς κολυμβήθραν μικρὰν ἐμπέσῃ ἂν τε εἰς μέγιστον πέλαγος μέσον, ὅμως

γε νεὶ οὐδὲν ἦτρον. 457 B: Ἐν ὥσπερ κύμα φῶμεν διαφεύγειν ὥστε μὴ κατακλυσθῆναι. 472 A: Τὸ μέγιστον τῆς τρικυμίας. 473 C: Ὅσπερ κύμα ἐγγελῶν κατακλύσειν.

4. ὥσπερ σὺ νῦν δὴ εἶπες] 161 B: Τοῦ ἐταίρου σου Πρωταγόρου.

6. παρὰ δόξαν] 'Against conviction.' Rep. I. 346 A: Καί, ὦ μακάριε, μὴ παρὰ δόξαν ἀποκρίνου, ἵνα τι καὶ περαινῶμεν.

7. πάντως καί] See above, 143 A, and note.

8. ἐμμελῶς . . ὑπακούειν] Cp. Soph. 217 D: Πάντες γὰρ ὑπακούσονται σοὶ πράως. Rep. 5. 474 A: Glaucon says, 'Ἄλλὰ τοί σε οὐ προδώσω, ἀλλ' ἀμυνῶ οἷς δύναμαι. δύναμαι δὲ εὐνοία τε καὶ τῷ παρακελεύεσθαι, καὶ ἴσως ἂν ἄλλου του ἐμμελέστερόν σοι ἀποκρινοίμην. The notion is not that of a respondent who assents to everything, but of one who apprehends the drift of each question in turn. See 145 D E, 155 D E, 159 B.

9. Ἄρα κὰν εἰς Λακεδαίμονα] It appears from this, and 169 B, that the Lacedæmonians used to compel bystanders to join in their gymnastic exercises. ("Ἐλκειν πρὸς τὸ γυμνάσιον. . . ἀπιέναι ἢ ἀποδύεσθαι κελεύουσιν.) This is probably

πρὸς τὰς παλαιίστρας ἀξιοῖς ἂν ἄλλους θεώμενος p. 162.
 γυμνοῦς, ἐνίους φαύλους, αὐτὸς μὴ ἀντεπιδεικνύει τὸ^B
 εἶδος παραποδνόμενος;

ΘΕΟ. Ἄλλὰ τί μὴν δοκεῖς, εἴπερ μέλλοιέν μοι
 5 ἐπιτρέψαι καὶ πείσεσθαι; ὥσπερ νῦν οἶμαι ὑμᾶς
 πείσειν ἐμὲ μὲν εἶν θεᾶσθαι καὶ μὴ ἔλκειν πρὸς τὸ
 γυμνάσιον σκληρὸν ἤδη ὄντα, τῷ δὲ δὴ νεωτέρῳ τε
 καὶ ὑγροτέρῳ ὄντι προσπαλαίειν.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' εἰ οὕτως, ὦ Θεόδωρε, σοὶ φίλον, οὐδ'
 10 ἐμοὶ ἐχθρόν, φασὶν οἱ παροιμιαζόμενοι. πάλιν δὴ οὖν
 ἐπὶ τὸν σοφὸν Θεαίτητον ἰτέον. Λέγε δὴ, ὦ Θεαί-
 τητε, πρῶτον μὲν ἂ νῦν διήλθομεν, ἄρα οὐ συνθαν-
 μάξεις εἰ ἐξαίφνης οὕτως ἀναφανήσει μηδὲν χείρων
 εἰς σοφίαν ὄπουσιν ἀνθρώπων ἢ καὶ θεῶν; ἢ ἡττόν
 15 τι οἶε τὸ Πρωταγόρειον μέτρον εἰς θεοὺς ἢ εἰς ἀνθρώ-
 πους λέγεσθαι;

According
 to this
 theory,
 Theaetetus
 is as wise
 as any God.

the point of the allusion here. There is no reason to suppose that the human form was less visible in an Athenian than in a Lacedaemonian palaestra. The law observed in severer times at Athens, which forbade adults to enter a gymnasium where boys were exercising, perhaps throws some light on this Spartan custom. (Aesch. c. Tim. p. 2. § 12.)

2. ἐνίους φαύλους] Socrates courteously implies his own inferiority. H. Schmidt objects that Socrates, although pretending ignorance, professes to have a special gift in dialectic. But the words have the same ironical tone as supr. 154 E, αἶτε ἰδιῶται, Rep. 2. 368 D, ἐπειδὴ οὖν ἡμεῖς οὐ δεινοί, and are used with reference to the failure of Socrates and Theaetetus to come to any conclusion hitherto.

3. παραποδνόμενος] 'Stripping beside them,' i. e. to compare with them.

7. σκληρόν] 'Stiff,' opposed to ὑγροτέρῳ, 'more supple.' Symp. 196 A: Ὑγρὸς τὸ εἶδος (ὁ ἔρωσ) οὐ γὰρ ἂν οἶός τ' ἦν πάντη περιπτύσσεσθαι . . εἰ σκληρὸς ἦν. Cp. Rep. 3. 410 D, where σκληρόν is metaphorically applied to character: Ἀγριότητός τε καὶ σκληρότητος καὶ αὐ μαλακίας τε καὶ ἡμερότητος. See too Hor. Od. 4. 1: 'Desine . . flectere molli-bus Jam durum imperiis.'

8. προσπαλαίειν] Sc. σε. 'Let more supple youth try a fall with you, and do not drag me into the gymnasium.' (Jowett.)

11. σοφόν] 'Qui scientiam a-ssthesin esse ponendo repente sapiens evasit.' Heind.

12. συνθανμάξεις] Cp. supr. ὁ θανμάξω.

15. εἰς θεοῦς] Contrast with

162. ΘΕΑΙ. Μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔγωγε. καὶ ὅπερ γε ἐρωτᾷς, πάνυ θαυμάζω. ἤνικα γὰρ διῆμεν ὄν τρόπον λέγοιεν τὸ δοκοῦν ἐκάστῳ τούτο καὶ εἶναι τῷ δοκοῦντι, πάνυ μοι εὖ ἐφαίνετο λέγεσθαι· νῦν δὲ τοῦναντίον τάχα μεταπέπτωκεν.

ΣΩ. Νέος γὰρ εἶ, ὦ φίλε παῖ· τῆς οὖν δημηγορίας ὀξέως ὑπακούεις καὶ πείθει. πρὸς γὰρ ταῦτα ἐρεῖ Πρωταγόρας ἢ τις ἄλλος ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ, ὦ γενναῖο παῖδες τε καὶ γέροντες, δημηγορεῖτε ξυγκαθεζόμενοι, θεούς τε εἰς τὸ μέσον ἄγοντες, οὓς ἐγὼ ἔκ τε τοῦ

this Legg. 4. 716 C: 'Ὁ δὲ θεὸς ἡμῖν πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἂν εἴη μάλιστα, καὶ πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ πού τις ὡς φασιν ἄνθρωπος,—a truth of which Plato here throws out a distant hint.

4. τοῦναντίον] Viz. οὐκ εὖ φαινόμενον λέγεσθαι. This word is not the subject of μεταπέπτωκε, but in apposition with the subject, forming part of the predicate. 'Nunc autem res subito in contrarium vertit. Ut Menon, 70 C: 'Ἐνθάδε δὲ . . . τὸ ἐναντίον περιέστηκεν.' Heind.—Riddell (Dig. of Idioms, § 13) would treat all such examples as accusatives. But with verbs of *becoming*, etc., the above explanation appears more probable.

τάχα] So the Bodleian MS. with Vat. Ven. II. Other MSS. have ταχύ.

6. Νέος γὰρ εἶ] Parm. 130 E: Νέος γὰρ εἶ ἔτι, φάναι τὸν Παρμενίδην, ὃ Σώκρατες, καὶ οὐπω σου ἀντίληπται φιλοσοφία ὡς ἔτι ἀντιλήφεται.

τῆς . . . δημηγορίας ὀξέως ὑπακούεις καὶ πείθει] 'Your ear is quickly caught, and your mind influenced, by popular arguments.'

9. δημηγορεῖτε] 'You talk clap-trap.'

10. ἄγοντες] Hip. Maj. 298 D: Μηδὲν τὸ τῶν νόμων εἰς μέσον παραγοντες. Phædr. 267 A: Τὸν δ' . . . εἶνον εἰς μέσον οὐκ ἄγομεν.

The Bodl. MS. with its two followers, Vat. and Ven. II., gives λέγοντες. But the tendency to the repetition of consonants, already noticed, weakens its testimony in this instance with λέγω and λέγετε following. Compare, besides the instances adduced in the note on 156, 169 C: 'Ἀντιλέγω, ἀλλ' ἄγε, Bodl. Vat. Ven. II. ἀντιλέγω, ἀλλὰ λέγε. As regards the sense there would be a slight awkwardness in the repetition of the same common word, which it is in Plato's manner to avoid, though, on the other hand, the expression ἔκ τε τοῦ λέγειν καὶ τοῦ γράφειν is made more pointed at first sight. But the general sense with δημηγορεῖτε is enough to occasion this, without the introduction of λέγοντες. And if we look closely at the expression εἰς τὸ μέσον λέγειν θεούς, it is hardly supported by comparing Herod. 6. 129: Ἔριν εἶχον

The confidence of the youth is shaken by these objections, but they are dismissed by Socrates, who points out that argument should be met with argument and not with ridicule.

λέγειν καὶ τοῦ γράφειν περὶ αὐτῶν, ὡς εἰσὶν ἢ ὡς p. 162.
οὐκ εἰσὶν, ἐξαιρῶ, καὶ ἂ οἱ πολλοὶ ἂν ἀποδέχοντο^E
ἀκούοντες, λέγετε ταῦτα, ὡς δεινὸν εἰ μηδὲν διοίσει
εἰς σοφίαν ἕκαστος τῶν ἀνθρώπων βοσκήματος ὄτου-
5 οῦν· ἀπόδειξιν δὲ καὶ ἀνάγκην οὐδ' ἠντινοῦν λέγετε,
ἀλλὰ τῷ εἰκότι χρῆσθε· ᾧ εἰ ἐθέλοι Θεόδωρος ἢ
ἄλλος τις τῶν γεωμετρῶν χρώμενος γεωμετεῖν, ἄξιος
οὐδ' ἐνὸς μόνου ἂν εἶη. σκοπεῖτε οὖν σύ τε καὶ Θεό-

ἀμφὶ μουσικῇ καὶ τῷ λεγομένῳ ἐς
τὸ μέσον; Legg. 7. 817 C
(the poets are addressed): Μὴ
δὴ δόξετε ἡμᾶς . . ἐπιτρέψειν ὑμᾶς
δημηγορεῖν . . πρὶν κρίναι τὰς ἀρ-
χὰς εἴτε ῥητὰ καὶ ἐπιτήδεια πε-
ποιήκατε λέγειν εἰς τὸ μέσον εἴτε
μή. Here λέγειν εἰς τὸ μέσον is
not equivalent to δημηγορεῖν,
but means rather to 'recite in
public.' Cp. ib. 2. 664 C: Εἰς τὸ
μέσον ἀσόμενος. The passages
already quoted show that ἄγειν
εἰς τὸ μέσον, meaning 'to ad-
duce in illustration or argu-
ment,' is quite Platonic. See
also Phil. 57 A: Οἱ δ' ἔνεκα
ταῦτα προημεγάμεθα εἰς τὸ μέσον.
There is a slight expression of
violence in θεοὺς . . ἄγοντες,
'dragging in the gods,' which
suits the context well.

1. ὡς εἰσὶν ἢ ὡς οὐκ εἰσὶν]
Here, as 152 A, Protagoras'
opinion is quoted in his own
words. Diog. Laert. 9: Περὶ
θεῶν οὐκ ἔχω εἰδέναι, οὐθ' ὡς εἰσὶν
οἱθ' ὡς οὐκ εἰσὶν. πολλὰ γὰρ τὰ
κωλύοντα εἰδέναι, ἢ τε ἀδηλόγητος,
καὶ βραχὺς ὢν ὁ βίος ὁ τοῦ ἀν-
θρώπου.

2. ἐξαιρῶ] Rep. 6.492 E: Θεῶν
μέντοι κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν ἐξαιρῶ-
μεν λόγον.

5. ἀπόδειξιν δὲ καὶ ἀνάγκην] In
dealing with a metaphysical
theory it is not enough to have

shown its inconsistency with
common sense. It must be met
upon its own ground, and the
truth which it contains, as well
as the sources of falsehood,
clearly distinguished. This, and
not merely, as the Scholiast
says, that he may draw out
Theætetus further, is Socrates'
motive in relinquishing the
ground he had taken in 151
C. This point of method
has two aspects, the Socratic
defiance of opinion and the
Sophistic contempt for ob-
vious facts. Gorg. 472 B:
'Ἄλλ' ἐγὼ σοὶ εἰς ὧν οὐκ ὁμολογῶ
οὐ γὰρ με σὺ ἀναγκάζεις. Soph.
293 E: Ξεν. φανερός, ὦ Θεαί-
τητε, εἰ σοφιστὴν οὐχ ἔωρακώς.
Θε. τί δὴ; Ξεν. δόξει σοὶ μύειν
ἢ παντάσῃσιν οὐκ ἔχειν ὄμματα
. . . τὸ δ' ἐκ τῶν λόγων ἐρωτήσει
σε μόνον.

8. οὐδ' ἐνὸς μόνου] Schol.: 'Ἐκ
τῆς τῶν κυβερνούντων συνηθείας ἔλαβε
τὸ οὐδενὸς μόνου; ὅταν ἐκεῖ πέση ἐν
τῷ παίξειν ἐν τὸ ἐλάχιστον.

(1) 'Not worth an ace.' Or,
if, as Wytttenbach thought, the
phrase originated in the line
of Homer, Il. 8. 234: Νῦν δ'
οὐδ' ἐνὸς ἀξιοὶ εἶμεν Ἐκτορος, (2)
'No better than a single man,'
whereas he is now ἐτέρων πολ-
λῶν ἀντάξιος. Cp. Polit. 297
E: Τὸν ἐτέρων πολλῶν ἀντάξιος

p. 163. δωρος εἰ ἀποδέξεσθε πιθανολογίαις τε καὶ εἰκόσι περὶ τούτων λεγομένους λόγους.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἄλλ' οὐ δίκαιον, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὔτε σὺ οὔτε ἂν ἡμεῖς φαίμεν.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλη δὴ σκεπτέον, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὡς ὁ τε σὸς 5 καὶ ὁ Θεοδώρου λόγος.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν ἄλλη.

ΣΩ. Τῆδε δὴ σκοπῶμεν, εἰ ἄρα ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη τε καὶ αἴσθησις ταῦτόν ἢ ἕτερον· εἰς γὰρ τοῦτό που πᾶς ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν ἔτεινε, καὶ τούτου χάριν τὰ πολλὰ 10 καὶ ἄτοπα ταῦτα ἐκινήσαμεν. οὐ γάρ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

B ΣΩ. Ἡ οὖν ὁμολογήσομεν, ἂ τῶ ὄραν αἰσθανόμεθα ἢ τῶ ἀκούειν, πάντα ταῦτα ἄμα καὶ ἐπίστασθαι; οἷον τῶν βαρβάρων πρὶν μαθεῖν τὴν φωνὴν πότερον 15 οὐ φήσομεν ἀκούειν, ὅταν φθέγγωνται, ἢ ἀκούειν τε καὶ ἐπίστασθαι ἂ λέγουσι; καὶ αὖ γράμματα μὴ ἐπιστάμενοι, βλέποντες εἰς αὐτὰ πότερον οὐχ ὄραν, ἢ ἐπίστασθαι, εἶπερ ὀρώμεν, διῶσχυριούμεθα;

ιατρόν. See above, 143 D: Ἄξιος γὰρ . . γεωμετρίας ἔνεκα, and below, 167 C: Ὁ σοφιστὴς . . ἄξιος πολλῶν χρημάτων τοῖς παιδευθείσιν. Bonitz questions such a use of ἄξιος = (ἀντάξιος), and would read οὐδενὸς λόγου.

I. πιθανολογίαις τε καὶ εἰκόσι] The Bodleian reading in the ancient hand. (Schanz doubts of this, but the erasure of σ is quite discernible.) Most MSS. have πιθανολογία. Cp. Ar. Eth. N. I. 2: Παραπλήσιον γὰρ φαίνεται μαθηματικῶν τε πιθανολογούντος ἀποδέχεσθαι καὶ ῥητορικοῦ ἀποδείξεις ἀπαιτεῖν.

2. τούτων] Several MSS. have τηλικούτων.

5. ὁ τε σὸς καὶ] Theætetus

has answered for both. See above, σὺ τε καὶ Θεόδωρος.

9. ἢ ἕτερον] πότερον B.

10. τὰ πολλὰ καὶ ἄτοπα] The novel doctrine of active and passive motions, the reality of dreams and phantasies, etc.

11. ἐκινήσαμεν] Rep. 5. 450 A: Ὅσον λόγον πάλι, ὥσπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς, κινεῖτε περὶ τῆς πολιτείας!

13. Ἡ οὖν, κ.τ.λ.] The argument is in brief as follows: 'If sensation is knowledge, we can know and not know the same thing; since (1) we have perfect sensible perception of things we do not know thoroughly; and (2) we remember (i. e. know) things which we do not sensibly perceive.'

2. The doctrine is therefore examined in the shape in which it first appeared; viz. 'Sense is knowledge.' If to see and hear is to know, when a person hears a strange language, or sees characters which he

ΘΕΑΙ. Αὐτό γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦτο αὐτῶν, ὅπερ p. 163,
 ὀρώμεν τε καὶ ἀκούομεν, ἐπίστασθαι φήσομεν· τῶν
 μὲν γὰρ τὸ σχῆμα καὶ τὸ χρῶμα ὄραν τε καὶ ἐπί-
 στασθαι, τῶν δὲ τὴν ὀξύτητα καὶ βαρύτητα ἀκούειν
 5 τε ἅμα καὶ εἰδέναί· ἃ δὲ οἷ τε γραμματισταὶ περὶ
 αὐτῶν καὶ οἱ ἔρμηνεῖς διδάσκουσιν, οὔτε αἰσθάνεσθαι
 τῷ ὄραν ἢ ἀκούειν οὔτε ἐπίστασθαι.

ΣΩ. Ἄριστά γ', ὦ Θεαίτητε, καὶ οὐκ ἄξιόν σοι
 πρὸς ταῦτα ἀμφισβητῆσαι, ἵνα καὶ αὐξάνῃ. ἀλλ' ὅρα
 10 δὴ καὶ τὸδε ἄλλο προσίόν, καὶ σκόπει πῆ αὐτὸ διω-
 σόμεθα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποῖον δὴ;

ΣΩ. Τὸ τοιόνδε· εἴ τις ἔροιτο, ἄρα δυνατόν, ὅτου
 τις ἐπιστήμων γένοιτό ποτε, ἔτι ἔχοντα μνήμην αὐτοῦ D

9. ἵνα καὶ αὐξάνῃ] 'That I may let you grow,' i. e. 'That I may not be always stunting and stopping you.' Cp. Lys. 206 A: Οἱ καλοὶ, ἐπειδάν τις αὐτοὺς ἐπανῆ καὶ αὔξῃ. Also Phædr. 246 E: Τούτοις δὴ τρέφεται τε καὶ αὔξεται μάλιστα γε τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς πτέρωμα. Rep. 497 A: Ἐν γὰρ προσηκούσῃ αὐτὸς τε μάλλον αὐξήσεται. Symp. 210 D: Ἄλλ' ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ πέλαιος τετραμμένος τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ θεωρῶν πολλοὺς καὶ καλοὺς λόγους τίκτη . . . ἕως ἂν ἐνταῦθα ῥωσθεῖς καὶ αὐξηθεῖς, κ.τ.λ. The expression in Aristoph. Vesp. 638, Ἡξανόμην ἀκούων, though more humorous, also affords an illustration.

We may naturally ask what objection Socrates would have raised, had he not feared to check Theætetus' growing intelligence. This may perhaps be gathered from below, where he ventures to puzzle him a little further, 165 D: Ἴσως δέ γ', ὦ θανμάσειε, πλείω ἂν τοιαῦτ'

ἔπαθες, κ.τ.λ. Socrates might have asked, Does every one who sees the forms of the letters, or who hears the sounds, possess the sciences of them (γραμματική, μουσική, 145 A)? Could he give an account, e. g. of the ὀξύτης and βαρύτης of what he hears? Cp. Rep. 7. 524 C: Μέγα μὴν καὶ ὄψις καὶ σμικρὸν ἑώρα, ἀλλ' οὐ κεχωρισμένον ἀλλὰ συγκεχυμένον τι. Not even the objects of sense are *known* by sense, but by a higher faculty.

10. τὸδε ἄλλο προσίόν, κ.τ.λ.] The implied metaphor is probably that of the wave. It is continued below, 172 B: Λόγος δὲ ἡμᾶς . . . ἐκ λόγου, μείζων ἐξ ἐλάττονος, καταλαμβάνει: and is slightly varied, 177 C: Πλείω αἰεὶ ἐπιρρέοντα καταχώσει ἡμῖν τὸν ἐξ ἀρχῆς λόγον.

14. ἐτι ἔχοντα] The Bodl. MS. has ἐπέχοντα, for which error cp. Rep. 7. 532 B. H. Schmidt (as Schanz formerly) defends ἐπέχοντα, in the sense of 'main-

has never learned, does he know or not know what is said and written?

Allowing this to pass,

Can I be ignorant of what I remember?

p. 163. τούτου καὶ σωζόμενον, τότε ὅτε μέμνηται μὴ ἐπίστασθαι αὐτὸ τοῦτο ὃ μέμνηται. μακρολογῶ δέ, ὡς εἶκε, βουλόμενος ἐρέσθαι, εἰ μαθὼν τίς τι μεμνημένος μὴ οἶδεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ πῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες; τέρας γὰρ ἂν εἶη 5 Surely not.
ὃ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Μὴ οὖν ἐγὼ ληρῶ; σκόπει δέ. ἄρα τὸ ὄραν And yet,
οὐκ αἰσθάνεσθαι λέγεις καὶ τὴν ὄψιν αἰσθησιν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐγωγε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὃ ἰδὼν τι ἐπιστήμων ἐκείνου γέγονεν 10
ὃ εἶδε κατὰ τὸν ἄρτι λόγον;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

E ΣΩ. Τί δέ; μνήμην οὐ λέγεις μέντοι τι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Πότερον οὐδενὸς ἢ τινός;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τινὸς δὴ που. 15

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὧν ἔμαθε καὶ ὧν ἤσθητο, τοιουτωνί
τινων;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μὴν;

ΣΩ. Ὁ δὴ εἶδέ τις, μέμνηταί που ἐνίοτε;

ΘΕΑΙ. Μέμνηται. 20 when I shut my eyes and remember what I have seen,

ΣΩ. Ἡ καὶ μύσας; ἢ τοῦτο δράσας ἐπελάθητο;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἄλλὰ δεινόν, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦτό γε φάναι.

taining,' 'keeping up,' i. e. not allowing to fade. But ἔτι ἔχοντα is simpler, and is sufficiently supported by MS. authority.

5. τέρας γὰρ ἂν εἶη ὃ λέγεις] 'The supposition is monstrous.' Parm. 129 B: Εἰ μὲν γὰρ αὐτὰ τὰ ὁμοία τις ἀπέφαιεν ἀνόμοια γυγνόμενα ἢ τὰ ἀνόμοια ὁμοια, τέρας ἂν, οἶμαι, ἦν. Phæd. 101 B: alib. The word τερατεία in Ar. Nub. 418 (with the verb τερατεύομαι) is connected with this use of τέρας.

13. Τί δέ;] So Bodl. first hand, Vat. Ven. Π. It seems more appropriate in serious argument than τί δαί, the common reading.

μέντοι] The particle brings forward something hitherto lost sight of, which may tend to modify the foregoing statement. We have hitherto dwelt on αἰσθησις to the exclusion of μνήμη, etc.

ΣΩ. Δεῖ γε μέντοι, εἰ σώσοιμεν τὸν πρόσθε λόγον· p. 164.
εἰ δὲ μή, οἴχεται.

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ ἐγώ, νῆ τὸν Δία, ὑποπτεύω, οὐ μὴν
ικανῶς γε συννοῶ· ἀλλ' εἰπέ πῆ.

5 ΣΩ. Τῆδε· ὁ μὲν ὁρῶν ἐπιστήμων, φαμέν, τούτου
γέγονεν οὐπερ ὁρῶν· ὄψις γὰρ καὶ αἴσθησις καὶ ἐπι-
στήμη ταῦτὸν ὁμολόγηται.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ὁ δέ γε ὁρῶν καὶ ἐπιστήμων γεγονὼς οὐ
10 ἑώρα, εἰ μύσῃ, μέμνηται μὲν, οὐχ ὁρᾶ δὲ αὐτό·

ἦ γάρ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τὸ δέ γε οὐχ ὁρᾶ οὐκ ἐπίσταται ἔστιν, εἶπερ β
καὶ τὸ ὁρᾶ ἐπίσταται.

15 ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθῆ.

ΣΩ. Συμβαίνει ἄρα, οὗ τις ἐπιστήμων ἐγένετο, ἔτι
μειννημένον αὐτὸν μὴ ἐπίστασθαι, ἐπειδὴ οὐχ ὁρᾶ. ὁ
τέρας ἔφασκεν ἂν εἶναι εἰ γίγνοιτο.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.

20 ΣΩ. Τῶν ἀδυνάτων δὴ τι συμβαίνει φαίνεται,
εἰ τις ἐπιστήμην καὶ αἴσθησιν ταῦτὸν φῆ εἶναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔοικεν.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλο ἄρα ἐκάτερον φατέον.

1. εἰ σώσοιμεν] The use of the optative is questioned, and σώσοιμεν has been conjectured. But see Riddell's Digest, § 77. He observes that the time of the infinitive after δεῖ (sc. τοῦτο φάναι) is undefined. A similarly doubtful optative occurs in Polit. 268 D: Τοῦτο τοίνυν . . ἡμῖν ποιητέον, εἰ μὴ μέλλοιμεν . . καταισχύουσι τὸν λόγον. For the sense cp. especially Phædo, 89 B: Ἐάνπερ γε ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος τελευτήσῃ, κ.τ.λ.

3. οὐ μὴν ικανῶς γε συννοῶ] 'But I do not quite comprehend why it is so.'

6. οὐπερ ὁρῶν] So Bodl. Vat. Ven. Π. ὁρῶν, sc. ἐστίν or γέγονεν. Compare the technical use of αἰσθανόμενος, noticed above, 159 D, 160 A. Also 156 D: Ἐγένετο οὐ τι ὄψις ἀλλ' ὀφθαλμὸς ὁρῶν. See also 160 D: Ἐπιστήμων . . ὄνπερ αἰσθητής.

13. Τὸ δέ γε οὐχ ὁρᾶ] Soph. 264 A: Φαίνεται δ' ὁ λέγομεν.

I remember it and do not see it.

I. e. If to see is to know,

I remember it and do not know it.

But this seemed to us a monstrous supposition; Therefore, Sense is not Knowledge.

p. 164. ΘΕΑΙ. Κινδυνεύει.

c ΣΩ. Τί οὖν δῆτ' ἂν εἴη ἐπιστήμη, πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ὡς εἴοικε, λεκτέον. Καίτοι τί ποτε μέλλομεν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, δρᾶν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τίνος πέρι;

ΣΩ. Φαινόμεθά μοι ἀλεκτρυνότος ἀγεννοῦς δίκην, πρὶν νενικηκέναι, ἀποπηδήσαντες ἀπὸ τοῦ λόγου ἄδειν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς δῆ;

ΣΩ. Ἀντιλογικῶς εἴοικαμεν πρὸς τὰς τῶν ὄνο- 10 μάτων ὁμολογίας ἀνομολογησάμενοι καὶ τοιούτῳ τινὶ περιγεγόμενοι τοῦ λόγου ἀγαπᾶν, καὶ οὐ φάσκοντες ἀγωνισταὶ ἀλλὰ φιλόσοφοι εἶναι λαμβάνομεν ταῦτὰ ἐκείνοις τοῖς δεινοῖς ἀνδράσι ποιοῦντες.

—We are in too great a hurry.

5

Perhaps the contradiction is only verbal.

2. πάλιν] μὴ πάλιν Bodl. (μῆ), Vat. Ven. Π. The Bodleian margin however says, ἐν ἐτέρῳ λείπει τὸ μῆ. If μῆ were right, the subjunctive ἦ would be required to complete the sense.

7. ἀπὸ τοῦ λόγου] Viz. the theory of Protagoras, which we have been trampling upon. Cp. infr. E: Προπηλακίζομεν.

10. Ἀντιλογικῶς εἴοικαμεν] Rep. 5. 453 E, 454: Ἡ γενναία, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Γλαύκων, ἡ δύναμις τῆς ἀντιλογικῆς τέχνης. Τί δῆ; Ὅτι, εἶπον, δοκοῦσί μοι εἰς αὐτὴν καὶ ἄκοιτες πολλοὶ ἐμπίπτειν καὶ οἰεσθαι οὐκ ἐρίξειν ἀλλὰ διαλέγεσθαι, διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι κατ' εἶδη διαιρούμενοι τὸ λεγόμενον ἐπισκοπεῖν, ἀλλὰ κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ ὄνομα διώκειν τοῦ λεχθέντος τὴν ἐναντίωσιν, ἔρδι, οὐ διαλέκτῳ, πρὸς ἀλλήλους χρώμενοι. Lys. 216 A: Καὶ ἡμῖν εὐθὺς ἄσμενοι ἐπιτηδύονται οὗτοι οἱ πάνσοφοι ἄνδρες, οἱ ἀντιλογικοί, καὶ ἐρήσονται εἰ οὐκ ἐναντιώτατον ἔχθρα φιλία; The tendencies of Ἀντι-

λογική are, first, to argue from contradictions of language, leading in the last resort to scepticism. Phæd. 90 B: Καὶ μάλιστα δὴ οἱ περὶ τοὺς ἀντιλογικοὺς λόγους διατρίψαντες οἴσθ' ὅτι τελευτῶντες οἴονται σοφώτατοι γενεῖναι τε καὶ κατανεσηκέναι ὅτι τῶν πραγμάτων οὐδενὸς οὐδὲν ἕγιές οὐδὲ βέβαιον οὔτε τῶν λόγων. Secondly, to confuse ideas or principles with facts or results. Ib. 101 E: Ἄμα δὲ οὐκ ἂν φύροιο ὥσπερ οἱ ἀντιλογικοὶ περὶ τε τῆς ἀρχῆς διαλεγόμενος καὶ τῶν ἐξ ἐκείνης ὀρηγμένων, εἴπερ βούλοιο τι τῶν ὄντων εὔρειν.

πρὸς τὰς τῶν ὀνομάτων ὁμολογίας] 'With a view to mere verbal consistency.' The whole fallacy of such formal reasoning is elaborately exposed in the Sophist.

12. οὐ φάσκοντες] Viz. supr. 154 D: Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὲν δεινοὶ καὶ σοφοί, κ.τ.λ., echoed in ἐκείνοις τοῖς δεινοῖς ἀνδράσι, below.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐπὼ μανθάνω ὅπως λέγεις.

p. 164.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ἐγὼ πειράσομαι δηλώσαι περὶ αὐτῶν ὃ γε δὴ νοῶ. ἤρόμεθα γὰρ δὴ εἰ μαθὼν καὶ μεμνημένος τίς τι μὴ ἐπίσταται, καὶ τὸν ἰδόντα καὶ μύσαντα μεμνημένον, ὀρώντα δὲ οὐ, ἀποδείξαντες, οὐκ εἰδότα ἀπεδείξαμεν καὶ ἅμα μεμνημένον· τοῦτο δ' εἶναι ἀδύνατον. καὶ οὕτω δὴ μῦθος ἀπώλετο ὁ Πρωταγόρειος, καὶ ὁ σὸς ἅμα ὁ τῆς ἐπιστήμης καὶ αἰσθήσεως, ὅτι ταυτὸν ἐστίν.

10 ΘΕΑΙ. Φαίνεται.

E

ΣΩ. Οὐ τι ἄν, οἶμαι, ὦ φίλε, εἶπερ γε ὁ πατὴρ τοῦ ἐτέρου μύθου ἔζη, ἀλλὰ πολλὰ ἂν ἤμυνε· νῦν δὲ ὀρφανὸν αὐτὸν ἡμεῖς προπηλακίζομεν. καὶ γὰρ οὐδ' οἱ ἐπίτροποι οὐς Πρωταγόρας κατέλιπε, βοηθεῖν ἐθέλουσιν, ὧν Θεόδωρος εἰς ὅδε. ἀλλὰ δὴ αὐτοὶ κινδυνεύσομεν τοῦ δικαίου ἕνεκ' αὐτῶ βοηθεῖν.

ΘΕΟ. Οὐ γὰρ ἐγώ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ μάλλον Καλλίας ὁ Ἰππονίου τῶν ἐκείνου ἐπίτροπος· ἡμεῖς p. 165.

7. μῦθος ἀπώλετο] Schol.: Παροιμία ἐπὶ τῶν τὴν διήγησιν μὴ ἐπὶ πέρας ἀγόντων. Hence probably the absence of the article. Cp. Rep. 10. 621 B: Καὶ οὕτως, ὦ Γλαύκων, μῦθος ἐσώθη καὶ οὐκ ἀπώλετο. Cp. also Phil. 14 A: Ὁ λόγος, ὥσπερ μῦθος, ἀπολόμενος οἴχοιτο.

μῦθος . . ὁ Πρωταγόρειος] Cp. supr. 157 C: Οὗτος ὁ μῦθος. Soph. 242 C: Μῖθόν τινα ἕκαστος φαίνεται μοι διηγέισθαι παισίν ὡς οὖσιν ἡμῖν. Arist. Met. 1. 993 a: Ψελλιζομένη γὰρ ἔοικεν ἡ πρώτη φιλοσοφία. Gorg. 485 B.

11. εἶπερ ὁ πατὴρ] See the passage of the Phædrus already quoted, 275 E: Πλημμελοῦμενος δὲ ὁ λόγος καὶ οὐκ ἐν δίκη λουδορηθεῖς τοῦ πατρὸς αἰεὶ δέεται βοηθοῦ,

κ.τ.λ. Cp. Soph. 241 D: Μὴ με οἶον πατραλοῖαν ὑπολάβης γίγνεσθαι τινα. Τί δὴ; Τὸν τοῦ πατρὸς Παρμενίδου λόγον ἀναγκαῖον ἡμῖν ἀμυνομένοις ἔσται βασανίζειν. It is in another sense that Phædrus in the Symposium (177 D) is πατὴρ τοῦ λόγου.

15. κινδυνεύσομεν] Not, 'I will undertake the risk,' but = κινδυνεύω βοηθήσειν, 'It seems I shall have to take his part myself.' Cp. Cratyl. 399 A: Καὶ κινδυνεύσω ἔαν μὴ εὐλαβῶμαι, ἔτι τήμερον σοφώτερος τοῦ δέουτος γενέσθαι. Symp. 174 C: Ἴσως μέντοι κινδυνεύσω καὶ ἐγὼ οὐκ ὡς σὺ λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ καθ' Ὀμηρον φαῦλος ὢν ἐπὶ σοφοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἰέναι θωῆν ἄκλητος.

18. Καλλίας ὁ Ἰππονίου] With whom Protagoras stayed

p. 165. δέ πως θάττον ἐκ τῶν ψιλῶν λόγων πρὸς τὴν γεωμετρίαν ἀπενεύσαμεν. χάριν γε μέντοι [σοὶ] ἔξομεν, εἰς αὐτῶ βοηθῆς.

ΣΩ. Καλῶς λέγεις, ὦ Θεόδωρε. σκέψαι οὖν τὴν γ' ἐμὴν βοήθειαν. τῶν γὰρ ἄρτι δεινότερα ἂν τις ὁμολογήσειε μὴ προσέχων τοῖς ῥήμασι τὸν νοῦν, ἢ τὸ πολὺ εἰθίσμεθα φάναι τε καὶ ἀπαρνεῖσθαι. σοὶ λέγω ὅπῃ, ἢ Θεαιτήτῳ;

The 'crucial' question is this,

when he came to Athens. Apol. 20 C: Ἄνδρὶ, ὃς τετέλεκε χρήματα σοφισταῖς πλείω ἢ ἔμπαντες οἱ ἄλλοι, Καλλία τῷ Ἱπποκρίτου. Prot. 311 A, 315 D: Xen. Symp. 1. 5. It hardly needs to be observed that ἐπίτροποι, like ὄρφανόν, is used figuratively, with reference to doctrines.

1. ἐκ τῶν ψιλῶν λόγων] 'From the abstractions of dialectic.' We are accustomed to speak of Geometry as a purely abstract science, but see Arist. Met. 1. 2: Αἰ γὰρ ἐξ ἑλαττόνων ἀκριβέστεραι τῶν ἐκ προσθέσεως λεγομένων, οἷον ἀριθμητικῆ γεωμετρίας. The expression ψιλοῖς λόγοις is used differently in Symp. 215 C: Ψιλοῖς λόγοις ἄνευ ὀργάνων, but cp. Phædr. 262 C: Νῦν γὰρ ψιλῶς πως λέγομεν οὐκ ἔχοντες ἱκανὰ παραδείγματα. Antisthenes is said to have called the Ideas of Plato ψιλαὶ ἔννοιαι. For λόγοι = διαλεκτική cp. Phæd. 99 E: Ἔδοξε δὲ μοι χρῆναι εἰς τοὺς λόγους καταφυγόντα ἐν ἐκείνοις σκοπεῖν τὴν ἀλήθειαν. See also Arist. de An. 1. 1, where a distinction is drawn between φιλόσοφος, μαθηματικός, and φυσικός.

2. μέντοι] σοὶ is omitted in Bod. Vat. Ven. Π. Although retained in the text by Schanz, it is not necessary to the sense.

If retained, it should be accented, as H. Schmidt observes.

ἔξομεν] Theodorus speaks on behalf of the ἐπίτροποι Πρωταγόρου.

4. τὴν γ' ἐμὴν] Cp. infr. 168 B: Κατ' ἐμὴν δύναμιν, and, for the 'modest' use of γε, Crat. 44 E, Rep. 1. 329 A: Οἷόν γε μοι φαίνεται.

6. μὴ προσέχων τοῖς ῥήμασι τὸν νοῦν, ἢ τὸ πολὺ εἰθίσμεθα] By freeing ourselves from the habitual oppositions of words, we are sometimes reconciled to what at first appears a pure contradiction. Spinoza (Cog. Met. 1.) shows a still loftier indifference to common language: 'At vero si rem accuratius examinare vellemus, possemus forte ostendere Deum non nisi improprie unum et unicum vocari; sed res non est tanti imo nullius momenti iis qui de rebus non vero de nominibus sunt solliciti.' Many of the difficulties in Greek philosophy arose, as Plato himself points out in the Sophist, from the too great stress laid upon logical alternatives; while the complexity and variety of things as they exist was lost sight of.

ἢ τὸ πολὺ εἰθίσμεθα] 'According to our common mode of affirming and denying: viz. with a view to words.

ΘΕΟ. Εἰς τὸ κοινὸν μὲν οὖν, ἀποκρινέσθω δὲ ὁ p. 165.
νεώτερος· σφαλῆς γὰρ ἦττον ἀσχημονήσει. ^B

ΣΩ. Λέγω δὴ τὸ δεινότατον ἐρώτημα. ἔστι δὲ
οἶμαι τοιόνδε τι· ἄρα οἶόν τε τὸν αὐτὸν εἰδὸτα τι
5 τοῦτο ὃ οἶδε μὴ εἰδέναι;

ΘΕΟ. Τί δὴ οὖν ἀποκρινούμεθα, ὦ Θεαίτητε;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀδύνατόν που, οἶμαι ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ, εἰ τὸ ὁρᾶν γε ἐπίστασθαι θήσεις. τί
γὰρ χρήσει ἀφύκτῳ ἐρωτήματι, τὸ λεγόμενον ἐν
10 φρέατι συνεχόμενος, ὅταν ἐρωτᾷ ἀνέκπληκτος ἀνὴρ,
καταλαβὼν τῇ χειρὶ σοῦ τὸν ἕτερον ὀφθαλμόν, εἰ
ὁρᾷς τὸ ἱμάτιον τῷ κατελιημμένῳ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ φήσω, οἶμαι, τοῦτῳ γε, τῷ μέντοι
ἐτέρῳ. ^C

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὁρᾷς τε καὶ οὐχ ὁρᾷς ἅμα ταῦτόν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὕτω γέ πως.

ΣΩ. Οὐδὲν ἐγώ, φήσει, τοῦτο οὔτε τάττω οὔτ'
ἠρόμην, τὸ ὅπως, ἀλλ' εἰ, ὃ ἐπίστασαι, τοῦτο καὶ οὐκ

3. Λέγω δὴ τὸ δεινότατον ἐρώτη-
μα] Cp. Rep. 5. 473 C: 'Ἐπ' αὐτὸ
δὴ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἴμι ὃ τῷ μεγίστῳ
προσεϊκόμενον κύματι. Where So-
crates assumes the same 'tragic'
tone as here.

4. ἄρα οἶόν τε τὸν αὐτὸν εἰδὸτα τι
· · μὴ εἰδέναι] This (Megarian)
question lies at the root of
most of the ἀπορίαι which follow.

9. ἀφύκτῳ] Euthyd. 276 E:
Τοιαῦτα ἡμεῖς ἐρωτῶμεν ἀφύκτα.
ἐν φρέατι συνεχόμενος] 'Caught
in a pit,' i.e. unable to stir hand
or foot.

11. καταλαβὼν . . τὸν . . ὀφθαλ-
μόν . . εἰ ὁρᾷς τὸ ἱμάτιον] The fal-
lacy called ἐγκεκαλυμμένος ('ob-
velatus'), which has been called
the invention of Eubulides,
seems to be here anticipated.

17. οὐδὲν . . τοῦτο, κ.τ.λ.] Τάττω,
sc. ἀποκρίνεσθαι. Cp. Rep. 5. 473
A: 'Ἐξευρηκέναι ὡς δυνατὰ ταῦτα γε-
νέσθαι ἂ σὺ ἐπιτάττεις (sc. ἐξευρεῖν).
For the sense cp. sup. 158 E:
Μὴ ὑπολάβωμεν τῇ μὲν ταῦτόν εἶναι,
κ.τ.λ. Cp. Euthyd. 295 E: Πότε-
ρον ἐπίστασαι τῷ ἂ ἐπίστασαι, ἢ
οὐ; 'Ἐγωγε, ἔφη, τῇ γε ψυχῇ.
Οὗτος αὖ, ἔφη, προσαποκρίνεται τοῖς
ἐρωτῶμένοις. οὐ γὰρ ἔγωγε ἐρωτῶ
ὅτῳ, ἀλλ' εἰ ἐπίστασαι τῷ, κ.τ.λ.
For the intentional abruptness
of the expression ('None of
that! I never asked you for
it') cp. Phil. 28 E: Οὐδὲν τῶν
αὐτῶν.

τοῦτο . . τὸ ὅπως] τοῦτο, al-
though presently explained by
τὸ ὅπως, is in the first instance
pronominal for οὕτω γέ πως.

Is it possible for the same person to know and not to know the same thing?

You are bound to say it is, if sight be knowledge. Nay, you may be driven to it without reference to memory, within the sphere of sense itself. A relentless adversary will pin you down, covering one eye with his mantle,

P. 165. ἐπίστασαι. νῦν δ' ὁ οὐχ ὄρα^s, ὄρων φαίνει. ὠμολο-
γηκῶς δὲ τυγχάνεις τὸ ὄραν ἐπίστασθαι καὶ τὸ μὴ
ὄραν μὴ ἐπίστασθαι. ἐξ οὖν τούτων λογίζου τί σοι
συμβαίνει.

D ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ λογίζομαι ὅτι τάναντία οἷς ὑπε- 5
θέμην.

ΣΩ. Ἴσως δέ γ', ὦ θαυμάσιε, πλείω ἂν τοιαῦτ'
ἔπαθες, εἴ τις σε προσηρώτα εἰ ἐπίστασθαι ἔστι μὲν
ὄξύ, ἔστι δὲ ἀμβλύ, καὶ ἐγγύθεν μὲν ἐπίστασθαι,
πόρρωθεν δὲ μὴ, καὶ σφόδρα καὶ ἡρέμα τὸ αὐτό, καὶ 10
ἄλλα μυρία, ἃ ἔλλοχῶν ἂν πελταστικὸς ἀνὴρ μισθο-
φόρος ἐν λόγοις ἐρόμενος, ἡνίκ' ἐπιστήμην καὶ αἰσθησιν
ταυτὸν ἔθον, ἐμβαλὼν ἂν εἰς τὸ ἀκούειν καὶ ὀσφραίνε-
σθαι καὶ τὰς τοιαύτας αἰσθήσεις, ἤλεγχεν ἂν ἐπέχων
E καὶ οὐκ ἀνιείς, πρὶν θαυμάσας τὴν πολυάρατον σοφίαν 15

to confess
that you
see and do
not see, and
therefore
know and
do not
know. And
thus you
will be
proved to
know both
vividly and
dimly, near
but not far
off, softly
and vio-
lently.

7. ὦ θαυμάσιε] Such ad-
dresses interposed give a tone
of increased earnestness, ex-
pressing the interest of Socrates
in what he is about to say.

9. ὄξύ . . ἀμβλύ] These terms
are properly applicable to
vision.

ἐγγύθεν μὲν . . πόρρωθεν δὲ μὴ]
This probably refers to the
sense of smell, cp. τὸ ὀσφραίνεσθαι
below, perhaps also to taste
and touch (so H. Schmidt).
Or ἐγγύθεν . . τὸ αὐτό may refer
to all the senses except sight.

10. σφόδρα καὶ ἡρέμα τὸ αὐτό]
'To know the same thing
strongly and feebly:' e. g. τὸ
ψυχρόν, — 152 B: Ἐργοί . . ὁ μὲν
ἡρέμα, ὁ δὲ σφόδρα; but the re-
ference here is probably to
sound, cp. τὸ ἀκούειν below.
(H. Schmidt takes τὸ αὐτό ad-
verbially, 'stark und leise eben-
so:' but cp. infr. 166 B.) Aris-
totle does not feel the difficulty.

Met. 6. 1029 b: Τὰ δ' ἐκάστοις
γνώριμα καὶ πρῶτα πολλάκις ἡρέμα
ἔστι γνώριμα.

καὶ ἄλλα μυρία] Cp. Phil. 14
D: Βαρὺν καὶ κούφον τὸν αὐτόν,
καὶ ἄλλα μυρία.

11. ᾶ] An accusative depend-
ing chiefly on ἐρόμενος, but
vaguely also on all that fol-
lows.

μισθοφόρος ἐν λόγοις] 'A
logical mercenary.' μισθοφόρος
is aimed at the Sophist's fee.

13. ἐμβαλὼν] 'Making his
assault.'

14. ἐπέχων καὶ οὐκ ἀνιείς] Rep.
3. 411 B: Ὄταν δ' ἐπέχων μὴ ἀνίη
ἀλλὰ κληῆ. 'Keeping up the
attack.' Cp. Odys. 19. 71:
Τί μοι ᾧδ' ἐπέχεις κεκοτηότι θυμῷ;

15. πολυάρατον] Buttmann
conjectures πολύκροτον, 'cun-
ning,' which occurs as a v. l. for
πολύτροπον in the first line of the
Odyssey. Heind. conjectures
πολύήρατον, but adds, 'ne hoc

ξυνεποδίσθης ὑπ' αὐτοῦ, οὐδὲ δὴ σε χειρωσάμενός τε p. 165.
καὶ ξυνδήσας ἤδη ἂν τότε ἐλύτρου χρημάτων ὅσων
σοί τε κάκείνω ἐδόκει. Τίν' οὖν δὴ ὁ Πρωταγόρας,
φαίης ἂν ἴσως, λόγον ἐπίκουρον τοῖς αὐτοῦ ἐρεῖ;

5 ἄλλο τι πειρώμεθα λέγειν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνν μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ταῦτά τε δὴ πάντα ὅσα ἡμεῖς ἐπαμύνοντες
αὐτῷ λέγομεν, καὶ ὁμόσε, οἶμαι, χωρήσεται, κατα- p. 166.
φρονῶν ἡμῶν καὶ λέγων, Οὗτος δὴ ὁ Σωκράτης ὁ
10 χρηστός, ἐπειδὴ αὐτῷ παιδίον τι ἐρωτηθὲν ἔδεισεν, εἰ

How would
Protagoras
defend his
own
against the
attacks of
such a
light-
armed mer-
cenary?

3. He
would say

quidem satisfacit.' In Ven. II. both *αἷ*s are written over erasures. πολυάρητος occurs twice in the *Odyssey*, 6. 280; 19. 404: "Ονομ' ὅτι κε θείης | παιδὸς παιδί φίλω· πολυάρητος δέ τοι ἔστιν. Protagoras seems to have affected certain rhetorical expressions, and he or some other Sophist perhaps may have used this word. See *Phædr.* 267 D: 'Ὀρθόεπεια, etc. Stallbaum quotes *Themist. Orat.* 22. 325. 19. ed. Dindorf.: τὸν πολυάρατον πλοῦτον τί ἂν καὶ λέγοιμεν ὁποῖων ἀγωνοθέτης πολέμων ἔστιν. For the sense cp. *Euthyd.* 272 B: Τῆς σοφίας ἧς ἔγωγε ἐπιθυμῶ, τῆς ἐριστικῆς. Ib. 273 E: Εἰ δὲ νῦν ἀληθῶς ταύτην τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἔχετον, ἴλεω εἴητον. ἀτεχνῶς γὰρ ἔγωγε σφῶ ὡσπερ θεῶ προσαγορεύω. Ib. 296 D: Ἀλλὰ βουληθείης, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὃ πολυτίμητε Εὐθύδημε. Ib. 301 B: Ἦδη δὲ τοῖν ἀνδρῶν τὴν σοφίαν ἐπεχειροῦν μμεῖσθαι, αἶτε ἐπιθυμῶν αὐτῆς.

2. χρημάτων . . ἐδόκει] *Protag.* 328 B: Καὶ τὸν τρόπον τῆς πράξεως τοῦ μισθοῦ τοιοῦτον πεποίημαι. ἐπειδὴν γὰρ τις παρ' ἐμοῦ μάθη, ἐὰν μὲν βούληται, ἀποδέδωκεν ὁ ἐγὼ πρᾶττομαι ἀργύριον·

ἐὰν δὲ μή, ἐλθὼν εἰς ἱερόν, ὁμόσας, ὅσων ἂν φῆ ἄξια εἶναι τὰ μαθήματα, τοσοῦτον κατέθηκεν.

3. τε] *Bodl. γε*, which *Wohlrab* defends.

7. Ταῦτά τε πάντα] From 162 D onwards.

8. ὁμόσε . . χωρήσεται] 'He will grapple with us.' There is a change of construction similar to that in *supr.* 149 D: Καὶ τίκτειν τε δὴ τὰς δυστοκούσας, καὶ . . ἀμβλίσκουσι. Protagoras is first imagined as pushing his adversary 'over a precipice,' by stating the *Eristic* objection to his doctrine in an extravagant form, and then as turning from arguments to facts, and showing the bearing of his theory not on truth and falsehood, but on (relative) good and evil.

10. χρηστός] Here almost = *εὐχερής*, 'Good easy man!'

ἐπειδὴ αὐτῷ, κ.τ.λ.] 'When he had found a child who was terrified by the question,' etc. For the dative cp. *Rep.* 1. 343 A: ὅς γε αὐτῷ . . γιγνώσκεις. παιδίον] Cp. *infr.* 168 D, where the same exaggeration is used.

166. οἷόν τε τὸν αὐτὸν τὸ αὐτὸ μεμνήσθαι ἅμα καὶ μὴ εἰδέναι, καὶ δεῖσαν ἀπέφησε διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι προορᾶν, γέλωτα δὴ τὸν ἐμὲ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἀπέδειξε. τὸ δέ, ὦ ραθυμότατε Σώκρατες, τῆδ' ἔχει. ὅταν τι τῶν ἐμῶν δι' ἐρωτήσεως σκοπῆς, εἴαν μὲν ὁ ἐρωτηθεὶς 5 οἴαπερ ἂν ἐγὼ ἀποκρινάμην ἀποκρινάμενος σφάλλη-
 B ται, ἐγὼ ἐλέγχομαι, εἰ δὲ ἄλλοῖα, αὐτὸς ὁ ἐρωτηθεὶς. αὐτίκα γὰρ δοκεῖς τινά σοι ξυγχωρήσασθαι μνήμην παρῆναι τῷ ὧν ἔπαθε τοιοῦτόν τι οὔσαν πάθος, οἷον ὅτε ἔπασχε, μηκέτι πάσχοντι; πολλοῦ γε δεῖ. ἢ αὖ 10 ἀποκνήσειν ὁμολογεῖν οἷόν τ' εἶναι εἰδέναι καὶ μὴ εἰδέναι τὸν αὐτὸν τὸ αὐτό; ἢ εἰάνπερ τοῦτο δείσῃ, δώσειν ποτὲ τὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι τὸν ἀνομοιούμενον τῷ πρὶν ἀνομοιουῖσθαι ὄντι; μᾶλλον δὲ τὸν εἶναι τινα, ἀλλ'

that he is not refuted, because not fairly represented by you. He would urge that memory is far less vivid than sensation. And, while not fearing to admit that it is possible to know and not to know the same thing, he would assert that the man knowing is different from the

3. τὸν ἐμέ] The use of the article has a humorously pathetic rather than a pompous effect. Cp. Soph. 239 B: Τὸν μὲν τοίνυν ἐμέ γε ἔτι τί τις ἂν λέγοι; Phædr. 258 A: Τὸν αὐτόν. Ib. 20 B: Τὸν ἐμέ. Ib. 59 B: Τοὺς μὲν δὴ σέ καὶ ἐμέ καὶ Γοργίαν καὶ Φίληθρον.

4. ὦ ραθυμότατε Σώκρατες] 'Slovenly Socrates!'

7. εἰ δὲ ἄλλοῖα] Sc. ἀποκρινάμενος σφάλλεται. The former case, εἴαν σφάλληται, was contingent. This is present fact. For the sense cp. Charm. 162 C D.

8. αὐτίκα] 'To begin with.' τινά σοι ξυγχωρήσασθαι] I. e. ἐμέ, 'Do you think a man would admit?'

μνήμην] 'That the memory a man has of an impression when it is past, is anything like what he experienced at the time.'

9. τοιοῦτόν τι οὔσαν πάθος] Hume, Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding: 'Everyone

will readily allow that there is a considerable difference between the perceptions of the mind, when a man feels the pain of excessive heat, or the pleasure of moderate warmth, and when he afterwards recalls to his memory this sensation, or anticipates it by his imagination.'—'We may observe a like distinction to run through all the other perceptions of the mind.'—'When we reflect on our past sentiments and affections, our thought is a faithful mirror, and copies its objects truly; but the colours which it employs are faint and dull, in comparison of those in which our original perceptions were clothed.'

14. τὸν εἶναι τινα] τίνα is subject, τὸν predicate. Cp. Phil. 14 C: Ἄρ' οὖν λέγεις, ὅταν τις ἐμὲ φῆ Πρώταρχον εἶνα γεγονότα φύσει πολλοὺς εἶναι πάλιν, τοὺς ἐμὲ καὶ ἐναντίους ἀλλήλοις μέγαν καὶ μικρὸν τιθέμενος, καὶ βαρὺν καὶ κούφον τὸν αὐτὸν καὶ ἄλλα μυρία.

man ignorant, and that every man becomes as many as the changes he undergoes. More seriously, he would challenge us to prove either that each man's sensations are not peculiar to him, or that it does not follow from this, that what appears to each man, is to him.

οὐχὶ τούς, καὶ τούτους γιγνομένους ἀπείρους, ἕανπερ p. 166.
 ἀνομοιώσις γίγνηται, εἰ δὴ ὀνομάτων γε δεήσει θη- c
 ρεύσεις διευλαβεῖσθαι ἀλλήλων; ἀλλ' ὃ μακάριε,
 φήσει, γενναιότερος ἐπ' αὐτὸ ἐλθὼν ὃ λέγω, εἰ δύνα-
 5 σαι, ἐξέλεγξον ὡς οὐχὶ ἴδιαι αἰσθήσεις ἐκάστῳ ἡμῶν
 γίγνονται, ἢ ὡς ἰδίων γιγνομένων οὐδέν τι ἂν μᾶλλον
 τὸ φαινόμενον μόνῳ ἐκείνῳ γίγνοιτο, ἢ εἰ εἶναι δεῖ
 ὀνομάζειν, εἴη, ᾧπερ φαίνεται. ἵς δὲ δὴ καὶ κυνοκε-
 φάλους λέγων οὐ μόνον αὐτὸς ὑψηεῖς, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς
 10 ἀκούοντας τοῦτο δρᾶν εἰς τὰ συγγράμματά μου ἀνα-
 πείθεις, οὐ καλῶς ποιῶν. ἐγὼ γὰρ φημὶ μὲν τὴν D
 ἀλήθειαν ἔχειν ὡς γέγραφα· μέτρον γὰρ ἕκαστον
 ἡμῶν εἶναι τῶν τε ὄντων καὶ μὴ· μυρίον μέντοι δια-
 φέρειν ἕτερον ἑτέρου αὐτῷ τούτῳ, ὅτι τῷ μὲν ἄλλα
 15 ἔστι τε καὶ φαίνεται, τῷ δὲ ἄλλα. καὶ σοφίαν καὶ
 σοφὸν ἄνδρα πολλοῦ δέω τὸ μὴ φάναι εἶναι, ἀλλ'
 αὐτὸν τοῦτον καὶ λέγω σοφόν, ὃς ἂν τινα ἡμῶν ᾧ
 φαίνεται καὶ ἔστι κακά, μεταβάλλων ποιήσῃ ἀγαθὰ
 φαίνεσθαί τε καὶ εἶναι. τὸν δὲ λόγον αὖ μὴ τῷ ρή-

Compare a strange fancy of Comte's, *Catéchisme Posit.* p. 2: 'For each man differs from himself successively as much as he differs simultaneously from other men.'

1. καὶ τούτους γιγνομένους ἀπείρους] 'Which become multiplied to infinity, if only alterations take place.'

2. ἀνομοίως γίγνηται, the reading of Bodl. Vat., admits of a possible rendering, 'If only the man become in a different way:' i.e. when he is the subject of a different process. But the reading in the text (that of T and other MSS.) is probably right.

ὀνομάτων . . . θηρεύσεις] 'Entanglements of words.' The

genitive is not objective but descriptive. Cp. *Euthyd.* 295 D: *Βουλόμενός με θηρεύσαι τὰ ὀνόματα περιστήσας.* 'If we must really be on our guard against being entangled by each other with words.'

3. ὃ μακάριε] 'By all that is sincere.' Protagoras is supposed here to appeal to Socrates as an ingenuous, single-minded person. In other cases ὃ μακάριε conveys a hint of *εὐήθεια* ('Bless your simple heart!'), *Phaedr.* 236 D.

4. γενναιότερος] 'In a nobler spirit,' viz. than that of mere verbal dispute.

8. ὀνομάζειν] *Supr.* 160 B.

19. τῷ ῥήματι] 'In a verbal

p. 166. ^Eματί μου δῖωκε, ἀλλ' ὧδε ἔτι σαφέστερον μάθε τί λέγω. οἶον γὰρ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἐλέγετο ἀναμνήσθητι, ὅτι τῷ μὲν ἀσθενοῦντι πικρὰ φαίνεται ἃ ἐσθίει, καὶ ἔστι, τῷ δὲ ὑγιαίνοντι τὰναντία ἔστι καὶ φαίνεται σοφώτερον μὲν οὖν τούτων οὐδέτερον δεῖ ποιῆσαι. 5

p. 167. οὐδὲ γὰρ δυνατόν. οὐδὲ κατηγορητέον ὡς ὁ μὲν κάμων ἀμαθής, ὅτι τοιαῦτα δοξάζει, ὁ δὲ ὑγιαίνων σοφός, ὅτι ἀλλοῖα μεταβλητέον δ' ἐπὶ θάτερα ἀμείνων γὰρ ἢ ἑτέρα ἔξις. οὕτω δὲ καὶ ἐν τῇ παιδείᾳ ἀπὸ ἑτέρας ἔξεως ἐπὶ τὴν ἀμείνω μεταβλητέον. ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ἰατρὸς 10 φαρμάκοις μεταβάλλει, ὁ δὲ σοφιστῆς λόγοις. ἐπεὶ οὐ τί γε ψευδῆ δοξάζοντά τις τινα ὕστερον ἀληθῆ ἐποίησε δοξάζειν. οὕτε γὰρ τὰ μὴ ὄντα δυνατόν δοξάσαι, οὕτε ἄλλα παρ' ἃ ἀν πάσχη· ταῦτα δὲ ἀεὶ 15 B ἀληθῆ. ἀλλ' οἶμαι, πονηρᾶς ψυχῆς ἔξει δοξάζοντας

He would tell us that he is far from disparaging the wisdom of the wise: but he would define wisdom as the power of bringing men over, not from false ideas to true ones, but from a

way? Cp. Rep. i. 340 D:

Λέγομεν τῷ ῥήματι οὕτως, κ.τ.λ.

1. μου] To be taken with λόγον.

3. φαίνεται . . . καὶ ἔστι . . . ἔστι καὶ φαίνεται] What is to the healthy man, also appears to him. Protagoras asserts that what appears to the sick man also is to him.

6. κατηγορητέον] Sc. τοῦ κάμωντος. The word has here its proper vernacular meaning 'to accuse,' although this is inapplicable to the succeeding clauses, where a more general notion has to be supplied.

8. μεταβλητέον . . . ἔξις] This 'practical' view of education is in close accordance with that which Pláto attributes to Protagoras in the dialogue which bears his name. See esp. 328 A: 'Ἀλλὰ κἂν εἰ ὀλίγον ἔστι τις ὅστις διαφέρει ἡμῶν προβιβάσαι εἰς ἀρετὴν, ἀγαπητόν.

15. πονηρᾶς ψυχῆς ἔξει δοξάζοντας συγγενῆ ἐαυτῆς] πονηρᾶς is the reading of all the MSS., δοξάζοντας of Bodl. (with marks over σ by b) Vat. Ven. Π. ἐαυτῆς is found in all the MSS. but one (Flor. b. αὐτῆς). πονηρᾶς ψυχῆς ἔξει, 'through having a bad or vicious soul.' ἔξις, like φαντασία, is not with Plato, as with Aristotle, a term of art, it is simply (as observed above on 153 B) the noun of the verb ἔχειν, and accordingly has two meanings, 'condition,' ἀπὸ τοῦ ἔχειν πως, and 'having;' and, like πράξις, it sometimes wavers between both. For instances of the active sense cp. Rep. 4. 433 E: 'Ἡ τοῦ οἰκείου τε καὶ ἐαυτοῦ ἔξις καὶ πράξις. Soph. 247 A: Δικαιοσύνης ἔξει καὶ παρουσία, and infr. 197 B: Ἐπιστήμης που ἔξιν φασὶν εἶναι. Also Crat. 414 B, de Legg. 1. 625 C, Tim. 73 A, 74 B, 87 E. For an instance where it seems

worse to
a better
state. Un-

συγγενῆ ἑαυτῆς χρηστῆ ἐποίησε δοξάσαι ἕτερα τοι- p. 167.
αὐτα, ἃ δὴ τινες τὰ φαντάσματα ὑπὸ ἀπειρίας ἀληθῆ

to waver cp. Rep. 509 A: Ἔτι
μειζόνως τιμητέον τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ
ἕξιν. Ib. 591 B: Ἡ ψυχὴ . .
τιμωτέραν ἕξιν λαμβάνει, σωφρο-
σύνην κτωμένη. Gorg. 524 B:
Ἔχει τὴν ἕξιν τὴν αὐτοῦ. And
above, 153 B: Ἡ τοῦ σώ-
ματος ἕξις . . ἡ δ' ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ
ἕξις, we seem to pass from one
meaning to the other within
a few lines, as here. Comp. also
Gorg. 523 C: Ψυχὰς πονηρὰς
ἔχοντες. ἑαυτῆς presents more
difficulty, but it may still be
genuine. The transition is easy
and not unfrequent from the
person thinking to the mind
thinking. Cp. Phædo. 82,
where the change from the
masculine to the feminine, i. e.
from the persons to the souls,
occurs several times together.
Gorg. 526 B: Τοιοῦτόν τινα . .
ἐνίοτε δ' ἄλλην. Infr. 173 A:
Σμικροὶ δὲ καὶ οὐκ ὀρθοὶ τὰς ψυχὰς.
τὴν γὰρ αἴξην καὶ τὸ εὐθύ . . ἡ ἐκ
νέων δουλεία ἀφήρηται . . κινδύνους
. . ἔτι ἀπαλαῖς ψυχαῖς ἐπιβάλ-
λουσα, οὐς οὐ δυνάμενοι, κ.τ.λ.
See also, for an instance of a
like change of subject, Rep. 4.
441 E: Μουσικῆς καὶ γυμναστικῆς
κράσις . . προστήσεται. That such
a change of subject does occur
here, is evident from the nomi-
native χρηστῆ. The reflexive
pronoun is also facilitated by
συγγενῆ, being a correlative
word. Cp. Phædr. 238 C:
Τῶν ἑαυτῆς συγγενῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν.
Compare also for the use of
the reflexive pronoun, where it
cannot be strictly referred to
the subject of the sentence,
Rep. 419 A: Ἐάν τις σε φῆ μὴ
πάνυ εὐδαίμονας ποιεῖν τούτους
τοὺς ἄνδρας, καὶ ταῦτα δι' ἑαυτοῦς.

Supr. 152 B: Πότερον . . ἐφ'
ἑαυτὸ τὸ πνεῦμα ψυχρὸν ἢ οὐ
ψυχρὸν φήσομεν.

δοξάζοντας is preferable as
the reading of the best MS.,
as the harder reading, and be-
cause the change to δοξάζοντα
was so easy with the same word
occurring a few lines above.
For the change from the sin-
gular τινὰ to the indefinite
plural cp. Rep. 1. 344 B: Ἐπειδὴν
δέ τις . . αὐτοῦς . . δουλώσεται
. . ἀπὸ τούτων τῶν αἰσχροῶν ὀνο-
μάτων . . μακάριοι κέκληνται, οὐ
μόνον ὑπὸ τῶν πολιτῶν ἀλλὰ καὶ
ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων, ὅσοι ἂν πύθωνται
αὐτὸν τὴν ὄλην ἀδικίαν ἡδικοκῶτα:
et passim.

For it is not to be supposed
that anybody ever makes one
who thinks falsely afterwards
think truly. For it is impos-
sible either to think what is not,
or to think anything beyond
the present impression, which
is always real. But, I suppose,
whereas men through having an
inferior mind entertain thoughts
of a kindred nature, a good
mind causes them to have good
thoughts, those, namely, which
men in ignorance call true.'

If any change of reading were
required, the most probable
would be the transposition of
συγγενῆ ἑαυτῆς and ἕτερα τοιαῦτα,
—πονηρὰς ψυχῆς ἕξει δοξάζοντας
ἕτερα τοιαῦτα χρηστῆ ἐποίησε
δοξάσαι συγγενῆ ἑαυτῆς.

1. χρηστῆ] Sc. ψυχῆ.

ἕτερα τοιαῦτα] Sc. χρηστά.

'Whereas inferior minds have
opinions kindred to themselves,
a superior mind creates in them
opinions which resemble it.'

2. φαντάσματα] This word here

p. 167. καλοῦσιν, ἐγὼ δὲ βελτίω μὲν τὰ ἕτερα τῶν ἐτέρων, ἀληθέστερα δὲ οὐδέν. καὶ τοὺς σοφούς, ὦ φίλε Σώκρατες, πολλοῦ δέω βατράχους λέγειν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ μὲν σώματα ἰατροὺς λέγω, κατὰ δὲ φυτὰ γεωργούς. φημί γὰρ καὶ τούτους τοῖς φυτοῖς ἀντὶ πονηρῶν αἰσθήσεων, ὅταν τι αὐτῶν ἀσθενῇ, χρηστὰς καὶ ὑγιεινὰς αἰσθήσεις

til this is disproved, Socrates must be content to be a 'measure of things.'

contains no association of falsehood, seeing that φαίνεσθαι and εἶναι are identified; but neither does it imply truth.

2. ἀληθέστερα δ' οὐδέν] I. e. 'all are equally real.'

4. κατὰ δὲ φυτὰ γεωργούς] The theory is exposed by being gravely carried to the farthest point. Man is reduced to a level not only with brutes but with vegetables. Cp. Ar. Met. 1008b: Εἰδὴ μὲν ὑπολαμβάνει ἀλλ' ὁμοίως οἰεταί τε καὶ οὐκ οἰεταί, τί ἂν διαφερόντως ἔχοι τῶν φυτῶν; This however is only remotely hinted at. At present we are to receive this as an additional proof of Protagoras' boldness. For a more serious use of the analogy between human nature and the vegetable world see Rep. 6. 491 D: Σπέρματος πέρι ἢ φύτου εἴτε ἐγγείων εἴτε τῶν ζώων, κ.τ.λ. and, for a still closer parallel, Tim. 77 A: Τῆς γὰρ ἀνθρωπίνης ξυγενῆ φύσεως φύσιν ἄλλαις ιδέαις καὶ αἰσθήσεσι κεραννύντες, ὥσθ' ἕτερον ζῶον εἶναι, φυτεῖουσιν ἂ δὴ νῦν ἡμερα δένδρα καὶ φυτὰ καὶ σπέρματα παιδευθέντα ὑπὸ γεωργίας τιθασῶς πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἔσχε' πρὶν δ' ἦν μόνον τὰ τῶν ἀγρίων γένη, πρεσβύτερα τῶν ἡμέρων ὄντα. Heind. quotes Aristot. de Plant. 1. 1, where, after mentioning the opinions of Anaxagoras and Empedocles on the question, 'Do plants feel?' he adds, Ὁσαύτως καὶ ὁ Πλάτων ἐπιθυμεῖν

μόνον αὐτὰ διὰ τὴν σφοδρὰν τῆς θρεπτικῆς δυνάμεως ἀνάγκην ἔφησεν, ὃ ἐὰν συσταίη, ἦδεσθαι ὄντως αὐτὰ καὶ λυπεῖσθαι αἰσθάνεσθαι τε σύμφωνον ἔσται. Cp. Æsch. Eumen. 911: ΑΘ. στέργω γάρ, ἀνδρὸς φυτυποιμένος δίκην, | τὸ τῶν δικαίων τῶνδ' ἀπένηθον γένος.

6. χρηστὰς καὶ ὑγιεινὰς αἰσθήσεις τε καὶ ἀληθείς] 'Impart to them good and healthy sensations and real ones too;' i. e. not only real (which they all are), but also good and healthy. The difference of idiom by which in Greek what is most emphatic is put first, though well known, is often a source of difficulty.

Cp. supr. 150 E: Αὐτοῖς τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἔδοξαν ἀμαθεῖς εἶναι.

Schleiermacher's conjecture, ἀληθείας, has been generally received, but ἀληθείς (in which Wohlrab agrees) is very possibly right. For the difficult position of τε cp. Rep. 4. 465 E: Καὶ γέρα δέχονται παρὰ τῆς αὐτῶν πόλεως ζῶντες τε καὶ τελευτήσαντες ταφῆς ἀξίας μετέχουσιν. Ib. 5. 472 A: Εἰκότως ἄρα ὠκνοῦν τε καὶ ἐδεδοικῆ οὕτω παράδοξον λέγειν λόγον τε καὶ ἐπιχειρεῖν διασκοπεῖν. The objection drawn from supr. ἂ δὴ τιμες . . ὑπὸ ἀπειρίας ἀληθῆ καλοῦσιν is cancelled by the preceding ταῦτα δὲ ἀεὶ ἀληθῆ. The state of plants has as much reality as that of the wise man:

τε καὶ ἴαληθεῖς ἐμποιοῦν, τοὺς δέ γε σοφοὺς τε καὶ p. 167.
 ἀγαθοὺς ῥήτορας ταῖς πόλεσι τὰ χρηστὰ ἀντὶ τῶν
 πονηρῶν δίκαια δοκεῖν εἶναι ποιεῖν. ἐπεὶ οἷά γ' ἂν
 ἐκάστη πόλει δίκαια καὶ καλὰ δοκῆ, ταῦτα καὶ εἶναι
 5 αὐτῇ, ἕως ἂν αὐτὰ νομίσῃ. ἀλλ' ὁ σοφὸς ἀντὶ πονηρῶν
 ὄντων αὐτοῖς ἐκάστων χρηστὰ ἐποίησεν εἶναι καὶ
 δοκεῖν. κατὰ δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον καὶ ὁ σοφιστῆς
 τοὺς παιδευομένους οὕτω δυνάμενος παιδαγωγεῖν
 σοφός τε καὶ ἄξιος πολλῶν χρημάτων τοῖς παιδευ- D
 10 θείσι. καὶ οὕτω σοφώτεροί τε εἰσιν ἕτεροι ἐτέρων καὶ
 οὐδεὶς ψευδῆ δοξάζει, καὶ σοί, εἴαν τε βούλῃ εἴαν τε μὴ,
 ἀνεκτέον ὄντι μέτρῳ. σώζεται γὰρ ἐν τούτοις ὁ λόγος
 οὗτος. ᾧ σὺ εἰ μὲν ἔχεις ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἀμφισβητεῖν,
 ἀμφισβῆται, λόγῳ ἀντιδιεξεληθῶν, εἰ δὲ δι' ἐρωτήσεων
 15 βούλει, δι' ἐρωτήσεων. οὐδὲ γὰρ τοῦτο φευκτέον ἀλλὰ
 πάντων μάλιστα διακτέον τῷ νουν ἔχοντι. ποίει
 μέντοι οὕτωςί. μὴ ἀδίκει ἐν τῷ ἐρωτᾶν. καὶ γὰρ E
 πολλὴ ἀλογία ἀρετῆς φάσκοντα ἐπιμελεῖσθαι μηδὲν
 ἀλλ' ἢ ἀδικοῦντα ἐν λόγοις διατελεῖν. ἀδικεῖν δ' ἔστιν

Protagoras would be willing to proceed by question and answer, only he would demand fair treatment.

and the latter has no advantage in point of truth.

2. ταῖς πόλεσι] A further step is thus made in advance. Having already (supr. 157 D) included the good and noble amongst the things of which each man is judge for himself, it is natural to apply the same theory to the State, and to law and justice. It is on this point that the dialectic of Socrates afterwards lays hold:—infr. 172 A, 177 C.

3. εἶναι has been needlessly suspected.

9. ἄξιος πολλῶν χρημάτων] Prot. 328 B.

12. ἐν τούτοις] 'Through the instances herein adduced.'

14. λόγῳ ἀντιδιεξεληθῶν, κ.τ.λ.] Protagoras himself is represented as master of both styles (Prot. 329 B: Ἰκανὸς μὲν μακροῦς λόγους . . εἰπεῖν . . ἱκανὸς δὲ καὶ ἐρωτηθεὶς ἀποκρίνασθαι κατὰ βραχύ), and in the Phædrus Socrates himself adopts both, of course to the implied disadvantage of the rhetorical. See also Gorg. 449 B C, Soph. 217 C: Πότερον εἴωθας μακρῷ λόγῳ διεξιέναι . . ἢ δι' ἐρωτήσεων ;

εἰ δὲ δι' ἐρωτήσεων βούλει] Sc. διεξεληθῆν. Protagoras is supposed to add this out of compliance with Socrates' humour. μὲν in the preceding clause really looks forward to ποίει μέντοι, κ.τ.λ.

For Dialectic, if fairly used, leads to sincere inquiry: if controversially, to the hatred of inquiry.

- p. 167. ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ, ὅταν τις μὴ χωρὶς μὲν ὡς ἀγωνιζόμενος τὰς διατριβὰς ποιῆται, χωρὶς δὲ διαλεγόμενος, καὶ ἐν μὲν τῷ παίξει τε καὶ σφάλλῃ καθ' ὅσον ἀνδύνηται, ἐν δὲ τῷ διαλέγεσθαι σπουδάξει τε καὶ ἐπανορθοῖ τὸν προσδιαλεγόμενον, ἐκεῖνα μόνον αὐτῷ⁵ ἐνδεικνύμενος τὰ σφάλματα, ἃ αὐτὸς ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ καὶ τῶν προτέρων συνουσιῶν παρεκέκρουστο. ἀν μὲν γὰρ οὕτω ποιῆς, ἑαυτοὺς αἰτιάσονται οἱ προσδιατρίβοντές σοι τῆς αὐτῶν ταραχῆς καὶ ἀπορίας, ἀλλ' οὐ σέ, καὶ σὲ μὲν διώξονται καὶ φιλήσουσιν, αὐτοὺς δὲ μισήσουσι, καὶ φεύξονται ἀφ' ἑαυτῶν εἰς φιλοσοφίαν, ἵν' ἄλλοι γινόμενοι ἀπαλλαγῶσι τῶν οἱ πρότερον ἦσαν. εἰ δὲ τὰναντία τούτων δράς ὥσπερ οἱ πολλοί, τὰναντία ξυμβήσεται σοι καὶ τοὺς ξυνόντας ἀντὶ φιλοσοφῶν μισοῦντας τοῦτο τὸ πρᾶγμα ἀποφανεῖς, ἐπειδὴ¹⁵ δὲν πρεσβύτεροι γίνωνται. εἰ δὲ οὖν ἐμοὶ πείθῃ, ὃ καὶ πρότερον ἐρρέθη, οὐ δυσμενῶς οὐδὲ μαχητικῶς, ἀλλ'

I. ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ] Sc. ἐν τῷ ἐρωτᾷ, ἐν λόγοις, supr. 'To play false in this particular game.' Cp. infr. 187 D: 'Ἐν τοῖς τοιοῖσδε. 207 E: 'Ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ καιρῷ. Ast and others take τοιούτῳ of what follows: 'There is false play in such a case as this, viz. when, etc. This is also possible, but the context points the other way. The whole passage contains a covert censure of the eristic method which has pervaded the argument hitherto. Cp. Rep. 6. 487 B, where perhaps Socrates himself is gently criticized: 'Ἐγούνηται . . . ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου παρ' ἕκαστον τὸ ἐρώτημα συμκρὸν παραγόμενοι, . . . ἐπὶ τελευταίῃ τῶν λόγων μέγα τὸ σφάλμα καὶ ἐναντίον τοῖς πρώτοις ἀναφαίνεσθαι.

5. ἐκεῖνα . . . τὰ σφάλματα] 'Those slips and deviations which are due to himself and to the company he has previously kept.' παρακρούειν (to deflect) is said to have been a wrestler's term. The language recalls supr. 150 E: Διὰ πονηρὰν ξυνουσίαν.

11. ἵν' ἄλλοι . . . ἦσαν] Protagoras here applies his theory. Supr. 166 B.

15. μισοῦντας τοῦτο τὸ πρᾶγμα] Viz. τὴν φιλοσοφίαν, i. e. μισολόγους γεγονότας. See the remarkable passage in the Phædo on this subject, 89, 90; where a parallel is drawn between the growth of misanthropy and scepticism.

16. ὃ καὶ πρότερον ἐρρέθη] Viz. supr. 166 C: Γενναιότερως ἐπ' αὐτὸ ἐλθὼν ὃ λέγω.

He would invite us to examine the meaning of his own saying, and of the principle of motion, and thus to meet the doctrine of sense on its own ground, avoiding the captiousness of verbal criticism.

ἴλεω τῇ διανοίᾳ συγκαθεῖς ὡς ἀληθῶς σκέψει τί ποτε p. 168.
 λέγομεν, κινεῖσθαι τε ἀποφαινόμενοι τὰ πάντα τό τε
 δοκοῦν ἐκάστῳ τούτο καὶ εἶναι ιδιώτῃ τε καὶ πόλει.
 καὶ ἐκ τούτων ἐπισκέψει εἴτε ταῦτον εἴτε καὶ ἄλλο
 5 ἐπιστήμη καὶ αἴσθησις, ἀλλ' οὐχ, ὥσπερ ἄρτι, ἐκ
 συνηθείας ῥημάτων τε καὶ ὀνομάτων, ἀ οἱ πολλοὶ ὅπη
 ἂν τύχῳσι ἔλκοντες ἀπορίας ἀλλήλοις παντοδαπὰς
 παρέχουσι. Ταῦτα, ὦ Θεόδωρε, τῷ ἐταίρῳ σου εἰς
 βοήθειαν †προσηρξάμην κατ' ἐμὴν δύναμιν, σμικρὰ
 10 ἀπὸ σμικρῶν· εἰ δ' αὐτὸς ἔζη, μεγαλειότερον ἂν τοῖς
 αὐτοῦ ἐβοήθησεν.

ΘΕΟ. Παίξεις, ὦ Σώκρατες· πάνυ γὰρ νεανικῶς
 τῷ ἀνδρὶ βεβοήθηκας.

ΣΩ. Εὖ λέγεις, ὦ ἐταῖρε. καί μοι εἶπέ· ἐνενόησάς
 15 πού λέγοντος ἄρτι τοῦ Πρωταγόρου καὶ ὀνειδίζοντος
 ἡμῖν ὅτι πρὸς παιδίον τοὺς λόγους ποιούμενοι τῷ τοῦ
 παιδὸς φόβῳ ἀγωνιζόμεθα εἰς τὰ ἑαυτοῦ, καὶ χαρι-

1. ἴλεω τῇ διανοίᾳ συγκαθεῖς] Sc. σεαυτόν. Cp. infr. 174 A: Αὐτὴν συγκαθειῖσα. 'Meeting us without reserve, in a candid and good-humoured spirit.'

6. ὅπη ἂν τύχῳσι ἔλκοντες] Soph. 259 C: Τότε μὲν ἐπὶ θάτερα τότε δ' ἐπὶ θάτερα τοὺς λόγους ἔλκων. Phil. 57 D: Τοῖς δεινοῖς περὶ λόγων ὀκλήν. Infr. 195 C, 199 A.

9. †προσηρξάμην] 'I have contributed as a beginning.' Notwithstanding Buttman's ingenious defence of this word, Lexil. i. 103, it is difficult not to incline to the conjecture of Coraius suggested by Schneider, προσήρκεσα μὲν. Cp. Legg. 6. 757 B: Σμικρὰ μὲν ἐπαρκεῖ, πᾶν δ' ὅσον ἂν ἐπαρκέσῃ: Soph. Œd. Col. 72: Ὡς ἂν προσαρκῶν σμικρὰ, κερδάνη μέγα. See however infr. 171

E: Ὑπεγράψαμεν βοηθοῦντες,— and cp. the use of ἐπάρχεσθαι in the Homeric hymn to Apollo, l. 125: Οὐδ' ἄρ' Ἀπόλλωνα χρυσάορα θήσατο μήτηρ, | ἀλλὰ Θέμις νέκταρ τε καὶ ἄμβροσίην ἐρατεινὴν | ἀθανάτησιν χέρσιν ἐπήρξατο, and the use of ὑπαρξάμενος in Tim. 41 C.

10. μεγαλειότερον] A rhetorical word, used probably in ironical imitation of Protagoras' style. See note on πολυάρατον, 165 E. Cp. Xen. Mem. 2. i. §34: Οὕτω πῶς διώκει Πρόδικος τὴν ὑπ' Ἀρετῆς Ἑρακλέους παιδείωσι, ἐκόσμησε μόντοι τὰς γνώμας ἐτι μεγαλειότεροις ῥήμασιν ἢ ἐγὼ νῦν.

12. πάνυ γὰρ νεανικῶς τῷ ἀνδρὶ βεβοήθηκας] 'Your defence of our friend has been most vigorous.' For τῷ ἀνδρὶ cp. supr. 162 A: Φίλος ἀνὴρ.

17. χαριεντισμόν τινα . . λόγον]

p. 168. εντισμόν τινα ἀποκαλῶν, ἀποσεμνύνων δὲ τὸ πάντων μέτρον, σπουδάσαι ἡμᾶς διεκελεύσατο περὶ τὸν αὐτοῦ λόγον;

ΘΕΟ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐκ ἐνενόησα, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; κελεύεις πείθεσθαι αὐτῷ;

ΘΕΟ. Σφόδρα γε.

ΣΩ. Ὅρας οὖν ὅτι τάδε πάντα πλὴν σοῦ παιδία ἐστίν; εἰ οὖν πεισόμεθα τῷ ἀνδρὶ, ἐμὲ καὶ σὲ δεῖ ἐρωτῶντάς τε καὶ ἀποκρινομένους ἀλλήλοις σπουδάσαι αὐτοῦ περὶ τὸν λόγον, ἵνα μή τοι τοῦτό γ' ἔχη 10 ἐγκαλεῖν, ὡς παίζοντες πρὸς μειράκια διεσκεψάμεθ' αὐτῷ τούτον τὸν λόγον.

ΘΕΟ. Τί δ'; οὐ πολλῶν τοι Θεαίτητος μεγάλους πώγωνας ἔχοντων ἄμεινον ἂν ἐπακολουθήσειε λόγῳ διερευνημένῳ;

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' οὗ τι σοῦ γε, ὦ Θεόδωρε, ἄμεινον. μὴ οὖν οἴου ἐμὲ μὲν τῷ σῷ ἐταίρῳ τετελευτηκότι δεῖν p. 169. παντὶ τρόπῳ ἐπαμύνειν, σὲ δὲ μηδενί, ἀλλ' ἴθι, ὦ ἄριστε, ὀλίγον ἐπίσπου, μέχρι τούτου αὐτοῦ ἕως ἂν εἰδῶμεν, εἴτε ἄρα σὲ δεῖ διαγραμμαμάτων πέρι μέτρον 20

'Giving a bad name of "quibbling" to our argument and exalting the respect due to his maxim, he bade us be in earnest when we are dealing with his theory.' For τὸ πάντων μέτρον cp. Phil. 20 B: Τὸ . . . εἰ βούλει. The sentence continues as if ἐνενόησας ὅτι had preceded. For χαριεντισμόν cp. supr. 167 E, and for ἀποσεμνύνων 166 C. τοι (which Schanz omits with pr. T.) adds a touch of humorous earnestness to the request of Socrates.

7. τάδε πάντα] Viz. Theætetus, the younger Socrates, and their companions. Supr. 144 C, 146 B.

11. αὐτῷ τῷ λόγῳ] Coisl. p. m. Αὐτοῦ τὸ λόγον. The Bodl. p. m. had αὐτοῦ τὸν τὸν λόγον. Cp. 166 D: Τὸν δὲ λόγον αὐτῷ μὴ τῷ ῥήματί μου δῖσκε. τούτον τὸν λόγον, if correct, refers to the fresh arguments which Protagoras had assumed in his defence, and the discussion founded on them.

18. σὲ δὲ μηδενί] The pronoun is simply used to strengthen the negative. Cp. Soph. Œd. Tyr. 1019: Καὶ πῶς ὁ φύσας ἐξ ἴσου τῷ μηδενί;

20. διαγραμμαμάτων . . . ἀστρονομίαν] Note the variety, and cp. supr. 147 A B.

That Protagoras may be treated with due gravity. Theodorus is at last compelled to join in the discussion.

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εἶναι, εἶτε πάντες ὁμοίως σοὶ ἱκανοὶ ἑαυτοῖς εἶς τε p. 169.
 ἀστρονομίαν καὶ τᾶλλα ὧν δὴ σὺ πέρι αἰτίαν ἔχεις
 διαφέρειν.

ΘΕΟ. Οὐ ρᾶδιον, ὦ Σώκρατες, σοὶ παρακαθήμενον
 5 μὴ διδόναι λόγον, ἀλλ' ἐγὼ ἄρτι παρελήρησα φάσκων
 σε ἐπιτρέψειν μοι μὴ ἀποδύεσθαι, καὶ οὐχὶ ἀναγκάσειν
 καθάπερ Λακεδαιμόνιοι· σὺ δέ μοι δοκεῖς πρὸς τὸν
 Σκίρρωνα μᾶλλον τείνειν. Λακεδαιμόνιοι μὲν γὰρ B
 ἀπέναυτοι ἢ ἀποδύεσθαι κελεύουσι, σὺ δέ κατ' Ἀνταίων
 10 τί μοι μᾶλλον δοκεῖς τὸ δρᾶμα δρᾶν· τὸν γὰρ προσ-
 ελθόντα οὐκ ἀνίης πρὶν ἀναγκάσης ἀποδύσας ἐν τοῖς
 λόγοις προσπαλαῖσαι.

ΣΩ. Ἀριστά γε, ὦ Θεόδωρε, τὴν νόσον μου ἀπέ-
 15 γαστας· ἰσχυρικώτερος μέντοι ἐγὼ ἐκείνων. μυρίοι
 γὰρ ἤδη μοι Ἡρακλέες τε καὶ Θησέες ἐντυγχά-

2. αἰτίαν ἔχεις] 'You are re-
 puted.' Rep. 4. 435 E: Οἱ δὴ καὶ
 ἔχουσι ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν (τοῦ θυ-
 μοειδέως εἶναι), Gorg. 503 B. Cp.
 the use of αἰτιῶμαι in Rep. 10.
 599 E, 4. 435 E.

8. τείνειν] Cp. Phæd. 65 A:
 Ἐγγύς τι τείνειν τοῦ τεθνάναι.
 'You come nearer to the an-
 alogy of Sciron.'

9. κατ' Ἀνταίων] The allusion
 to the Lacedæmonian custom
 (supr. 162 B) is repeated, but,
 as usual, with fresh imagery,
 and additional point. The
 Lacedæmonians tell one to
 strip or go away. But you,
 like Sciron, strip all you meet
 with, and, like Antæus, force
 them to wrestle with you. H.
 Schmidt needlessly suspects
 κατ' Ἀνταίων. There is a slight
 inversion for the sake of em-
 phasis. The natural order
 would be μᾶλλον τι κατ' Ἀνταίων.

10. τὸ δρᾶμα δρᾶν] (1) 'To go

about your work.' Or (2) 'To
 perform your part.' Cp. supr.
 150 A: "Ἐλαττον δὲ τοῦ ἐμοῦ
 δράματος, and note.

11. πρὶν ἀναγκάσης] Schanz,
 following Heindorf, thinks it
 necessary to read πρὶν ἄν. ἄν
 might of course easily fall out
 before ἀναγκάσης. But its omis-
 sion may be defended on the
 ground that ἀνίης contains a
 general statement.

ἀποδύσας] 'Having stripped
 him of every pretext.'

13. For νόσον Heindorf aptly
 compares Phædr. 228 B: Τῷ
 νοσοῦντι περὶ λόγων ἀκοήν.

14. ἰσχυρικώτερος μέντοι ἐγὼ
 ἐκείνων] 'But I have more of
 the athlete in me than they
 had;' (ἰσχυρικός = 'given to
 trials of strength.')

15. Ἡρακλέες τε καὶ Θησέες] Winkelmann (Fr. Antisthenis)
 suspects an allusion to Antis-
 thenes here. But the Scholiast

ρ. 169. νουντες καρτεροὶ πρὸς τὸ λέγειν μάλ' εὖ ξυγκεκόφασιν, ἀλλ' ἐγὼ οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον ἀφίσταμαι· οὕτω τις ἔρωσ δεινὸς ἐνδέδυκε τῆς περὶ ταῦτα γυμνασίας. μὴ οὖν μηδὲ σὺ φθονήσης προσανατριψάμενος σαυτὸν τε ἅμα καὶ ἐμὲ ὀνήσαι.

ΘΕΟ. Οὐδὲν ἔτι ἀντιλέγω, ἀλλ' ἄγε ὅπῃ ἐθέλεις· πάντως τὴν περὶ ταῦτα εἰμαρμένην, ἣν [ἀν] σὺ ἐπικλώσης, δεῖ ἀνατλήναι ἐλεγχόμενον. οὐ μέντοι περαιτέρω γε ὧν προτίθεσαι οἷός τ' ἔσομαι παρασχεῖν ἐμαυτὸν σοι.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ἀρκεῖ καὶ μέχρι τούτων. καὶ μοι πάνν 10 τῆρει τὸ τοιόνδε, μή που παιδικὸν τι λάθωμεν εἶδος τῶν λόγων ποιούμενοι, καὶ τις πάλιν ἡμῖν αὐτὸ ὀνειδίσῃ.

ΘΕΟ. Ἄλλὰ δὴ πειράσομαί γε καθ' ὅσον ἂν δύωμαι.

ΣΩ. Τοῦδε τοίνυν πρῶτον πάλιν ἀντιλαβόμεθα

is probably nearer the mark: Οἱ Θρασύμαχοι, Καλλικλείς, Διωνυσόδωροι, Εὐθύδημοι καὶ οἱ τοιοῦτοι. Cp. Euthyd. 297.

1. καρτεροὶ πρὸς τὸ λέγειν] 'Men of valour in the art of controversy.'

μάλ' εὖ ξυγκεκόφασιν] 'Have bruised me well.'

2. οὕτω τις ἔρωσ δεινὸς ἐνδέδυκε] Sc. με implied in ἐγὼ supr. It is left doubtful whether οὕτω is to be joined with δεινός or ἐνδέδυκεν. 'So strong a passion for this kind of exercise has taken possession of me.' It is not forgotten that Socrates says this at the close of his career. For ἐνδέδυκε cp. Phæd. 89 D: Ἦ τε γὰρ μισανθρωπία ἐνδέεται.

3. δεινός] For the inversion (= οὕτω δεινός τις ἔρωσ) cp. Rep. 3. 391 D, 6. 500 A.

4. προσανατριψάμενος] 'Giving

me a grip,' 'trying one fall with me.'

6. ἀλλ' ἄγε] The Bodl. has ἀλλὰ λέγε. See above 162 D: Εἰς τὸ μέσον ἄγοντες, and note. ἄγε is more vivid and in better agreement with the image which follows. Hermann's objection is well answered by H. Schmidt.

7. [ἀν]] ἂν has weak MS. authority. Cp. supr. B: Πρίν, κ. τ. λ. and note.

9. ὧν προτίθεσαι] Viz. διαγραμμάτων πέρι, supr. A.

11. λάθωμεν] Cp. supr. 164 C: Λαυθάνομεν ταῦτα . . . ποιούντες. There is exquisite humour in Socrates' warning Theodorus against being sportive in argument.

12. τις] Somebody; i. e. Protagoras.

16. ἀντιλαβόμεθα] 'Let us at-

οὔπερ τὸ πρότερον, καὶ ἴδωμεν, ὀρθῶς ἢ οὐκ ὀρθῶς p. 169.
 ἐδυσχεραίνομεν ἐπιτιμῶντες τῷ λόγῳ, ὅτι αὐτάρκη
 ἕκαστον εἰς φρόνησιν ἐποίει, καὶ ἡμῖν ξυνεχώρησεν ὁ
 Πρωταγόρας περὶ τε τοῦ ἀμείνονος καὶ χείρονος δια-
 5 φέρειν τινάς, οὓς δὴ καὶ εἶναι σοφούς. οὐχί;

ΘΕΟ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Εἰ μὲν τοίνυν αὐτὸς παρὼν ὠμολόγει, ἀλλὰ
 μὴ ἡμεῖς βοηθοῦντες ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ ξυνεχωρήσαμεν, οὐ- E
 δὲν ἂν πάλιν ἔδει ἐπαναλαβόντας βεβαιουῖσθαι· νῦν
 10 δὲ τάχ' ἂν τις ἡμᾶς ἀκύρους τιθείη τῆς ὑπὲρ ἐκείνου
 ὁμολογίας. διὸ καλλιόνως ἔχει σαφέστερον περὶ τού-
 του αὐτοῦ διομολογήσασθαι· οὐ γάρ τι σμικρὸν παρ-
 ἀλλάττει οὕτως ἔχον ἢ ἄλλως.

ΘΕΟ. Λέγεις ἀληθῆ.

15 ΣΩ. Μὴ τοίνυν δι' ἄλλων, ἀλλ' ἐκ τοῦ ἐκείνου
 λόγου ὡς διὰ βραχυτάτων λάβωμεν τὴν ὁμολογίαν. p. 170.

tack the question from the same point as before.' Cp. Rep. 8.544 B: Πάλιν .. ὡσπερ παλαιστής τὴν αὐτὴν λαβὴν πάρεχε.

3. καὶ ἡμῖν ξυνεχώρησεν] The sentence breaks and reverts to the direct form. Cp. Rep. 6.489 D: Οὓς δὴ σὺ φῆς, κ.τ.λ. καὶ γὰρ ξυνεχώρησα ἀληθῆ σε λέγειν. (Others, with Heindorf, 'and whether Protagoras was right in admitting.')

In conceding for Protagoras that some men are wise, we went beyond his own words. We must try to prove it out of his own mouth. He says, What appears to each man, is to him. Now it certainly appears to every man that some are wiser than himself, and some less wise; that some think truly, others falsely. Therefore, whether Protagoras be right or wrong, it is the case

that some think truly, and some falsely.

11. καλλιόνως ἔχει] 'It would seem the less exceptionable course.' The rare form of the adverb in -ως avoids the ambiguity of κάλλιον ἔχει.

12. διομολογήσασθαι implies greater thoroughness than ἀνομολογησάμενοι, supr. 164 C.

οὐ γάρ τι σμικρὸν παραλλάττει] 'It is of no small importance to the question at issue.' Socrates appeals again to the geometrical consciousness of Theodorus, to whom possibly παραλλάττει, a half-technical word, may express more than the simple διαφέρει.

15. δι' ἄλλων .. ἐκ τοῦ .. λόγου] 'Not through any third person, but from the data supplied by himself.'

p. 170.

ΘΕΟ. Πῶς;

ΣΩ. Οὕτωςί. Τὸ δοκοῦν ἐκάστῳ τοῦτο καὶ εἶναί φησί που ᾧ δοκεῖ;

ΘΕΟ. Φησὶ γὰρ οὖν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν, ᾧ Πρωταγόρα, καὶ ἡμεῖς ἀνθρώπου, ⁵
 μᾶλλον δὲ πάντων ἀνθρώπων δόξας λέγομεν, καὶ
 φαμέν οὐδένα ὄν τινα οὐ τὰ μὲν αὐτὸν ἡγεῖσθαι τῶν
 ἄλλων σοφώτερον, τὰ δὲ ἄλλους ἑαυτοῦ, καὶ ἔν γε
 τοῖς μεγίστοις κινδύνοις, ὅταν ἐν στρατείαις ἢ νόσοις
 ἢ ἐν θαλάττῃ χειμάζονται, ὥσπερ πρὸς θεοὺς ἔχειν ¹⁰
 Β τοὺς ἐν ἐκάστοις ἄρχοντας, σωτήρας σφῶν προσδο-
 κῶντας, οὐκ ἄλλῳ τῷ διαφέροντας ἢ τῷ εἶδέναι. καὶ
 πάντα που μεστὰ τὰνθρώπινα ζητούντων διδασκάλους
 τε καὶ ἄρχοντας ἑαυτῶν τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζῶων τῶν
 τε ἐργασιῶν, οἰομένων τε αὐτῶν ἰκανῶν μὲν διδάσκειν, ¹⁵
 ἰκανῶν δὲ ἄρχειν εἶναι. καὶ ἐν τούτοις ἅπασιν τί ἄλλο
 φήσομεν ἢ αὐτοὺς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἡγεῖσθαι σοφίαν
 καὶ ἀμαθίαν εἶναι παρὰ σφίσιν;

ΘΕΟ. Οὐδὲν ἄλλο.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὴν μὲν σοφίαν ἀληθῆ διάνοιαν ²⁰
 ἡγούνται, τὴν δὲ ἀμαθίαν ψευδῆ δόξαν;

ΘΕΟ. Τί μήν;

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν, ᾧ Πρωταγόρα, χρησόμεθα τῷ λόγῳ;

6. καὶ φαμέν is paratactic
 for λέγοντες.

10. χειμάζονται] There is a
 zeugma only in so far as the
 verb is used literally with ἐν
 θαλάσῃ and figuratively with
 ἐν στρατείαις ἢ νόσοις. Cp. Lach.
 194 B: Ἄνδράσι φίλοις χειμαζο-
 μένοις ἐν λόγῳ . . . βοήθησον.

ὥσπερ πρὸς θεοὺς ἔχειν] Cp.
 Rep. 6. 489 C: Τὸ δ' ἀληθές
 πέφυκεν, εἴαν τε πλούσιος εἴαν τε
 πένης κάμνη, ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι ἐπὶ

ιατρῶν θύρας ἰέναι, καὶ πάντα τὸν
 ἄρχεσθαι δεόμενον ἐπὶ τὰς τοῦ ἄρ-
 χειν δυναμένου. On the omis-
 sion of πρὸς with the second
 word see Cobet, Var. Lect.
 pp. 163 sqq.

23. ᾧ Πρωταγόρα] Bodl. Vat.
 pr. Ven. II. have τῷ Πρωταγόρα.
 But the Bodleian has ᾧ in the
 margin by an ancient hand.
 The reading τῷ may have been
 suggested by τί δὲ αὐτῷ Πρωτα-
 γόρα infr. E.

'What ap-
 pears to
 each man,
 is to him.'
 And does it
 not, then,
 appear to
 every man
 that some
 know more
 than he
 does and
 some less;
 so that in
 the great-
 est dan-
 gers, they
 look up to
 the wise
 man as to
 a God, sub-
 mitting to
 be taught
 and ruled
 by him?
 And they
 account
 wisdom to
 be true
 thought;
 and folly
 to be false
 opinion.

It follows that, if all men think truly, some men think falsely.

πότερον ἀληθῆ φῶμεν αἰὲν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους δοξάζειν, ἢ p. 170.
ποτέ μὲν ἀληθῆ, ποτέ δὲ ψευδῆ; ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων γάρ
που ξυμβαίνει μὴ αἰὲν ἀληθῆ ἀλλ' ἀμφοτέρα αὐτοὺς
δοξάζειν. σκόπει γάρ, ὦ Θεόδωρε, εἰ ἐθέλοι ἄν τις τῶν
5 ἀμφὶ Πρωταγόραν ἢ σὺ αὐτὸς διαμάχεσθαι ὡς οὐδεὶς
ἠγείται ἕτερος ἕτερον ἀμαθῆ τε εἶναι καὶ ψευδῆ δοξάζειν.

ΘΕΟ. Ἄλλ' ἄπιστον, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν εἰς τοῦτό γε ἀνάγκης ὁ λόγος ἦκει ὁ δ
πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἄνθρωπον λέγων.

10 ΘΕΟ. Πῶς δῆ;

ΣΩ. Ὅταν σὺ κρίνας τι παρὰ σαυτῷ πρὸς με ἀπο-
φαίνῃ περὶ τίνος δόξαν, σοὶ μὲν δὴ τοῦτο κατὰ τὸν
ἐκείνου λόγον ἀληθὲς ἔστω, ἡμῖν δὲ δὴ τοῖς ἄλλοις
περὶ τῆς σῆς κρίσεως πότερον οὐκ ἔστι κριταῖς γενέ-
15 σθαι, ἢ αἰὲν σε κρίνομεν ἀληθῆ δοξάζειν; ἢ μυρίοι
ἐκάστοτέ σοι μάχονται ἀντιδοξάζοντες, ἠγούμενοι
ψευδῆ κρίνειν τε καὶ οἶσθαι;

ΘΕΟ. Νῆ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, μάλα μυρίοι ε
δῆτα, φησὶν Ὅμηρος, οἳ γέ μοι τὰ ἐξ ἀνθρώπων
20 πράγματα παρέχουσιν.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; βούλει λέγωμεν ὡς σὺ τότε σαυτῷ
μὲν ἀληθῆ δοξάζεις, τοῖς δὲ μυρίοις ψευδῆ;

ΘΕΟ. Ἔοικεν ἕκ γε τοῦ λόγου ἀνάγκη εἶναι.

8. εἰς τοῦτο . . ἀνάγκης . . ἦκει] 'The trouble of the world,' i.e. troubles, the greatest that can come from all men. Cp. Æschin. c. Timarch. 9: Τὸ δὲ τελευταῖον δῆσαντες πρὸς τὸν κίονα αὐτὸν τὸν Πιττάλακον ἐμαστίγουν τὰς ἐξ ἀνθρώπων πληγὰς οὕτω πολὺν χρόνον ὥστε, κ.τ.λ. A somewhat similar use of ἀνθρώπων occurs in Soph. Phil. 305: Πολλὰ γὰρ τάδε ἐν τῷ μακρῷ γένοιτ' ἂν ἀνθρώπων χρόνῳ. 'Respondet vulgare illud nostratum, alle menschenmögliche.' Heindorf.

18. Νῆ τὸν Δία . . παρέχουσιν] 'Yes, truly, Socrates, I have opponents more than I can tell, as Homer says, and they give me worlds of trouble.'

19. φησὶν Ὅμηρος] Od. 16. 121: Τῷ νῦν δυσμενέες μάλα μυρίοι εἶσ' ἐνὶ οἴκῳ.

τὰ ἐξ ἀνθρώπων πράγματα]

As a matter of fact men do become judges of one another's impressions.

p. 170. ΣΩ. Τί δὲ αὐτῷ Πρωταγόρα; ἄρ' οὐχὶ ἀνάγκη, εἰ μὲν μηδὲ αὐτὸς ᾔετο μέτρον εἶναι ἀνθρώπου μηδὲ οἱ πολλοί, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ οἴονται, μηδενὶ δὴ εἶναι ταύτην
 p. 171. τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἣν ἐκεῖνος ἔγραψεν; εἰ δὲ αὐτὸς μὲν ᾔετο, τὸ δὲ πλήθος μὴ συνοίεται, οἶσθ' ὅτι πρῶτον 5 μὲν ὅσῳ πλείους οἷς μὴ δοκεῖ ἢ οἷς δοκεῖ, τοσοῦτῳ μᾶλλον οὐκ ἔστιν ἢ ἔστιν.

ΘΕΟ. Ἀνάγκη, εἴπερ γε καθ' ἐκάστην δόξαν ἔσται καὶ οὐκ ἔσται.

ΣΩ. Ἐπειτά γε τοῦτ' ἔχει κομψότατον· ἐκεῖνος 10 μὲν περὶ τῆς αὐτοῦ οἰήσεως τὴν τῶν ἀντιδοξαζόντων οἴησιν, ἣ ἐκεῖνον ἡγούνται ψεύδεται, συγχωρεῖ που ἀληθῆ εἶναι ὁμολογῶν τὰ ὄντα δοξάζειν ἅπαντας.

ΘΕΟ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

B ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὴν αὐτοῦ ἀν ψευδῆ συγχωροῖ, εἰ τὴν 15 τῶν ἡγουμένων αὐτὸν ψεύδεται ὁμολογεῖ ἀληθῆ εἶναι;

ΘΕΟ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Οἱ δὲ γ' ἄλλοι οὐ συγχωροῦσιν ἑαυτοὺς ψεύ-
 δεσθαι;

ΘΕΟ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ὁ δὲ γ' αὖ ὁμολογεῖ καὶ ταύτην ἀληθῆ τὴν δόξαν ἐξ ὧν γέγραπεν.

ΘΕΟ. Φαίνεται.

For instance, they condemn Protagoras. His opinion therefore may be true for him, but, on his own showing, it is false for all men besides. Its truth is to its falsehood, as one man is to all mankind. But further, in saying that they think truly, he confirms them in saying that he thinks falsely: and upholds them in denying that they are wrong. Thus the unanimity of dissent is not broken even by Protagoras himself.

1. Τί δὲ αὐτῷ Πρωταγόρα;] Sc. ἀνάγκη ἐστίν; Or rather, as H. Schmidt points out, a more general notion: 'What follows for Protagoras? Is he not compelled?'

2. μηδὲ . . . μηδέ] 'If Protagoras himself also did not think so, nor yet the majority, as indeed they do not.'

5. συνοίεται] This is present,

because it has been asserted just above in ὥσπερ . . . οἴονται.

10. Ἐπειτα . . . κομψότατον] 'Now follows the most exquisite touch of all.' Cf. Rep. 5. 558 A: Τί δέ; ἢ πραότης ἐνίων τῶν δικασθέντων οὐ κομψή;—ἔχει, sc. τὸ πρᾶγμα, s. ὁ λόγος. μὲν points forward to the antithesis, which is expressed in οἱ δὲ γ' ἄλλοι, κ.τ.λ.

ΣΩ. Ἐξ ἀπάντων ἄρα ἀπὸ Πρωταγόρου ἀρξάμε- p. 171.
νων ἀμφισβητήσεται, μᾶλλον δὲ ὑπὸ γε ἐκείνου ὁμο-
λογήσεται, — ὅταν τῷ τἀναντία λέγοντι συγχωρῆ ἄλη-
θῆ αὐτὸν δοξάζειν, τότε καὶ ὁ Πρωταγόρας αὐτὸς συγ- c
5 χωρήσεται μήτε κύνα μήτε τὸν ἐπιτυχόντα ἄνθρωπον
μέτρον εἶναι μηδὲ περὶ ἐνὸς οὐδ' ἂν μὴ μάθῃ. οὐχ
οὕτως;

ΘΕΟ. Οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐπειδὴ ἀμφισβητεῖται ὑπὸ πάντων,
10 οὐδενὶ ἂν εἴη ἢ Πρωταγόρου ἀλήθεια ἀληθής, οὐδέ
τινι ἄλλῳ οὐτ' αὐτῷ ἐκείνῳ.

ΘΕΟ. Ἄγαν, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸν ἐταῖρόν μου κατα-
θέομεν.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλά τοι, ὦ φίλε, ἄδηλον εἰ καὶ παραθέομεν

1. Ἐξ ἀπάντων ἄρα] 'So then, the result obtained from them all is this.' Cf. Soph. 245 E: Τοὺς δὲ ἄλλως λέγοντας αὐθεατέον, ἔν' ἐκ πάντων εἰδῶμεν ὅτι τὸ ὄν τοῦ μὴ ὄντος οὐδὲν εὐπωρότερον εἰπεῖν ὃ τί ποτε ἔστιν. Ar. Met. 988 a: Τοσοῦτόν γ' ἔχομεν ἐξ αὐτῶν, ὅτι, κ.τ.λ. The preposition is probably suggested by ἐξ ὧν immediately preceding. 'On all hands, then, including Protagoras, we find it disputed, or rather on his part it is admitted.' This use of ἐξ has been needlessly disputed by Heindorf and others, and Schanz reads ὑφ' ἀπάντων. Badham suggests ἐξ ἀπάντων ἄρα ἀπὸ τῶν Πρωταγόρου.

3. ὅταν .. συγχωρήσεται] These words are explanatory of ὑπὸ ἐκείνου ὁμολογήσεται, and what follows, from μήτε onwards, depends immediately on συγχωρήσεται, but really also on all that precedes. The construction of a sentence is frequently thus

disturbed by the introduction of an explanatory or appositional clause. Cp. Rep. 7. 529 B: Οὐ δύναμαι ἄλλο τι νομίσαι ἄνω ποιεῖν ψυχὴν βλέπειν μάθημα ἢ ἐκείνο, ὃ ἂν περὶ τὸ ὄν τε ἢ καὶ τὸ ἀόρατον, εἰάν τις ἄνω κεχηρῶς ἢ κάτω συμ- μεμυκῶς τῶν αἰσθητῶν τι ἐπιχειρῆ μαυθάνειν, οὔτε μαθεῖν ποτέ φημι αὐτόν, οὔτε ἄνω ἀλλὰ κάτω αὐτοῦ βλέπειν τὴν ψυχὴν, κἂν ἐξ ὑπτίας νέων ἐν γῆ ἢ ἐν θαλάττῃ μαυθάνῃ. The futures middle are used with passive meaning.

5. μήτε κύνα] Supr. 154 A.

12. Ἄγαν] 'We are urging my friend too vehemently,' 'running him very hard.'

καταθέομεν] Cp. Legg. 7. 806 C: Τί δράσομεν, ὦ Κλεινία; τὸν ξέγον ἐάσομεν τὴν Σπάρτην ἡμῖν οὕτω καταδραμεῖν;

14. Ἀλλά . . ἄδηλον] 'But it does not appear that we are outrunning what is right,' i. e. I do not see that we are transgressing any rule of truth or fairness. τὸ ὀρθόν means simply

p. 171. τὸ ὀρθόν. εἰκός γε ἄρα ἐκείνον πρεσβύτερον ὄντα σο-
 D φώτερον ἡμῶν εἶναι· καὶ εἰ ἀντίκα ἐντεύθεν ἀνακίψει
 μέχρι τοῦ αὐχένος, πολλὰ ἂν ἐμέ τε ἐλέγξας ληροῦντα,
 ὡς τὸ εἰκός, καὶ σέ ὁμολογοῦντα, καταδὺς ἂν οἴχοιτο
 ἀποτρέχων. ἀλλ' ἡμῖν ἀνάγκη, οἶμαι, χρῆσθαι ἡμῖν⁵
 αὐτοῖς, ὁποῖοί τινές ἐσμεν, καὶ τὰ δοκοῦντα ἀεὶ ταῦτα
 λέγειν. καὶ δῆτα καὶ νῦν ἄλλο τι φῶμεν ὁμολογεῖν
 ἂν τοῦτό γε ὄντινούν, τὸ εἶναι σοφώτερον ἕτερον ἐτέ-
 ρου, εἶναι δὲ καὶ ἀμαθέστερον;

ΘΕΟ. Ἐμοὶ γοῦν δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Ἦ καὶ ταύτη ἂν μάλιστα ἴστασθαι τὸν λόγον,

(as in Rep. 7. 540 D: τὸ ὀρθόν
 περὶ πλείστου ποιησάμενοι. Meno,
 99 A: 'Ἡγεμῶν . . ἐπὶ τὸ ὀρθόν),
 'What is just and true.' There
 is no necessity therefore for
 making παραθεῖν (with the accu-
 sative) mean 'to swerve from.'

1. εἰκός γε ἄρα] Socrates ad-
 mits that there is some ground
 for Theodorus' remonstrance.
 'It is reasonable, I grant, to
 presume that as he is older so
 he is wiser than we are.' ἄρα
 refers to an implied argument;
 'as your words imply.' For
 εἰκός γε cp. infr. 202 D.

4. καὶ σέ ὁμολογοῦντα] Sc. λη-
 ρώδη. Steinhart suggests that
 the notion of Protagoras put-
 ting up his head and disap-
 pearing again is perhaps taken
 from the use of 'Charon's
 steps' in the theatre. H.
 Schmidt well observes that
 καταδὺς . . . ἀποτρέχων implies
 that the Sophist would not
 have waited for a rejoinder.
 Cp. Rep. 1. 344 C D, esp. the
 words ὦ δαιμόνιε Θρασύμαχε, οἶον
 ἐμβαλὼν λόγον ἐν νῶ ἔχεις ἀπιέναι,
 πρὶν διδάξαι ἰκανῶς ἢ μαθεῖν εἶτε
 οὔτως εἶτε ἄλλως ἔχει.

5. ἀλλ' ἡμῖν] Socrates returns
 to the charge with the second
 ἀλλά.

6. τὰ δοκοῦντα] 154 C: Ἐὰν
 μὲν τὸ δοκοῦν, κ.τ.λ. Meno. 83
 D: Ἐμοίγε δοκεῖ οὕτως. Σ.
 Καλῶς· τὸ γὰρ σοι δοκοῦν τοῦτο
 ἀποκρίνου. Cp. esp. Crat. 386
 B C.

11. ταύτη ἂν . . Πρωταγόρα]
 'Will be most likely to take
 up this position, which we
 sketched out for it in our de-
 fence of Protagoras.' Cp. Π.
 11. 570, 1: Αὐτὸς δὲ Τρώων καὶ
 Ἀχαιῶν θῆνε μεσηγγύς | ἱστάμενος.
 Ib. 590, 1: Ἀλλὰ μάλ' ἄντην | ἱσ-
 τασθ' ἀμφ' Αἴαντα μέγαν. Parm.
 130 D: Ὅταν ταύτη στῶ. 'The
 argument' is personified, as so
 often in Plato (cp. Rep. 6. 484
 A: Διὰ μακροῦ τινος διεξελθόντος
 λόγου. Ib. 503 A: Τοιαῦτ' ἄττα
 ἦν τὰ λεγόμενα παρεξίοντος καὶ
 παρακαλυπτομένου τοῦ λόγου), and
 is the subject of συγχωρήσεται,
 ἐβελήσαι, ὁμολογήσει and τολ-
 μήσεις, in what follows. (If
 Protagoras were the subject, as
 H. Schmidt suggests, the da-
 tive Πρωταγόρα should have
 been αὐτῷ). ἴστασθαι depends

Could he
 put his
 head above
 the ground,
 no doubt
 he might
 convince
 us of much
 folly. But
 we have
 done our
 best.
 No one will
 deny that
 one man is
 wiser, and
 another
 less wise,
 than his
 neighbour.

10

It is clear, too, that the strength of the position lies in the region of sensible things, which we made the basis of our defence of Protagoras.

ἢ ἡμεῖς ὑπεγράψαμεν βοηθοῦντες Πρωταγόρα, ὡς τὰ p. 171.
 μὲν πολλὰ ἢ δοκεῖ ταύτη καὶ ἔστιν ἐκάστῳ, θερμά,^E
 ξηρά, γλυκέα, πάντα ὅσα τοῦ τύπου τούτου· εἰ δέ
 5 περὶ τὰ ὑγιεινὰ καὶ νοσώδη ἐτελέησαι ἂν φάναι μὴ πᾶν
 γύναιον καὶ παιδίον καὶ θηρίον δὲ ἰκανὸν εἶναι ἰᾶσθαι
 αὐτὸ γιγνώσκον ἑαυτῷ τὸ ὑγιεινόν, ἀλλὰ ἐνταῦθα δὴ
 ἄλλον ἄλλον διαφέρειν, εἴπερ που;

ΘΕΟ. Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ οὕτως.

(Transition to the conception of the Beneficial.)

If the theory would concede any thing,

10 ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ πολιτικῶν, καλὰ μὲν καὶ p. 172.
 αἰσχρὰ καὶ δίκαια καὶ ἄδικα καὶ ὅσια καὶ μῆ, οἷα ἂν
 ἐκάστη πόλις οἰηθεῖσα θῆται νόμιμα ἑαυτῇ, ταῦτα καὶ
 εἶναι τῇ ἀληθείᾳ ἐκάστη, καὶ ἐν τούτοις μὲν οὐδὲν
 σοφώτερον οὔτε ἰδιώτην ἰδιώτου οὔτε πόλιν πόλεως

immediately on φῶμεν.—May there also be a slight play upon the word ἴσταςθαι? 'This unstable theory will make a stand hereabouts if anywhere.' See also Thuc. 6. 34: Πρὸς τὰ λεγόμενα καὶ αἱ γνῶμαι ἴστανται.

1. ἢ ἡμεῖς ὑπεγράψαμεν βοηθοῦντες Πρωταγόρα] This 'new wave' of discussion rises upon the last, 167 B, 168: Κατὰ μὲν σώματα ἰατροῦς λέγω, κατὰ δὲ φυτὰ γεωργούς. . . ταῖς πόλεσι τὰ χρηστά ἀντὶ τῶν πονηρῶν δίκαια δοκεῖν εἶναι ποιεῖν. ἐπεὶ οἷα γ' ἂν ἐκάστη πόλις δίκαια καὶ καλὰ δοκῇ, ταῦτα καὶ εἶναι αὐτῇ, ἕως ἂν αὐτὰ νομίξῃ. The argument is beginning to relax a little under the influence of the ἀγαθὸν καὶ καλὸν thrown carelessly in, 157 D.

4. συγχωρήσεται] Sc. ὁ λόγος. Others go back for a subject to ὀπιτιοῦν, supr. D. But if the imaginary opponent were wholly indefinite, why should a doubt be expressed whether he would make a reasonable admission?

So in what follows, 172 A, the words εἴπερ που, οὐκ ἂν πάνυ πολμύσειε, imply certain pre-conceptions and tendencies.

6. καὶ θηρίον δέ] 'Nay, even every inferior animal.' Vegetables might have been included. Supr. 167 B C.

10. Οὐκοῦν. . . περὶ πολιτικῶν] The distinction in the case of sensible things between the impressions of sense, and the knowledge of what is good, is evident enough. The analogous distinction in the case of things moral and social is less obvious. See, amongst other passages, Rep. 6. 505 D: Τί δέ; τόδε οὐ φανερόν, ὡς δίκαια μὲν καὶ καλὰ πολλοὶ ἂν ἔλοιτο τὰ δοκοῦντα κἂν μὴ ἢ ὅμως ταῦτα πράττειν καὶ κεκτῆσθαι καὶ δοκεῖν, ἀγαθὰ δὲ οὐδενὶ ἔτι ἀρκεῖ τὰ δοκοῦντα κτᾶσθαι, ἀλλὰ τὰ ὄντα ζητοῦσι, τὴν δὲ δόξαν ἐνταῦθα ἤδη πᾶς ἀτιμάζει;

12. οἰηθεῖσα] Sc. καλὰ, δίκαια, κ.τ.λ.

p. 172. εἶναι· ἐν δὲ τῷ συμφέροντα ἑαυτῇ ἢ μὴ συμφέροντα
 τίθεσθαι, ἐνταῦθ', εἶπερ που, αὐὸ μολογήσει σύμβου-
 λόν τε συμβούλου διαφέρειν καὶ πόλεως δόξαν ἑτέραν
 ἑτέρας πρὸς ἀλήθειαν, καὶ οὐκ ἂν πάνυ τολμήσει
 B φῆσαι, ἃ ἂν θῆται πόλις συμφέροντα οἰηθεῖσα αὐτῇ, 5
 παντὸς μᾶλλον ταῦτα καὶ συνοίσειν. ἀλλ' ἐκεῖ οὐ
 λέγω, ἐν τοῖς δικαίοις καὶ ἀδίκτοις καὶ ὁσίοις καὶ ἀνο-
 σίοις, ἐθέλουσιν ἰσχυρίζεσθαι ὡς οὐκ ἔστι φύσει
 αὐτῶν οὐδὲν οὐσίαν ἑαυτοῦ ἔχον, ἀλλὰ τὸ κοινῇ δόξαν
 τοῦτο γίνεταί ἀληθὲς τότε ὅταν δόξη καὶ ὅσον ἂν 10
 δοκῇ χρόνον. καὶ ὅσοι γε δὴ μὴ παντάπασι τὸν Πρω-
 ταγόρου λόγον λέγουσιν, ὧδέ πως τὴν σοφίαν ἄγουσι.
 Λόγος δὲ ἡμᾶς, ὧ Θεόδωρε, ἐκ λόγου, μείζων ἐξ ἐλάτ-
 C ττος, καταλαμβάνει.

8. ἐθέλουσιν ἰσχυρίζεσθαι] He drops the figure, and passes from what the 'argument' would be apt to say, to what certain persons, who are presently defined, actually do say. For a somewhat similar transition from 'arguments' to 'certain persons' cp. Gorg. 457 C: Οἶμαι, ὧ Γοργία, καὶ σὲ ἔμπειρον εἶναι πολλῶν λόγων καὶ καθωρακῆναι ἐν αὐτοῖς τὸ τοιόνδε, ὅτι οὐ ραδίως δύνανται περὶ ὧν ἂν ἐπιχειρήσωσι διαλέγεσθαι διορισάμενοι πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ μαθόντες καὶ διδάξαντες ἑαυτοὺς οὕτω διαλύεσθαι τὰς συνοουσίας . . καὶ εἰνοί γε τελευτῶντες (cp. καὶ ὅσοι γε in the present passage), κ.τ.λ.

11. μὴ παντάπασι] 'In part only.' For the negative form cp. Soph. 247 B: Τοῦτο οὐκέτι κατὰ ταῦτα ἀποκρίνονται πάν ('here they make a certain distinction'). Aristotle (Met. 1008 a) uses the expression τοῖς τὸν Πρωταγόρου λέγουσι λόγον.

12. ὧδέ πως τὴν σοφίαν ἄγουσι]

'Conduct their philosophic procedure thus.' 'Proceed somewhat on this wise in their philosophy.' Cp. Men. 80 E: 'Ὁρᾶς τοῦτον ὡς ἐριστικὸν λόγον κατάγεις ;

ὧδε refers either to the preceding sentence, or to the exposition which is broken off by the digression:—certainly not (with H. Schmidt) to the digression itself.

The digression which follows is not merely an ornament. As in the Sophistes the philosopher and the sophist are the counterpart of being and not-being respectively, so here the man of the world and the philosopher represent the contrast between the life of sense and the life of knowledge.

13. μείζων ἐξ ἐλάττους] The question of Justice and Injustice, etc. is greater than the question of the relativity of Sense. The greater question is not fully resumed in the pre-

it would be this, that all are not equally judges of what is wholesome: and in the case of states, that although honour and justice are matters of convention merely, yet in deciding what is expedient, mistake is possible both to individuals and states.

This is the attitude of some who have partially relinquished the Protagorean doctrine. They offer us a new and important handle for discussion.

(Digression.)

Before entering upon this, however,

ΘΕΟ. Οὐκοῦν σχολὴν ἄγομεν, ὦ Σώκρατες ;
 ΣΩ. Φαινόμεθα. καὶ πολλάκις μὲν γε δῆ, ὦ δαιμόνιε, καὶ ἄλλοτε κατενόησα, ἀτὰρ καὶ νῦν, ὡς εἰκότως οἱ ἐν ταῖς φιλοσοφίαις πολὺν χρόνον διατρίψαντες εἰς
 5 τὰ δικαστήρια ἴοντες γελοῖοι φαίνονται ῥήτορες.

ΘΕΟ. Πῶς δὴ οὖν λέγεις ;

ΣΩ. Κινδυνεύουσιν οἱ ἐν δικαστηρίοις καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις ἐκ νέων κυλινδούμενοι πρὸς τοὺς ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ καὶ τῇ τοιαύτῃ διατριβῇ τεθραμμένους ὡς οἰκέται
 10 πρὸς ἐλευθέρους τεθράφθαι.

sent dialogue, but is treated at large in the Gorgias and Republic.

1. Οὐκοῦν σχολὴν ἄγομεν] Compare the opening of the digression in the Phædrus, 258 E: Σχολὴ μὲν δὴ ὡς ἔοικε . . . and Cic. de Amic. 5: 'Et sumus, ut dixit Fannius, otiosi.' We must suppose that the impending trial of Socrates, although not alluded to until the end of the dialogue, is in Plato's mind throughout this passage. Cp. Gorg. 522 B.

2. ὦ δαιμόνιε] 'In sober truth.' The words add a touch (not here of expostulation but) of solemnity.

4. ἐν ταῖς φιλοσοφίαις] 'In scientific pursuits.' Supr. 143 D: Γεωμετρίαν ἢ τινα ἄλλην φιλοσοφίαν. Tim. 88 C: Μουσικὴ καὶ πάση φιλοσοφίᾳ. Socrates takes common ground with Theodorus. Cp. infr. 173 E: Τά τε γὰρ ὑπέρθε καὶ τὰ ἐπίπεδα γεωμετροῦσα, οὐρανοῦ τε ὑπερ ἀστρονομοῦσα. Compare with the whole passage the opening words of the Apology (esp. ὁμολογοῖν ἂν ἔγωγε οὐ κατὰ τοὺς εἶναι ῥήτορας), and the dispute of Socrates with Callicles in

the Gorgias.

8. ἐκ νέων κυλινδούμενοι] 'Who have knocked about from their early days.' Compare Aristophanes' περίτριμμα δικῶν (Nub. 447), and Dem. de Cor. 269. κυλινδούμενοι] The word expresses contempt for the 'casual,' 'hand to mouth,' intellectual existence of the lawyer. Cp. Rep. 5. 479 D: Μεταξύ του κυλινδεῖται, Phædr. 257 A, Polit. 309 A.

10. πρὸς ἐλευθέρους] Soph. 253 C (referring to this): 'Ἡ πρὸς Διὸς ἐλάθμεν εἰς τὴν τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἐμπεσόντες ἐπιστήμην, καὶ κινδυνεύομεν ζητοῦντες τὸν σοφιστὴν πρότερον ἀνευρηκέναι τὸν φιλόσοφον; Rep. 6. 499 A: Οὐδέ γε αὖ λόγων, ὦ μακάριε, καλῶν τε καὶ ἐλευθέρων ἱκανῶς ἐπήκοοι γεγονάσιν, οἷον ζητεῖν μὲν τὸ ἀληθές, κ.τ.λ. 7. 536 D: Οὐδὲν μάθημα μετὰ δουλείας τὸν ἐλεύθερον χρήμαθάνειν—and the whole image of the cave with its captives and their liberation. See also Aristot. Met. 1. 2: Δῆλον οὖν ὡς δι' οὐδεμίαν αὐτὸ ζητοῦμεν χρεῖαν ἑτέραν, ἀλλ' ὡς ἄνθρωπος φάμεν ἐλεύθερος ὁ αὐτοῦ ἔνεκα καὶ μὴ ἄλλου ὧν, οὕτω καὶ αὕτη μόνη ἐλευθέρᾳ οὖσα τῶν ἐπιστημῶν.

p. 172.

ΘΕΟ. Πῆ δὴ;

ΣΩ. Ἐπι τοῖς μὲν, τοῦτο ὃ σὺ εἶπες, αἰεὶ πάρεστι
 σχολὴ καὶ τοὺς λόγους ἐν εἰρήνῃ ἐπὶ σχολῆς ποι-
 οῦνται, ὥσπερ ἡμεῖς νυνὶ τρίτον ἤδη λόγον ἐκ λόγου
 μεταλαμβάνομεν, οὕτω κάκεινοι, εἰάν αὐτοὺς ὁ ἐπελθὼν 5
 τοῦ προκειμένου μάλλον, καθάπερ ἡμᾶς, ἀρέσῃ· καὶ
 διὰ μακρῶν ἢ βραχέων μέλει οὐδὲν λέγειν, ἂν μόνον
 τύχῳσι τοῦ ὄντος· οἱ δὲ ἐν ἀσχολίᾳ τε αἰεὶ λέγουσι
 E (κατεπείγει γὰρ ὕδωρ ρέον) καὶ οὐκ ἐγχωρεῖ περὶ οὗ
 ἂν ἐπιθυμήσωσι τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖσθαι, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκην 10

2. τοῦτο ὃ σὺ εἶπες] H. Schmidt would delete the commas, because Theodorus had only spoken of himself and Socrates. But such 'apposition of general and particular' is common in Plato.

4. τρίτον ἤδη λόγον ἐκ λόγου] 'We are for the third time beginning a fresh argument.' The first fresh λόγος was the criticism of Protagoras and his defence; the second begins where Theodorus is induced to accept Socrates' challenge (see the doubtful words, 168 E: *Ἀδ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον*); the third and greatest (*μείζων*, *supr. B*) arises with the mention of the wholesome and expedient, and the partial supporters of Protagoras. Cp. *Rep. i. 354*, where Socrates owns to a similar discursiveness, and is by no means exact in recapitulating.

5. οὕτω κάκεινοι] Sc. *μεταλαμβάνουσι*. This part of the sentence (from *ὥσπερ* . . .) stands in apposition to what precedes. Cp. *supr. 171 C*: *Τότε καὶ ὁ Πρωταγόρας . . .*, and note; also *Rep. 8. 557 C*: *Κινδυνεύει, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καλλίστη αὕτη τῶν πολιτειῶν εἶναι ὥσπερ ἱμάτιον ποικίλον πᾶσιν*

ἀνθεσι πεποικιλμένον, οὕτω καὶ αὕτη πᾶσιν ἤθεσι πεποικιλμένη καλλίστη ἂν φαίνοιτο. Also *ib. 7. 532 A*: *Οὕτω καὶ ὅταν τις τῷ διαλέγεσθαι ἐπιχειρῇ, ἀνευ πασῶν τῶν αἰσθήσεων διὰ τοῦ λόγου ἐπ' αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστιν ὀρμῆ, καὶ μὴ ἀποστῆ πρὶν ἂν αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστιν ἀγαθὸν αὐτῇ νοήσει λάβῃ, ἐπ' αὐτῷ γίγνεται τῷ τοῦ νοητοῦ τέλει, ὥσπερ ἐκείνος ἐπὶ τῷ τοῦ ὄρατοῦ*. But as the verb is omitted in the second clause, the comma is preferable to a colon after *ποιοῦνται*.

6. καθάπερ ἡμᾶς] Such slight redundancies are natural in conversation.

ἀρέσκειν governs the accusative where it means *to satisfy*. It has the dative *supr. 157 D*. The whole sentence is in construction with Ἐπι.

7. διὰ μακρῶν ἢ βραχέων] See *Polit. 286*.

10. ἀνάγκην] *Hesych.*: *Ἀνάγκη ἢ δικαστικὴ κλεψύδρα*. *Pollux, 8. 17*: *Ἔτιοι δ' οἴονται καὶ ἀνάγκην σκευὸς εἶναι δικαστικόν*. The latter quotation expresses doubt. May not the notion mentioned by the grammarian have arisen from the present passage? The structure of the sentence (*τε—καὶ*) forbids our identifying

we pause to reflect upon the happiness and freedom of the philosophic life, which has leisure to take up fresh topics or to lay them down at will. Not so the mind which is exercised in the courts of law. The

ἔχων ὁ ἀντίδικος ἐφέστηκε καὶ ὑπογραφὴν παραναγι- p. 172.
γνωσκομένην, ὧν ἐκτὸς οὐ ῥητέον· (ἦν ἀνωμοσίαν
καλοῦσιν·) οἱ δὲ λόγοι αἰεὶ περὶ ὁμοδούλου πρὸς δε-
σπότην καθήμενον, ἐν χειρὶ τινα δίκην ἔχοντα, καὶ οἱ
5 ἀγῶνες οὐδέποτε τὴν ἄλλως ἀλλ' αἰεὶ τὴν περὶ αὐτοῦ·
πολλάκις δὲ καὶ περὶ ψυχῆς ὁ δρόμος· ὥστ' ἐξ ἀπάν- p. 173.

ἀνάγκη here with the clepsydra, which has been already alluded to. It is rather 'the strong arm of the law,' which the adversary could bring to bear, if the speaker wandered from the indictment. (So also Ast and H. Schmidt.) 'But the other sort are always pressed for time: for the ebbing water hurries on the speaker: and he has no liberty to follow whither fancy leads him, but the adversary is at hand to wield over him the resistless logic of coercion, holding a written outline of the points to which he must confine himself, which forms a running commentary to his oration.'

2. ὧν ἐκτὸς οὐ ῥητέον] ὑπογραφὴν retains its verbal force nearly as if it were ὑπογεγραμμένα, but is not the antecedent to ὧν. See 147 E, note on ὄτῳ.

ἦν ἀνωμοσίαν καλοῦσιν] 'What they call their affidavits.' The affected unfamiliarity with legal terms is in good keeping. Compare Rep. 3. 400 B: Καί, ὡς ἐγῶμαι, ἴαμβον καὶ τι' ἄλλον τροχάϊον ὀνόμαζε.

3. πρὸς δεσπότην] Not simply the δικαστής, but rather δῆμος or νόμος, whom he represents. Compare the passages in the Republic in which Δῆμος is spoken of as the master of the ship (488), as the great Sophist (492), and as a mighty beast (493); and cp. Eu-

thyphr. 2 C: "Ἐρχεται κατηγορήσων μου, ὥσπερ πρὸς μητέρα, πρὸς τὴν πόλιν. Also Herodotus, 7. 104 (of the Spartans): "Ἐπεστι γάρ σφι δεσπότης, νόμος, τὸν ὑποδειμαίνουσι πολλῶ ἔτι μᾶλλον, ἢ οἱ σοὶ σέ. Pindar, 3. 38: Νόμος πάντων βασιλεύς.

4. τινα δίκην] So the Bodleian MS. 'Some cause or other.' This reading suits the distant, unfamiliar tone, in which judicial proceedings are here described. The other reading, ἐν χειρὶ τὴν δίκην ἔχοντα (T, etc.), gives a different force to ἐν χειρὶ . . . ἔχοντα,—not merely 'engaged with' but 'having in his power.'

καὶ οἱ ἀγῶνες] 'And the trial is never for an indifferent stake, but always immediately concerns the speaker.' αὐτοῦ is surely masculine not neuter (as Stallb. and Wohlrab).

6. περὶ ψυχῆς ὁ δρόμος] Pl. 22. 161 (of Achilles and Hector): "Ἐπεὶ οὐχ ἱερίηον, οὐδέ βοεῖην ἀρνύσθην, ἃ τε ποσσὶν ἀέθλια γίγνεται ἀνδρῶν· ἀλλὰ περὶ ψυχῆς θεῶν "Ἐκτορος ἵπποδάμοιο. In Herodotus, 7. 57: Περὶ ἑαυτοῦ τρέχων (said of Xerxes), the metaphor is already softened down. Cp. Aristoph. Vesp. 375: Ποιήσω δακείν | τὴν καρδίαν καὶ τὸν περὶ ψυχῆς δρόμον | δραμεῖν. The expression τὴν περὶ αὐτοῦ is suggested by τὴν ἄλλως.

P. 173. των τούτων ἔντονοι καὶ δριμύεις γίνονται, ἐπιστάμενοι τὸν δεσπότην λόγῳ τε θωπεύσαι καὶ ἔργῳ χαρίσασθαι, σμικροὶ δὲ καὶ οὐκ ὀρθοὶ τὰς ψυχὰς. τὴν γὰρ αὖξην καὶ τὸ εὐθύ τε καὶ τὸ ἐλεύθερον ἢ ἐκ νέων δουλεία ἀφήρηται, ἀναγκάζουσα πράττειν σκολιά, μεγάλους 5 κινδύνους καὶ φόβους ἔτι ἀπαλαῖς ψυχαῖς ἐπιβάλλουσα, οὓς οὐ δυνάμενοι μετὰ τοῦ δικαίου καὶ ἀληθοῦς ὑποφέρειν, εὐθύς ἐπὶ τὸ ψεῦδος τε καὶ τὸ ἀλλήλους ἀνταδικεῖν τρεπόμενοι πολλὰ κάμπτονται καὶ συγκλῶνται, ὡσθ' ὑγιᾶς οὐδὲν ἔχοντες τῆς διανοίας εἰς 10 ἄνδρας ἐκ μειρακίων τελευτῶσι, δεινοὶ τε καὶ σοφοὶ γεγονότες, ὡς οἴονται. Καὶ οὗτοι μὲν δὴ τοιοῦτοι, ὧ

Whose mind becomes inevitably dwarfed and crooked and servile.

1. ἔντονοι καὶ δριμύεις] 'Keen and shrewd.' As H. Schmidt observes, the former epithet points to concentration of will, the latter to mental penetration.

3. τὴν γὰρ αὖξην . . ἐλεύθερον] 'Of all mental growth, and all honest and liberal culture;' 'of self-respect and the spirit of upright independence.' Both meanings are expressed in the Greek.

7. οὓς οὐ δυνάμενοι] 'So that, not being able to undergo these consistently with righteousness and truth, they betake themselves forthwith to falsehood, and to avenging themselves on one another by wrong, and so are repeatedly bent and stunted; whence they pass from youth to manhood with no soundness in their mind, but supposing themselves to have become capable and accomplished men.' Cp. Rep. 7. 519 A: *Ἡ οὐπω ἐννεόηκας τῶν λεγομένων ποιηρῶν μὲν σοφῶν δέ, ὡς δριμὺ μὲν βλέπει τὸ ψυχάριον καὶ ὀξέως διορᾷ ταῦτα ἐφ' ἃ τέτραπται, ὡς οὐ φαύλην

ἔχον τὴν ὄψιν, κακία δ' ἠναγκασμένον ὑπηρετεῖν' ὥστε ὅσῳ ἂν ὀξύτερον βλέπῃ, τοσοῦτ' ἀπλείω κακὰ ἐργαζόμενον. . . Τοῦτο μέντοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὸ τῆς τοιαύτης φύσεως, εἰ ἐκ παιδὸς εὐθύς κοπτόμενον περιεκόπη τοὺς τῆς γενέσεως συγγενεῖς ὡσπερ μολυβδίδας, αἱ δὲ ἐδωδαῖς τε καὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἠθροαῖς τε καὶ λιχνεῖς προσφνεῖς γιγνόμεναι, περὶ τὰ κάτω στρέφουσι τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ὄψιν, κ.τ.λ.

9. πολλὰ κάμπτονται καὶ συγκλῶνται] 'Are continually thwarted and cramped in their growth.' Rep. 6. 495 D: 'Ἀτελεῖς μὲν τὰς φύσεις, ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν τεχνῶν τε καὶ βαναυσίων ὡσπερ τὰ σώματα λελώβηται οὕτω καὶ τὰς ψυχὰς ξυγκεκλασμένοι τε καὶ ἀποτεθρυσμένοι διὰ τὰς βαναυσίας τυγχάνουσιν. 10. 611 C: Θεθεάμεθα μέντοι διακεκίμενον αὐτό, ὡσπερ οἱ τὸν θαλάττιον Γλαυκὸν ὀρῶντες οὐκ ἂν ἔτι ῥαδίως αὐτοῦ ἴδοιεν τὴν ἀρχαίαν φύσιν, ὑπὸ τοῦ τὰ τε παλαιὰ τοῦ σώματος μέρη τὰ μὲν ἐκκεκλάσθαι, τὰ δὲ συντετριφθῆναι καὶ πάντως λελωβῆσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν κυμάτων. Gorg. 525 C-E

Θεόδωρε· τοὺς δὲ τοῦ ἡμετέρου χοροῦ πότερον βούλει p. 173.
διελθόντες ἢ ἔασαντες πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸν λόγον τρεπώ-
μεθα, ἵνα μὴ καί, ὃ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν, λίαν πολὺ τῇ
ἐλευθερίᾳ καὶ μεταλήψῃ τῶν λόγων καταχρώμεθα;

Turn we
now from
them; and
let us still
use our
liberty to
describe
the leaders
of our own
band.

5 ΘΕΟ. Μηδαμῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ διελθόντες.
πάνυ γὰρ εἶ τοῦτο εἶρηκας, ὅτι οὐχ ἡμεῖς οἱ ἐν τῷ c
τοιῶδε χορεύοντες τῶν λόγων ὑπηρεταί, ἀλλ' οἱ λόγοι
†οἱ ἡμέτεροι ὥσπερ οἰκέται, καὶ ἕκαστος αὐτῶν περι-
μένει ἀποτελεσθῆναι ὅταν ἡμῖν δοκῇ· οὔτε γὰρ δικα-
10 στῆς οὔτε θεατῆς, ὥσπερ ποιηταῖς, ἐπιτιμήσων τε καὶ
ἄρξων ἐπιστατεῖ παρ' ἡμῖν.

1. τοὺς δὲ τοῦ ἡμετέρου χοροῦ] Phædr. 247 A: Φθόνος γὰρ ἕξω
θείου χοροῦ ἴσταται. Polit. 291
B: Ἡμφεγνόησα κατιδὼν τὸν περὶ
τὰ τῶν πόλεων πράγματα χορόν.
The metaphor is continued in
the words οἱ ἐν τῷ τοιῶδε χορεύ-
οντες, . . . οὔτε θεατῆς ὥσπερ ποιη-
ταῖς . . . περὶ τῶν κορυφαίων . . .

2. διελθόντες] The expression
is a little confused: for the
words πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸν λόγον τρεπώ-
μεθα, as understood with διελ-
θόντες, are unemphatic, while in
the second part of the clause
they are emphatic. Probably
but for the attraction of the
other participle, διελθόντες would
have been διελθωμεν. (Coisl.
τραπώμεθα.)

ἔασαντες] Since here, as in
the 'Sophist' (253 D), we have
stumbled prematurely on the
philosophic life.

3. ὃ νῦν δὴ . . . μεταλήψῃ] 'Our
freedom, which consists,
as we have said, in the power
of ranging from one topic to
another.' The words ὃ νῦν δὴ
ἐλέγομεν belong to ἐλευθερία καὶ
μεταλήψῃ and not to λίαν πολὺ
καταχρώμεθα. But in deleting

the comma H. Schmidt is again
led by too strict a requirement
of minute logical coherence.
Cp. Tim. 26 E: Καὶ τίς ἄν,
ὃ Κριτία, μᾶλλον ἀντὶ τούτου με-
ταλάβοιμεν; Polit. 257 C: Διανα-
παύσωμεν αὐτὸν μεταλαβόντες αὐ-
τοῦ τὸν συγγυμναστήν τόνδε Σώ-
κράτη; . . . Καθάπερ εἶπες, μετα-
λάμβανε.

8. †οἱ ἡμέτεροι] The article
is rather doubtful. If genuine,
it still belongs to the predicate,
—'our servants,' i. e. those
which, as philosophers, we have.
περιμένει] 'Waits our plea-
sure for its completion.'

9. The word δικαστής re-
calls the previous description.
With οὔτε θεατῆς ὥσπερ ποιηταῖς
a new illustration is brought
in. Cp. supr. 147 B. The
θεατῆς is the same δεσπότης (viz.
Δῆμος) in another aspect. The
image of dramatic poetry was
suggested by Socrates using the
expression τοὺς τοῦ ἡμετέρου
χοροῦ.

10. ἐπιτιμήσων . . . ἐπιστατεῖ] 'Stands
over us to criticise and
to compel.'

p. 173. ΣΩ. Λέγωμεν δὴ, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐπεὶ σοί γε δοκεῖ, περὶ τῶν κορυφαίων· τί γὰρ ἂν τις τοὺς γε φαύλως δια-
 τρίβοντας ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ λέγοι; Οὗτοι δέ που ἐκ νέων
 D πρῶτον μὲν εἰς ἀγορὰν οὐκ ἴσασι τὴν ὁδόν, οὐδὲ ὅπου
 δικαστήριον ἢ βουλευτήριον ἢ τι κοινὸν ἄλλο τῆς πί- 5
 λεως συνέδριον· νόμους δὲ καὶ ψηφίσματα λεγόμενα
 ἢ γεγραμμένα οὔτε ὀρώσιν οὔτε ἀκούουσι. σπουδαὶ
 δὲ ἑταιρειῶν ἐπ' ἀρχὰς καὶ σύνοδοι καὶ δεῖπνα καὶ σὺν
 αὐλητρίσι κῶμοι, οὐδὲ ὄναρ πράττειν προσίσταται
 αὐτοῖς. εὐ δὲ ἢ κακῶς τι γέγονεν ἐν πόλει, ἢ τί τῷ 10

They know nothing of politics or of public life, still less of revels and intrigues for power.

1. ὡς ἔοικεν] The sentence continues as if λέγωμεν had been *λεκτέον*.

2. τοὺς φαύλως διατρίβοντας ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ λέγοι] ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ is emphatic, i. e. 'who are frivolous in such a pursuit.' For an account of these gentry see Rep. 6. 489 D-496, where they are called *παμπόνηροι* . . ὥσπερ οἱ ἐκ τῶν εἰργμῶν εἰς τὰ ἱερά ἀποδιδράσκοντες, κ.τ.λ.

3. Οὗτοι δέ που] Compare the less ironical description in the Republic, 6. 488 A: *Νόησον γὰρ τοιουτοῦ γενόμενον*, κ.τ.λ. The contradiction between philosophy and common life is here stated in its most paradoxical aspect. No existing commonwealth is great enough to interest the philosophic mind. Cp. Rep. 6. 496 B: *Ἡ ἐν σμικρᾷ πόλει ὅταν μεγάλη ψυχὴ φυῆ καὶ ἀτιμάσασα τὰ τῆς πόλεως ὑπερίδῃ*.

7. σπουδαὶ δέ, κ.τ.λ.] 'But the ambitious striving of political clubs for power, and public meetings and banquets and revellings with minstrelsy, are actions which do not occur to them even in dreams.' For *προσίσταται* cp. Hyperides (?) Pro Euxenippo sub init. : *Εἰ μὴ*

προσίστανται ὑμῖν αἰ τοιαῦτα εἰσαγγελίαι, κ.τ.λ.

For a similar 'nominativus pendens' cp. Rep. 7. 532 B: *Ἡ δὲ γε λύσις . . ἡ πραγματεία τῶν τεχνῶν . . ταύτην ἔχει τὴν δύναμιν*. The irregularity is softened in the present instance by the fact that the earlier part of the sentence forms a sort of collective nominative to *προσίσταται*. With this list of 'worldly goods' compare Rep. 6. 491 C: *Πάντα τὰ λεγόμενα ἀγαθὰ, κἄλλος καὶ πλοῦτος καὶ ἰσχύς σώματος καὶ ξυγγένεια ἐρρωμένη ἐν πόλει καὶ πάντα τὰ τούτων οἰκεία*.

8. ἑταιρειῶν] 'Clubs' or 'leagues.' See Rep: 2. 365 D: *Ἐπὶ γὰρ τὸ λαθάνειν ξυνωμοσίας τε καὶ ἑταιρείας συνάξομεν . . .* Thucyd. 8. 54: *Καὶ ὁ μὲν Πείσανδρος τὰς τε ξυνωμοσίας, αἵπερ ἐτύγχανον πρότερον ἐν τῇ πόλει οὔσαι ἐπὶ δίκαις καὶ ἀρχαῖς, ἀπάσας ἐπέλεθῶν*, κ.τ.λ.

10. τι γέγονει] So the Bodleian and several other MSS., including the first hand of T. But Clement in quoting the passage reads *τις* with the majority of manuscripts. This, however, may easily have arisen out of what follows. Stallbaum

The philosopher's ignorance of these things and of his neighbour's pedigree, is not ironical but real. His body is at home in the city, but his mind is

κακὸν ἔστιν ἐκ προγόνων γεγονὸς ἢ πρὸς ἀνδρῶν ἢ p. 173.
 γυναικῶν, μᾶλλον αὐτὸν λέληθεν ἢ οἱ τῆς θαλάττης
 λεγόμενοι χόες. καὶ ταῦτα πάντ' οὐδ' ὅτι οὐκ οἶδεν, E
 οἶδεν· οὐδὲ γὰρ αὐτῶν ἀπέχεται τοῦ εὐδοκιμῆν χάριν,
 5 ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι τὸ σῶμα μόνον ἐν τῇ πόλει κείται αὐ-
 τοῦ καὶ ἐπιδημῆι, ἢ δὲ διάνοια, ταῦτα πάντα ἡγήσα-
 μένη σμικρὰ καὶ οὐδέν, ἀτιμάσασα πανταχῆ φέρεται
 κατὰ Πίνδαρον, τά τε γὰς ὑπέερθε καὶ τὰ ἐπίπεδα

says, 'Si quis alius, certe philosophus scit, quid recte, quid secus in republica fiat.' But if he is ignorant of what is passing, how can he judge of it? See above, νόμους δὲ καὶ ψηφίσματα, κ.τ.λ., and infr. 174 C: Οὐκ εἰδὼς κακὸν οὐδὲν οὐδενὸς ἐκ τοῦ μὴ μεμεληθέναι. And cp. Rep. 6. 496. This reading is consistent with the spirit of paradox which is unmistakably present throughout. No part of the description except the absence of rhetoric would apply to the real Socrates. Even in this dialogue we have seen that he knows some of the antecedents of Theætetus and is interested in knowing more.

2. οἱ τῆς θαλάττης λεγόμενοι χόες] Aristid. Or. 3. T. I. p. 30. ed. Dind.: τὸ λέγειν περὶ τούτων καὶ ἐγγχειρῆν ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις ἐξαριθμῆσθαι βούλοιο τοὺς χόας τῆς θαλάττης. (Stallb.)

4. οὐδὲ γὰρ αὐτῶν ἀπέχεται τοῦ εὐδοκιμῆν χάριν] Cp. Ar. Eth. N. 4. 3. §§ 27, 28 (of the high-minded man)—πρὸς τὰ ἐντιμα μὴ ἴεναι . . . εἴρωνα πρὸς τοὺς πολλοὺς.

7. ἀτιμάσασα] Cp. Rep. 6. 496 B, quoted above.

8. κατὰ Πίνδαρον] The fragment is thus quoted by Clem. Alex. Str. 20. 707: Πέταται κατὰ

Πίνδαρον τὰς τε γὰς ὑπέερθεν οὐρανοῦ τε ὑπερ ἀστρονομῶν, καὶ πᾶσαν πάντη φύσιν ἐρευνάμενος (v. 1. ἐρευνώμενος). He seems to have had the poet's words, as well as this passage, in his mind. Plato therefore seems to have changed πέταται into the more prosaic φέρεται (πέτεται occurs as a marginal reading), and to have introduced the words καὶ τὰ ἐπίπεδα γεωμετροῦσα (perhaps also ἀστρονομοῦσα), in compliment to Theodorus, adding τῶν ὄντων ἐκάστου, κ.τ.λ. Plato almost always thus inweaves quotation with his own language, and accommodates the poet's measures to the rhythm of prose; e. g. Rep. 2. 365 B: Πότερον δίκαια τείχος ὑψιὸν ἢ σκολιὰς ἀπάταις ἀναβάς καὶ ἐμαντὸν οὕτω περιφράξας διαβιῶ; Ib. 364 D: Τῆς δ' ἀρετῆς ἰδρῶτα θεοὶ προπάρειθεν ἔθκαν καὶ τινα ὁδὸν μακράν τε καὶ ἀνάντη. Protag. 340 D: Ὅταν δὲ τις αὐτῆς εἰς ἀκρὸν ἵκηται, ῥῆιδίην δ' ἡπειτα πέλει, χαλεπὴν περ εὐόουσαν, ἐκτίσθαι.

τά τε γὰς] Bodl. τᾶτε (but with an erasure over ᾶ). Is it possible that Plato wrote τὰς τε, as in the quotation of Clement? This seems probable, when it is considered that τὰ ἐπίπεδα, κ.τ.λ. is an afterthought, to which the transition as the words stand in the text is

- P. 173. γεωμετροῦσα, οὐρανοῦ τε ὑπερ ἀστρονομοῦσα, καὶ
 P. 174. πᾶσαν πάντη φύσιν ἐρευνωμένη τῶν ὄντων ἐκάστου
 ὄλου, εἰς τῶν ἐγγύς οὐδὲν αὐτὴν συγκαθειῖσα.

ΘΕΟ. Πῶς τοῦτο λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Ὡσπερ καὶ Θαλῆν ἀστρονομοῦντα, ὦ Θεό- 5
 ὦρε, καὶ ἄνω βλέποντα, πεσόντα εἰς φρέαρ, Θραῦττά
 τις ἐμμελῆς καὶ χαρίεσσα θεραπαινὶς ἀποσκῶψαι λέ-
 γεται, ὡς τὰ μὲν ἐν οὐρανῷ προθυμοῖτο εἰδέναι, τὰ
 δ' ἐμπροσθεν αὐτοῦ καὶ παρὰ πόδας λανθάνοι αὐτόν.
 ταῦτόν δὲ ἀρκεῖ σκῶμμα ἐπὶ πάντας ὅσοι ἐν φιλο- 10

traversing
 the earth
 and hea-
 ven, com-
 passing the
 whole of
 everything.
 He is
 laughed at
 by ordinary
 people, as
 Thales was
 by the
 Thracian
 maid-ser-
 vant. For
 knowing
 nothing of

somewhat abrupt; and also that the term γεωμετροῦσα is more naturally applicable to the surface than to the lower parts of the Earth.

autem h. l. ad leporem et venustatem in jocando trahendam docuit Ruhnken. ad Longin. p. 261. Fabellam hinc forte duxit Laert. 1. 34.' Heind.

2. τῶν ὄντων ἐκάστου ὄλου] Ὅ γὰρ συνοπτικὸς διαλεκτικὸς, ὁ δὲ μή, οὐ. (Rep. 7. 537 C.) See the humorous illustration of this in the Republic, 5. 474 C: Ὅτι ὄν ἂν φῶμεν φιλεῖν τι, δεῖ φανῆναι αὐτόν, εἴαν ὀρθῶς λεγῆται, οὐ τὸ μὲν φιλοῦντα ἐκείνου, τὸ δὲ μή, ἀλλὰ πᾶν στέργοντα, κ.τ.λ. And ib. 6. 486 A: Ἐναντιώτατον μικρολογία ψυχῇ μελλούσῃ τοῦ ὄλου καὶ παντὸς αἰεὶ ἐπορέξεσθαι θείου τε καὶ ἀνθρώπινου. . . ἧ οὖν ἵπάρχει διανοία μεγαλοπρέπεια καὶ θεωρία παντὸς μὲν χρόνου, πάσης δὲ οὐσίας, οἷόν τε οἶει τούτῳ μέγα τι δοκεῖν εἶναι τὸν ἀνθρώπινον βίον; Ibid. 500 B.

Does not ἐμμελῆς rather refer to the slave's neatness in her own department? Cp. τὸρῶς καὶ ὀξέως 175 E. 'A trim and dainty Thracian handmaid.' The opposite is implied in ἀσχημοσύνη . . . ἀβελτερίας, infr. C. The same jest occurs in Chaucer, The Millere's Tale, 3458-60: 'He walked in the felde for to prie

Upon the starres, what ther should befall,
 Til he was in a marlepit yfalle.'

10. ταῦτόν δὲ ἀρκεῖ σκῶμμα] 'The same piece of raillery does not fail to apply,'—'will serve.' For the metaphorical use of ἀρκεῖν ἐπὶ cp. Soph. Ant. 611: Τό τ' ἔπειτα καὶ τὸ μέλλον καὶ τὸ πρὶν ἐπαρκέσει νόμος ὅδε.

3. ὄλου] 'In its universal aspect.' εἰς τῶν ἐγγύς] 'Not lowering herself to contemplate any of the things surrounding her.'

4. Theodorus does not at once understand the contrast between 'things universal and things near.'

6. Θραῦττά τις] Ἐθραῦτταν a patria ancillam hanc dicit. ἐμμελῆς

For the application of the σκῶμμα in the mouth of an enemy see the speech of Calicles in the Gorgias, 484 sqq., which presents many points of similarity to the present passage.

his neighbour, while he searches into the nature of man, he appears helpless in public and private life, having no topics for scandal, and despising the common subjects of praise and boasting: thinking of a king merely as the shepherd of a troublesome flock, who for want of leisure must be a clown: looking upon broad acres as a narrow strip of earth: and on high pedigree as but a single reach in the descent of an endless river.

σοφία διάγουσι. τῷ γὰρ ὄντι τὸν τοιοῦτον ὁ μὲν p. 174.
 πλησίον καὶ ὁ γείτων λέληθεν, οὐ μόνον ὃ τι πράττει, ^B
 ἀλλ' ὀλίγου καὶ εἰ ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν ἢ τι ἄλλο θρέμμα·
 τί δέ ποτ' ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος καὶ τί τῇ τοιαύτῃ φύσει
 5 προσήκει διάφορον τῶν ἄλλων ποιεῖν ἢ πάσχειν,
 ζητεῖ τε καὶ πράγματ' ἔχει διερευνώμενος. μαθάνεις
 γάρ που, ὦ Θεόδωρε. ἢ οὐ;

ΘΕΟ. Ἐγωγε· καὶ ἀληθῆ λέγεις·

ΣΩ. Τοιγάρτοι, ὦ φίλε, ἰδία τε συγγιγνόμενος ὁ
 10 τοιοῦτος ἐκάστῳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ, ὅπερ ἀρχόμενος ἔλεγον, ὅ
 ὅταν ἐν δικαστηρίῳ ἢ που ἄλλοθι ἀναγκασθῆ περὶ
 τῶν παρὰ πόδας καὶ τῶν ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς διαλέγεσθαι,
 γέλωτα παρέχει οὐ μόνον Θράτταις ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ
 ἄλλῳ ὄχλῳ, εἰς φρέατά τε καὶ πᾶσαν ἀπορίαν ἐμπί-
 15 πτων ὑπὸ ἀπειρίας, καὶ ἢ ἀσχημοσύνη δεινῇ, δόξαν
 ἀβελτερίας παρεχομένη. ἐν τε γὰρ ταῖς λαιδορῆσιν
 ἴδιον ἔχει οὐδὲν οὐδένα λαιδορεῖν, ἅτ' οὐκ εἰδὼς κακὸν
 οὐδὲν οὐδενὸς ἐκ τοῦ μὴ μεμελετηκέναι· ἀπορῶν οὖν
 γελοῖος φαίνεται· ἐν τε τοῖς ἐπαίνοις καὶ ταῖς τῶν D
 20 ἄλλων μεγαλαυχίαις, οὐ προσποιήτως, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι
 γελῶν ἐνδηλος γιγνόμενος ληρώδης δοκεῖ εἶναι. τύ-
 ραννόν τε γὰρ ἢ βασιλέα ἐγκωμιαζόμενον ἕνα τῶν

4. τῇ τοιαύτῃ] Sc. ἀνθρωπίνῃ.

10. ὅπερ ἀρχόμενος ἔλεγον] These words refer only to δημοσίᾳ, and recall 172 C.

14. εἰς φρέατα] 'Into pitfalls and all manner of perplexity.' Cp. supr. 165 B: Τὸ λεγόμενον ἐν φρέατι συνεχόμενος. But the words immediately refer to supr. A: Πεσόοντα ἐς φρέαρ.

15. ἢ ἀσχημοσύνη] 'And the awkwardness of the position is terrible, making him seem no better than a fool.'

17. ἴδιον] I. e. he cannot use

personality in invective.

20. οὐ προσποιήτως, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι] Cp. 173 E: Οὐ γὰρ αὐτῶν ἀπέχεται τοῦ εὐδοκμεῖν χάριν, κ.τ.λ.

21. τύραννον. . ἐγκωμιαζόμενον] Governed (1) by ἀκούων, implied in ἀκούειν below: or (2) more truly, an accusativus pendens. τε is answered by δέ in γῆς δέ, κ.τ.λ. infr.

22. ἕνα τῶν νομέων] Comp. the Politicus, 266 D, where this is regarded as the most universal conception of the

p. 174. νομέων, οἷον συβώτην, ἢ ποιμένα, ἢ τινα βουκόλον ἡγεῖται ἀκούειν εὐδαιμονιζόμενον πολὺ βδάλλοντα· δυσκολώτερον δὲ ἐκείνων ζῶον καὶ ἐπιβουλότερον ποιμαίνειν τε καὶ βδάλλειν νομίζει αὐτούς· ἄγροικον δὲ καὶ ἀπαίδευτον ὑπὸ ἀσχολίας οὐδὲν ἦττον τῶν 5
 E νομέων τὸν τοιοῦτον ἀναγκαῖον γίνεσθαι, σηκὸν ἐν ὄρει τὸ τεῖχος περιβεβλημένον. γῆς δὲ ὅταν μυρία πλέθρα ἢ ἔτι πλείω ἀκούσῃ ὥς τις ἄρα κεκτημένος θαυμαστὰ πλήθει κέκτηται, πάνσμικρα δοκεῖ ἀκούειν εἰς ἅπασαν εἰωθῶς τὴν γῆν βλέπειν. τὰ δὲ δὴ γένη 10 ἡμούντων, ὡς γενναῖός τις ἑπτὰ πάππους πλουσίους

kingly office; contemplating νομενική as a whole, the philosopher thinks of βασιλική only as a part of it: "Οτι τῇ τοιαύτῃ μεθόδῳ τῶν λόγων οὐτε σεμνοτέρου μᾶλλον ἐμέλησεν ἢ μή, τὸν τε σμικρότερον οὐδὲν ἡτίμακε πρὸ τοῦ μείζονος, ἀεὶ δὲ καθ' αὐτὴν περαίνει τὰ ληθέστατον. Soph. 227 A: Τῇ τῶν λόγων μεθόδῳ σπογγιστικῆς ἢ φαρμακοποιίας οὐδὲν ἦττον οὐδέ τι μᾶλλον τυγχάνει μέλου, εἰ τὸ μὲν σμικρὰ τὸ δὲ μεγάλα ὠφελεῖ ἡμᾶς καθαίρων. τοῦ γὰρ κτήσασθαι ἕνεκα νοῦν πασῶν τεχνῶν τὸ ξυγγενές καὶ τὸ μὴ ξυγγενές κατανοεῖν πειρωμένη τιμὰ πρὸς τοῦτο ἐξ ἴσου πάσας, καὶ θάτερα τῶν ἐτέρων κατὰ τὴν ὁμοιότητα οὐδὲν ἡγεῖται γελούτερα, σεμνότερον δὲ τι τὸν διὰ στρατηγικῆς ἢ φθειριστικῆς δηλοῦντα θηρευτικῆν οὐδὲν νενομίκεν, ἀλλ' ὡς τὸ πολὺ χαυνότερον.— The latter passage has also a slight tinge of the irony of the text. The figure may have originated in some saying of Socrates. Compare Xen. Mem. I. 2. § 32: "Οτι θαυμαστὸν οἱ δοκοίη εἶναι, εἴ τις γενόμενος βοῶν ἀγέλης νομεὺς καὶ τὰς βοῦς ἐλάτους τε καὶ χείρους ποιῶν μὴ ὁμολο-

γοίη κακὸς βουκόλος εἶναι. Ib. § 37: 'Ο δὲ Κριτίας· Ἀλλὰ τῶνδ' ἐτοί σε ἀπέχεσθαι δεήσει, τῶν σκυτέων καὶ τῶν τεκτόνων καὶ τῶν χαλκέων. . . Ναὶ μὰ Δί', ἔφη ὁ Χαρικλῆς, καὶ τῶν βουκόλων γε· εἰ δὲ μή, φυλάττου, ὅπως μὴ καὶ σὺ ἐλάττους τὰς βοῦς ποιήσης.

2. πολὺ βδάλλοντα] 'As being rich in milk,' i. e. 'squeezing out much wealth.' Compare the speeches of Thrasymachus in Rep. I.

3. ἐκείνων] Masculine.

4. ποιμαίνειν τε καὶ βδάλλειν] 'Only he thinks that the creature whom they tend, and out of whom they squeeze their wealth, is of a less tractable and more insidious nature.' There is here an anticipation of the bitter satire or actual human nature which appears in the Politicus.

ἄγροικον δέ.. ἀσχολίας] 'Rough and uncivilized from stress of work.'

6. σηκὸν ἐν ὄρει, κ.τ.λ.] And so cut off from the great world, over which the philosopher freely ranges, supr. 173 E.

10. γένη ἡμούντων. . .] 'And when they cant of pedigree. . .'

ἔχων ἀποφῆναι, παντάπασιν ἀμβλὺ καὶ ἐπὶ σμικρὸν p. 174.
 ὀρώντων ἡγείται τὸν ἔπαινον, ὑπὸ ἀπαιδευσίας οὐ p. 175.
 δυναμένων εἰς τὸ πᾶν ἀεὶ βλέπειν οὐδὲ λογίζεσθαι
 ὅτι πάππων καὶ προγόνων μυριάδες ἐκάστω γεγό-
 5 νασιν ἀναρίθμητοι, ἐν αἷς πλούσιοι καὶ πτωχοὶ καὶ
 βασιλεῖς καὶ δούλοι βάρβαροί τε καὶ Ἕλληνες πολ-
 λάκις μυρίοι γεγόνασιν ὄφρουν, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ πέντε καὶ
 εἴκοσι καταλόγῳ προγόνων σεμννομένων καὶ ἀναφε-
 ρόντων εἰς Ἡρακλέα τὸν Ἀμφιτρύωνος ἄτοπα αὐτῶ

1. παντάπασιν ἀμβλὺ . . ὀρών-
 των] 'Betraying a dull and con-
 tracted vision.' In what fol-
 lows, the apodosis ἡγείται is twice
 resumed (καταφαίνεται, γελᾷ) with

variations of the protasis.

4. ὅτι πάππων καὶ προγόνων]
 Compare the comic fragment
 ascribed to Menander: Men.
 Fragm. Inc. 4 (Meineke):—

Ἀπολεί με τὸ γένος' μὴ λέγ', εἰ φιλεῖς ἐμέ,
 Μῆτερ, ἐφ' ἐκάστω τὸ γένος' οἷς ἂν τῇ φύσει
 Ἀγαθὸν ὑπάρχη μὴθὲν οἰκείον προσόν,
 Ἐκεῖσε καταφεύγουσιν εἰς τὰ μνήματα,
 Καὶ τὸ γένος, ἀριθμοῦσίν τε τοὺς πάππους ὄσοι.
 Οὐδ' ἓνα δ' ἔχεις ἰδεῖν ἂν, οὐδ' εἰπεῖν, ὄφρ
 Οὐκ εἰσὶ πάπποι' πῶς γὰρ ἐγένοντ' ἂν ποτε; κ. τ. λ.

μυριάδες . . ἀναρίθμητοι] This
 expression recurs frequently in
 later Greek authors.

6. βάρβαροί τε καὶ Ἕλληνες]
 These words belong to all the
 preceding nouns.

7. ἐπὶ πέντε . . προγόνων] The
 order is ἐπὶ καταλόγῳ πέντε καὶ
 εἴκοσι προγόνων.

8. ἀναφερόντων] Sc. τὸ γένος,
 or τὴν εὐγένειαν. The genitives
 depend upon σμικρολογίας, or
 rather, more vaguely, upon the
 sense of the words ἄτοπα αὐτῶ
 καταφαίνεται τῆς σμικρολογίας, as
 δυναμένων upon γελᾷ below, κατα-
 φάινεται being perhaps
 used in its condemnatory sense,
 as in καταγιγνώσκειν.

9. ἄτοπα . . τῆς σμικρολογίας] The
 genitive is not quite analogous
 to ἀμήχανον εὐδαιμονίας, Apol. 41
 C, which is rather quantitative:

nor is it exactly equivalent to
 ἄτοπος ἢ σμικρολογία (like ἀσημα
 . . βοῆς, . . φῶτων ἀθλίων ἰκτήρια,
 in Sophocles), though, as in
 these last cases, the adjective
 is isolated for the sake of em-
 phasis; but the genitive has
 the additional meaning, 'in
 respect of,' as after interjec-
 tions and epithets. Cf. Πρό-
 tagoras 317 B: Πολλὴ μωρία καὶ
 τοῦ ἐπιχειρήματος. Rep. I. 328 E:
 Χαλεπὸν τοῦ βίου (for its way
 of life?) 7. 531 D: Πάμπλου
 ἔργον λέγεις. τοῦ προοιμίου, ἦν δ'
 ἐγώ; Phæd. 99 B: Πολλὴ ἂν καὶ
 μακρὰ ῥαθυμία ἂν εἴη τοῦ λόγου.

The whole sense lies some-
 where between σεμννόμενοι καὶ
 ἀναφέροντες . . ἄτοποι φαίνονται τῆς
 σμικρολογίας and σεμννομένων καὶ
 ἀναφερόντων . . ἄτοπος φαίνεται ἢ
 σμικρολογία.

175. καταφαίνεται τῆς σμικρολογίας, ὅτι δὲ ὁ ἀπ' Ἀμφι-
 Β τρύωνος εἰς τὸ ἄνω πεντεκαικοστὸς τοιοῦτος ἦν, οἷα
 συνέβαιεν αὐτῷ τύχη, καὶ ὁ πεντηκοστὸς ἀπ' αὐτοῦ,
 γελᾷ οὐ δυναμένων λογίζεσθαι τε καὶ χαυνότητα
 ἀνοήτου ψυχῆς ἀπαλλάττειν. ἐν ἅπασιν δὲ τούτοις ὁ 5
 τοιοῦτος ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν καταγελάται, τὰ μὲν ὑπερ-
 ηφάνως ἔχων, ὡς δοκεῖ, τὰ δ' ἐν ποσὶν ἀγνοῶν τε καὶ
 ἐν ἐκάστοις ἀπορῶν.

ΘΕΟ. Παντάπασιν τὰ γιννόμενα λέγεις, ὦ Σώ-
 κρατες.

ΣΩ. Ὅταν δέ γέ τινα αὐτός, ὦ φίλε, ἐλκύσῃ ἄνω,
 C καὶ ἐβελήσῃ τις αὐτῷ ἐκβῆναι ἐκ τοῦ Τί ἐγὼ σέ
 ἀδικῶ ἢ σὺ ἐμέ; εἰς σκέψιν αὐτῆς δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ
 ἀδικίας, τί τε ἐκάτερον αὐτοῖν καὶ τί τῶν πάντων ἢ
 ἀλλήλων διαφέρετον; ἢ ἐκ τοῦ Εἰ βασιλεὺς εὐδαίμων 15

But when
 he takes
 the other
 up into his
 own region,
 from ques-
 tions of pri-
 vate wrong,
 to inquire

2. οἷα συνέβαιεν] The Bodl.
 reads οἷα συνέβαιεν αὐτῷ τύχη.
 Perhaps rightly. The meaning
 in both cases is the same.
 'He was,—what Fortune made
 him.'

3. ἀπ' αὐτοῦ] Sc. (1) τοῦ πεν-
 τεκαικοστοῦ: or (2) τοῦ Ἀμφι-
 τρύωνος. But the latter (2) has
 less point.

11. Ὅταν δέ γε, κ.τ.λ.] Compare
 Rep. 7. 515 E, 516: Εἰ δ', ἦν δ'
 ἐγώ, ἐντεύθεν ἔλθοι τις αὐτὸν βία διὰ
 τραχείας τῆς ἀναβάσεως καὶ ἀνάν-
 τους, καὶ μὴ ἀνείη πρὶν ἐξελκύσειε
 πρὸς τὸ τοῦ ἡλίου φῶς, ἄρα οὐχὶ
 ὀδυνᾶσθαι τε ἂν καὶ ἀγανακτεῖν
 ἐλκόμενον, καὶ ἐπειδὴ πρὸς τὸ φῶς
 ἔλθοι, αὐγῆς ἂν ἔχοντα τὰ ὄμματα
 μετὰ ὄραν οὐδ' ἂν ἐν δύνασθαι
 τῶν νῦν λεγομένων ἀληθῶν.

τινα . . . τις] The indefinites
 are used with an indirect refer-
 ence to τὸν σμικρὸν ἐκείνον καὶ
 δρμῶν καὶ δικανικόν below (D).

12. καὶ . . . αὐτῷ] 'And he finds

some one willing.' Supr. 154
 E, Rep. 1. 343 A, etc.

15. Εἰ βασιλεὺς εὐδαίμων] See
 the passage of the Gorgias
 (471), in which Polus con-
 tends that Archelaus is happy.
 (Diog. L. mentions a diatribe
 of Antisthenes, called Ἀρχελαος,
 ἢ περὶ βασιλείας, in which Gor-
 gias was assailed.)

Buttmann thus defends εἰ,
 which a few MSS. omit:
 'Quamvis certum exploratum-
 que haberent vulgares illi ora-
 tores, regem propter divitias
 suas unice beatum putandum
 esse, tamen rem ita in encomiis
 tractabant, ut, quasi dubia ea
 videri posset, multis eam exem-
 plis argumentisque probarent.
 Quidni igitur v. c. encomii
 alicujus in Cræsum argumen-
 tum his verbis indicari potu-
 erit; εἰ Κροῖσος εὐδαίμων;' If
 εἰ is retained, a certain point
 may be given to αὐ (with Cou-

what justice is, from diatribes on the theme 'Is a king happy?' to contemplate the idea of the royal office and of human happiness, Then that dwarfed shrewd legal mind is

κεκτημένος τ' αὖ πολὺ χρυσίον, βασιλείας πέρι καὶ p. 175.
 ἀνθρωπίνης ὄλως εὐδαιμονίας καὶ ἀθλιότητος ἐπὶ σκέψιν, ποίω τέ τινε ἐστὸν καὶ τίνα τρόπον ἀνθρώπου φύσει προσήκει τὸ μὲν κτήσασθαι αὐτοῖν, τὸ δὲ ἀπο-
 5 φυγεῖν,—περὶ τούτων ἀπάντων ὅταν αὖ δέη λόγον διδόναι τὸν σμικρὸν ἐκείνον τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ δριμὺν D καὶ δικανικόν, πάλιν αὖ τὰ ἀντίστροφα ἀποδίδωσιν ἰλιγγίων τε ἀπὸ ὑψηλοῦ κρεμασθεῖς καὶ βλέπων μετέωρος ἄνωθεν ὑπὸ ἀηθείας, ἀδημονῶν τε καὶ ἀπορῶν

sin, Wagner, H. Schmidt) by supposing βασιλεὺς and κεκτημένος to be distinct subjects: 'Is a king, or, again, one possessed of much gold, to be accounted happy?' It may be questioned, however, whether ἢ βασιλεὺς might not give a better meaning.

In any way of taking the words as they stand, τε seems to impede the sense, and αὖ is superfluous. If Plato is really quoting from a rhetorician, this is possibly not a fatal objection, though the conjectures πάν πολὺ, πάμπλου, (Heusd. Hirschig. Badh.) would seem probable. (Schanz reads from Madvig's conj. βασιλεὺς εὐδαιμόνων κεκτημένος ταῦ χρυσίον.) Possibly, however, the words βασιλεὺς . . . χρυσίον are adapted from some poet. (Cp. Theogn. : Εὐδαιμόνων εἶην, καὶ θεοῖς φίλος ἀθανάτοισι, Κύρν', ἀρετῆς δ' ἄλλης οὐδεμίης ἔραμαι.) In which case γὰρ πολὺ χρυσον is perhaps the true reading. For κεκτημένος in such an adaptation, cp. (besides Protag. 340 D quoted above), the quotation of Tyrtaeus in the Laws, 629 A: Οὐτ' ἂν μνησαίμην οὐτ' ἐν λόγῳ ἄνδρα τιθείμην, οὐτ' εἰ πλουσιώτατος ἀνθρώπων εἶη, φησὶν, οὐτ' εἰ πολλὰ

ἀγαθὰ κεκτημένος, εἰπὼν σχεδὸν ἅπαντα, κ.τ.λ. (E. g. the lines might run Εἰ βασιλεὺς εἶην, ἴσχοιμι δὲ γὰρ πολὺ χρυσον.)

There is a close parallel between the present passage and 174 B: Τοιγάροι, κ.τ.λ. Cp. τί ἐγὼ σὲ ἀδικῶ with ἐν δικαστηρίῳ . . . ἀναγκασθῆ λέγειν : ἢ σὺ ἐμέ with ἐν ταῖς λοιδορίαις : εἰ (or ἦ) βασιλεὺς . . . with τύραννόν τε γάρ . . .

2. ἐπὶ σκέψιν] MSS. ἐπίσκεψιν. Bekker corr.

3. ἀνθρώπου φύσει] Cp. supr. 174 B: Τῇ τοιαύτῃ φύσει.

8. ἰλιγγίων τε] 'He gives the philosopher his revenge; (for) dizzied by the strange experience of hanging at such a height and looking downwards from mid-air, and being dismayed and lost, and broken in his utterance, he is laughed at, not by Thracian handmaids, nor by any other of the uneducated, for they do not perceive his plight; but by all whose nurture has been the reverse of servile.'

The sentence probably divides after ἀηθείας, and ἀδημονῶν τε . . . answers to ἰλιγγίων τε. (ἰλιγγίων τε. γάρ add. Ven. Ξ. This is quite unnecessary.)

p. 175. καὶ βαρβαρίζων, γέλωτα Θράτταις μὲν οὐ παρέχει οὐδ' ἄλλω ἀπαιδευτῷ οὐδενί, οὐ γὰρ αἰσθάνονται, τοῖς δ' ἐναντίως ἢ ὡς ἀνδραπόδοις τραφεῖσιν ἅπασιν. Οὗτος δὴ ἐκατέρου τρόπος, ᾧ Θεόδωρε, ὁ μὲν τῷ ὄντι ἐν ἔλευθερίᾳ τε καὶ σχολῇ τεθραμμένον, ὃν δὴ φιλόσο- 5 φον καλεῖς, ᾧ ἀνεμέσητον εὐήθει δοκεῖν καὶ οὐδενί εἶναι, ὅταν εἰς δουρικὰ ἐμπέσῃ διακονήματα, οἷον στρωματόδεσμον μὴ ἐπισταμένου συσκευάσασθαι μηδὲ ὄφρον ἠδῦναι ἢ θῶπας λόγους· ὁ δ' αὖ τὰ μὲν τοιαῦτα πάντα δυναμένου τωρῶς τε καὶ ὀξέως δια- 10 κονεῖν, ἀναβάλλεσθαι δὲ οὐκ ἐπισταμένου ἐπιδέξια

puzzled in its turn, and becomes a laughing-stock not to the uneducated, but to the wise and free. The philosopher may be well content to seem unskilled in servile arts, in comparison with those who are dumb in the highest music of the soul.

1. βαρβαρίζων] Lit. 'Speaking a strange dialect:'—strange i. e. to the inhabitants of the higher region. Schanz admits into the text Pierson's conjecture βατταρίζων ('stammering'), founded on a passage in Themistius which seems an echo of this; Themist. 22. 278 b: "Ὅψει γὰρ ἰλιγγιώσαν εὐθέως καὶ λογιζομένην καὶ βατταρίζουσαν. But there is no sufficient reason for rejecting βαρβαρίζων.

6. ᾧ ἀνεμέσητον] 'Who may, without our surprise or censure, appear simple and a mere cipher, when some menial service is required of him, if he has no skill, for instance, in tying up bedclothes with the proper knot, nor in flavouring a sauce, or a fawning speech:—the other character is that of the man who is able to do all such service with smartness and despatch, but has not the skill to throw his cloak over his right shoulder with a gentlemanly grace; no, nor to celebrate aright with the music of discourse, in his turn, that life which is lived in truth by the

immortals and by heaven-favoured men.'

Cobet requires οὐδέν for οὐδενί. But the dative, whether masculine or neuter, is analogous to Soph. (Ed. Tyr. 1019: 'Ἐξ ἴσου τῷ μηδενί, and agrees better with εὐήθει.

8. ἐπισταμένου] So Bodl. Vat. Ven. Π. ἐπιστάμενος cett.

10. τωρῶς] 'Smartly.' ἄτε δὴ δριμύς ἄν.

11. ἀναβάλλεσθαι . . ἐπιδέξια] Probably, (1) 'to wear his garment over his right shoulder in a gentlemanly fashion.' Aristoph. Av. 1567: Οὗτος, τί δρᾶς; ἐπ' ἀριστερ' οὕτως ἀπέχει; | οὐ μεταβαλεῖς θοιμάτιον ὧδ' ἐπὶ δεξιᾷ; Or, possibly, ἐπιδέξια may mean 'cleverly,' 'deftly.' Cp. Hor. Ep. 1. 1. 96: 'Si toga dissidet impar, Rides. Quid, mea cum pugnat sententia secum?' (2) A possible rendering at first sight is, 'to strike up the song in his turn.' Cp. οὐδέ γ' ἁρμονίαν λόγων λαβόντα, and cp. Rep. 4. 420 E: Κατακλινάντες ἐπὶ δεξιᾷ πρὸς τὸ πῦρ διαπίνοντας. Symp. 177 D: Εἰπεῖν ἔπαινον Ἐρωτος ἐπὶ δεξιᾷ. But one person could hardly be

ἐλευθέρως οὐδέ γ' ἁρμονίαν λόγων λαβόντος ὀρθῶς p. 176.
ὑμνήσαι θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνδρῶν εὐδαιμόνων βίον ἀληθῆ.

ΘΕΟ. Εἰ πάντας, ὦ Σώκρατες, πείθοις ἃ λέγεις
ὥσπερ ἐμέ, πλείων ἂν εἰρήνη καὶ κακὰ ἐλάττω κατ'
5 ἀνθρώπους εἶη.

ΣΩ. 'Αλλ' οὐτ' ἀπολέσθαι τὰ κακὰ δυνατόν, ὦ
Θεόδωρε· ὑπεναντίον γάρ τι τῷ ἀγαθῷ ἀεὶ εἶναι
ἀνάγκη· οὐτ' ἐν θεοῖς αὐτὰ ἰδρύσθαι, τὴν δὲ θνητὴν
φύσιν καὶ τόνδε τὸν τόπον περιπολεῖ ἐξ ἀνάγκης.

said to sing ἐπὶ δεξιά, and the antithesis requires the other rendering. The slave can tuck in and pack up bedclothes, the freeman wear his garment with a grace. The slaves' contribution to the banquet is literally ὄψον ἡδύναι, figuratively θῶπας λόγους ἡδύναι. Supr. 173 A. (Cp. Gorg. 465 D: Τὴν ῥητορικὴν . . . ἀντίστροφον ὄψοποιίας ἐν ψυχῇ ὡς ἐκεῖνο ἐν σώματι.) The 'freeman's' part is literally the lyre and song; in a higher sense, discourse of philosophy and virtue. This is his proper ἔρανος. Cp. Symp. 177 D, where the minstrel is dismissed, and Eryximachus proposes that they should discourse of the praises of love: Δοκεῖ γάρ μοι χρῆναι ἕκαστον ἡμῶν λόγον εἰπεῖν ἔπαινον Ἐρωτος ἐπὶ δεξιά ὡς ἂν δύνηται κάλλιστον, Prot. 347 E. There is a further 'harmony' between the discourse and life of the philosopher; Lach. 188 D: Καὶ κομιδῆ μοι δοκεῖ μουσικὸς ὁ τοιοῦτος εἶναι, ἁρμονίαν κάλλιστην ἡρμοσμένους οὐ λύραν οὐδὲ παιδίᾳ ὄργανα, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι ξὺν ἡρμοσμένους αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ τὸν βίον ξύμφωνον τοῖς λόγοις πρὸς τὰ ἔργα, ἀτεχνῶς θωριστὶ ἀλλ' οὐκ ἰαστί, οὔμαι δὲ οὐδὲ φρυγιστὶ οἰδὲ λυδιστὶ, ἀλλ' ἥπερ

μόνη Ἑλληνικὴ ἐστὶν ἁρμονία.

There is an allusion to the well-known custom of taking the lyre in turn. θῶπας λόγους is perhaps rightly supposed by Ruhnk. ad Tim. p. 146 to be a poetical expression, quoted perhaps from Euripides or Epicharmus.

2. θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνδρῶν εὐδαιμόνων βίον ἀληθῆ] There is a rhythmical cadence in the words, cp. Phædr. 261 A: Πάριτε δῆ, θρέμματα γενναῖα, καλλίπαιδά τε Φαῖδρον πείθετε. Rep. 617 D: Ἀνάγκης θυγατρὸς κόρης Λαχέσεως λόγος, κ. τ. λ. Symp. 197 E, the end of Agathon's speech. This is not improved by deleting ἀληθῆ with Cobet, and so leaving an iambic ending — — — — —.

7. ὑπεναντίον γάρ] Compare the saying of Heraclitus, Fr. 56: Παλίντονος ἁρμονιῆ κόσμου ὅκωσπερ λύρας καὶ τάξου. The preposition conveys the idea of 'bearing up against.'

9. τόνδε τὸν τόπον] Viz. τὸν σωματιοειδῆ τε καὶ ὄρατὸν τόπον, Rep. 7. 532 D. The imagery of place in which Plato's philosophy is enfolded appears most prominently in the Phædo, the Phædrus, and Rep. 6 and 7.

The notion that evil must

176. διὸ καὶ πειράσθαι χρὴ ἐνθένδε ἐκείσε φεύγειν ὃ τι
 Β τάχιστα. φυγὴ δὲ ὁμοίωσις θεῶ κατα τὸ δυνατόν·
 ὁμοίωσις δὲ δίκαιον καὶ ὄσιον μετὰ φρονήσεως γενέ-

Men will
 not hear

exist in everything but the Divine Nature reappears in a curious mythical form in the Politicus, 270; and is implied Tim. 48A: Ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ νοῦ συστάσεως. 86 B: Τὰ δὲ περὶ ψυχῆν (sc. νοσήματα) διὰ σώματος ἔξιν, κ.τ.λ. Ib. 69 D: Ξυγκερασάμενοι τ' αὐτὰ ἀναγκαιῶς τὸ θνητὸν γένος ξυνέθεσαν. In the Phædo evil is almost identified with the bodily principle. Our ignorance on the subject is, however, confessed in the Lysis, 220 E, 221: Πότερον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἰν τὸ κακὸν ἀπόληται, οὐδὲ πεινῆν ἔτι ἔσται οὐδὲ διψῆν οὐδὲ ἄλλο οὐδὲν τῶν τοιούτων; . . ἢ γελοῖον τὸ ἐρώτημα, ὃ τί ποτ' ἔσται τότε ἢ μὴ ἔσται; τίς γὰρ οἶδεν;

2. φυγὴ δὲ ὁμοίωσις θεῶ] Phædr. 252 E, 253: Ἰχνεύοντες δὲ παρ' εἰνῶν ἀνευρίσκειν τὴν τοῦ σφετέρου θεοῦ φύσιν, εὐποροῦσι διὰ τὸ συντόμως ἠναγκάσθαι πρὸς τὸν θεὸν βλέπειν, καὶ ἐφαπτόμενοι αὐτοῦ τῇ μνήμῃ, ἐνθουσιῶντες, ἐξ ἐκείνου λαμβάνουσι τὰ ἔθη καὶ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα, καθ' ὅσον δυνατόν θεοῦ ἀνθρώπῳ μετασχέιν.

Rep. 10. 613 A: Οὐ γὰρ δὴ ὑπὸ γε θεῶν ποτὲ ἀμελείται, ὅς ἂν προθυμείσθαι ἐθέλῃ δίκαιος γίγνεσθαι καὶ ἐπιτηδεύων ἀρετὴν εἰς ὅσον δυνατόν ἀνθρώπῳ ὁμοιοῦσθαι θεῶ. Ib. 6. 500 B: Οὐδὲ γὰρ που, ὦ Ἀδείμαντε, σχολὴ τῷ γε ὡς ἀληθῶς πρὸς τοῖς οὐσι τὴν διάνοιαν ἔχοντι κάτω βλέπειν εἰς ἀνθρώπων πραγματείας καὶ μαχόμενον αὐτοῖς φθόνου τε καὶ δυσμενείας ἐμπίπασθαι, ἀλλ' εἰς τεταγμένα ἄττα καὶ κατὰ ταῦτα αἰεὶ ἔχοντα ὀρώντας καὶ θεωρούμενους

οὔτ' ἀδικούντα οὔτ' ἀδικούμενα ὑπ' ἀλλήλων, κόσμῳ δὲ πάντα καὶ κατὰ λόγον ἔχοντα, ταῦτα μμείσθαι τε καὶ ὃ τι μάλιστα ἀφομοιοῦσθαι. Phæd. 107 C: Νῦν δὲ ἐπειδὴ ἀθάνατος φαίνεται οὐσα, οὐδεμία ἂν εἴη αὐτῇ ἄλλη ἀποφυγὴ κακῶν οὐδὲ σωτηρία πλὴν τοῦ ὡς βελτίστην τε καὶ φρονιμοτάτην γενέσθαι. Tim. 90 B: Τῷ δὲ περὶ φιλομάθειαν καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀληθείς φρονήσεις ἐσπουδακότε καὶ ταῦτα μάλιστα τῶν αὐτοῦ γεγυμνασμένῳ φρονεῖν μὲν ἀθάνατα καὶ θεία, ἄνπερ ἀληθείας ἐφάπτηται, πᾶσα ἀνάγκη που, καθ' ὅσον δ' αἶ μετασχέιν ἀνθρωπίνῃ φύσει ἀθανασίας ἐνδέχεται, τούτου μηδὲν μέρος ἀπολείπειν. . . διὰ τὸ καταμανθάνειν τὰς τοῦ παντὸς ἀρμονίας τε καὶ περιφοράς, τῷ κατανοουμένῳ τὸ κατανοοῦν ἐξομοιωῶσαι κατὰ τὴν ἀρχαίαν φύσιν.

3. ὁμοίωσις δέ] 'And to be made like to Him is to become righteous and holy, not without wisdom.'

μετὰ φρονήσεως] Is virtue possible apart from knowledge? This question is discussed in the Protagoras and the Meno. The answer given is, that practically it would appear so, but that perfect virtue must be inseparable from knowledge. And in the Meno the paradox is solved by saying that practical virtue is a Divine gift, θεία μοῖρα προσγιγνομένη ἄνευ νοῦ, but that if ever there should be a virtuous man who could teach virtue, he would be like Teiresias amongst the shades; ὡσπερ παρὰ σκιάς ἀληθῆς ἂν πρᾶγμα εἴη πρὸς ἀρετῆν. In

this: for there must be some evil to resist the good, and this cannot dwell in heaven, but must wander about this lower world. Our wisdom therefore is to escape heavenwards, by becoming

σθαι. ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ ἄριστε, οὐ πᾶν ῥάδιον πείσαι ὡς p. 176.
 ἄρα οὐχ ὢν ἔνεκα οἱ πολλοὶ φασὶ δεῖν πονηρίαν μὲν
 φεύγειν, ἀρετὴν δὲ διώκειν, τούτων χάριν τὸ μὲν ἐπι-
 τηδευτέον, τὸ δ' οὐ, ἵνα δὴ μὴ κακὸς καὶ ἵνα ἀγαθὸς
 5 δοκῇ εἶναι. ταῦτα γάρ ἐστιν ὁ λεγόμενος γραῶν
 ὕθλος, ὡς ἐμοὶ φαίνεται. τὸ δὲ ἀληθὲς ὧδε λέγωμεν.
 θεὸς οὐδαμῇ οὐδαμῶς ἄδικος, ἀλλ' ὡς οἶόν τε δικαιο- c
 τatos, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτῷ ὁμοίωτερον οὐδὲν ἢ ὃς ἂν
 ἡμῶν αὖ γένηται ὅ τι δικαιοτάτος. περὶ τούτου καὶ ἡ

the more dialectical dialogues one side of the contradiction disappears, and it is assumed that philosophy is essential to real virtue. Phæd. 69 A B: ὦ μακάριε Σιμμία, μὴ γὰρ οὐχ αὕτη ἢ ἡ ὀρθὴ πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἀλλαγῆ, ἡδονὰς πρὸς ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας πρὸς λύπας καὶ φόβον πρὸς φόβον καταλλάττεσθαι . . . ἀλλ' ἢ ἐκείνο τὸ νόμισμα ὀρθόν, . . . φρόνησις, . . . καὶ ξυλληβδὴν ἀληθῆς ἀρετῆ ἢ μετὰ φρονήσεως, . . . χωριζόμενα δὲ φρονήσεως καὶ ἀλλαττόμενα ἀντὶ ἀλλήλων, μὴ σκιαγραφία τις ἢ ἡ τοιαύτη ἀρετῆ, κ. τ. λ. In the Republic it is again acknowledged that it is possible to partake of virtue without philosophy, but in an imperfect way; e.g. in the case of the soul which laments its choice of another life; 10. 619 C: Εἶναι δὲ αὐτὸν τῶν ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ ἡκόντων, ἐν τεταγμένῃ πολιτείᾳ ἐν τῷ προτέρῳ βίῳ βεβιωκότα, ἔθει ἄνευ φιλοσοφίας ἀρετῆς μετεिल्φότα. And the education of the φύλακες generally (not of the rulers) is independent of reason, though in harmony with it. Rep. 3. 401, 402. (In the Philebus also the perfect life contains the knowledge of practical things. The philosopher must

know his way home.) Thus the contradiction felt at first is reconciled by acknowledging the existence of different parts of our nature, which, though connected, and indispensable to each other's perfection, are not identical. There is a slight emphasis on μετὰ φρονήσεως in opposition to what follows.

4. ἵνα . . . δοκῇ εἶναι . . . ἀγνοοῦσι γὰρ ζημίαν ἀδικίας] The whole of this passage is parallel to the speeches of Glaucon and Adeimantus in the second book of the Republic, and the same thought is differently worked out in the Gorgias.

5. ὁ λεγόμενος γραῶν ὕθλος] 'This is what men commonly repeat, an old wives' fable, as appears to me.' The meaning of λεγόμενος here (not = 'as the saying is') seems determined by λέγομεν following.

9. περὶ τούτου] 'Moreover a man's real ability, or else his nothingness and want of manhood, is concerned with this.' περὶ τούτου is read in the quotations of Iamblichus and Theodoret. It is approved by Cobet, and has been adopted by Schanz. The genitive is accounted for by the indeter-

176. ὡς ἀληθῶς δεινότης ἀνδρὸς καὶ οὐδενία τε καὶ ἀνανδρία. ἡ μὲν γὰρ τούτου γνῶσις σοφία καὶ ἀρετὴ ἀληθινή, ἡ δὲ ἄγνοια ἀμαθία καὶ κακία ἐναργής· αἱ δ' ἄλλαι δεινότητές τε δοκοῦσαι καὶ σοφαί ἐν μὲν πολιτικαῖς δυναστείαις γιγνόμεναι φορτικάι, ἐν δὲ 5 τέχναις βάνανσοι. τῷ οὖν ἀδικοῦντι καὶ ἀνόσια λέγουσι ἢ πράττοντι μακρῷ ἄριστ' ἔχει τὸ μὴ συγχωρεῖν δεινῷ ὑπὸ πανουργίας εἶναι. ἀγάλλονται γὰρ τῷ οὐκ εἶδεναι, καὶ οἴονται ἀκούειν ὅτι οὐ λῆροί εἰσι, γῆς ἄλλως ἄχθη, ἀλλ' ἄνδρες οἴους δεῖ ἐν πόλει τοὺς 10 σωθησομένους. λεκτέον οὖν τάληθές, ὅτι τοσοῦτ' ἄλλοι εἰσιν οἴοι οὐκ οἴονται, ὅτι οὐκ οἴονται· ἀγνοοῦσι γὰρ ζῆμιαν ἀδικίας, ὃ δεῖ ἤκιστα ἀγνοεῖν. οὐ γάρ ἐστὶν ἡν δοκοῦσι, πληγαί τε καὶ θάνατοι, ὧν ἐνίστε πάσχοισιν οὐδὲν ἀδικοῦντες, ἀλλὰ ἡν ἀδύνατον 15 ἐκφυγεῖν.

wise and just and pure, so becoming like to God.

This is a man's true 'cleverness' and proof of virtue. And the real penalty of vice is one which cannot be escaped by clever shifts. For to act wrongly is to be removed from the Divine pattern, and to be brought

minateness of the point in question. 'On this, *one way or other*, depends,' etc. ἀνανδρία is suggested by ἀνδρὸς.

5. φορτικάι . . βάνανσοι] 'Vulgar'—'mechanical,' or 'mean.' The contrast here is not between truth and falsehood, but, as in the Politicus, between the actual and the ideal.

6. τῷ οὖν ἀδικοῦντι, κ. τ. λ.] This very favourite thought is developed in the Gorgias. See esp. 524-7.

7. τὸ μὴ . . ὑπὸ πανουργίας εἶναι] 'Not to admit that villainy constitutes him a clever man.'

9. οὐ λῆροι] 'That they are not mere absurdities, cumbering the ground:'—'not solecisms,' as Carlyle might say.

γῆς ἄλλως ἄχθη] ἐτώσιον ἄχθος ἀρούρης (Il. 18. 104, quoted in Apol. 28), Od. 20. 379,

Aristoph. Nub. 1203: Πρόβατ' ἄλλως. Milton, Areopagitica: 'Many a man lives a burden to the Earth; but a good book is the precious life-blood of a master spirit.'

λῆροι] Charm. 176 A: Ἐμὲ μὲν λῆρον ἠγέισθαι εἶναι καὶ ἀδύνατον λόγῳ ὀτιοῦν ζητεῖν. Phæd. 72 C: Τελευτῶντα πάντ' ἂν λῆρον τὸν Ἐνδυμίωνα ἀποδείξειε καὶ οὐδαμοῦ ἂν φαίνοιο.

10. οἴους . . τοὺς σωθησομένους] 'Such as all must be in the city who are to live securely there.' 'Such as those must be in the state whose lives are not to be forfeit,' i. e. endangered by every accusation (Wohlrab). Cp. Soph. Ant. 189: Ἡδ' ἐστὶν ἡ σώζουσα.

14. ὧν ἐνίστε πάσχοισιν οὐδὲν ἀδικοῦντες] 'Which men often escape entirely in doing wrong.' 'ὧν pendet ab οὐδέν.' Heindorf.

nearer to the likeness of the Evil. The soul that does so will not be received at death into the region pure from evils.—They will laugh at this, and call us simple men.

ΘΕΟ. Τίνα δὴ λέγεις ;

p. 176.

ΣΩ. Παραδειγμάτων, ὦ φίλε, ἐν τῷ ὄντι ἐσώτων, τοῦ μὲν θείου εὐδαιμονεστάτου, τοῦ δὲ ἀθέου ἀθλιωτάτου, οὐχ ὀρώντες ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει, ὑπὸ ἡλιθιότητος
 5 τε καὶ τῆς ἐσχάτης ἀνοίας λανθάνουσι τῷ μὲν ὁμοιοῦμενοι διὰ τὰς ἀδίκους πράξεις, τῷ δὲ ἀνομοιούμενοι. p. 177.
 οὗ δὲ τίνουσι δίκην ζῶντες τὸν εἰκότα βίον ᾧ ὁμοιοῦνται. ἐὰν δ' εἴπωμεν ὅτι, ἂν μὴ ἀπαλλαγῶσι τῆς δεινότητος, καὶ τελευτήσαντας αὐτοὺς ἐκείνος μὲν ὁ
 10 τῶν κακῶν καθαρὸς τόπος οὐ δέξεται, ἐνθάδε δὲ τὴν αὐτοῖς ὁμοιότητα τῆς διαγωγῆς αἰεὶ ἔξουσι, κακοὶ κακοῖς συνόντες, ταῦτα δὴ καὶ παντάπασιν ὡς δεινοὶ καὶ πανοῦργοι ἀνοήτων τινῶν ἀκούσονται.

2. Παραδειγμάτων] Cp. Rep. 9. 592 B: Ἄλλ', ἣν δ' ἐγώ, ἐν οὐρανῷ ἴσως παραδείγμα ἀνάκειται τῷ βουλομένῳ ὄραν καὶ ὀρῶντι ἐαυτὸν κατοικίσειν.

3. ἀθέου] 'From which all that is Divine has fled.'

8. τῆς δεινότητος] 'From this cleverness which is their boast.'

10. τῶν κακῶν καθαρὸς] Viz. πλάνης καὶ ἀνοίας καὶ φόβου καὶ ἀγρίων ἐρώτων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων κακῶν τῶν ἀνθρωπείων, Phæd. 81 A.

καθαρός] Phæd. 83 D: Ἐκ γὰρ τοῦ ὁμοδοξεῖν τῷ σώματι καὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς χაίρειν ἀναγκάζεται, οἶμαι, ὁμότροπος καὶ ὁμότροφος γίνεσθαι καὶ οἷα μηδέποτε καθαρῶς εἰς Ἄιδου ἀφικέσθαι ἀλλ' αἰεὶ τοῦ σώματος ἀναπλέα ἐξίεναί, ὥστε ταχὺ πάλιν πίπτειν ἐς ἄλλο σῶμα καὶ ὥσπερ σπειρομένη ἐμφύεσθαι, καὶ ἐκ τούτων ἄμοιρος εἶναι τῆς τοῦ θείου τε καὶ καθαροῦ καὶ μονοειδοῦς συνουσίας.

Ibid. 69 C: Καὶ ἡ σωφροσύνη, κ.τ.λ. καὶ αὐτὴ ἡ φρόνησις μὴ καθαρμὸς τις ἦ. καὶ κινδυνεύουσι καὶ οἱ τὰς τελετὰς . . καταστήσαντες . . πάλαι αἰνίττεσθαι ὅτι ὁς ἂν ἀμύητος

καὶ ἀτέλεστος εἰς Ἄιδου ἀφίκηται, ἐν βορβύρῳ κείσεται, ὁ δὲ κεκαθαρμένος τε καὶ τετελεσμένος ἐκεῖσε ἀφικόμενος μετὰ θεῶν οἰκήσει.

τὴν αὐτοῖς ὁμοιότητα τῆς διαγωγῆς] I. e. (as H. Schmidt remarks) τὴν αὐτοῖς ὁμοίαν διαγωγὴν τοῦ βίου. 'They will always retain their way of life like to themselves—evil as they are, associating with evil things.' Compare the well-known passage of the Phædo, 81 C—82 A: Ἄλλα διειλημμένη γε, οἶμαι, ὑπὸ τοῦ σωματοειδοῦς . . κατὰ τὰς αὐτῶν ὁμοιότητος τῆς μελέτης (imitated by Milton, Comus, 467—9:

'The soul grows clotted by contagion,

Imbodies, and imbrates, till she quite lose

The divine property of her first being.)

11. κακοὶ κακοῖς συνόντες] κακοῖς is probably neuter. See H. Schmidt, Exegetischer Commentar, p. 139.

12. καὶ παντάπασιν ὡς δεινοὶ]

177. ΘΕΟ. Καὶ μάλα δὴ, ὦ Σώκρατες.

B ΣΩ. Οἶδά τοι, ὦ ἑταῖρε. ἐν μέντοι τι αὐτοῖς συμβέβηκεν, ὅτι ἂν ἰδίᾳ λόγον δέη δοῦναί τε καὶ δέξασθαι περὶ ὧν ψέγουσι, καὶ ἐθελήσωσιν ἀνδρικῶς πολὺν χρόνον ὑπομεῖναι καὶ μὴ ἀνάνδρως φεύγειν, 5 τότε ἀτόπως, ὦ δαιμόνιε, τελευτῶντες οὐκ ἀρέσκουσιν αὐτοὶ αὐτοῖς περὶ ὧν λέγουσι, καὶ ἡ ῥητορικὴ ἐκείνη πως ἀπομαραίνεται, ὥστε παίδων μηδὲν δοκεῖν διαφέρειν. Περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων, ἐπειδὴ καὶ πάρεργα τυγχάνει λεγόμενα, ἀποστῶμεν.—εἰ δὲ μή, πλείω αἰὲ 10 C ἐπιρρέοντα καταχώσει ἡμῶν τὸν ἐξ ἀρχῆς λόγον.— ἐπὶ δὲ τὰ ἔμπροσθεν ἴωμεν, εἰ καὶ σοὶ δοκεῖ.

ΘΕΟ. Ἐμοὶ μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἀηδέστερα ἀκούειν· ῥᾶω γὰρ τηλικῶδε ὄντι ἐπακολουθεῖν· εἰ μέντοι δοκεῖ, πάλιν ἐπανίωμεν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐνταῦθά που ἡμεν τοῦ λόγου, ἐν ᾧ 15

But if they would consent to reason with us, they would ere long become confused and silent, and their fluent rhetoric would fade away, leaving each of them as helpless as a child. But we must return, and take up the broken thread of our discussion.

I. e. the feeling of superiority will only be confirmed in them. The force of ὡς extends to ἀνοήτων τινῶν.

2. Οἶδά τοι, ὦ ἑταῖρε] 'I am quite aware of it, my friend!' i. e. I know the full extent of the ridicule that they will pour on us.' He refers to the emphatic answer of Theodorus. (This explanation is accepted by H. Schmidt.)

3. ἰδίᾳ] 'Singly.' I. e. in conversation with one person, instead of haranguing εἰς τὸ μέσον.

5. καὶ μὴ ἀνάνδρως φεύγειν] Cp. Rep. 7. 518 A: Οὐκ ἂν ἀλογίστως γελῶ.

7. ἡ ῥητορικὴ ἐκείνη πως ἀπομαραίνεται] 'That brilliant rhetoric of theirs fades utterly, leaving them to appear no better than children.' Meletus,

in Apol. 24-27, is a case in point. For πως cp. supr. 144 B.

8. παίδων μηδὲν δοκεῖν διαφέρειν] Cp. Crit. 49 A: Ἐλάθομεν ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς παίδων οὐδὲν διαφέροντες.

10. πλείω αἰὲ ἐπιρρέοντα καταχώσει ἡμῶν τὸν ἐξ ἀρχῆς λόγον] 'They will come in like a flood and bury our main argument.' The image is that of a torrent covering with its 'drift' the works of man. Cp. Crat. 414 C: Τὰ πρῶτα ὄνόματα τεθέντα κατακίχωνται ἤδη ὑπὸ τῶν βουλομένων τραφιδεῖν αὐτά. Polit. 302 C: Τοῦ νῦν ἐπικεχυμένου λόγου κατ' ἀρχάς. Legg. 7. 793 B. A still more lively image is employed below, 184 A.

13. τὰ τοιαῦτα] 'Quam spiosiora ista.' Cic. Tuscul. I.

I. γ. *Third criticism of the doctrine,*

What appears to me, is to me.

We found that even those who make justice conventional, hesitate to apply their

ἔφαμεν τοὺς τὴν φερομένην οὐσίαν λέγοντας, καὶ p. 177.
τὸ αἰὲ δοκοῦν ἐκάστῳ τοῦτο καὶ εἶναι τούτῳ ᾧ δοκεῖ,
ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐθέλειν διῶσχυρίζεσθαι, καὶ οὐχ
ἦκιστα περὶ τὰ δίκαια, ὡς παντὸς μᾶλλον, ἃ ἂν θῆται D
5 πόλις δόξαντα αὐτῇ, ταῦτα καὶ ἔστι δίκαια τῇ θε-
μένη, ἕωσπερ ἂν κέηται· περὶ δὲ τάγαθου οὐδένα ἀν-
δρείον ἔθ' οὕτως εἶναι, ὥστε τολμᾶν διαμάχεσθαι ὅτι
καὶ ἃ ἂν ὠφέλιμα οἰηθεῖσα πόλις ἐαυτῇ θῆται, καὶ

3. ἐν μὲν . . . περὶ δὲ τάγα-
θοῦ] 'In other cases they
would insist strongly on the
truth of their principle;—
with respect to justice in par-
ticular they would insist that
the enactments of any state
are just for her, so long as
they remain in force;—but
when good is in question—'

4. περὶ τὰ δίκαια . . . περὶ
τάγαθου] 'In regard to what
is just—concerning what is
good.'

5. τῇ θεμένῃ] So Bodl. with
Vat. Ven. Π., τιθεμένη T cett.

6. ἕωσπερ ἂν κέηται] Supr.
172 B: "Ὅσον ἂν δοκῇ χρόνον.

περὶ δὲ τάγαθου] Rep. 6. 505
D: "Ὁ δὲ διώκει μὲν ἅπαντα ψυχῇ
καὶ τούτου ἕνεκα πάντα πράττει,
ἀπομαντευομένη τι εἶναι, ἀποροῦσα
δέ, κ.τ.λ. What is good can-
not be apparent merely. (Com-
pare the saying of Des Cartes
and Spinoza: 'The idea of God
implies His existence.') This
was not, however, universally
admitted. Ar. Eth. N. 1. 3.
§ 3: Τοιαύτην δὲ τινα πλάνην ἔχει
καὶ τάγαθά, κ.τ.λ.

τάγαθου. ὠφέλιμα] Rep. 5. 457
B, 458 E: Κάλλιστα γὰρ τοῦτο
καὶ λέγεται καὶ λελέξεται, ὅτι τὸ
μὲν ὠφέλιμον καλόν, τὸ δὲ βλα-
βερόν αἰσχρόν. . . γάμους . . . ποι-

ήσομεν ἱερούς εἰς δύναμιν ὅτι μά-
λιστα' εἶεν δ' ἂν ἱεροὶ οἱ ὠφελι-
μώτατοι.

We have not yet risen to the
conception of the ideal good
ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας: good is still
a relative term, though know-
ledge begins to find a resting-
place there. In the concrete
the good and expedient are
identical. See Spinoza, Cog.
Met. 1. §§ 6, 11: 'Res sola
considerata neque bona dicitur,
neque mala, sed tantum
respectiva ad aliam, cui con-
ducit ad id quod amat acqui-
rendum, vel contra; ideoque
unaquæque res diverso respectu
eodemque tempore bona et
mala potest dici—Deus vero
dicitur summe bonus, quia
omnibus conducit, nempe uni-
uscujusque esse, quo nihil
magis amabile, suo concursu
conservando. Malum autem
absolutum nullum datur, ut
per se est manifestum.

'Porro uti bonum et malum
non dicitur nisi respectiva, sic
etiam perfectio, nisi quando
perfectionem sumimus pro ipsa
rei essentia, quo sensu antea
diximus, Deum infinitam per-
fectionem habere, hoc est infi-
nitam essentiam, seu infinitum
esse.'

177. ἔστι τοσοῦτον χρόνον ὅσον ἂν κέηται ὠφέλιμα, πλὴν εἴ τις τὸ ὄνομα λέγοι· τούτο δέ που σκῶμμ' ἂν εἶη πρὸς ὃ λέγομεν. οὐχί;

ΘΕΟ. Πάνυ γε.

Ε ΣΩ. Μὴ γὰρ λεγέτω τὸ ὄνομα, ἀλλὰ τὸ πρᾶγμα ἢ ὃ ὀνομαζόμενον θεωρεῖται.

ΘΕΟ. Μὴ γάρ.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ὃ ἂν τοῦτο ὀνομάξῃ, τούτου δὴ που στοχάζεται νομοθετουμένη, καὶ πάντας τοὺς νόμους, καθ' ὅσον οἶεταί τε καὶ δύναται, ὡς ὠφελιμωτάτους ἰοῦ ἑαυτῇ τίθεται. ἢ πρὸς ἄλλο τι βλέπουσα νομοθετεῖται;

78. ΘΕΟ. Οὐδαμῶς.

ΣΩ. Ἡ οὖν καὶ τυγχάνει αἰεί, ἢ πολλὰ καὶ διαμαρτάνει ἐκάστη;

principle to what is Beneficial and good.

A state makes laws for the benefit of its members, but they are not always beneficial.

1. πλὴν εἴ τις . . . λέγομεν] Rep. 7. 533 D: "Ἔστι δ', ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, οὐ περὶ ὀνόματος ἀμφισβήτησις, οἷς τοσοῦτων πέρι σκέψις ὅσων ἡμῖν πρόκειται. The scoffer is supposed to say that the legislature may give the name ὠφέλιμον to what it will. Cp. Charm. 163 D.

3. πρὸς ὃ λέγομεν] In respect of that which we mean.

5. Μὴ γὰρ λεγέτω τὸ ὄνομα] 'Let him not intend the name but the thing which is contemplated under it.' γάρ refers to Theodorus' πάνυ γε. Badham's conjecture, τὸ πρᾶγμα ὃ ὀνομαζόμενον θεωρεῖτω, has received a curious apparent confirmation from the variant which appears on the margin of two MSS. (Ven. II and Ces.), ἀλλὰ τὸ πρᾶγμα τὸ ὀνομαζόμενον θεωρεῖτω. But it may still be doubted whether this is not a coincidence of conjectures.

For λέγειν in Plato is rather 'to mean' than 'to say.' For the sense cp. Ar. Met. I. 1006: Τὸ δ' ἀπορούμενον οὐ τοῦτό ἐστιν, εἰ ἐνδέχεται τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι ἄνθρωπον τὸ ὄνομα, ἀλλὰ τὸ πρᾶγμα.

7. Μὴ γάρ] These words were put into Socrates' mouth in the edd. before Heindorf. Cp. Soph. 255 B: Μὴ τοίνυν λέγωμεν, κ.τ.λ. Θε. μὴ γάρ.

8. ὃ ἂν τοῦτο ὀνομάξῃ] 'Whatever name the State gives to this' (τὸ πρᾶγμα, supr.).

10. καθ' ὅσον οἶεταί τε καὶ δύναται] 'To the extent of her opinion and her power.' I. e. She prescribes what she thinks beneficial, so far as she is able to enforce it. (She may be blind to her true interests, or a stronger power may prevent her from legislating according to her own views.) Cp. Rep. I. 338 foll.

Or, to put it more generally, (for the laws regard the future benefit of the citizens,)

ΘΕΟ. Οἶμαι ἔγωγε καὶ διαμαρτάνειν.

p. 178

ΣΩ. Ἔτι τοίνυν ἐνθένδε ἂν μᾶλλον πᾶς τις ὁμολογήσειε ταῦτα ταῦτα, εἰ περὶ παντός τις τοῦ εἶδους ἐρωτῶη, ἐν ᾧ καὶ τὸ ὠφέλιμον τυγχάνει ὄν. ἔστι δέ 5 πού καὶ περὶ τὸν μέλλοντα χρόνον. ὅταν γὰρ νομοθετώμεθα, ὡς ἐσομένους ὠφελίμους τοὺς νόμους τιθέμεθα εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον. τοῦτο δὲ μέλλον ὀρθῶς ἂν λέγοιμεν.

ΘΕΟ. Πάνυ γε.

B

The man, you say, is the measure of all things white, heavy, and the like, for he has

10 ΣΩ. Ἴθι δῆ, οὕτωςι ἐρωτῶμεν Πρωταγόραν ἢ ἄλλον τινὰ τῶν ἐκείνω τὰ αὐτὰ λεγόντων, Πάντων μέτρον ἄνθρωπος ἔστιν, ὡς φατέ, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, λευκῶν, βαρέων, κούφων, οὐδενὸς ὅτου οὐ τῶν τοιούτων. ἔχων γὰρ αὐτῶν τὸ κριτήριον ἐν αὐτῷ, οἷα

2. ἐνθένδε] 'From the following point of view.'

4. ἐν ᾧ καί] For the method cp. Rep. 6. 491 C: Δαβου τοίνυν ὄλου αὐτοῦ ὀρθῶς . . . πάντος περὶ σπέρματος ἢ φυτοῦ. By analysing the term 'beneficial' into 'future good' Socrates is able to extend his proof to sensible things, and thus directly to refute Protagoras. For not only 'future good,' but 'future hot,' 'sweet,' 'tuneful,' 'persuasive,' is known by the ἐπιστήμων, and by him alone. Plato also brings out the significant principle that 'prediction is the test of science.'

ἔστι δέ] Cp. τὸ ὠφέλιμον. Whatever is expedient is also referrible to future time. As elsewhere, the connotation of the term is limited by the example given, so that τὸ ὠφέλιμον here really = τὸ ἐν νομοθετήσει ὠφέλιμον, 'Expediency as a principle of legislation.'

Cp. infr. 179 A. And, for the use of καί, supr. 152 B: Οὐκοῦν καὶ φαίνεται οὕτως ἑκατέρω;

7. τοῦτο δέ] Cp. τὸ ἐσόμενον εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον.

μέλλον] The MSS. vary between μᾶλλον (Bodl. Vat. Ven. Π.), μέλλει μᾶλλον (Coisl.), and μέλλον μᾶλλον (T pr. cett.). But μέλλον is given by the corrector of T.

13. λευκῶν, βαρέων, κούφων, οὐδενὸς ὅτου οὐ] Cp. supr. 171 E: Τὰ μὲν πολλὰ ἢ δοκεῖ ταύτη καὶ ἔστιν ἑκάστω, θερμά, ξηρά, γλυκέα, πάντα ὅσα τοῦ τύπου τούτου. And, for the omission of μελάνων, supr. 159 C, καθεύδοντα, and note.

14. τὸ κριτήριον] The word is formed from κριτής, on the analogy of δικαστήριον. Cp. Legg. 6. 767 B: Δύο δὲ τῶν λοιπῶν ἔστω κριτήρια. The present is probably one of the earliest instances of its use.

οἷα πάσχει τοιαῦτα οἰόμενος]

178. πᾶσχει τοιαῦτα οἰόμενος, ἀληθῆ τε οἶεται αὐτῷ καὶ ὄντα. οὐχ οὕτως;

ΘΕΟ. Οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Ἡ καὶ τῶν μελλόντων ἔσσεσθαι, φήσομεν, ὧ

ο Πρωταγόρα, ἔχει τὸ κριτήριον ἐν αὐτῷ· καὶ οἶα ἂν 5
οἰηθῆ ἔσσεσθαι, ταῦτα καὶ γίγνεται ἐκείνῳ τῷ οἰηθέντι;
οἶον θερμά, ἄρ' ὅταν τις οἰηθῆ ἰδιώτης αὐτὸν πυρετὸν
λήψεσθαι καὶ ἔσσεσθαι ταύτην τὴν θερμότητα, καὶ
ἕτερος, ἰατρὸς δέ, ἀντοιηθῆ, κατὰ τὴν ποτέρου δόξαν
φῶμεν τὸ μέλλον ἀποβήσεσθαι; ἢ κατὰ τὴν ἀμφο- 10
τέρων, καὶ τῷ μὲν ἰατρῷ οὐ θερμὸς οὐδὲ πυρέττων
γενήσεται, ἑαυτῷ δὲ ἀμφότερα;

ΘΕΟ. Γελοῖον μὲν τ' ἂν εἴη.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ', οἶμαι, περὶ οἴνου γλυκύτητος καὶ αὐ-

Sc. αὐτά. Or rather the accusatives are cognate. Cp. supr. 152 C: *οἶα γὰρ αἰσθάνεται*, and note.

2. ὄντα] There is a slight stress on the present tense in opposition to *μελλόντων ἔσσεσθαι*.

4. Ἡ καὶ τῶν μελλόντων ἔσσεσθαι, φήσομεν] As here knowledge seems to emerge with the mention of future time, so in the Protagoras, 357, virtue is shown to be knowledge, because it implies the power of comparing the future with the present. (Cp. the line of Homer, Π. 1. 343: *οὐδέ τι οἶδε νοῆσαι ἅμα πρόσσω καὶ ὀπίσσω*.)

7. οἶον θερμά] The word is placed absolutely, or in a loose construction with *φῶμεν* infr. Heindorf comp. Crat. 393 E: *οἶον τὸ βῆτα' ὀρᾶς ὅτι τοῦ ἦ καὶ τοῦ τ' καὶ τοῦ ἄ προστεθέντων οὐδὲν ἐλύπησεν, κ.τ.λ.*

ἀρα . . κατὰ τὴν ποτέρου δόξαν]

'Surely we must suppose (must we not?) that the result will be according to the opinion of one of them, or shall we say that it will be in accordance with both?' It is implied in what follows, *which* opinion is probably right. For the indefinite *ποτέρου* see above, 145 B, *εἰ ποτέρου*, and esp. Lach. 181 D.

αὐτόν] The accusative (not *αὐτός*) is used because the man is supposed to consider his own case objectively.

12. *ἑαυτῷ δὲ ἀμφότερα*] Viz. καὶ *θερμὸς καὶ πυρέττων*. The same word is repeated in a different relation. Cp. supr. 147 E, *δυνάμενον*, and note.

Cp. Aristotle, Met. 1. 5. 1010 b: **Ἐτι δὲ περὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος, ὥσπερ καὶ Πλάτων λέγει, οὐ δήπου ὁμοίως κυρία ἢ τοῦ ἰατροῦ δόξα καὶ ἢ τοῦ ἀγροῦντος, οἶον περὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος ἔσσεσθαι ὑγιούς ἢ μὴ μέλλοντος.*

the standard of them in himself. Has he also the standard in himself of Future things? If he thinks he is going to have a fever, and the physician tells him No, which opinion will prove true for him in the sequel?

στηρότητος μελλούσης ἔσεσθαι ἢ τοῦ γεωργοῦ δόξα, p. 178.
 ἀλλ' οὐχ ἢ τοῦ κιθαριστοῦ, κυρία. D

The musician is a better judge of future harmony than the gymnast, as the latter will himself confess when he hears the sounds.

ΘΕΟ. Τί μήν;

ΣΩ. Οὐδ' ἂν αὖ περὶ ἀναρμόστου τε καὶ εὐαρμόστου ἐσομένου παιδοτρίβης ἂν βέλτιον δοξάσει μουσικοῦ, ὃ καὶ ἔπειτα αὐτῷ τῷ παιδοτρίβῃ δόξει εὐάρμοστον εἶναι.

ΘΕΟ. Οὐδαμῶς.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος ἐστιάσεσθαι μὴ μαγειρικοῦ ὄντος, σκευαζομένης θοίνης, ἀκυροτέρα ἢ κρίσις τῆς τοῦ ὀψοποιοῦ περὶ τῆς ἐσομένης ἡδονῆς. περὶ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ ἤδη ὄντος ἐκάστῳ ἡδέος ἢ γεγυρόστος μὴδὲν πω τῷ λόγῳ διαμαχώμεθα, ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος ἐκάστῳ καὶ δόξειν καὶ ἔσεσθαι πότερον αὐτὸς αὐτῷ ἄριστος κριτῆς, ἢ σύ, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, τό γε περὶ λόγους πιθανὸν ἐκάστῳ ἡμῶν ἐσόμενον εἰς δικαστήριον βέλτιον ἂν προδοξάσαις ἢ τῶν ιδιωτῶν ὅστισοῦν;

Surely Protagoras himself professed to be a better prophet than those whom he taught, of the probable effect of a rhetorical argument.

ΘΕΟ. Καὶ μάλα, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦτό γε σφόδρα ὑπισχνεῖτο πάντων διαφέρειν αὐτός.

ΣΩ. Νῆ Δία, ὦ μέλε· ἢ οὐδεὶς γ' ἂν αὐτῷ διε-

4. ἀναρμόστου . . ἐσομένου] The neuter is used without the article here, because the question refers to a particular case.

9. Here, as in the Gorgias, (463, 4) cookery prepares the way for rhetoric. Cp. supr. 175 D. Even ὀψοποιική, however, is not an ἀτεχνος τριβή if it can foretell consequences.

13. μὴδὲν πω τῷ λόγῳ διαμαχώμεθα] The certainty of present impressions is afterwards swept away together with the doctrine of motion, infr. 182. And the relation of present to past impressions

is further discussed under the guise of a new inquiry, 191 foll. (See especially the word *μνημείον*.)

15. τό γε περὶ λόγους πιθανόν] A further homethrust at Protagoras, of a different order from his own *ἡνεῖς* supr. 166 C.

16. ἐκάστῳ ἡμῶν ἐσόμενον εἰς δικαστήριον] 'That which each of us will find persuasive to be spoken in court.' 'Each of us' includes not only those who are to hear, but the man who is to speak the speech in court.

21. ὦ μέλε] This comic ad-

179. λέγεται διδοὺς πολὺ ἀργύριον, εἰ *δὴ τοὺς συνόντας
ἔπειθεν ὅτι καὶ τὸ μέλλον ἔσεσθαι τε καὶ δόξειν οὔτε

dress, nowhere else used by Plato, marks Socrates' exquisite enjoyment of the humour of the situation.

1. εἰ *δῆ] The MSS. have all εἰ μὴ. Heindorf corrects this to εἴ πη, and gives the following note:—Profecto in futurarum quoque rerum cognitione omnibus præcellere se Protagoras profitebatur, aut nemo ipsi magnam doctrinæ mercedem solvisset, si quo modo persuasisset discipulis, etiam de futuris rebus neque vatem neque alium quemquam melius posse judicare, quam ipsum sibi unumquemque. V. ad Gorg. § 75. 47. Platonis autem sententiam restituimus unius litterulæ mutatione. Quippe vulgo scriptum εἰ μὴ τοὺς συν., unde contrarius prorsus et absurdus sensus efficitur. Quam scripturam nequis tuendam arbitretur verbo αὐτός ad Protagoram trahendo et αὐτῶ mutando in αὐτῷ (sc. τῷ συνόντι), manifesta h. l. est superiorum verborum πότερον αὐτὸς αὐτῶ ἄριστος κριτής repetitio, neque tum ferri posset hoc αὐτῶ: adeo id moleste redundaret. Idem vitium insedit Phileb. 34 C: "ἵνα μὴ τὴν ψυχῆς ἡδονὴν χωρὶς σώματος ὅτι μάλιστα καὶ ἐναργέστατα λάβοιμεν. Corr. ἵνα πη, et Protog. 331 D: Καὶ γὰρ ὅτι οὖν ὄφου ἄμην ἄμην προσέεικε. τὸ γὰρ λευκὸν τῷ μέλανι ἔστιν ὃ μὴ (l. ὅπη) προσέεικε καὶ τὸ σκληρὸν τὸ μαλακῶ."

This reasoning is in the main correct. But δῆ, which is the received correction of Phil. l. c., seems more forcible here than πη, which has no

particular aptness in this passage. 'If it had really been his wont to persuade them of that which has been now suggested.' Cp. 166 C: Εἰ δὴ ὀνομάτων γε . . . : alib. The corruption probably originated in the slightly obscure reference of αὐτὸς αὐτῶ, or perhaps simply from the neighbourhood of Νῆ (written ρῆ). [Schanz also, it would seem independently, suggests εἰ δῆ.]

Schleiermacher solved the difficulty by omitting αὐτῶ (which, as H. Schmidt observes, might be suggested to an emendator by πότερον αὐτὸς αὐτῶ, supr. 178 E), and referring αὐτὸς to Protagoras. But this destroys the force of καί, and the question is not between one oracle and another, but between the opinion of the master and of the common individual. For αὐτῶ referring to an indefinite subject cp. Apol. 39 D: Οὐ γὰρ ἐστ' αὐτῆ ἢ ἀπαλλαγῆ οὔτε πάνυ δυνατῆ οὔτε καλή, ἀλλ' ἐκείνη καὶ καλλίστη καὶ ῥάστη, μὴ τοὺς ἄλλους κολούειν, ἀλλ' ἑαυτὸν παρασκευάζειν ὅπως ἔσται ὡς βέλτιστος. For the change from plural to singular, which has been elsewhere illustrated, cp. esp. Rep. 1. 344 B C.

The μάντις is introduced as being ἐπιστήμων of the future generally, just as the physician is of future health or sickness, the musician of future harmony, etc. τις ἄλλος points distantly at Protagoras himself, and his position as the prophet of the school is hinted at. Cp. supr. 162 A: Ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ τῆς βύβλου ἐφθέξατο,

μάντις οὔτε τις ἄλλος ἄμεινον κρίνειεν ἂν ἢ αὐτὸς p. 179:
αὐτῷ.

ΘΕΟ. Ἀληθέστατα.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ αἱ νομοθεσίαι καὶ τὸ ὠφέλιμον
5 περὶ τὸ μέλλον ἐστί, καὶ πᾶς ἂν ὁμολογοῖ νομοθετου-
μένην πόλιν πολλάκις ἀνάγκην εἶναι τοῦ ὠφελιμωτά-
του ἀποτυγχάνειν;

ΘΕΟ. Μάλα γε.

ΣΩ. Μετρίως ἄρα ἡμῖν πρὸς τὸν διδάσκαλόν σου
10 εἰρήσεται, ὅτι ἀνάγκη αὐτῷ ὁμολογεῖν σοφώτερόν τε β
ἄλλον ἄλλου εἶναι καὶ τὸν μὲν τοιοῦτον μέτρον εἶναι,
ἐμοὶ δὲ τῷ ἀνεπιστήμονι μηδὲ ὅπωςτιοῦν ἀνάγκην
εἶναι μέτρῳ γίνεσθαι, ὡς ἄρτι με ἠνάγκαζεν ὁ ὑπὲρ
ἐκείνου λόγος, εἴτ' ἐβουλόμην εἶτε μὴ, τοιοῦτον εἶναι.

15 ΘΕΟ. Ἐκείνη μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, μάλιστα
ἀλίσκεσθαι ὁ λόγος, ἀλίσκόμενος καὶ ταύτη, ἣ τὰς
τῶν ἄλλων δόξας κυρίας ποιεῖ, αὐται δὲ ἐφάνησαν
τοὺς ἐκείνου λόγους οὐδαμῇ ἀληθεῖς ἠγούμεναι.

ΣΩ. Πολλαχῆ, ὦ Θεόδωρε, καὶ ἄλλη ἂν τό γε ο
20 τοιοῦτον ἀλοίη, μὴ πᾶσαν παντὸς ἀληθῆ δόξαν εἶναι.

H. Schmidt remarks that the descriptive imperfects are continued from *ὑπισχνείτο* supr.

4. αἱ νομοθεσίαι καὶ τὸ ὠφέλιμον] 'Legislation and expediency' (which is the principle of legislation).

5. πᾶς ἂν ὁμολογοῖ] An appeal to common sense like supr. 171 D: 'Ὁμολογεῖν ἂν τοῦτό γε ὄντιοῦν. Thus we return to the chief statement, which has been reinforced with the additional argument beginning with Ἔτι τοῖνυν, supr. 178 A.

Arist. Met. II. 1063 a: Τούτου δ' ὄντος τοιοῦτου, τοὺς ἐτέρους μὲν ὑποληπτέον μέτρον εἶναι, τοὺς

δ' ἐτέρους οὐχ ὑποληπτέον.

12. τῷ ἀνεπιστήμονι] Supr. 150 C.

13. ὡς ἄρτι] Supr. 167 D.

15. Ἐκείνη . . . ταύτη] The position which Theodorus has previously accepted is nearer and more familiar to him than that to which he points as still in the hands of Socrates. Hence the use of the demonstratives.

16. καὶ ταύτη] 171 foll.

20. μὴ] Cp. supr. 166 C. τὸ τοιοῦτον is either (1) the theory, or (2) (as cognate subject of ἀλοίη) the refutation of the theory.

And it is acknowledged that a state must often fail in its legislation, which regards the future. Therefore one man is wiser than another, and not every man, but the wise man, is the measure of things.

On this ground, then, the theory cannot stand. And there are other

179. περὶ δὲ τὸ παρὸν ἐκάστῳ πάθος, ἐξ ὧν αἱ αἰσθήσεις
καὶ αἱ κατὰ ταύτας δόξαι γίνονται, χαλεπότερον
ἐλεῖν ὡς οὐκ ἀληθεῖς. ἴσως δὲ οὐδὲν λέγω· ἀνάλωτοι
γάρ, εἰ ἔτυχον, εἰσὶ, καὶ οἱ φάσκοντες αὐτὰς ἐναργεῖς
τε εἶναι καὶ ἐπιστήμας τάχα ἂν ὄντα λέγοιεν, καὶ 5
Θεαίτητος ὅδε οὐκ ἀπὸ σκοποῦ εἶρηκεν αἴσθησιν καὶ
ἐπιστήμην ταυτὸν θέμενος. προσιτέον οὖν ἐγγυτέρω,
D ὡς ὁ ὑπὲρ Πρωταγόρου λόγος ἐπέταττε, καὶ σκεπτέον

points where it is easily assailable. But it is more difficult to attack the main position, viz. that the present sensible impression is always true.

1. περὶ δὲ τὸ παρὸν, κ.τ.λ.] This was the point reserved above, 178 D E: Περὶ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ ἦδη ὄντος, κ.τ.λ. For the change from singular to plural cp. Rep. 2. 373 E: Πολέμου . . . ἐξ ὧν.

ἐξ ὧν] 'The momentary effect produced on each man, from which arise the sensations, and the beliefs which are in accordance with them.' Vid. 156 D E; and note the incipient distinction between αἴσθησις and δόξα. καὶ . . . δόξαι is added because we are now directly engaged with Protagoras, who said τὸ δοκοῦν ἐκάστῳ εἶναι, or rather with those disciples of his who support his theory on the Heraclitean principle. πάθος in this sense appears to have been a technical term of the Cyrenaic school. Cp. Sext. Emp. adv. Math. 191: Φάσιν οὖν οἱ Κυρηναῖκοι κριτήρια εἶναι τὰ πάθη καὶ μόνα καταλαμβάνεσθαι καὶ ἀδιάψευστα τυγχάνειν, κ.τ.λ. But we may observe that Plato here, as elsewhere, distinguishes the physical impression from the sensation itself.

5. ὄντα] Ast conjectured τὰ ὄντα, but see above, 178 B: Ἄληθῆ τε οἶεται αὐτῷ καὶ ὄντα.

6. οὐκ ἀπὸ σκοποῦ εἶρηκεν] Hom. Odys. 11. 344: ὦ φίλοι, οὐ μὲν ἦμιν ἀπὸ σκοποῦ οὐδ' ἀπὸ δόξης | μυθεῖται βασιλεία περίφρων.

8. ὡς . . . ἐπέταττε] Supr. 166 C, 168 B. In the previous section Socrates was dealing directly with Protagoras. He now goes still more closely to work by grappling with the principle on which the theory of Protagoras is grounded by his disciples, especially by those who are also followers of Heraclitus. We have already answered him (supr. A) in his own person, but we have not quite done with him (infr. 183 B) until the Heraclitean 'flux' has been finally disposed of.

σκεπτέον . . . διακρούοντα] Soph. 246 B: Τοιγαροῦν οἱ πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἀμφισβητοῦντες μάλα εὐλαβῶς ἄνωθεν ἐξ ἀοράτου ποθὲν ἀμύνονται, νοητὰ ἅττα καὶ ἀσώματα εἶδη βιαζόμενοι τὴν ἀληθινὴν οὐσίαν εἶναι· τὰ δὲ ἐκείνων σώματα καὶ τὴν λεγομένην ὑπ' αὐτῶν ἀληθειαν κατὰ σμικρὰ διαθραύοντες ἐν τοῖς λόγοις γένεσιν ἀντ' οὐσίας φερομένην τινὰ προσαγορεύουσιν. ἐν μέσῳ δὲ περὶ ταῦτα ἄπλετος ἀμφοτέρων μάχη τις, ᾧ Θεαίτητε, αἰεὶ ξυνέστηκεν. This combat is somewhat differently de-

Perhaps this is impregnable, but let us approach, and try whether its foundation in the doctrine of motion is secure.

I. δ. Criticism of the principle. All is motion.

Final rejection of the doctrine of sense.

τὴν φερομένην ταύτην οὐσίαν διακρούοντα, εἴτε ὑγιᾶς εἴτε σαθρὸν φθέγγεται. μάχη δ' οὖν περὶ αὐτῆς οὐ φαύλη οὐδ' ὀλίγοις γέγονεν.

ΘΕΟ. Πολλοῦ καὶ δεῖ φαύλη εἶναι, ἀλλὰ περὶ
5 μὲν τὴν Ἰωνίαν καὶ ἐπιδίδωσι πάμπολυ. οἱ γὰρ τοῦ
Ἑρακλείτου ἐταῖροι χορηγοῦσι τούτου τοῦ λόγου
μάλα ἐρρωμένως.

ΣΩ. Τῷ τοι, ὦ φίλε Θεόδωρε, μᾶλλον σκεπτέον·
καὶ ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ὥσπερ αὐτοὶ ὑποτείνονται. E

10 ΘΕΟ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. καὶ γάρ, ὦ Σώκρατες,
περὶ τούτων τῶν Ἑρακλειτείων, ἢ ὥσπερ σὺ λέγεις

scribed in the present passage.

1. τὴν φερομένην . . . οὐσίαν] ταύτην refers to the conclusion in 160 C and the preceding argument from 156 A onwards.

διακρούοντα] (ἀκούοντα Bodl.) Schol.: Ἐκ μεταφορᾶς τῶν διακωδωνούντων τὰ κεράμια, εἰ ἀκεραία εἰσιν. Cp. Phileb. 55 C: Γενναίως δέ, εἴ πη σαθρὸν ἔχει, πάν περικρούωμεν. Compare the English expression, 'As sound as a bell.'

5. ἐπιδίδωσι πάμπολυ] 'Gains in importance,' 'is waged with increasing energy.'

6. χορηγοῦσι] Cp. Demetr. Byz. ap. Athen. 295. ed. Schw.: Ἐκάλουν δὲ καὶ χορηγούς, ὡς φησιν ὁ Βυζάντιος Δημήτριος, οὐχ ὥσπερ νῦν τοὺς μισθουμένους τοὺς χορούς, ἀλλὰ τοὺς καθηγουμένους τοῦ χοροῦ, καθάπερ τοῦνομα σημαίνει.

It would appear from this that the Heracliteans of Ephesus upheld a doctrine akin to that of the Cyrenaics.

τούτου τοῦ λόγου] λόγος is here almost equivalent to

'school of thought.' Cp. supr. τοὺς τοῦ ἡμετέρου χοροῦ, κ. τ. λ., infr. τῶν ἐπεισχωμαζόντων λόγων.

8. Τῷ τοι] 'We are the more bound to consider the question, and that in the light of its first principle, even as they present it to us in the discussion.' Gorg. 448 E: Ὡσπερ σοι τὰ ἔμπροσθεν ὑπετίνατο Χαιρεφῶν. (καὶ ἐξ ἀρχῆς is the Bodleian reading, ἐξ ἀρχῆς T. The words ἢ τοιαῦτα σκέψις . . μᾶλλον ἐξ ἀρχῆς εἴη ἂν occur in Lach. 189 E.

9. ὥσπερ αὐτοὶ ὑποτείνονται] Viz. in referring everything to a first principle, whether of fire or motion.

11. τῶν Ἑρακλειτείων] Sc. δογμάτων. περὶ τούτων, κ. τ. λ. depends verbally partly on διαλεχθῆναι, partly on ἔμπειροι, but really upon the notion 'there is no discussion possible.' Cp. infr. 180 C: Ὡπερ ἦα ἐρών. If the genitives were masculine, and out of construction, the use of ἔμπειροι without an object would be too abrupt. Compare, however, παρὰ μὲν τούτων, below.

p. 179. Ὁμηρείων, καὶ ἔτι παλαιότερων, αὐτοῖς μὲν τοῖς περὶ τὴν Ἐφεσον, ὅσοι προσποιῦνται ἔμπειροι [εἶναι], οὐδὲν μᾶλλον οἶόν τε διαλεχθῆναι ἢ τοῖς οἰστρώσιν. ἀτεχνῶς γὰρ κατὰ τὰ συγγράμματα φέρονται, τὸ δ'

Great has been the conflict and many the combatants on either side. The

ὡσπερ σὺ λέγεις] 152 C. Cp. Cratyl. 439 C: Φαίνονται γὰρ ἔμοιγε καὶ αὐτοὶ οὕτω διανοηθῆναι.

1. Ὁμηρείων] Cp. 152 C. ἔτι παλαιότερων] 'Orpheum intelligit: conf. Cratyl. § 41. (402 B.)' Heind.

αὐτοῖς μὲν] μὲν points to the opposition which comes out distinctly afterwards (180 C) between the men and their doctrine. There is no conversing with the men; we must examine their doctrine on our own account.

2. [εἶναι] Omitted in most MSS. including B T.

3. τοῖς οἰστρώσιν] 'With men in frenzy.'

4. ἀτεχνῶς γάρ] 'For, in true accordance with their master's writings, they are ever in motion; but as for dwelling upon an argument or question, and quietly asking and answering in turn, they are absolutely without the power of doing so; or rather they possess in a surpassing degree the most perfect absence of all quietness, even in the minutest respect.'

More literally, (1) 'It is beyond everything, how utterly incapable they are of rest even in the most trifling respect.' Cp. Ar. Eth. N. 4. 1. § 39: Ὑπερβολῆς . . . τοῦ μηδεὶ ἀν διδόναι. Infr. 192 C.

The doubtful point in this rendering of the last words is πρὸς τὸ μηδὲ σμικρόν = 'in respect of what is less than

little.' For πρὸς compare Soph. 248 C: Ὅταν τῷ παρῆ ἢ τοῦ πάσχειν ἢ δρᾶν καὶ πρὸς τὸ σμικρότατον δύναμις. And for μηδὲ σμικρόν cp. Phileb. 60 C: Φρόνησιν . . . ἡδονῆς μηδὲ τὸ σμικρότατον ἔχουσαν. See also Phædo, 93 B: Ὅσπερ καὶ κατὰ τὸ σμικρότατον . . . ἐπὶ πλέον . . . ἢ ἐπ' ἔλαττον . . . αὐτὸ τοῦτο εἶναι.

Here it is assumed that by a stretch of hyperbole, made possible by the negative sentence, μηδὲ σμικρόν is substituted for σμικρότατον. Cp. ἦττον . . . ἢ τὸ μηδέν, supr. There is a similar emphasis, though with less complexity, in Symp. 192 C: Οὐκ ἐθέλουτες, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, χωρίζεσθαι ἀλλήλων οὐδὲ σμικρόν χρόνον . . . (where οὐδὲ σμικρόν χρόνον might be rendered 'any time at all'). ὑπερβάλλει is here taken as impersonal, and τό, κ.τ.λ. as epexegetic. The use of μή (not οὐκ) is occasioned by the hypothetical turn = οὐδ' εἰ μηδὲ σμικρόν εἴη. The genitive ἡσυχίας is postponed.

(2) Mr. Riddell, in his Digest of Idioms, § 246, observes that 'to τὸ οὐδ' οὐδέν must be supplied ἐνεῖναι: i. e. he would render 'the utter absence of it is extraordinary, in regard of the entire absence of rest in the men even in the least particular.' But this is surely too harsh.

(3) H. Schmidt (Fleckeis. Jahrb. 103. 806) suspects the whole sentence (μᾶλλον . . . ἡσυχίας) as interpolated.

friends of
Heraclitus
in Ionia
defend the
doctrine of
motion
with all
their might.

But we
must take
their theory
into our
own hands
to test it.
For the
men are in
a flux, and
offer us no
hold for ar-
gument.

ἐπιμείναι ἐπὶ λόγῳ καὶ ἐρωτήματι καὶ ἡσυχίῳς ἐν p. 179.
μέρει ἀποκρίνασθαι καὶ ἐρέσθαι ἦττον αὐτοῖς ἐν ἡ τὸ p. 180.
μηδέν· μᾶλλον δὲ ὑπερβάλλει τὸ οὐδ' οὐδὲν πρὸς τὸ
μηδὲ σμικρὸν ἐνεῖναι τοῖς ἀνδράσιν ἡσυχίας· ἀλλ' ἄν
5 τινά τι ἔρη, ὥσπερ ἐκ φαρέτρας ῥηματίσκια αἰνιγμα-
τώδη ἀνασπῶντες ἀποτοξεύουσι, κἂν τούτου ζητῆς
λόγον λαβεῖν, τί εἶρηκεν, ἐτέρῳ πεπλήξει καινῶς
μετωνομασμένῳ, περανεῖς δὲ οὐδέποτε οὐδὲν πρὸς
οὐδένα αὐτῶν· οὐδέ γε ἐκείνοι αὐτοὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους,
10 ἀλλ' εὐ πάνυ φυλάττουσι τὸ μηδὲν βέβαιον εἶναι
μήτ' ἐν λόγῳ μήτ' ἐν ταῖς αὐτῶν ψυχαῖς, ἡγούμενοι, B
ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, αὐτὸ στάσιμον εἶναι· τούτῳ δὲ πάνυ
πολεμοῦσι, καὶ καθ' ὅσον δύνανται πανταχόθεν ἐκ-
βάλλουσιν.

15 ΣΩ. Ἰσως, ὦ Θεόδωρε, τοὺς ἀνδρας μαχομένους
εἴωρακας, εἰρηνεύουσι δὲ οὐ συγγέγονας. οὐ γάρ σοι

The point in ὑπερβάλλει is, not that οὐδ' οὐδὲν is a stronger expression than μηδέν (it should be compared with ἦττον . . . ἡ τὸ μηδέν), but (a) the negation is put more strongly by being affirmed; (b) ὑπερβάλλει assists the climax, as being a stronger word than any in the former clause; and, (c) if the first rendering is correct, what was at first spoken of only with reference to argument, is now asserted generally (πρὸς τὸ μηδὲ σμικρὸν). Cp. inf. Μήτ' ἐν λόγῳ μήτ' ἐν ταῖς αὐτῶν ψυχαῖς.

5. ὥσπερ ἐκ φαρέτρας, κ.τ.λ.] Cp. Protag. 342 D (of the Spartans): Τὰ μὲν πολλὰ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις εὐρήσει αὐτὸν φαῦλόν τινα φανόμενον, ἔπειτα, ὅπου ἂν τύχη τῶν λεγομένων, ἐνέβαλε ῥῆμα βραχὺ καὶ συνεστραμμένον, ὥσπερ δειῶς ἀκοντιστής.

ῥηματίσκια . . . ἀποτοξεύουσι] 'Plucking up as from a quiver sayings brief and dark, they let them fly at you.'

6. ἀνασπῶντες] Cp. Soph. Aj. 302: Δόγους ἀνέσπα.

τούτου] Sc. τοῦ ῥηματισκίου.

7. τί εἶρηκεν] Sc. τὸ ῥηματίσκιον.

καινῶς μετωνομασμένῳ] 'Of words new-fangled ill,' 'of terms strangely twisted to an unheard-of sense.' Compare the humorous simile in Protag. 329 A: Ὡσπερ τὰ χαλκεία, κ.τ.λ.

10. βέβαιον . . . στάσιμον] 'Fixed or settled—stationary. εἶναι] γενέσθαι is purposely avoided.

12. αὐτό] Sc. τὸ βέβαιον.

16. οὐ γάρ σοι ἐταῖροί εἰσιν] The dislike of a geometrician to the Heraclitean 'method' is not unnatural. And it is unmistakably evident here

30. *ἐταῖροι εἰσιν. ἀλλ', οἶμαι, τὰ τοιαῦτα τοῖς μαθηταῖς ἐπὶ σχολῆς φράζουσιν, οὓς ἂν βούλωνται ὁμοίους αὐτοῖς ποιῆσαι.*

ΘΕΟ. Ποίοις μαθηταῖς, ὧ δαιμόνιε; οὐδὲ γίγνεται
 5 τῶν τοιούτων ἕτερος ἑτέρου μαθητῆς, ἀλλ' αὐτόματοι 5
 ἀναφύονται, ὁπόθεν ἂν τύχη ἕκαστος αὐτῶν ἐνθου-
 σιάσας, καὶ τὸν ἕτερον ὁ ἕτερος οὐδὲν ἠγχείται εἰδέναι.
 παρὰ μὲν οὖν τούτων, ὅπερ ἦα ἐρῶν, οὐκ ἂν ποτε
 λάβοις λόγον οὔτε ἐκόντων οὔτε ἀκόντων. αὐτοὺς δὲ
 δεῖ παραλαβόντας ὥσπερ πρόβλημα ἐπισκοπεῖσθαι. 10

that Plato has used a 'tour de force' in bringing together the Heracliteans and the 'disciples of Protagoras.'

1. τὰ τοιαῦτα] Sc. *εἰρημικά* (Heindorf) or, rather, τὰ βέβαια ἐν τοῖς λόγοις.

4. Ποίοις μαθηταῖς] 'Disciples forsooth!' Rep. I. 330 B: Ποῖ ἑπεκτησάμην, ὦ Σώκρατες; alib.

5. αὐτόματοι ἀναφύονται] 'They spring up unbidden, wherever each happens to have caught the *afflatus*.'

6. ὁπόθεν ἂν τύχη . . ἐνθουσιάζας] Contrast with this Hegel, G. d. Ph. ed. 1840, p. 55: 'It is the very spirit of this whole recital, that the more developed Philosophy of a later age, is really the product of the previous labours of the thinking mind: that it is required and determined by these earlier views, and has not sprung of itself independently from the ground.' ('Nicht isolirt für sich aus dem Boden gewachsen ist.') For the expression αὐτόματοι ἀναφύονται cp. Rep. 7. 520 B: Αὐτόματοι γὰρ ἐμφύονται ἀκούσης τῆς ἐν ἐκάστῃ πολιτείας. As in supr. 172 foll. we had a description of the

man corresponding to Protagoras' theory, so here we have the men of Heraclitus. The wildness and the enthusiasm, at once speculative and irrational, are Oriental rather than Greek, and are probably due rather to the soil than to the germ. Comparatively little of this is to be found in Heraclitus himself, although for their abrupt quaintness his sayings might be called ῥηματίσκια αἰνιγματώδη.

8. οὐκ ἂν ποτε λάβοις λόγον] Ar. Met. 3. 4. 1006 a: Γελοῖον τὸ ζητεῖν λόγον πρὸς τὸν μηθενὸς ἔχοντα λόγον, ἢ μὴ ἔχει· ὁμοίως γὰρ φντῶ ὁ τοιοῦτος ἢ τοιοῦτος ἦδη. 10. 1063 a: Μηθὲν γὰρ τιθέντες ἀναρουῖσι τὸ διαλέγεσθαι καὶ ὄλως λόγον, ὥστε πρὸς μὲν τοὺς τοιοῦτους οὐκ ἔστι λόγος.

9. αὐτοὺς δὲ δεῖ παραλαβόντας] 'But we must take the doctrine out of their hands, and con it over by ourselves like a geometrical theorem.' Theodorus speaks as a mathematician. The object of παραλαβόντας is vague; neither λόγον in the sense just used, nor ἀρχήν; but τὰ Ἡρακλείτεια ταῦτα, ἢ τι τοιοῦτον.

The question now before us has come down from ancient times. But wise men formerly veiled their meaning from the multitude in poetry, not as these now, who make no secret of their views, and seek to win universal suffrage for them, and to convert men from the foolishness of common sense.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μετρίως γε λέγεις. τό γε δὴ πρόβλημα p. 180.
 ἄλλο τι παρειλήφαμεν παρὰ μὲν τῶν ἀρχαίων μετὰ
 ποιήσεως ἐπικρυπτομένων τοὺς πολλούς, ὡς ἡ γένεσις D
 τῶν ἄλλων πάντων Ὀκεανός τε καὶ Τηθύς ρεύματα
 5 τυγχάνει καὶ οὐδὲν ἔστηκε, παρὰ δὲ τῶν ὑστέρων, ἅτε
 σοφωτέρων, ἀναφανδὸν ἀποδεικνυμένων, ἵνα καὶ οἱ
 σκυτοτόμοι αὐτῶν τὴν σοφίαν μάθωσιν ἀκούσαντες
 καὶ παύσωνται ἡλιθίως οἰόμενοι τὰ μὲν εἶσθαι, τὰ
 δὲ κινεῖσθαι τῶν ὄντων, μαθόντες δ' ὅτι πάντα κινεῖ-
 10 ται τιμῶσιν αὐτούς; ὀλίγου δὲ ἐπελαθόμεν, ὧς Θεό-
 δωρε, ὅτι ἄλλοι αὖ τὰναντία τούτοις ἀπεφήναντο, Οἶον
 ἀκίνητον †τελέθει, τῷ πάντι † ὄνομ' εἶναι, καὶ ἄλλα ὅσα E
 Μέλισσοί τε καὶ Παρμενίδαι ἐναντιούμενοι πᾶσι τού-
 τοις διῶσχυρίζονται, ὡς ἔν τε πάντα ἐστὶ καὶ ἔστηκεν

1. τό γε δὴ πρόβλημα] 'Well, the theorem, as you call it.' Compare with the repetition of γε the double use of γάρ, ἀλλά, κ.τ.λ.

2. παρειλήφαμεν . . . ἀποδεικνυμένων] 'The doctrine comes to us from ancient and from modern sources. The ancients indeed veiled their meaning from the multitude and said, etc.; but the moderns openly declare their meaning.' See H. Schmidt, Krit. Comment., p. 509.

4. ρεύματα τυγχάνει] Sc. ὄντα, which is purposely (or instinctively) omitted. Ὀκεανός τε καὶ Τηθύς are in apposition with ἡ γένεσις, and ρεύματα is predicate. ὡς, etc. expresses not what the poets said, but what they meant, depending partly on παρειλήφαμεν.

7. σκυτοτόμοι] I. e. The meanest artificers. Cp. Prot. 324 C: Ὡς μὲν . . . εἰκότως

ἀποδέχονται . . . καὶ χαλκῆως καὶ σκυτοτόμον συμβουλευόντος τὰ πολιτικά: alib.

10. τιμῶσιν αὐτούς] These words merely satirize the φιλοτιμία of the Sophist. H. Schmidt's remark that the multitude are predisposed to extol a doctrine which reflects the arbitrariness of their life, introduces a subtlety which is not present in the text.

11. Οἶον] MSS. οἶον. But the words of Simplicius in Aristot. Phys. f. 7. a. are decisive: 'Ἀκίνητον αὐτὸ ἀνυμνεῖ καὶ μόνον ὡς πάντων ἐξηρήμενον.

12. †τελέθει, τῷ παντί†] So all the MSS. Buttm. conjectured τ' ἔμναι τῷ πάντι. This is gathered from the quotations of Simplicius, and is probably right. Cobet, relying on the same source, changes οἶον to οὐλον.

14. ἔστηκεν αὐτὸ ἐν αὐτῷ] 'All Being is One, and standeth self-contained, not having any space in which it moves.'

- p. 180. αὐτὸ ἐν αὐτῷ, οὐκ ἔχον χώραν ἐν ἧ κινεῖται. Τούτοις οὖν, ὧ ἑταίρε, πᾶσι τί χρησόμεθα; κατὰ σμικρὸν γὰρ προΐοντες λελήθαμεν ἀμφοτέρων εἰς τὸ μέσον πεπτωκότες, καὶ ἂν μὴ πη ἀμυνόμενοι διαφύγωμεν,
- p. 181. δίκην δώσομεν ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν ταῖς παλαιστραῖς διὰ 5 γραμμῆς παίζοντες, ὅταν ὑπ' ἀμφοτέρων ληφθέντες ἔλκωνται εἰς τὰναντία. δοκεῖ οὖν μοι τοὺς ἐτέρους

Their vehemence almost makes us forget the oppo-

The nearest approach to this latter assertion in the fragments of Parmenides is in the lines—

(78-85 Mullach) Οὐδὲ διαιρετὸν ἔστιν, ἐπεὶ πᾶν ἔστιν ὅμοιον, | οὐδὲ τι τῇ μᾶλλον τό κεν εἴργοι μιν ξυνέχεσθαι, | οὐδέ τι χειρότερον· πᾶν δὲ πλεόν ἔστιν ἕντος. | τῷ ξυνεχές πᾶν ἔστιν, ἐὼν γὰρ ἕντι πελάζει. | Αὐτὰρ ἀκίνητον μεγάλων ἐν πείρασι δεσμῶν | ἔστιν, ἀναρχόν, ἀπανστον, ἐπεὶ γένεσις καὶ ὀλεθρὸς | τῆλε μάλ' ἐπλάγχθησαν, ἀπωσε δὲ πίστις ἀληθῆς. | ταῦτόν δ' ἐν τωὺτῷ τε μένον καθ' ἑαυτὸ τε κείται.

He asserts, however, that Being is not without boundaries, else it would be imperfect.

Zeno appears to have said, that being was neither with nor without boundaries. Cp. Arist. de Xenoph. Gorg. et Melisso, c. 3: 'Αἰδίων δὲ ὄντα καὶ ἕνα καὶ σφαιροειδῆ, οὐτ' ἀπειρον, οὔτε πεπερασθαι· Ἄπειρον γὰρ τὸ μὴ εἶναι . . . τὸ δὲ ἐν οὔτε τῷ οὐκ ὄντι οὔτε τοῖς πόλλοις ὁμοιοῦσθαι. Ἐν γὰρ οὐκ ἔχει πρὸς ὃ τι περανεῖ.

'Dasz hier Melissus als Vertreter der Eleatischen Schule genannt wird, hat seine Grund darin, dasz der Beweis . . . ἔστηκεν αὐτὸ ἐν αὐτῷ οὐκ ἔχον χώραν ἐν ἧ κινεῖται nach der von Heindorf angezogenen Stelle Aristot. Phys. 4, 6, dem Me-

lissus angehört.' H. Schmidt.

The Eleatics did not abstract the idea of Being from that of extension, although its fulness destroyed the idea of space. It was here that the Atomists joined issue with them. To Leucippus and Democritus the relations of body were not symbolical but real. They felt that they must account for motion. Hence their assertion of the existence of empty space, τὸ κενόν, or, in other words, τὸ μὴ ὄν in the material sense.

3. εἰς τὸ μέσον] Viz. by having partly discarded and partly retained the principle, ἐπιστήμη αἰσθησις, . . . τὸν Πρωταγόρου λόγον μὴ παντάσῃ λέγοντες.

5. δίκην δώσομεν] For the humour cp. Rep. 5. 474 A: Τῷ ὄντι τωθαζόμενος δώσεις δίκην.

διὰ γραμμῆς παίζοντες] A game, like our French and English, was called διελεκυστίδα.

7. δοκεῖ οὖν μοι] 'I think therefore we ought first to examine the one faction, to whom we first addressed ourselves, these wavering movers of unrest,' and if we find any truth in them, we will join our efforts with theirs to pull us to them, endeavouring to shake the others off. But if those who stand for the un-

sitefaction, who say that the One Being which fills all things doth not move.

We find ourselves on the dangerous middle ground between these armies. With which side shall we go? Shall we declare for the inviolable constitution of all things, or for the

πρότερον σκεπτέον, ἐφ' οὔσπερ ὠρμήσαμεν, τοὺς p. 181.
 ρέοντας. καὶ ἐὰν μὲν τι φαίνονται λέγοντες, συνέλ-
 ζομεν μετ' αὐτῶν ἡμᾶς αὐτούς, τοὺς ἐτέρους ἐκφυγεῖν
 πειρώμενοι. ἐὰν δὲ οἱ τοῦ ὅλου στασιῶται ἀληθέ-
 5 στερα λέγειν δοκῶσι, φευξόμεθα παρ' αὐτοὺς ἀπ' αὐ-
 τῶν τὰ ἀκίνητα κινούντων. ἀμφότεροι δ' ἂν φανῶσι B
 μηδὲν μέτριον λέγοντες, γελοῖοι ἐσόμεθα ἡγούμενοι
 ἡμᾶς μὲν τι λέγειν φαύλους ὄντας, παμπалаίους δὲ
 καὶ πασσόφους ἄνδρας ἀποδοδοκιμακότες. ὄρα οὖν,
 10 ὦ Θεόδωρε, εἰ λυσιτελεῖ εἰς τοσοῦτον προῖέναι κίν-
 δυνον.

ΘΕΟ. Οὐδὲν μὲν οὖν ἀνεκτόν, ὦ Σώκρατες, μὴ οὖ
 διασκέψασθαι τί λέγουσιν ἑκάτεροι τῶν ἀνδρῶν.

broken Whole of Being seem to speak more reasonably, we will desert to these again from the revolutionary violence of the movement party.'

1. τοὺς ρέοντας] 'The unstable philosophers.' ('The river-gods,' Jowett.) They are humorously identified with their principle. Vid. supr. ἀτεχνῶς γὰρ κατὰ τὰ συγγράμματα φέρονται. This way of taking ρέοντας—not as causative—is also confirmed by the parallel passage in the Cratylus, 439 C: Αὐτοὶ τε ὥσπερ εἷς τινα δῆλην ἐμπεσόντες κυκῶνται καὶ ἡμᾶς ἐφέλκόμενοι προσεμβάλλουσι. Socrates adopts the jest of Theodorus, supr. 180 B: Μηδὲν βέβαιον ἔαν . . . ἐν ταῖς αὐτῶν ψυχαῖς.

For a similar reference to a set of persons by an epithet cp. Phileb. 46 A: Οὐς εἵπομεν δυσχερεῖς. Soph. 248 C: Τὸ νῦν δὴ ῥηθὲν πρὸς τοὺς γηγενεῖς. Rep. 6. 488 A: Τὸ πάθος τῶν ἐπιεικεστάτων.

5. ἀπ' αὐτῶν] (ἀπ' αὐτῶν τῶν παρ' αὐτοὺς Bodl. Vat. Ven. Π. παρ' αὐτοὺς ἀπ' αὐτῶν T cett. Schleierm. corr.: αὐτῶν τῶν Bekk. But for the position of αὐτῶν cp. supr. 161 A, and note). We pass from the image of a game to that of a civil war, in which the Heracliteans are the 'movement,' or revolutionary, party. There is probably a slight play on the word στασιῶται, and certainly also on the phrase τὰ ἀκίνητα κινεῖν. For 'to move what may not be moved' was, as the scholiast indicates, a proverbial way of speaking of sacrilegious actions. See esp. Legg. 8. 842 E: Διὸς ὀρίον μὲν πρῶτος νόμος ὅδε εἰρήσθω· μὴ κινεῖτω γῆς ὄρια μηδεῖς . . . νομίσας τὸ τὰκίνητα κινεῖν ἀληθῶς τοῦτο εἶναι. Thuc. 8. 15: Τὰ τε χίλια τάλαντα . . . κινεῖν.

7. μηδὲν μέτριον] 'Nothing worthy of our reception.'

12. Οὐδὲν μὲν οὖν ἀνεκτόν] 'Nay, Socrates, we can by no

p. 181: ΣΩ. Σκεπτέον ἂν εἴη σοῦ γε οὕτω προθυμουμένου.
 Δοκεῖ οὖν μοι ἀρχὴ εἶναι τῆς σκέψεως κινήσεως πέρι,
 c ποῖόν τί ποτε ἄρα λέγοντες φασὶ τὰ πάντα κινεῖσθαι.
 βούλομαι δὲ λέγειν τὸ τοιόνδε. πότερον ἐν τι εἶδος
 αὐτῆς λέγουσιν ἢ ὥσπερ ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, δύο; μὴ μὲν- 5
 τοι μόνον ἐμοὶ δοκεῖτω, ἀλλὰ συμμέτεχε καὶ σύ, ἵνα
 κοινῇ πάσχωμεν, ἂν τι καὶ δέη. καί μοι λέγε· ἄρα
 κινεῖσθαι καλεῖς, ὅταν τι χώραν ἐκ χώρας μεταβάλλῃ
 ἢ καὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ στρέφῃται;

4 ΘΕΟ. Ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Τοῦτο μὲν τοίνυν ἐν ἔστω εἶδος. ὅταν δὲ ἢ
 d μὲν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, γηράσκη δέ, ἢ μέλαν ἐκ λευκοῦ ἢ
 σκληρὸν ἐκ μαλακοῦ γίγνηται, ἢ τινα ἄλλην ἀλλοίω-
 σιν ἀλλοιῶται, ἄρα οὐκ ἄξιον ἕτερον εἶδος φάναι κί-
 νήσεως;

ΘΕΟ. Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Ἀναγκαῖον μὲν οὖν. δύο δὲ λέγω τούτω εἶδη
 κινήσεως, ἀλλοίωσιν, τὴν δὲ † περιφοράν.

means endure to stop short of thoroughly examining the meaning of both sets of thinkers.' οὐδένις, of course, adverbial. Madvig's conjecture, ἀνετέον, had occurred to others. But the humour of the place, where Theodorus, who had been so backward, is now become so eager and ἀτεχνῶς φιλολόγος in the hands of Socrates, is more pointedly expressed by ἀνεκτόν, the MS. reading.

1. σοῦ γε] I. e. You, that were so reluctant to enter on the discussion. Cp. supr. 169 C: Οὐ μέντοι περαιτέρω γε ὦν προτίθεσαι οἷός τ' ἔσομαι παρασχεῖν ἑμαυτόν σοι.

2. ἀρχή] This is the predicate, the subject being contained in what follows. Hence

no article is required.

5. ἢ ὥσπερ ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, δύο.] Parm. 138 B: Κινούμενον γε ἢ φέροιστο ἢ ἀλλοιοῖτο ἂν αὐται γὰρ μόναι κινήσεις. No argument can be drawn from this about the comparative dates of the two dialogues. ἀλλοίωσις as yet includes αἵξεσις.

Aristot. Phys. Ausc. 8. 3. § 3: Πρὸς οὓς, καίπερ οὐ διορίζον-
 τας ποῖαν κίνησιν λέγουσιν ἢ πά-
 στας, οὐ χαλεπὸν ἀπαντῆσαι.

6. ἵνα κοινῇ πάσχωμεν] Socrates continues the notion of danger from supr. A B, and with his usual irony professes fear of τῶν τὰ ἀκίνητα κινούντων.

11. ὅταν δὲ ἢ μὲν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ] Cp. supr. 156 C D.

18. ἀλλοίωσιν, τὴν δὲ † περιφο-
 ράν] 'Coisl. τὴν μὲν ἀλλοίωσιν,

movement party? Let us examine the latter first, as we began with them.

Motion is their principle. Do they admit that motion is of two kinds, locomotion and change?

10

15

ΘΕΟ. Ὅρθως γε λέγων.

p. 181.

On their granting this, we ask, Do you mean that all things move in both these ways? And they must say, Yes; or else it will be as true to say that things stand still, as that they move.

ΣΩ. Τοῦτο τοίνυν οὕτω διελόμενοι διαλεγόμεθα ἤδη τοῖς τὰ πάντα φάσκουσι κινεῖσθαι καὶ ἐρωτῶμεν· πότερον πᾶν φατὲ ἀμφοτέρως κινεῖσθαι, φερόμενον
5 τε καὶ ἀλλοιούμενον, ἢ τὸ μὲν τι ἀμφοτέρως, τὸ δ' ἑτέρως;

ΘΕΟ. Ἀλλὰ μὰ Δί' ἔγωγε οὐκ ἔχω εἰπεῖν· οἶμαι δ' ἂν φάναι ἀμφοτέρως.

ΣΩ. Εἰ δέ γε μή, ὦ ἑταῖρε, κινούμενά τε *αὐτοῖς
10 καὶ ἐστῶτα φανέται, καὶ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ὀρθῶς ἕξει εἰπεῖν ὅτι κινεῖται τὰ πάντα ἢ ὅτι ἔστηκεν.

ΘΕΟ. Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐπειδὴ κινεῖσθαι αὐτὰ δεῖ, τὸ δὲ μὴ κινεῖσθαι μὴ ἐνεῖναι μηδενί, πάντα δὴ πᾶσαν κίνησιν
15 αἰὲ κινεῖται. p. 182.

τὴν δὲ περιφορᾶν—quod glossema sapit.' Stallb. Cp. Soph. 221 E, alib. It may be asked why circular motion should be chosen to represent *φορά*. The answer possibly is, that the revolution of the Heavens is conceived of as embracing all other kinds of motion. Cp. supr. ἕως μὲν ἡ περιφορὰ ἢ κινουμένη καὶ ὁ ἥλιος.

Perhaps also the révolution of the Heavens (or of the Sun) is symbolical of the Heraclitean cycle of elements. (Lassalle.) For *περιφορὰ* interchanged with *φορά* cp. Rep. 7. 528 A: Ἐν περιφορᾷ ἤδη ὄν στερεὸν λαβάντες . . . ἀστρονομίαν ἔλεγον, φορᾶν οὖσαν βάθους.

It must be admitted that *φορᾶν* would be more exact. But the compound is more rhythmical, and, as *περιφέρεσθαι* does not always mean 'to revolve,' it may be used

here for locomotion in general. See Tim. 70 B, Apol. 19 C, Rep. 3. 402 A-C.

2. διαλεγόμεθα ἤδη] Imagining them, for the sake of our argument, to be less impracticable. ὑποτιθέμενοι νομιμώτερον αὐτοῖς ἢ νῦν ἐθέλοντας ἂν ἀποκρίνασθαι. (Soph. 246 D.)

5. τὸ μὲν τι . . . τὸ δ'] Rep. 4. 436 C.

6. ἐτέρως] 'In one or other of these two ways.' Cp. Soph. 226 A: Οὐ τῇ ἐτέρᾳ ληπτέον.

9. κινούμενά τε *αὐτοῖς καὶ ἐστῶτα φανέται] Cp. Rep. 4. 436 D: Ὡς οἱ γε στρόβιλοι ὄλοι ἐστᾶσί τε ἅμα καὶ κινούνται. Most MSS. εἰαυτοῖς. For αὐτοῖς, 'They will find,' cp. supr. 170 E: Τί δὲ αὐτῷ Πρωταγόρᾳ, κ.τ.λ.

14. ἐνεῖναι] Almost all the MSS. have ἐν εἶναι. But the correction of the Bodl. MS. to ἐνεῖναι appears to be in an ancient hand.

p. 182. ΘΕΟ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Σκόπει δὴ μοι τόδε αὐτῶν· τῆς θερμότητος ἢ λευκότητος ἢ ὄπου οὖν γένεσιν οὐχ οὕτω πως ἐλέγομεν φάναι αὐτούς, φέρεσθαι ἕκαστον τούτων ἅμα αἰσθήσει μεταξὺ τοῦ ποιούντος τε καὶ πάσχοντος, καὶ τὸ μὲν 5 πάσχον *αἰσθανόμενον ἀλλ' οὐκ αἰσθησιν ἔτι γίγνεσθαι,

Let us now recall their theory of sensations and qualities, which were said to flit between the subject and the object.

2. Σκόπει δὴ μοι τόδε αὐτῶν] 'I would have you consider this point in them,' i. e. in their theory. Cp. 149 D: Ἄρ' οὖν ἔτι καὶ τόδε αὐτῶν ἤσθησαι;

3. οὕτω πως ἐλέγομεν] Supr. 156, 157, 159.

5. τὸ μὲν πάσχον *αἰσθανόμενον] The MS. reading αἰσθητόν is inconsistent with the context, and with the language used elsewhere in the dialogue. Buttman conjectured αἰσθητήν, to which Schleiermacher objected that τὸ πάσχον means the sensorium, and not the sentient subject. But the distinction between them is not clearly marked from the Protagorean point of view. Indeed the conception of a 'sensorium' nowhere appears, at least in this part of the dialogue. It is only in speaking of a particular sense that τὸ πάσχον means, for instance, the eye (157).

In 159 A it appears doubtful whether τὸ πάσχον means the tongue of Socrates, or more indefinitely the 'perceptient.' And even if τὸ πάσχον is limited to the organ of sense, there is no reason why αἰσθητής should not be used of this. (Cp. Xen. Mem. 1. 4. 5: Ἡ γλῶσσα γνώμων τούτων ἐνεργάσθη.)

The noun αἰσθητής appears to be suggested in 160 D

by the use of ἐπιστήμων just before. In the present place it might recur naturally, as it is in the manner of Plato to recall a train of thought by repeating some remarkable word. (Rep. 488 A: Οἱ ἐπιεικέστατοι. Supr. 180 C: Τό γε δὴ πρόβλημα.) To which it may be added, that there is a consciousness of technicality observable in the present passage. (ἴσως οὖν ἡ ποιότης ἅμα ἀλλόκοτόν τε φαίνεται ὄνομα, κ.τ.λ.) Apart from these considerations, the rareness of the word, which would be a strong argument in its favour if it had MS. authority, must be allowed to weigh against it as a conjectural reading. And it may also be urged, that the masculine gender of αἰσθητής would impair the effect of the passage, in which everything seems to be made, as far as possible, neuter and impersonal.

But Heindorf's emendation, αἰσθανόμενον, agrees perfectly with the context and with all that precedes (esp. supr. 159 E, 160 A), and it is quite possible that αἰσθητόν may have slipped in instead of it by an unconscious logical inversion on the part of the copyist. This conjecture is therefore adopted in the text.

6. ἔτι] I. e. when we carry

τὸ δὲ ποιοῦν ποιόν τι ἄλλ' οὐ ποιότητα; ἴσως οὖν ἢ p. 182.
 ποιότης ἅμα ἀλλόκοτόν τε φαίνεται ὄνομα καὶ οὐ
 μαθάνεις ἀθρόον λεγόμενον· κατὰ μέρη οὖν ἄκουε.
 τὸ γὰρ ποιοῦν οὔτε θερμότης οὔτε λευκότης, θερμὸν B
 5 δὲ καὶ λευκὸν γίγνεται, καὶ τᾶλλα οὔτω. μέμνησαι
 γὰρ που ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ὅτι οὔτως ἐλέγομεν, ἐν
 μηδὲν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ εἶναι, μηδ' αὖ τὸ ποιοῦν ἢ
 πάσχον, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων πρὸς ἄλληλα συγγιγνο-
 μένων—τὰς αἰσθήσεις καὶ τὰ αἰσθητὰ ἀποτίκτοντα τὰ
 10 μὲν ποιὰ ἅττα γίγνεσθαι, τὰ δὲ αἰσθανόμενα.

our analysis beyond the act of sensation to that which underlies it. ἔτι is omitted in one MS., and Schanz reads ἄρα instead.

1. ποιόν τι] MSS. ποιοῦντι. But the Bodleian margin has ποιόν τι, with marg. F, corr. E. ἢ ποιότης] Two difficulties stand in the way of the reception of any new 'term of art'; the strangeness of the word, and the effort required to follow the generalization which it presupposes.

2. ἀλλόκοτον] 'Strange and uncouth.' ἀλλοκοτώτερον is a v. r.

3. ἀθρόον λεγόμενον] 'The collective (i. e. general) expression.' This harmonizes with the language adopted above, 157 B: Δεῖ δὲ καὶ κατὰ μέρος οὔτω λέγειν καὶ περὶ πολλῶν ἀθροισθέντων, ᾧ δὴ ἀθροίσματι ἄνθρωπὸν τε τίθενται καὶ λίθον καὶ ἕκαστον ζῶν τε καὶ εἶδος.

The conception of quality is of later growth than that of kind or form; since the latter is less abstract, and still retains a tinge of metaphor.

6. ἐν] καὶ ἐν Bodl. corr.

7. μηδ' αὖ τὸ ποιοῦν ἢ πάσχον]

Supr. 157 A. αὐ distinguishes the active and passive elements from the crude notion of an object, which is analysed into these.

8. ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων . . . αἰσθανόμενα] 'But out of both as they come together—they become, while producing sensations and sensible things, the one of a certain kind, the other percipient.'

Attribute and perception arise together in the act of sense out of the meeting of agent and patient, neither of which has any independent existence. The text is not grammatical, but neither is it really open to suspicion, and Madvig's conjecture, ἀποτεχθέντα, makes nonsense. The construction may be explained by substituting ἐκ τοῦ συγγίγνεσθαι ἀμφοτέρα for ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων συγγιγνομένων, — or the sentence from τὰς αἰσθήσεις to the end may be taken as an expansion of γίγνεσθαι τὸ τοιαῦτα φανῆναι. Cp. the construction of infr. 194 C D, where, conversely, τὰ ἴόντα should in strict grammar be a genitive governed by τὰ σημεῖα.

D. 182.

ΘΕΟ. Μέμνημαι· πῶς δ' οὐ;

C ΣΩ. Τὰ μὲν τοίνυν ἄλλα χαίρειν ἐάσωμεν, εἴτε ἄλλως εἴτε οὕτως λέγουσιν· οὐ δ' ἔνεκα λέγομεν, τοῦτο μόνον φυλάττωμεν, ἐρωτῶντες· Κινεῖται καὶ ρεῖ, ὡς φατέ, τὰ πάντα; ἦ γάρ;

ΘΕΟ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἀμφοτέρας ἄς διειλόμεθα κινήσεις, φερόμενά τε καὶ ἀλλοιούμενα;

ΘΕΟ. Πῶς δ' οὐ; εἴ πέρ γε δὴ τελέως κινήσεται.

ΣΩ. Εἰ μὲν τοίνυν ἐφέρετο μόνον, ἡλλοιοῦτο δὲ μὴ, εἴχομεν ἄν που εἰπεῖν, οἷα ἅττα ρεῖ τὰ φερόμενα· ἦ πῶς λέγωμεν;

ΘΕΟ. Οὕτως.

D ΣΩ. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ οὐδὲ τοῦτο μένει, τὸ λευκὸν ρεῖν τὸ ρέον, ἀλλὰ μεταβάλλει, ὥστε καὶ αὐτοῦ τούτου εἶναι ρόην, τῆς λευκότητος, καὶ μεταβολὴν εἰς ἄλλην χροῖαν, ἵνα μὴ ἀλῶ ταύτη μένον· ἀρά ποτε οἷον τέ τι προσειπεῖν χροῖμα, ὥστε καὶ ὀρθῶς προσαγορεύειν;

ΘΕΟ. Καὶ τίς μηχανή, ὦ Σώκρατες; ἦ ἄλλο γέ τι τῶν τοιούτων, εἶπερ αἰεὶ λέγοντος ὑπεξέρχεται, ἅτε δὴ ρέον;

2. εἴτε ἄλλως . . . λέγουσιν] We need dwell no longer on the details of the theory, since our business now is with its first principle—κίνησις.

7. Οὐκοῦν, κ.τ.λ.] Sc. κινεῖται τὰ πάντα.

12. λέγωμεν] λέγομεν T.

17. ἵνα μὴ ἀλῶ ταύτη μένον] Cp. supr. 154 D: Φυλάττων μὴ ἐναντία εἶπω. Infr. 183 A: "Ἴνα δὴ ἐκείνη ἢ ἀπόκρισις ὀρθῆ φανῆ. And, for the argument, Cratyl. 439 D: Ἐρ' οὖν οἷον τε προσειπεῖν αὐτὸ ὀρθῶς, εἰ αἰεὶ ὑπεξέρχεται, πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι ἐκείνὸ ἐστίν, ἔπειτα ὅτι τοιούτων, ἢ ἀνάγκη ἅμα

ἡμῶν λεγόντων ἄλλο αὐτὸ εὐθὺς γίνεσθαι καὶ ὑπεξίεναι καὶ μηκέτι οὕτως ἔχειν;

τι προσειπεῖν χροῖμα] To give the name of any colour (to an object)—To use the name of any colour so as to apply it rightly.

20. τῶν τοιούτων] Viz. τῶν αἰσθητῶν, i. e. the remark applies to all sensible attributes and not to colour only. For the step which, for the sake of brevity, Theodorus is here allowed to make by himself, H. Schmidt well compares supr. 158 C E, 189 C, 196 B.

If the qualities moved without changing, we might give them names. But now, while each of them is moving between object and subject, it also changes, so that while you are naming it, it has become another thing.

And the same argument applies to the sensations, and to Sensation, which we said was Knowledge. Therefore when we said Sensation was Knowledge, it would have been equally true to say, Not knowledge. The principle of motion has proved a fallacious support, since according to it every answer, whether Yes or No, is, or rather

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ περὶ αἰσθήσεως ἐροῦμεν ὅποιασοῦν, p. 182.
οἶον τῆς τοῦ ὄραν ἢ ἀκούειν; μένειν ποτὲ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ ὄραν ἢ ἀκούειν;

ΘΕΟ. Οὐκουν δεῖ γε, εἴπερ πάντα κινεῖται.

5 ΣΩ. Οὔτε ἄρα ὄραν προσρητέον τι μᾶλλον ἢ μὴ ὄραν, οὐδέ τι ἄλλην αἴσθησιν μᾶλλον ἢ μὴ, πάντων γε πάντως κινουμένων.

ΘΕΟ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν αἴσθησις γε ἐπιστήμη, ὡς ἔφαμεν
10 ἐγὼ τε καὶ Θεαίτητος.

ΘΕΟ. Ἦν ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Οὐδὲν ἄρα ἐπιστήμην μᾶλλον ἢ μὴ ἐπιστήμην ἀπεκρινάμεθα ἐρωτώμενοι ὅ τί ἐστιν ἐπιστήμη.

ΘΕΟ. Ἐοίκατε.

15 ΣΩ. Καλὸν ἂν ἡμῖν συμβαίνοι τὸ ἐπανόρθωμα τῆς ἀποκρίσεως, προθυμηθεῖσιν ἀποδείξαι ὅτι πάντα κινεῖται, ἵνα δὴ ἐκείνη ἢ ἀπόκρισις ὀρθὴ φανῇ. τὸ δ', ὡς εἴκειν, ἐφάνη, εἰ πάντα κινεῖται, πᾶσα ἀπόκρισις,

E

p. 183.

1. Τί δὲ περὶ αἰσθήσεως] So far of αἰσθητά, now of αἰσθήσεις.

2. μένειν] Sc. τὴν αἴσθησιν.

5. Οὔτε ἄρα, κ.τ.λ.] 'Then we must not at all predicate seeing in preference to not-seeing, nor any other sensation rather than the absence of it, since all things move in every way.' Join οὔτε μᾶλλον.

6. Bekker reads οὔτε . . . οὔτε, perhaps rightly.

12. Οὐδὲν is adverbial. For ἐπιστήμην . . . ἀπεκρινάμεθα cp. supr. 147 B: 'Ὅταν ἀποκρίνηται τέχνης τινὸς ὄνομα. We gave 'sense' as an equivalent for Knowledge. But 'sense' = 'not-sense,' therefore if 'sense' = 'knowledge,' 'sense' = 'not-knowledge.'

15. Καλὸν ἂν ἡμῖν] 'Here is a fine result of having corrected (or completed) our first answer in our eagerness to prove that nothing is at rest, and so to make it clear that that first answer was right, whereas it would seem to be made clear that if nothing is at rest, every answer upon whatever subject is equally right, both "it is so" and "it is not so," or, if you choose, "becomes so," that we may say nothing that would bring them to a stand-still.' For the asyndeton, and for ἂν ('would seem to') Heind. well compares Rep. 10. 602 A: Χαρίεις ἂν εἴη, κ.τ.λ. Badh. conjectures Καλὸν ἄρ' ἡμῖν συμβαίνει.

183. *περὶ οὗτου ἂν τις ἀποκρίνηται, ὁμοίως ὀρθῆ εἶναι, οὕτω τ' ἔχειν φάναι καὶ μὴ οὕτω, εἰ δὲ βούλει, γίγνεσθαι, ἵνα μὴ στήσωμεν αὐτοὺς τῷ λόγῳ.*

ΘΕΟ. Ὅρθως λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Πλήν γε, ὦ Θεόδωρε, ὅτι οὕτω τε εἶπον καὶ 5 οὐχ οὕτω. δεῖ δὲ οὐδὲ τοῦτο *τὸ οὕτω λέγειν· οὐδὲ γὰρ Β ἂν ἔτι κινοῖτο *τὸ οὕτω· οὐδ' αὖ μὴ οὕτω· οὐδὲ γὰρ τοῦτο κίνησις· ἀλλὰ τιν' ἄλλην φωνὴν θετέον τοῖς

1. οὕτω τ' ἔχειν φάναι] These words are added in explanation of *πάσα*. While you are naming a quality, it is altered and slips away; and while you are naming a sensation, it has given place to another. While you say the words 'Sense is knowledge,' your theory of change compels you to utter in the same breath, Sense is not knowledge. In supporting your answer by the doctrine of motion, you have made this and every other answer alike unstable.

3. ἵνα μὴ στήσωμεν αὐτούς] 'That we may not arrest them (τοὺς ρέοντας) in their flow.' Cp. supr. 181 D E, 182 A. The humour is lost by reading αὐτούς.

5. Πλήν γε, ὦ Θεόδωρε] *μή* is changed to *οὐχ*, because the words are taken out of their hypothetical connection.—Compare the conclusion of the Parmenides.

6, 7. *τὸ] The articles, which seem necessary, were added by Schleiermacher. Their absence is defended by Wohlrab, who quotes Soph. 244 A: 'Ὁπότερον ἂν φθέγγησθε.

7. οὐδὲ γάρ] 'For when we think of "so," there is no motion in it: nor yet in "not so."'

8. ἀλλὰ τιν' ἄλλην φωνὴν θετέον] Cp. supr. 157 B, Soph. 252 C: Τῷ τε εἶναί που περὶ πάντα ἀναγκάζονται χρῆσθαι καὶ τῷ χωρὶς καὶ τῷ ἄλλων καὶ τῷ καθ' αὐτὸ καὶ μυρίαὶς ἑτέροις, ὧν ἀκρατεῖς ὄντες εἴργεσθαι καὶ μὴ συνάπτειν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις οὐκ ἄλλων δέονται τῶν ἐξελεγεύοντων, κ.τ.λ. φωνήν] 'Dialect.'

Arist. Met. 3. 4. 1008 a: Οὔτε γὰρ οὕτως οὔτ' οὐχ οὕτως λέγει, ἀλλ' οὕτως τε καὶ οὐχ οὕτως. καὶ πάλιν γε ταῦτα ἀπόφησιν ἄμφω ὅτι οὔθ' οὕτως οὔτε οὐχ οὕτως. εἰ γὰρ μή, ἧδὴ ἂν εἶη τι ὠρισμένον.

Aristotle points out (1), that it does not follow, because quantity is wholly relative, that quality need be so also; (2) that it is not the quality, but the subject of it, which changes.

Sensations are wholly shifting and relative. They could not be the objects of the mind, unless we perceived resemblance and difference in them. In every act of sense, therefore, there is a universal element, and the mind gives to it its own stamp of unity.

Arist. Met. 3. 4. 1007 b: Καὶ γίγνεται δὴ τὸ Ἀναξαγόρου, ὁμοῦ πάντα χρήματα ὥστε μηθὲν ἀληθῶς ὑπάρχειν. τὸ ἀόριστον οὖν εἰκόσασι λέγειν, καὶ οἰόμενοι τὸ ἂν λέγειν, περὶ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος λέγουσιν· τὸ γὰρ

becomes, equally true, except that both Yes and No are falsified while we are uttering them. A new dialect should be invented to carry out this theory. The only

word for it in existing language is, 'No-how.'

Thus we are rid, not only of Protagoras, but also of the theory of sense, so far as it is based on motion.

τὸν λόγον τοῦτον λέγουσιν, ὡς νῦν γε πρὸς τὴν αὐ- p. 183.
τῶν ὑπόθεσιν οὐκ ἔχουσι ῥήματα, εἰ μὴ ἄρα τὸ οὐδ'
ὅπως. μάλιστα δ' οὕτως ἂν αὐτοῖς ἀρμόττοι, ἄπειρον
λεγόμενον.

5 ΘΕΟ. Οἰκειοτάτη γοῦν διάλεκτος αὕτη αὐτοῖς.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν, ὦ Θεόδωρε, τοῦ τε σοῦ ἐταίρου
ἀπηλλάγμεθα, καὶ οὐπω συγχωροῦμεν αὐτῷ πάντ'
ἄνδρα πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον εἶναι, ἂν μὴ φρόνι- c
μός τις ἦ· ἐπιστήμην τε αἰσθησιν οὐ συγχωρησόμεθα
10 κατὰ γε τὴν τοῦ πάντα κινεῖσθαι μέθοδον. εἰ μὴ τί
πως ἄλλως Θεαίτητος ὅδε λέγει.

ΘΕΟ. Ἄριστ' εἶρηκας, ὦ Σώκρατες· τούτων γὰρ
περαυνθέντων καὶ ἐμὲ δεῖ ἀπηλλάχθαι σοι ἀποκρινό-
μενον κατὰ τὰς συνθήκας, ἐπειδὴ τὸ περὶ τοῦ Πρω-
15 ταγόρου λόγου τέλος σχοίη.

ΘΕΑΙ. Μὴ πρίν γ' ἂν, ὦ Θεόδωρε, Σωκρατης τε
καὶ σὺ τοὺς φάσκοντας αὖ τὸ πᾶν ἐστάναι διέλθητε, D
ὥσπερ ἄρτι προὔθεσθε.

δυνάμει ὃν καὶ μὴ ἐντελεχεία τὸ
ἀόριστόν ἐστιν.

2. τὸ οὐδ' ὅπως. ἄπειρον λεγόμενον] With most of the Greek philosophers the Infinite was a purely negative idea.

At this point sensation appears to be annihilated. And yet if we view the dialogue as a whole, the impression we receive from it is rather this:—Sensations are purely relative to the individual, and infinitely diverse: taken alone, therefore, they cannot be the objects of knowledge and thought: but it is not denied that they are the occasions of thought and the conditions of knowledge. (186 D: 'Ἐν μὲν ἄρα τοῖς παθήμασιν οὐκ ἔνι ἐπιστήμη, ἐν δὲ τῷ περὶ ἐκείνων συλλογισμῷ.)

3. οὕτως . . . λεγόμενον] Viz. οὐδ' ὅπως.

6. τοῦ τε σοῦ ἐταίρου] This τε is answered by ἐπιστήμην τε. . . καὶ is exegetic.

Aristotle, Met. 3. 4. 1009 a, expresses the same sense of relief: Καὶ τοῦ λόγου ἀπηλλαγμένοι ἂν εἴημεν τοῦ ἀκράτου καὶ κωλύοντός τι τῇ διανοίᾳ ὄρσαι.

10. εἰ μὴ τί πως] Theætetus is to follow the argument, but Socrates has no intention of relinquishing Theodorus, now that he has dragged him in. This gives occasion for the banter which follows.

15. σχοίη] The optative depends on συνθήκας. 'As it was agreed I should, when the discussion of Protagoras' argument should be completed.' Supr. 169 C.

33. ΘΕΟ. Νέος ὢν, ὃ Θεαίτητε, τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους ἀδικεῖν διδάσκεις ὁμολογίας παραβαίνοντας; ἀλλὰ παρασκευάζου ὅπως τῶν ἐπιλοίπων Σωκράτει δώσεις λόγον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐάνπερ γε βούληται. ἤδιστα μέντ' ἂν ἤκουσα περὶ ὧν λέγω.

ΘΕΟ. Ἰππέας εἰς πεδῖον προκαλεῖ Σωκράτη εἰς λόγους προκαλούμενος· ἐρώτα οὖν καὶ ἀκούσει.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλά μοι δοκῶ, ὃ Θεόδωρε, περὶ γε ὧν κελεύει Θεαίτητος, οὐ πείσεσθαι αὐτῷ.

ΘΕΟ. Τί δὴ οὖν οὐ πείσεσθαι;

ΣΩ. Μέλισσον μὲν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, οἱ ἐν ἐστὸς λέγουσι τὸ πᾶν, αἰσχυρόμενος μὴ φορτικῶς σκοπῶμεν, ἦττον αἰσχύνομαι ἢ ἓνα ὄντα Παρμενίδην. Παρμενίδης δέ μοι φαίνεται, τὸ τοῦ Ὀμήρου, αἰδοῖός τε μοι εἶναι ἄμα δεινός τε.

1. τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους] Viz. Socrates, who, in his character of Sciron (supr. 169 A), is not likely to be over-scrupulous.

3. τῶν ἐπιλοίπων] Viz. the discussion of the Eleatic principle according to Socrates' own proposal, supr. 181 A.

7. Ἰππέας εἰς πεδῖον] 'You challenge cavalry to an encounter in the open plain.'

Schol.: Ἰππέας προκαλεῖσθαι εἰς πεδῖον, ἐπὶ τῶν τοὺς ἔν τισι βελτίους καὶ ἐπιστημονικωτέρους αὐτῶν εἰς ἔριν προκαλουμένων. Πλάτων ἐν Θεαίτητῳ καὶ Μένανδρος Καταψευδομένῳ. γράφεται δὲ καὶ Ἰππον εἰς πεδῖον προκαλεῖσθαι ἐπὶ τῶν εἰς ἃ βούλεται τις προκαλούντων. The latter interpretation is alone suitable here. For the point is, not that Theætetus is provoking defeat, but that Socrates is eager for the fray.

11. Τί δὴ οὖν] Either 'in what respect?' or 'for what reason?' The former is preferable. Theodorus is puzzled, as supr: 161 A. 'How do you mean, Socrates, that you will not comply with his request?' Rep. 5. 449 C: Τί μάλιστα, ἔφην, ὑμεῖς οὐκ ἀφίετε; Σέ, ἦ δ' ὅς. Ἐτι ἐγὼ εἶπον, τί μάλιστα; Ἀπορραθυμῆν ἡμῖν δοκεῖς, ἔφη . . .

12. ἐστὸς] So Bodl. (though rather doubtfully) with Vat. Ven. II, and other MSS.

15. τὸ τοῦ Ὀμήρου] Π. 3. 172: Αἰδοῖός τε μοί ἐσσι, φίλε ἔκυρέ, δεινός τε.

16. εἶναι ἄμα] This is the reading of the Bodl. MS. and of T. συμπροσέμιξα γὰρ . . . τῷ ἀνδρὶ πάνν νέος πάνν πρεσβύτη] In what connection do these words stand with the Parmenides? Do they imply that Plato had already written it, or that he

Theætetus desires now to hear the opposite theory (that of rest) discussed. But Socrates declines. 'Parmenides, whom I once saw in his old age, inspires me, for his glorious depth, with reverence and awe. I fear, therefore, lest we

should
mistake
his words,
and still
more his
thoughts,
and lest the
crowd of
discussions
which
would
enter in
should

ἀνδρὶ πάνυ νέος πάνυ πρεσβύτη, καὶ μοι ἐφάνη βάθος p. 183.
τι ἔχειν παντάπασι γενναῖον. φοβουῖμαι οὖν μὴ οὔτε p. 184.
τὰ λεγόμενα ξυνηῶμεν, τί τε διανοούμενος εἶπε πολὺ
πλέον λειπώμεθα, καὶ τὸ μέγιστον, οὐ ἔνεκα ὁ λόγος
5 ὄρμηται, ἐπιστήμης πέρι, τί ποτ' ἐστίν, ἄσκεπτον
γένηται ὑπὸ τῶν ἐπισκωμαζόντων λόγων, εἴ τις αὐ-
τοῖς πείσεται· ἄλλως τε καί, ὃν νῦν ἐγείρομεν πλήθει

had conceived it? or do they refer to a fact or to a supposition which was the germ from which that dialogue sprang, or which was used to ornament it, by Plato or by some one else? Or did Plato add the present passage after both dialogues had been written? Some light is thrown upon this question by comparing Soph. 217 C: Οἶον (δι' ἐρωτήσεων) καὶ Παρμενίδη χρωμένῳ καὶ διεξιόντι λόγους παγκάλους παρεγενόμενῳ ἐγὼ νέος ὢν, ἐκείνου μάλα δὴ τότε ὄντος πρεσβύτου. This passage conveys the impression that the written dialogue is referred to. At all events, the repeated reference helps to mark the Parmenides as belonging to this series of dialogues. (See Introduction.) The same conception of the time at which Parmenides lived, and the same reverence for him, is implied in the words of the Eleatic stranger (his professed disciple), Soph. 237 A: Παρμενίδης δὲ ὁ μέγας, ὃ παῖ, παισὶν ἡμῖν οὖσιν . . . ἀπεμαρτύρατο . . . ὧδε ἐκάστοτε λέγων.

1. βάθος . . . γενναῖον] 'A magnificent depth of mind.' Schol.: Φαίνεται καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης σεμνύνων τὸν Παρμενίδην.

2. οὔτε τὰ λεγόμενα] It is remarkable to find already in

Plato such a distinct perception of the difference between the grammatical sense and the real drift of an author. The expression ὁ διανοούμενος ἠρόμη occurs in Lach. 190 E.

5. ἄσκεπτον . . . λόγων] 'Should fail to be considered through the endless intrusion of alien subjects of inquiry.'

6. τῶν ἐπισκωμαζόντων λόγων] We pass from the image of a flood (supr. 177 B) to that of a disorderly crowd of discussions. Compare Philebus, 62 C: Βούλει δὴτα, ὥσπερ θυρωρὸς ὑπ' ὄχλου τις ὠθοῦμενος καὶ βιαζόμενος, ἤττηθείς ἀναπετάσας τὰς θύρας ἀφῶ πάσας τὰς ἐπιστήμας εἰσερεῖν καὶ μίγνυσθαι ὁμοῦ καθαρᾶ τὴν ἐνδεεστέραν; See also Shakespeare, Lucrece, 1301, 2: 'Much like a press of people at a door Throng her inventions, which shall go before.' For the use of the verb see Rep. 6. 500 B: Ἐπισκεκωμακότας . . . said of the bad philosophers.

εἴ τις . . . πείσεται] 'If we once let them in,'—'give them a hearing.'

7. ἄλλως τε καί] 'Especially as.' For the paratactic structure cp. Aesch. Pers. 689: Ἄλλως τε πάντως χοί κατὰ χθονὸς θεοὶ | λαβεῖν ἀμείνους εἰσὶν ἢ μετιέναι.

184. ἀμήχανον, εἴ τέ τις ἐν παρέργῳ σκέψεται, ἀνάξι' ἂν
 πάθοι, εἶτε ἰκανῶς, μηκυνόμενος τὸ τῆς ἐπιστήμης
 Β ἀφανιεῖ. δεῖ δὲ οὐδέτερα, ἀλλὰ Θεαίτητον ὦν κνεῖ
 περὶ ἐπιστήμης πειράσθαι ἡμᾶς τῇ μαιευτικῇ τέχνῃ
 ἀπολύσαι.

cause the
 question
 about
 Knowledge
 to be end-
 lessly de-
 ferred.

5

ΘΕΟ. Ἄλλὰ χρή, εἰ δοκεῖ, οὕτω ποιεῖν.

ΣΩ. Ἔτι τοίνυν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, τοσόνδε περὶ τῶν
 εἰρημένων ἐπίσκεψαι. αἴσθησιν γὰρ δὴ ἐπιστήμην
 ἀπεκρίνω. ἦ γάρ;

Transition
 from Sense
 to Opinion.

We there-
 fore return
 once more
 upon our
 old track,
 and ask,
 With what
 do we see
 and hear
 what is
 white or
 shrill?

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

10

ΣΩ. Εἰ οὖν τίς σε ὧδ' ἐρωτῶη· τῶ τὰ λευκὰ καὶ
 μέλανα ὄρα ἄνθρωπος καὶ τῶ τὰ ὀξεῖα καὶ βαρῆα
 ἀκούει; εἴποις ἂν, οἶμαι, ὄμμασί τε καὶ ὠσίν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ εὐχερὲς τῶν ὀνομάτων τε καὶ ῥημάτων 15
 καὶ μὴ δι' ἀκριβείας ἐξεταζόμενον τὰ μὲν πολλὰ οὐκ

Do we see
 and hear
 with our

1. εἴ τέ τις, κ.τ.λ.] The reasons
 given here for avoiding a criti-
 cism of Parmenides and the
 Eleatic doctrine are not such
 as would prevent its being
 discussed in another dialogue.
 It would therefore be a mis-
 take to argue from them against
 the genuineness of the Sophist.
 Compare with the expression
 ὄν νῦν ἐγείρομεν πλήθει ἀμήχανον . .
 Rep. 5. 450 B: Οὐκ ἔστε ὅσον
 ἐσμὸν λόγων ἐπεγείρετε.

3. ὦν κνεῖ] Bodl. Vat. Ven. Π.
 ὄν. Perhaps rightly. Schanz
 gives κνεῖ, the reading of the
 Bodleian first hand, and of T.

ὦν κνεῖ περὶ ἐπιστήμης] Supr.
 149 E. This reference to
 μαιευτική prepares us for the
 'appeal to experience' in what
 follows.—A different method
 is required for the ontological
 problem.—Theætetus' first an-

swer has been disposed of,
 but his second is to be
 evolved through a final criti-
 cism of the first. He is now
 prepared to see the limits of
 sensation and to pass beyond
 them. The present criticism
 was already implied in the lan-
 guage of 179 C.

5. ἀπολύσαι] 'To deliver.'

15. Τὸ . . εὐχερές] 'Facility
 about words and phrases rather
 than captious minuteness.' Cp.
 supr. 177 E, Polit. 261 E:
 ἂν διαφυλάξης τὸ μὴ σπουδάζειν
 ἐπὶ τοῖς ὀνόμασι, πλουσιώτερος εἰς
 τὸ γῆρας ἀναφανήσει φρονήσεως.
 Cp. Arist. Met. 1. 3. 995 a: Τοὺς
 δὲ λυπεῖ τὸ ἀκριβὲς ἢ διὰ τὸ μὴ δύ-
 νασθαι συνείρειν ἢ διὰ τὴν μικρολο-
 γίαν· ἔχει γάρ τι τὸ ἀκριβὲς τοιοῦ-
 του, ὥστε καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν συμβο-
 λαίων, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν λόγων ἀνελεύθε-
 ρον εἶναι τισι δοκεῖ.

eyes and ears, or through them?

ἀγεννές, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τὸ τούτου ἐναντίον ἀνελεύθερον, ἔστι δὲ ὅτε ἀναγκαῖον, οἷον καὶ νῦν ἀνάγκη ἐπιλαβέσθαι τῆς ἀποκρίσεως ἣν ἀποκρίνει, ἢ οὐκ ὀρθή. σκόπει γάρ, ἀπόκρισις ποτέρα ὀρθότερα, ᾧ ὀρώμεν, 5 τοῦτο εἶναι ὀφθαλμούς, ἢ δι' οὐ ὀρώμεν, καὶ ᾧ ἀκούομεν, ὧτα, ἢ δι' οὐ ἀκούομεν;

Not with, but through.

ΘΕΑΙ. Δι' ὧν ἕκαστα αἰσθανόμεθα, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, μᾶλλον ἢ οἷς.

We are not each of us a sort of Trojan-horse full of disconnected faculties. There is one presiding nature, in which they all meet. This it is with which we see through our eyes

ΣΩ. Δεινὸν γάρ που, ὦ παῖ, εἰ πολλαί τινες ἐν 10 ἡμῖν, ὥσπερ ἐν δουρείοις ἵπποις, αἰσθήσεις ἐγκάθηνται, ἀλλὰ μὴ εἰς μίαν τινὰ ἰδέαν, εἴτε ψυχὴν εἴτε ὅ τι δεῖ καλεῖν, πάντα ταῦτα ξυντείνει, ἢ διὰ τούτων οἷον ὀργάνων αἰσθανόμεθα ὅσα αἰσθητά.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλά μοι δοκεῖ οὕτω μᾶλλον ἢ ἐκείνως.

ΣΩ. Τοῦδέ τοι ἔνεκα αὐτά σοι διακριβοῦμαι, εἴ 15 τινι ἡμῶν αὐτῶν τῷ αὐτῷ διὰ μὲν ὀφθαλμῶν ἐφικνούμεθα λευκῶν τε καὶ μελάνων, διὰ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων ἐτέρων αὖ τινῶν· καὶ ἔξεις ἐρωτώμενος πάντα τὰ τοι- E

2. ἐπιλαβέσθαι . . ἢ οὐκ ὀρθή] 'To check your answer and show where it is erroneous.' Cp. Rep. 5. 450 A: Οἷον . . εἰργάσασθε ἐπιλαβόμενοι μου.

9. Δεινὸν γάρ που] 'Would it not be strange, if in each of us there were perched, as in a sort of Trojan horse, a number of separate perceptions, and these did not all meet in some one nature, the Mind or what you will, with which, through the medium of these, we perceive the various objects of sense?'

10. ὥσπερ ἐν δουρείοις ἵπποις] The plural is caused by ἡμῖν. As if each of us were a sort of wooden machine, like the Trojan horse ('a sort of Noah's ark,' as we might say).—Man cannot be regarded as a bundle

of separate faculties having no higher unity: that would be too mechanical a conception of his nature. The term 'organ of sense' perhaps originates with this passage. The difference between ᾧ and δι' οὐ, direct and indirect instrumentality, is obvious, but difficult to render exactly.

11. ἰδέα is used in the concrete vernacular sense; Thuc. 2. 51: Τοιοῦτον ἦν ἐπὶ πάντων τὴν ἰδέαν.

15. Τοῦδέ τοι ἔνεκα] 'It is with a view to this that I am so precise with you, namely, to the inquiry whether,' etc. τοῦδε (better than τοῦ δέ) has a double reference to εἰς μίαν τινὰ ἰδέαν . . αἰσθητά and to εἴ τινι, κ.τ.λ.

18. πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα must mean 'all attributes,' preparing

184. αὐτα εἰς τὸ σῶμα ἀναφέρειν; ἴσως δὲ βέλτιον σὲ λέγειν αὐτὰ ἀποκρινόμενον μᾶλλον ἢ ἐμὲ ὑπὲρ σου πολυπραγμονεῖν. καὶ μοι λέγε· θερμὰ καὶ σκληρὰ καὶ κούφα καὶ γλυκέα δι' ὧν αἰσθάνει, ἄρα οὐ τοῦ σώματος ἕκαστα τίθης; ἢ ἄλλου τινός;

and hear through our ears.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδενὸς ἄλλου.

185. ΣΩ. Ἡ καὶ ἐθελήσεις ὁμολογεῖν, ἃ δι' ἐτέρας δυνάμεως αἰσθάνει, ἀδύνατον εἶναι δι' ἄλλης ταύτ' αἰσθῆσθαι, οἷον ἃ δι' ἀκοῆς, δι' ὄψεως, ἢ ἃ δι' ὄψεως, δι' ἀκοῆς;

But we cannot see and hear through the same organ.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐκ ἐθελήσω;

ΣΩ. Εἴ τι ἄρα περὶ ἀμφοτέρων διανοεῖ, οὐκ ἂν διὰ γε τοῦ ἐτέρου ὄργανου, οὐδ' αὖ διὰ τοῦ ἐτέρου περὶ ἀμφοτέρων αἰσθάνοι ἄν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

ΣΩ. Περὶ δὴ φωνῆς καὶ περὶ χροῆς πρῶτον μὲν αὐτὸ τοῦτο περὶ ἀμφοτέρων ἢ διανοεῖ, ὅτι ἀμφοτέρω ἐστὸν;

There are some things which we perceive about the objects of both senses, e.g. that they are both, that

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐγωγε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὅτι ἐκάτερον ἐκατέρου μὲν ἕτερον, ἐαυτῷ δὲ ταυτόν;

the way for the suprasensual attributes to be adduced below. For τῷ αὐτῷ cp. Rep. 4. 436 A. In καὶ ἔξεις . . . ἀναφέρειν; the question is put more strongly instead of continuing καὶ εἰ δεῖ ἐνία γε τῶν τοιούτων ἀναφέρειν εἰς μὴ σωματικόν τι. This passage is differently interpreted by H. Schmidt, who takes εἴ τι, κ.τ.λ. as hypothetical, and supposes the apodosis to be deferred, where Socrates breaks off at ἴσως δέ, κ.τ.λ.

3. πολυπραγμονεῖν] Socrates will not, if he can help it, act beyond his part as questioner and μαειντής.

7. ἃ δι' ἐτέρας δυνάμεως] The object of one sense cannot be perceived by another. Therefore if I perceive anything about the objects of two different senses, it cannot be through either of them.

12. οὐκ ἂν . . . αἰσθάνοι ἄν] 'This cannot be a perception of either sense which embraces the objects of both.'

17. ἢ διανοεῖ] 'I wonder if you have this notion,' i.e. 'Surely you have.' Cp. supr. 145 A; and for the position of ἢ, Rep. 2. 396 B, ἵππους, κ.τ.λ. . . ἢ μμήσονται;

they are different from each other, and each the same with itself. That both are two, and each is one. That they are like or unlike. Through what organ do we perceive these things? If I had asked, through what do we perceive that they are salt, you would have said 'the tongue.'

Through what, then, do we perceive being and not-being, sameness and

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μὴν;

ΣΩ. Καὶ ὅτι ἀμφοτέρω δύο, ἐκάτερον δὲ ἓν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ τοῦτο.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ εἶτε ἀνομοίω εἶτε ὁμοίω ἀλλήλοιν,
5 δυνατὸς εἶ ἐπισκέψασθαι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἴσως.

ΣΩ. Ταῦτα δὴ πάντα διὰ τίνος περὶ αὐτοῖν διανοεῖ; οὔτε γὰρ δι' ἀκοῆς οὔτε δι' ὄψεως οἷόν τε τὸ κοινὸν λαμβάνειν περὶ αὐτῶν. ἔτι δὲ καὶ τόδε τεκμήριον περὶ οὗ λέγομεν· εἰ γὰρ δυνατόν εἴη ἀμφοτέρω σκέψασθαι, ἂρ' ἐστὸν ἀλμυρὸ ἢ οὐ, οἶσθ' ὅτι ἕξεις εἰπεῖν ᾧ ἐπισκέψει, καὶ τοῦτο οὔτε ὄψις οὔτε ἀκοή^c φαίνεται, ἀλλὰ τι ἄλλο.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί δ' οὐ μέλλει; ἢ γε διὰ τῆς γλώττης
15 δύναμις.

ΣΩ. Καλῶς λέγεις. ἢ δὲ δὴ διὰ τίνος δύναμις τότ' ἐπὶ πᾶσι κοινὸν καὶ τὸ ἐπὶ τούτοις δηλοῖ σοι, ᾧ τὸ ἔστιν ἐπονομάζεις καὶ τὸ οὐκ ἔστι καὶ ἂ νῦν δὴ ἡρωτῶμεν περὶ αὐτῶν; τούτοις πᾶσι ποῖα ἀποδώσεις

8. τὸ κοινόν] 'That which regards them both.' You can refer any particular sensation to its proper organ. Can you do so in the case of these common perceptions?

Cr. Rep. 7. 522 C: Οἷον τοῦτο τὸ κοινόν, ᾧ πᾶσαι προσχρῶνται . . ἐπιστήμαι . . τὸ ἓν τε καὶ τὰ δύο καὶ τὰ τρία διαγιγνώσκειν.

10. ἀμφοτέρω] So B: ἀμφοτέρως T.

16. τότ' ἐπὶ πᾶσι κοινὸν καὶ τὸ ἐπὶ τούτοις] 'Which is common not only to these sensible objects, but to all things.' H. Schmidt would confine πᾶσι to objects of sense (sc. τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς), referring τούτοις to φωνή,

χρόα, χυμός only. Although this is more strictly logical, it seems improbable that the notion of ἐπὶ πᾶσι (and of ἐπὶ πάντων, 186 A) should be thus narrowed.

18. ἂ νῦν δὴ ἡρωτῶμεν] Viz. as Theætetus understands it, ὁμοιότητα καὶ ἀνομοιότητα, καὶ τὸ ταυτόν τε καὶ τὸ ἕτερον, ἔτι δὲ ἓν τε καὶ τὸν ἄλλον ἀριθμὸν περὶ αὐτῶν, referring to what has just preceded.

Ἐπέρειν] This warm praise of Theætetus for dialectical apprehension prepares the way for the unwonted outburst of admiration which follows.

19. περὶ αὐτῶν] Concerning the objects of sense.

p. 185. ὄργανα, δι' ὧν αἰσθάνεται ἡμῶν τὸ αἰσθανόμενον ἕκαστα ;

difference, unity and plurality, odd and even ?

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐσίαν λέγεις καὶ τὸ μὴ εἶναι, καὶ ὁμοιότητα καὶ ἀνομοιότητα, καὶ τὸ ταῦτόν τε καὶ τὸ ἕτερον, ^D ἔτι δὲ ἓν τε καὶ τὸν ἄλλον ἀριθμὸν περὶ αὐτῶν. δῆλον ⁵ δὲ ὅτι καὶ ἄρτιόν τε καὶ περιπτόν ἐρωτᾶς, καὶ τᾶλλα ὅσα τούτοις ἔπεται, διὰ τίνος ποτὲ τῶν τοῦ σώματος τῆ ψυχῆ αἰσθανόμεθα.

ΣΩ. Ὑπέρου, ὃ Θεαίτητε, ἀκολουθεῖς, καὶ ἔστιν ἂ ἐρωτῶ αὐτὰ ταῦτα.

10

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ μὰ Δία, ὃ Σώκρατες, ἔγωγε οὐκ ἂν ἔχοιμι εἰπεῖν, πλήν γ' ὅτι μοι δοκεῖ τὴν ἀρχὴν οὐδ' εἶναι τοιοῦτον οὐδὲν τούτοις ὄργανον ἴδιον ὥσπερ ^E ἐκείνοις, ἀλλ' αὐτὴ δι' αὐτῆς ἢ ψυχῆ τὰ κοινὰ μοι φαίνεται περὶ πάντων ἐπισκοπεῖν.

Theætetus answers, that these are perceived through no special bodily organ, but by the mind itself, surveying what is common to all.

15

ΣΩ. Καλὸς γὰρ εἶ, ὃ Θεαίτητε, καὶ οὐχ, ὡς ἔλεγε Θεόδωρος, αἰσχρὸς· ὁ γὰρ καλῶς λέγων καλὸς τε κάγαθός. πρὸς δὲ τῷ καλῷ εὖ ἐποίησάς με μάλα

Socrates receives his

13. ὄργανον ἴδιον] The Bodl. MS. has ὄργανιδιον.

16. Καλὸς γὰρ εἶ] The enthusiasm with which Socrates accepts Theætetus' acknowledgment of the truth that the mind has its perceptions, independent of sense, belongs to the most interesting aspect of Greek Philosophy. 'Gradually it threw off the garment of sense ; it revealed a world of ideas. It is impossible for us to conceive the intensity of these ideas in their first freshness : they were not ideas but gods, penetrating into the soul of the disciple, sinking into the mind of the human race ; objects not of speculation only, but of faith and love.' (Jowett.) Compare, as an-

other instance of this religious feeling, Soph. 265 D : Νῦν μὴ βλέπων εἰς σέ καὶ ὑπολαμβάνων οἶεσθαί σε κατὰ γε θεὸν αὐτὰ γίγνεσθαι, ταύτη καὶ αὐτὸς νερόμικα, Καλῶς γε, ὃ Θεαίτητε. καὶ εἰ μὲν γέ σε ἠγοῦμεθα τῶν εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον ἄλλως πως δοξαζόντων εἶναι, νῦν ἂν τῷ λόγῳ μετὰ πειθοῦς ἀναγκαίας ἐπεχειροῦμεν ποιεῖν ὁμολογεῖν· ἐπειδὴ δὲ σοῦ καταμανθάνω τὴν φύσιν, ὅτι καὶ ἄνευ τῶν παρ' ἡμῶν λόγων αὐτὴ πρόσσεισις ἐφ' ἧς νῦν ἐλκεσθαι φῆς, ἐάσω· χρόνος γὰρ ἐκ περιπτῶ γίγνοιτ' ἂν.

17. ὁ γὰρ καλῶς λέγων, κ.τ.λ.] Rep. 3. 402 E.

18. πρὸς δὲ τῷ καλῷ] (1) 'Ad καλῷ ex præcedd. mente repentendum εἶναι, quæ notatu dignum est ellipsis, quum post

answer with de-
light. There are
some things then
which the mind
itself perceives with-
out the help of the
body. Being is
the most universal
of these.

συχνού λόγου ἀπαλλάξας, εἰ φαίνεται σοι τὰ μὲν p. 185.
αὐτὴ δι' αὐτῆς ἢ ψυχῇ ἐπισκοπεῖν, τὰ δὲ διὰ τῶν τοῦ
σώματος δυνάμεων. τοῦτο γὰρ ἦν ὃ καὶ αὐτῷ μοι
ἔδόκει, ἐβουλόμην δὲ καὶ σοὶ δοῦναι.

5 ΘΕΑΙ. Ἄλλα μὴν φαίνεται γε.

p. 186.

ΣΩ. Ποτέρων οὖν τίθης τὴν οὐσίαν; τοῦτο γὰρ
μάλιστα ἐπὶ πάντων παρέπεται.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐγὼ μὲν ὦν αὐτὴ ἢ ψυχῇ καθ' αὐτὴν
ἐπορέγεται.

10 ΣΩ. Ἡ καὶ τὸ ὅμοιον καὶ τὸ ἀνόμοιον, καὶ τὸ ταύ-
τὸν καὶ ἕτερον;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ καλὸν καὶ αἰσχροῦν, καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ
κακόν;

The Good
and Beautiful
are also
thus per-
ceived.

15 ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ τούτων μοι δοκεῖ ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα
πρὸς ἄλληλα σκοπεῖσθαι τὴν οὐσίαν, ἀναλογιζομένην

hæc πρὸς δὲ τῷ καλῷ non inferatur
nominativus, verbo εἶ vel
addito vel subaudiendo, velut
inferitur Sympos. 195 C: Νέος
μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ, πρὸς δὲ τῷ νέῳ
ἀπαλός... Heind. (2) 'Præter
hoc pulchrum, quod in te lau-
davi.' Stallb.

The latter (2) is right. 'Be-
sides this beauty you have
shown, you have done me a kind-
ness...' Cp. Eurip. Hec. 382:
Καλῶς μὲν εἶπας, θύγατερ, ἀλλὰ τῷ
καλῷ | λύπη πρόσσεστιν. Thuc. 4.
98. 2. The phrase in Symp.
195 C ought to be similarly
construed.

6. τοῦτο γὰρ μάλιστα ἐπὶ πάν-
των παρέπεται] I. e. ἐπὶ πᾶσι κοι-
νὸν ἐστὶ (supr. 185 C). It will
serve therefore as a sort of
crucial instance.

9. ἐπορέγεται expresses Plato's
notion of the intuitive action

of the mind (νόησις), not as mere
contemplation, but as a passion-
ate outgoing. Rep. 6. 490 A B.

15. ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα] In this and
similar phrases the article re-
tains its demonstrative force,
as is evident where the words
are separated; e. g. Euthyd.
303 C: Ἐν δὲ τοῖς καὶ τοῦτο με-
γαλοπρεπέστερον. Soph. Œd.
Col. 742: Ἐκ δὲ τῶν μάλιστ' ἐγώ.

16. πρὸς ἄλληλα σκοπεῖσθαι]
'To consider in relation to each
other:' viz. as opposites.

Theætetus is probably think-
ing of the recent argument in
which ἀγαθόν, ἀφέλμων, μέλλον,
were identified. The 'idea of
good' is still regarded by him
'hypothetically,' and, as it were,
from beneath. But he is no
longer capable of the fallacious
admission into which he fell
unwarily, supr. 157 D. The

p. 186. ἐν ἑαυτῷ τὰ γεγονότα καὶ τὰ παρόντα πρὸς τὰ μέλ-
B λοντα.

ΣΩ. Ἐχε δὴ· ἄλλο τι τοῦ μὲν σκληροῦ τὴν σκλη-
ρότητα διὰ τῆς ἐπαφῆς αἰσθήσεται, καὶ τοῦ μαλακοῦ
τὴν μαλακότητα ὡσαύτως;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τὴν δέ γε οὐσίαν καὶ ὅ τι ἐστὸν καὶ τὴν
ἐναντιότητα πρὸς ἀλλήλω καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν αὖ τῆς
ἐναντιότητος αὐτῇ ἢ ψυχῇ ἐπανιούσα καὶ συμβάλ-
λουσα πρὸς ἄλληλα κρίνειν πειράται ἡμῖν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὰ μὲν εὐθὺς γενομένοις πάρεστι
C φύσει αἰσθάνεσθαι ἀνθρώποις τε καὶ θηρίοις, ὅσα
διὰ τοῦ σώματος παθήματα ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχὴν τείνει·

question pressed by H. Schmidt, 'How past and future enter into the notion of honour,' is hardly present in the Greek, but may be answered by the familiar example of an act of ordinary courage, in which the fear of future disgrace overcomes that of instant danger. The sense of honour emphatically belongs to a creature of 'large discourse, looking before and after.'

ἀναλογισομένη] 'Thinking over the past and present with a view to the future.'

3. Ἐχε δὴ] 'Hold there!' Socrates sees his opportunity of furthering the argument by applying the last expression of Theaetetus, and therefore bids him pause over it.

7. Τὴν δέ γε οὐσίαν] Sc. τοῦ σκληροῦ καὶ τοῦ μαλακοῦ. 'The fact that they exist' (Germ. 'Dasein'). In this and similar passages Plato may be said to be appealing to the consciousness of his reader.

All such ideas the mind immediately contemplates, surveying with a view to the future the present and the past:— e. g. The quality of hardness is perceived through the touch. But that it is, that it is opposite to softness, and that

9. ἐπανιούσα καὶ συμβάλλουσα] Returning upon (reviewing) the sensations, it perceives the Being of their objects, and comparing these together, perceives their opposition, and the Being of this again.

12. Οὐκοῦν, κ.τ.λ.] For the rarity of Reason cp. Rep. 4. 428, Tim. 51 E: Καὶ τοῦ μὲν πάντα ἄνδρα μετέχειν φάτεόν, νοῦ δὲ θεοῦς, ἀνθρώπων δὲ γένος βραχύ τι.

14. ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχὴν τείνει] 'Extend to the mind.' Cp. Tim. 64 B: Τὸ μὲν γὰρ κατὰ φύσιν εὐκίνητον. . . καὶ βραχὺ πάθος. . . διαδιδωσιν. . . ἐπὶ τὸ φρόνιμον. . . τὸ δ' ἐναντίον ἐδραῖον ὄν. . . ἀναίσθητον παρέσχε τὸ παθόν.

Phileb. 33 D: ὅς τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἡμῶν ἐκάστοτε παθημάτων τὰ μὲν ἐν τῷ σώματι κατασβεννύμενι πρὶν ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχὴν διεξελθεῖν, ἀπαθῆ ἐκείνην ἔασαντα, τὰ δὲ δι' ἀμφοῖν ἴοντα, καὶ τινα ὡσπερ σεισμῶν ἐντιθέεντα ἰδίον τε καὶ κοινὸν ἐκατέρω.

this opposition is, the mind itself seeks to decide, returning over its sensations, and comparing them.

The one power belongs to all live creatures from their birth: the other is slowly attained, and only by some men. Sensation does not reach being, there-

τὰ δὲ περὶ τούτων ἀναλογίσματα πρὸς τε οὐσίαν καὶ π. 186.
ὠφέλειαν μόγισ καὶ ἐν χρόνῳ διὰ πολλῶν πραγμάτων
καὶ παιδείας παραγίγνεται οἷς ἂν καὶ παραγίγνηται.

ΘΕΑΙ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

5 ΣΩ. Οἷόν τε οὖν ἀληθείας τυχεῖν, ᾧ μὴδὲ οὐσίας;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀδύνατον.

ΣΩ. Οὐδὲ ἀληθείας τις ἀτυχήσει, ποτὲ τούτου
ἐπιστήμων ἔσται;

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ πῶς ἂν, ὦ Σώκρατες;

10 ΣΩ. Ἐν μὲν ἄρα τοῖς παθήμασιν οὐκ ἐνὶ ἐπι-
στήμῃ, ἐν δὲ τῷ περὶ ἐκείνων συλλογισμῷ. οὐσίας
γὰρ καὶ ἀληθείας ἐνταῦθα μὲν, ὡς ἔοικε, δυνατὸν
ἄψασθαι, ἐκεῖ δὲ ἀδύνατον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Φαίνεται.

1. ἀναλογίσματα] 'But what the mind discovers by reflecting upon these.' The idea of proportion (τὸ ἀνάλογον) does not seem to enter into the verb ἀναλογίζομαι and its derivative noun. ἀναλογίζεσθαι is rather εἰς εἶδος τι ἀναφέρειν τῷ λόγῳ.

οὐσίαν] German critics raise the doubt whether οὐσία is to be taken in the same sense throughout this passage. Plato had not present to his mind the distinctions between 'Sein,' 'Dasein,' 'Wesen,' 'Fürsichsein,' etc., but if one meaning is to be held throughout, it is rather the 'fact' ('Dasein') than the 'mode' ('Wesen'). If this is emphasized, μὴδέ (1. 6) retains the force of 'not even.'

5. ᾧ μὴδὲ οὐσίας] (1) 'Ad dat. hunc ᾧ repetendum est οἷόν τε (potestne illud verum assequi quod ne οὐσίαν quidem assequi potest?), ut declarant illa mox, ἔμπαν ἄρ' αὐτὸ καλεῖς αἴσθησιν; Ἀνάγκη. Ωἶτε, φάμεν, οὐ μέτεστω

ἀληθείας ἄψασθαι, οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐσίας.' Heindorf. And so H. Schmidt.

But (2) in the present connection ᾧ is probably masculine. 'Is it possible for him to reach truth who misses truth?' (Wohlrab assents to this.) There is a transition in the next question from the subject to the object, from αἰσθανόμενος to αἰσθητόν. 'But can one have knowledge of that, the truth of which he misses?' A third way may be mentioned, but only to be rejected, viz. (3) making ᾧ instrumental dative. 'Can one reach truth with that,' etc. Schanz reads οὐ from Heindorf's conj.

11. ἐν δὲ τῷ περὶ ἐκείνων συλλογισμῷ] Something very different from syllogism is meant, and more nearly analogous to generalization. Cp. Phædr. 249 B: Δεῖ γὰρ ἄνθρωπον συνιέναι κατ' εἶδος λεγόμενον, ἐκ πολλῶν ἰὸν αἰσθήσεων εἰς ἐν λογισμῷ συναυρούμενον. Phil. 41 C.

186. ΣΩ. Ἡ οὖν ταῦτόν ἐκείνό τε καὶ τοῦτο καλεῖς,
 τοσαύτας διαφορὰς ἔχοντε ;
 ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκ οὖν δὴ δίκαιόν γε.
 ΣΩ. Τί οὖν δὴ ἐκείνω ἀποδίδως ὄνομα, τῷ ὄραν,
 ἀκούειν, ὄσφραίνεσθαι, ψύχεσθαι, θερμαίνεσθαι ; 5
 Ε ΘΕΑΙ. Αἰσθάνεσθαι ἔγωγε· τί γὰρ ἄλλο ;
 ΣΩ. Ξύμπαν ἄρ' αὐτὸ καλεῖς αἰσθησιν ;
 ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀνάγκη.
 ΣΩ. Ὡι γε, φαμέν, οὐ μέτεστιν ἀληθείας ἀψα-
 σθαι· οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐσίας. 10
 ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.
 ΣΩ. Οὐδ' ἄρ' ἐπιστήμης.
 ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ γάρ.
 ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρ' ἂν εἶη ποτέ, ὦ Θεαίτητε, αἰσθησίς
 τε καὶ ἐπιστήμη ταυτόν. 15
 ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ φαίνεται, ὦ Σώκρατες. καὶ μάλιστα
 γε νῦν καταφανέστατον γέγονεν ἄλλο ὄν αἰσθήσεως
 ἐπιστήμη.

fore it fails of truth, and is not knowledge. This lies not in our impressions, but in that which the mind collects from them.

Sensation, therefore, has no share in knowledge. They are wholly distinct.

We have found what knowledge is not. Our aim was to find what

9. Ὡι is neuter here—referring to the fem. αἰσθησιν.

12. Οὐδ' ἄρ' ἐπιστήμης] The genitive is governed by μέτεστιν alone. ἀληθείας and οὐσίας are governed partly by μέτεστιν, partly by ἀψασθαι.

16. μάλιστα γε νῦν καταφανέστατον] For the double superlative cp. Rep. I. 331 B: Ἀλλά γε ἐν ἀνθ' ἐνός οὐκ ἐλάχιστον ἔγωγε θείην ἂν εἰς τοῦτο ἀνδρὶ νοῦν ἔχοντι, ὦ Σώκρατες, πλοῦτον χρησιμώτατον εἶναι.

17. καταφανέστατον γέγονεν] The criticism of Sensation is now complete. We see it clearly, as relative, shifting, momentary, inseparable from physical conditions: we have placed ourselves above it, and proceed to explore the region next beyond,

that of Opinion.

To recapitulate the criticism of ἐπιστήμη αἰσθησις. 1. Certain presumptions are raised against the saying ἄνθρωπος μέτρον, as that it makes all beings equally wise, and that it implies that we can at once know and not know the same thing. 2. Protagoras is convicted out of his own mouth, for in confirming the opinion of other men he confutes himself. 3. There is at least one sphere of knowledge which is above sense, the foresight of consequences, the perception of what is good. 4. And within the sphere of sense, if sensation depend on motion, and motion include change, no quality can be so much as named. 5. The mind

it is. Yet we have gained something. We shall not seek for it any more in sensation, but in whatever that is called, when the mind is by itself engaged with being. Opinion is the name for this.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' οὐ τι μὲν δὴ τούτου γε ἔνεκα ἠρχόμεθα p. 187.
 διαλεγόμενοι, ἵνα εὐρωμεν τί ποτ' οὐκ ἔστ' ἐπιστήμη,
 ἀλλὰ τί ἔστιν. ὅμως δὲ τοσοῦτόν γε προβεβήκαμεν,
 ὥστε μὴ ζητεῖν αὐτὴν ἐν αἰσθήσει τὸ παράπαν, ἀλλ'
 5 ἐν ἐκείνῳ τῷ ὀνόματι, ὃ τί ποτ' ἔχει ἡ ψυχὴ, ὅταν
 αὐτὴ καθ' αὐτὴν πραγματεύηται περὶ τὰ ὄντα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν τοῦτό γε καλεῖται, ὃ Σώκρατες,
 ὡς ἐγῶμαι, δοξάζειν.

ΣΩ. Ὁρθῶς γὰρ οἶε, ὃ φίλε. καὶ ὅρα δὴ νῦν
 10 πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, πάντα τὰ πρόσθεν ἐξαλείψας, εἴ τι β
 μᾶλλον καθορᾶς, ἐπειδὴ ἐνταῦθα προελήλυθας. καὶ
 λέγε αὐθις τί ποτ' ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη.

ΘΕΑΙ. Δόξαν μὲν πᾶσαν εἰπεῖν, ὃ Σώκρατες,
 ἀδύνατον, ἐπειδὴ καὶ ψευδὴς ἐστὶ δόξα· κινδυνεύει δὲ
 15 ἡ ἀληθὴς δόξα ἐπιστήμη εἶναι, καὶ μοι τοῦτο ἀποκε-
 κρίσθω. ἐὰν γὰρ μὴ φανῆ προιοῦσιν, ὥσπερ τὸ νῦν,
 ἄλλο τι πειρασόμεθα λέγειν.

We venture accordingly on a second definition:—

receives impressions from without through certain bodily organs; but knowledge implies the comparison of the impressions received through different organs, and this must be the immediate function of the mind. The whole of this last section should be compared with Rep. 7. 522-6.

5. ἐκείνῳ τῷ ὀνόματι] 'But in that other term, whatever it is, which is applied to the mind when engaged alone with being.'

The form of expression is partly influenced by the words (186 D), Τί οὖν ἐκείνῳ ἀποδίδως ὄνομα; κ.τ.λ. The distinction between ὄνομα and ῥήμα is not observed here.

10. πάντα τὰ πρόσθεν ἐξαλείψας] As if in a mathematical demonstration.

13. Δόξαν] δόξα follows naturally upon αἰσθησις. Charm. 158 E, 159 A: Δηλον γὰρ ὅτι εἴ σοι πάρεστι σωφροσύνη, ἔχεις τι περὶ αὐτῆς δοξάζειν. ἀνάγκη γάρ που ἐνούσαν αὐτὴν, εἴπερ ἔνεστιν, αἰσθησὶν τινα παρέχειν, ἐξ ἧς δόξα ἂν τίς σοι περὶ αὐτῆς εἴη ὃ τί ἐστὶ καὶ ὁποῖόν τι ἡ σωφροσύνη.

As in finding the mathematical δύναμις Theætetus used a word which had been employed in the previous inquiry, so here. But hitherto δόξα has been bound up with φαντασία and αἰσθησις, and even where Socrates had preserved the distinction between apprehension and judgment (179 C), this had passed unnoticed.

16. ὥσπερ τὸ νῦν] Sc. φαίνεται.

17. ἄλλο τι ('something else') is not adverbial here.

p. 187. ΣΩ. Οὕτω μέντοι χρή, ὧ³ Θεαίτητε, λέγειν προθύ-
 μως μᾶλλον ἢ ὡς τὸ πρῶτον ὠκνεῖς ἀποκρίνεσθαι.
 εἰν γὰρ οὕτω δρῶμεν, δυοῖν θάτερα, ἢ εὐρήσομεν ἐφ'
 c ὃ ἐρχόμεθα, ἢ ἦπτον οἰησόμεθα εἰδέναι ὃ μηδαμῆ
 ἴσμεν· καί τοι οὐκ ἂν εἴη μεμπτὸς μισθὸς ὁ τοιοῦτος. 5
 καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν τί φῆς; δυοῖν ὄντων *εἰδέοιν δόξης,
 τοῦ μὲν ἀληθινοῦ, ψευδοῦς δὲ τοῦ ἐτέρου, τὴν ἀληθῆ
 δόξαν ἐπιστήμην ὀρίζει;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐγωγε· τοῦτο γὰρ αὖ νῦν μοι φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν ἔτ' ἄξιον περὶ δόξης ἀναλαβεῖν 10
 πάλιν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποῖον δὴ λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Θράττει μέ πως νῦν τε καὶ ἄλλοτε δὴ πολ-
 d λάκις, ὥστ' ἐν ἀπορίᾳ πολλῇ πρὸς ἑμαυτὸν καὶ πρὸς
 ἄλλον γεγονέναι, οὐκ ἔχοντα εἰπεῖν τί ποτ' ἐστὶ τοῦτο 15
 τὸ πάθος παρ' ἡμῖν καὶ τίνα τρόπον ἐγγιγνόμενον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποῖον δὴ;

ΣΩ. Τὸ δοξάζειν τινὰ ψευδῆ. σκοπῶ δὴ καὶ νῦν

II. Know-
 ledge is
 true
 opinion.

But, still
 to return
 upon a for-
 mer track,

Is false
 opinion
 possible?

3. εἰν . . . δρῶμεν] For the first person cp. infr. 210 B.

6. *εἰδέοιν] MSS. ἰδέαιν. 'εἰδέοιν ex emend. apogr. H.' Schanz.

10. ἀναλαβεῖν πάλιν] 'To take up a thread of the previous argument.'

Though we have dismissed the saying of Protagoras, so far as it is bound up with sense, τὸ δοκοῦν ἐκάστῳ τοῦτο καὶ εἶναι, (φαντασία being σύμ-
 μίσις αἰσθήσεως καὶ δόξης, Soph. 264 B), yet the same question returns upon us in regard to opinion considered by itself. This forms a link of connection between the present inquiry and the fore-
 going. Cp. Cratyl. 429 D:

*Ἄρ' ὅτι ψευδῆ λέγειν τὸ παράπαν οὐκ ἔστιν, ἄρα τοῦτό σοι δύναται ὁ λόγος; συχνοὶ γάρ τινες οἱ λέγοντες, ὧ φίλε Κρατύλε, καὶ νῦν καὶ πάλαι.

See also Euthyd. 284 A, 286 C, where the ἀπορία (ὅτι ψεύδεσθαι, ἀντιλέγειν, οὐκ ἔστιν) is ascribed to the followers of Protagoras amongst others. It has generally, however, been associated with the name of Antisthenes.

15. τοῦτο τὸ πάθος παρ' ἡμῖν] 'This experience of the human mind.' Cp. supr. 155 A.

18. σκοπῶ δὴ καὶ νῦν ἔτι] Though the past discussion has been 'wiped out,' this still remains 'to trouble the mind's eye.' Badham would read

ἔτι διστάζων, πότερον ἑάσωμεν αὐτὸ ἢ ἐπισκεψώμεθα p. 187.
ἄλλον τρόπον ἢ ὀλίγον πρότερον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μὴν, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἴ πέρ γε καὶ ὀπη-
οὖν φαίνεται δεῖν; ἄρτι γὰρ οὐ κακῶς γε σὺ καὶ
5 Θεόδωρος ἐλέγετε σχολῆς πέρι, ὡς οὐδὲν ἐν τοῖς τοι-
οῖσδε κατεπείγει.

ΣΩ. Ὅρθῶς ὑπέμνησας. ἴσως γὰρ οὐκ ἀπὸ και- E
ροῦ πάλιν ὥσπερ ἵχνος μετελθεῖν. κρείττον γάρ που
συμκρὸν εἶ ἢ πολὺ μὴ ἱκανῶς περᾶναι.

10 ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μὴν;

ΣΩ. Πῶς οὖν; τί δὴ καὶ λέγομεν; ψευδῆ φαμέν
ἐκάστοτε εἶναι δόξαν, καὶ τινα ἡμῶν δοξάζειν ψευδῆ,
τὸν δ' αὖ ἀληθῆ, ὡς φύσει οὕτως ἐχόντων;

ΘΕΑΙ. Φαμὲν γὰρ δῆ.

1. In re-
gard to
everything

15 ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τότε γ' ἔσθ' ἡμῖν περὶ πάντα καὶ p. 188.
καθ' ἕκαστον, ἥτοι εἰδέναι ἢ μὴ εἰδέναι; μανθάνειν

ὁ θράττει, but the asyndeton is expressive. δῆ also has been changed to δέ (Buttmann), but without reason.

2. ἄλλον τρόπον ἢ ὀλίγον πρότερον] I. e. not with reference to sensation and motion (supr. 164, 167, 171, 180), but in a more abstract way. The new 'manner' has something in it of the Eleatic spirit. For the expression compare Soph. 245 E: Τοὺς δὲ ἄλλως λέγοντας αὐ θεατέον.

3. ὀπηροῦν] The Bodl. has ὀπηροῦν. But the second γε is awkward, and ὀπηροῦν has good authority in T.

6. κατεπείγει] Supr. 172 D.

8. πάλιν ὥσπερ ἵχνος μετελθεῖν] We seemed to ourselves to be launching into a wholly new inquiry, but we have fallen into the same track by

a different route. Cp. Aristot. Eth. I. 7. 2: Μεταβαίνων δὴ ὁ λόγος εἰς ταῦτόν ἀφίικται. Aesch. Prom. 845: Ταῦτόν μετελθὼν τῶν πάλαι λόγων ἵχνος.

κρείττον . . . περᾶναι] This is said in order to obviate the discouragement which may be felt at having to return again upon our footsteps. Cp. Soph. 261 A B.

13. ἐχόντων is neuter. For the plural cp. Rep. 2. 375 C: Ταῦτα δὲ ἀδυνάτοις ἔοικε.

16. ἥτοι εἰδέναι ἢ μὴ εἰδέναι] Socrates here takes up the thread of reflection introduced above, 165 B: Ἄρ' οἶόν τε τὸν αὐτὸν εἰδῶτα τι τοῦτο ὁ οἶδε μὴ εἰδέναι; It was one weakness of the sensation doctrine that it led to this contradiction. The same opposition considered in the abstract is now used to

188. γὰρ καὶ ἐπιλανθάνεσθαι μεταξὺ τούτων ὡς ὄντα χαίρειν λέγω ἐν τῷ παρόντι· νῦν γὰρ ἡμῖν πρὸς λόγον ἐστὶν οὐδέν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἄλλὰ μὴν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἄλλο γ' οὐδὲν λείπεται περὶ ἕκαστον πλὴν εἰδέναι ἢ μὴ εἰδέναι. 5

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἤδη ἀνάγκη τὸν δοξάζοντα δοξάζειν ἢ ὧν τι οἶδεν ἢ μὴ οἶδεν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν εἰδότα γε μὴ εἰδέναι τὸ αὐτὸ ἢ μὴ εἰδότα εἰδέναι ἀδύνατον. 10

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς δ' οὐ;

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν ὁ τὰ ψευδῆ δοξάζων, ἃ οἶδε, ταῦτα οἶεται οὐ ταῦτα εἶναι ἀλλὰ ἕτερα ἅττα ὧν οἶδε, καὶ ἀμφοτέρα εἰδὼς ἀγνοεῖ ἀμφοτέρα;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἄλλ' ἀδύνατον, ὦ Σώκρατες. 15

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ἄρα, ἃ μὴ οἶδεν, ἠγείναι αὐτὰ εἶναι ἕτερα ἅττα ὧν μὴ οἶδε, καὶ τοῦτ' ἐστὶ τῷ μήτε Θεαί-

prove the impossibility of falsehood in opinion.

The discussion which follows probably bears some relation to the notions of Gorgias, and perhaps of Antisthenes. At all events it would seem to be a fragment of Eleaticism; being exactly analogous to the difficulties raised by Zeno against the possibility of motion. It runs parallel also to the subtleties of the later Megarians.

1. μεταξὺ . . . λέγω] The construction follows the analogy of χαίρειν ἐῶ. Cp. Soph. 258 E, where the phrase again occurs in a loose construction.

2. νῦν γὰρ ἡμῖν πρὸς λόγον ἐστὶν οὐδέν] Because we choose to dwell on the absolute alternative, knowledge or igno-

rance. Cp. supr. 158 E: Μὴ ὑπολάβωμεν, κ.τ.λ., where a limited 'Standpoint' is similarly emphasized.

Plato thus hints at the true solution of the difficulty, viz. the conception of a gradual process, which is afterwards presented under the image of the impressions on wax, etc.

The doctrine of ἀνάμνησις which had been developed in the Meno and Phædo, is perhaps also held in reserve.

5. λείπεται] 'Remains' — when learning and forgetting are left out.

6. ἤδη] 'Since that point is settled.'

7. ὧν τι οἶδεν] For τι thus interposed cp. infr. 192 A.

12. ὁ τὰ ψευδῆ δοξάζων] The articles refer to supr. 187 E.

one of two alternatives is true of us. Either we know it, or we do not know it. (The intermediate processes of learning and forgetting may be left out of sight as beside our present argument.) In thinking, therefore, I must think of something which I know, or which I do not know.

But I cannot know and be ig-

norant of
the same
thing.

Therefore
I cannot
think
falsely, for
I cannot
think one
thing which
I know to
be another
which I
know, else
I should
know it
and not
know it.
Nor can I
think what
I do not
know to be
something
else which
I do not
know, for
what I
know not
cannot be
present to
my mind.
Nor can I
think what
I do not

τητον μήτε Σωκράτη εἰδότι εἰς τὴν διάνοιαν λαβεῖν p. 188.
ὡς ὁ Σωκράτης Θεαίτητος ἢ ὁ Θεαίτητος Σωκράτης;

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ πῶς ἂν;

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' οὐ μὴν, ἃ γέ τις οἶδεν, οἶεται που ἃ μὴ
5 οἶδεν αὐτὰ εἶναι, οὐδ' αὖ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν, ἃ οἶδεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τέρας γὰρ ἔσται.

ΣΩ. Πῶς οὖν ἂν τις ἔτι ψευδῇ δοξάσειεν; ἐκτὸς
γὰρ τούτων ἀδύνατόν που δοξάζειν, ἐπεὶ περ πάντ' ἢ
ἴσμεν ἢ οὐκ ἴσμεν, ἐν δὲ τούτοις οὐδαμοῦ φαίνεται
10 δυνατὸν ψευδῇ δοξάσαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθέστατα.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν οὐ ταύτη σκεπτέον ὁ ζητοῦμεν, κατὰ
τὸ εἰδέναι καὶ μὴ εἰδέναι ἰόντας, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ εἶναι
καὶ μὴ;

15 ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Μὴ ἀπλοῦν ἢ ὅτι ὁ τὰ μὴ ὄντα περὶ ὅπου οὖν
δοξάζων οὐκ ἔσθ' ὡς οὐ ψευδῇ δοξάσει, καὶ ὅπως οὖν
ἄλλως τὰ τῆς διανοίας ἔχη.

4. Ἄλλ' οὐ μὴν . . . ἃ οἶδεν]
'But surely when a man
knows anything, he cannot
take for that thing one which
he does not know, nor for what
he does not know can he take
what he knows.' Cp. *infr.*
191 A, and note.

5. αὐτὰ] Cp. *Phaed.* 99 B:
'Ὁ δὴ μοι φαίνονται . . . ὡς αἴτιον
αὐτὸ προσαγορεύειν: and see
155 E.

6. Τέρας] *Supr.* 163 D,
and note: Τέρας γὰρ ἂν εἴη ὁ
λέγεις. *Phaed.* 101 B, *alib.*

9. ἐν δὲ τούτοις] 'And
under this alternative,' viz. as
developed in the above in-
stances.

12. ὁ ζητοῦμεν]. The *Bodl.*
MS., by an obvious error, has
ἐζητοῦμεν. Cp. *Polit.* 276 C:

*Ὁ λέγομεν, and v. rr.

13. εἶναι] So the *Coislinian*
MS. and the corrector of T.
Most *MSS.* have εἰδέναι.

16. Μὴ ἀπλοῦν ἢ] 'May not
the case possibly be simply
thus?' μὴ expresses *suspicion*
= 'I should not wonder if.'
Cp. *Phaed.* 67 B: Μὴ οὐ θεμιτὸν
ἦ. *Ibid.* 69 A: Μὴ γὰρ οὐχ
αὕτη ἢ ἡ ὀρθὴ ἀλλαγὴ, κ. τ. λ., μὴ
σκιαγραφία τις ἢ ἡ τοιαύτη ἀρετή.
Crit. 48 C: Μὴ . . . ταῦτα . . .
σκέμματα ἦ: and see *Ast.*, *Lex.*
sub v. For ἀπλοῦν in this
sense cp. *supr.* 147 C: Ἀπλοῦν
εἰπεῖν. *Symp.* 183 D. *Polit.*
306: Πότερον οὕτως ἀπλοῦν ἐστὶ
τοῦτο ἢ . . . ἔχει διαφορὰν . . .
Aristot. Eth. N. 5. 9. 9: Ἡ οὐδὲ
τοῦτο ἀπλοῦν.

188. ΘΕΑΙ. Εἰκός γ' αὖ, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Πῶς οὖν; τί ἐροῦμεν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, εἴαν τις ἡμᾶς ἀνακρίνη· Δυνατὸν δὲ ὄτ' αὐτοῦν ὁ †λέγεται, καὶ τις ἀνθρώπων τὸ μὴ ὄν δοξάσει, εἴτε περὶ τῶν ὄντων του εἴτε αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό; Καὶ ἡμεῖς δὴ, ὡς εἴκει, πρὸς 5
 Ε ταῦτα φήσομεν Ὅταν γε μὴ ἀληθῆ οἴηται οἴομενος.
 ἢ πῶς ἐροῦμεν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Ἡ οὖν καὶ ἄλλοθί που τὸ τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. Εἴ τις ὄρα μὲν τι, ὄρα δὲ οὐδέν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ πῶς;

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ ἔν γέ τι ὄρα, τῶν ὄντων τι ὄρα.

ἢ σὺ οἶει ποτὲ τὸ ἐν ἐν τοῖς μὴ οὖσιν εἶναι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκ ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Ὅ ἄρα ἔν γέ τι ὄρων ὄν τι ὄρα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Φαίνεται.

189. ΣΩ. Καὶ ὁ ἄρα τι ἀκούων ἔν γέ τι ἀκούει καὶ ὄν ἀκούει.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

3. ὁ †λέγεται] 'Which is herein asserted. Buttmann and Bekker conjecture λέγετε, which seems probable, but not necessary. Cp. Phæd. 77 D: Ἀποδέδεικται μὲν οὖν ὅπερ λέγεται καὶ νῦν, where there is a similar doubt.

11. Εἰ] Interrogative. 'I mean to ask whether (for example) a man who sees something, sees no single thing?'

13. εἰ ἐν γέ τι ὄρα] The converse argument is used Rep. 5. 478 B (where it is asked, 'What is opinion concerned with?'): Ἡ οἶόν τε αὖ δοξάζειν

μὲν, δοξάζειν δὲ μηδέν; Ἀδύνατον. Ἀλλ' ἐν γε τι δοξάζει ὁ δοξάζων; Ναί. Ἀλλὰ μὴν μὴ ὄν γε οὐχ ἔν τι, ἀλλὰ μηδὲν ὀρθότατ' ἂν προσαγορεύοιτο. Πάνν γε. This close relation between the ideas of unity and being, derived from Parmenides, appears frequently. See especially Soph. 237 D: Ἀνάγκη τόν τι λέγοντα ἐν γε τι λέγειν. The mind cannot recognise Being except where it finds its own impress of Unity.

Ar. Met. 3. 4. 1006 b: οὐθὲν γὰρ ἐνδέχεται νοεῖν μὴ νοοῦντα ἔν.

know to be what I know, nor what I know to be what I do not know.

And what other case (under the above alternative) is conceivable?

2. The path of knowledge being thus hemmed in, we try the path of being. To think that which is not, is to think falsely.

15 But can I think of what is not, either absolutely or with reference to anything?

I cannot see, and yet see nothing.

20

And that which I see, being one thing, must have existence. For unity and being are inseparable. The same is true of hearing and touch,

And of thought also.

To think what is not is to think nothing, and to think nothing is not to think.

False opinion, if it exists, must be something different from this.

ΣΩ. Καὶ ὁ ἀπτόμενος δὴ του, ἐνός γέ του ἄπτεται p. 189.
καὶ ὄντος, εἶπερ ἐνός ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ τοῦτο.

ΣΩ. Ὅ δὲ δὴ δοξάζων οὐχ ἔν τι δοξάζει ;

5 ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Ὅ δ' ἔν τι δοξάζων οὐκ ὄν τι ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ξυγχωρῶ.

ΣΩ. Ὅ ἄρα μὴ ὄν δοξάζων οὐδὲν δοξάζει.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ φαίνεται.

10 ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅ γε μηδὲν δοξάζων τὸ παράπαν οὐδὲ δοξάζει.

ΘΕΑΙ. Δῆλον, ὡς ἔοικεν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα οἶόν τε τὸ μὴ ὄν δοξάζειν, οὔτε περὶ β τῶν ὄντων οὔτε αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό.

15 ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλο τι ἄρ' ἐστὶ τὸ ψευδῆ δοξάζειν τοῦ τὰ μὴ ὄντα δοξάζειν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἄλλο ἔοικεν.

ΣΩ. Οὐ *τε γὰρ οὕτως οὔτε ὡς ὀλίγον πρότερον
20 ἐσκοποῦμεν, ψευδῆς ἐστὶ δόξα ἐν ἡμῖν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν δῆ.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ἄρα ὧδε γιγνόμενον τοῦτο προσαγο-
ρεύομεν ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς ;

13. περὶ τῶν ὄντων] Arist. Met. 3. 2. 1004 a: Ἀπόφασιν δὲ καὶ στέρησιν μᾶς ἐστὶ θεωρῆσαι διὰ τὸ ἀμφοτέρως θεωρεῖσθαι τὸ ἔν, οὐ ἢ ἀπόφασιν ἢ ἢ στέρησιν (ἢ γὰρ ἀπλῶς λέγομεν ὅτι οὐχ ὑπάρχει ἐκεῖνο ἢ τινι γένει, κ.τ.λ.)

19. Οὐ *τε γάρ] MSS. οὐ γάρ. τε seems required (as Van Heusde observed), but γάρ is right. Cp. 190 E: Οὔτε γάρ ταύτη, κ.τ.λ.

οὔτε ὡς ὀλίγον πρότερον] Viz. κατὰ τὸ εἰδένα καὶ μὴ εἰδένα, 188 C.

22. Ἀλλ' ἄρα ὧδε γιγνόμενον] 'But may it be supposed, then, that what we express by this name arises in the following way?' 'In what way?' 'That what we call false opinion is really a sort of crossing of opinions.'

189. ΣΩ. Ἀλλοδοξίαν τινὰ οὔσαν ψευδῆ φημέν εἶναι
 C δόξαν, ὅταν τις τι τῶν ὄντων ἄλλο αὖ τῶν ὄντων,
 ἀνταλλαζόμενος τῇ διανοίᾳ, φῆ εἶναι. οὕτω γὰρ ὄν
 μὲν αἰεὶ δοξάζει, ἕτερον δὲ ἀνθ' ἑτέρου, καὶ ἀμαρ-
 τάνων οὐ ἐσκόπει δικαίως ἂν καλοῖτο ψευδῆ δοξά- 5
 ζων.

3. Can it then be a cross-application or transference of thought: i.e. When I think one existing thing to be another? Theaetetus believes this must be the true falsehood.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὁρθότατά μοι νῦν δοκεῖς εἰρηκέναι. ὅταν
 γάρ τις ἀντὶ καλοῦ αἰσχροῦ ἢ ἀντὶ αἰσχροῦ καλὸν
 δοξάζῃ, τότε ὡς ἀληθῶς δοξάζει ψευδῆ.

ΣΩ. Δῆλος εἶ, ὦ Θεαίτητε, καταφρονῶν μου καὶ 10
 οὐ δεδιώς.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μάλιστα;

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄν, οἶμαι, σοὶ δοκῶ τοῦ ἀληθῶς ψεύδους
 D ἀντιλαβέσθαι, ἐρόμενος εἰ οἶόν τε ταχὺ βραδέως ἢ
 κοῦφον βαρέως ἢ ἄλλο τι ἐναντίον μὴ κατὰ τὴν αὐ- 15
 τοῦ φύσιν ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν τοῦ ἐναντίου γίγνεσθαι
 ἐαυτῷ ἐναντίως. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν, ἵνα μὴ μάτην θαρ-
 ρήσης, ἀφήμι. ἀρέσκει δέ, ὡς φῆς, τὸ τὰ ψευδῆ
 δοξάζειν ἀλλοδοξεῖν εἶναι;

Socrates claims credit for moderation in not pressing this contradiction in terms, and passes on.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐμοιγε.

20

1. Ἀλλοδοξίαν] This seems to have been a prevalent conception. Vid. Arist. Met. 3. 5. 1010 a: Φασὶ δὲ καὶ τὸν Ὅμηρον ταύτην ἔχοντα φαίνεσθαι τὴν δόξαν, ὅτι ἐποίησε τὸν Ἐκτορα, ὡς ἐξέστη ὑπὸ τῆς πληγῆς, κείσθαι ἀλλοφρονέοντα, ὡς φρονοῦντας μὲν καὶ τοὺς παραφρονοῦντας, ἀλλ' οὐ ταυτά. He ascribes this application of Homer to Democritus, de An. 1. 2. Cp. Herod. 1. 85: Ἀλλογνώσας τὸν Κροῖσον.

φημέν] In apposition with the preceding verb, introduced by ὡδε.

This third case is linked

on to the second, but is not, as H. Schmidt supposes, a subdivision of it. The three cases are (1) thinking what we do not know, (2) thinking what is not, (3) thinking cross-wise.

13. τοῦ ἀληθῶς ψεύδους] Rep. 2. 382 A: Τό γε ὡς ἀληθῶς ψεύδος, εἰ οἶόν τε τοῦτο εἰπεῖν. Phil. 23 B: Ἄρα ὅτι τὸ ἀδύνατον εἶπον, λυπεῖν ἠδουήν.

17. ἵνα μὴ μάτην θαρρήσης] Supr. 163 C: Ἴνα καὶ αὐξάνῃ. He refers to the boldness with which Theaetetus now answers, supr. 187 B: Οὕτω . . . χρῆ . . . λέγειν προθύμως.

When I take one thing for another, I must have either one or both things in my mind,

Either at once or in turn.

Now thought is the mind's self-dialogue, in

ΣΩ. Ἔστιν ἄρα κατὰ τὴν σὴν δόξαν ἕτερόν τι ὡς p. 189.
ἕτερον καὶ μὴ ὡς ἐκείνῳ τῇ διανοίᾳ τίθεσθαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔστι μέντοι.

ΣΩ. Ὅταν οὖν τοῦθ' ἡ διάνοιά του δρᾷ, οὐ καὶ
5 ἀνάγκη αὐτὴν ἦτοι ἀμφοτέρα ἢ τὸ ἕτερον διανο-
εῖσθαι;

*ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀνάγκη μὲν οὖν ἦτοι ἅμα γε ἢ ἐν
μέρει.

*ΣΩ. Κάλλιστα. τὸ δὲ διανοεῖσθαι ἄρ' ὅ περ ἐγὼ
10 καλεῖς;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί καλῶν;

ΣΩ. Λόγον ὃν αὐτὴ πρὸς αὐτὴν ἡ ψυχὴ διεξέρ-
χεται περὶ ὧν ἂν σκοπῇ. ὡς γε μὴ εἰδῶς σοι ἀπο-
φαίνομαι. τοῦτο γάρ μοι ἰνδάλλεται διανοουμένη, οὐκ

2. ὡς ἐκείνῳ] Referring to the first ἕτερον.

5. τὸ ἕτερον] 'The one or the other.' ἕτερος here = *alteruter*.

7. ἦτοι ἅμα γε ἢ ἐν μέρει] The bearing of these words is not quite clear. Perhaps they are meant to introduce the analysis of thinking, in which things are present to the mind at first successively, afterwards in one view. Most MSS. arrange the persons thus: Θε. Ἀνάγκη μὲν οὖν. Σω. Ἦτοι . . μέρει; Θε. Κάλλιστα. Σω. Τὸ δὲ . . καλεῖς; (In the Bodl. MS., however, it is not clear that the double colon after οὖν is in the first hand, and ἦτοι κ.τ.λ. is given to Socrates in continuation as in our text.) Hirzel, followed by Schanz, gives ἦτοι . . μέρει to Theætetus, and κάλλιστα to Socrates. *Theæt.* 'Certainly, either at once or by turns.' *Soc.* 'Well said; but I wonder if your conception of the thinking-

process agrees with mine.' There is much to recommend this arrangement, which is adopted also by H. Schmidt. He proposes, however, to delete the words ἦτοι . . μέρει.

Compare with the following account of thinking Phileb. 38 C, 39, where the mind not only talks with itself, but has a writer and a painter within it: Ἄρ' οὖν ἡμᾶς . . κ.τ.λ. *Soph.* 263 E: Οὐκοῦν διάνοια μὲν καὶ λόγος ταυτὸν πλὴν ὁ μὲν ἐντὸς τῆς ψυχῆς πρὸς αὐτὴν διάλογος ἄνευ φωνῆς γινόμενος, κ.τ.λ.

12. Λόγον is here used in the first of the three meanings given below, 206 D.

13. ὡς γε μὴ εἰδῶς] 'As one who does not know,' 'who is not to be supposed to know.' The use of μὴ assists the ironical tone of Socrates, who avoids categorical statements. 'You must not assume that I speak as if I knew.'

14. τοῦτο γάρ μοι] Plato was

190. ἄλλο τι ἢ διαλέγεσθαι, αὐτὴ ἑαυτὴν ἐρωτῶσα καὶ ἀποκρινομένη, καὶ φάσκουσα καὶ οὐ φάσκουσα. ὅταν δὲ ὀρίσασα, εἴτε βραδύτερον, εἴτε καὶ ὀξύτερον ἐπαΐξασα, τὸ αὐτὸ ἤδη φῆ καὶ μὴ διστάξῃ, δόξαν ταύτην τίθεμεν αὐτῆς. ὥστ' ἐγωγε τὸ δοξάζειν λέγειν καλῶ⁵ καὶ τὴν δόξαν λόγον εἰρημένον, οὐ μέντοι πρὸς ἄλλον οὐδὲ φωνῆ, ἀλλὰ σιγῆ πρὸς αὐτόν. σὺ δὲ τί;

ΘΕΑΙ. Κἀγώ.

ΣΩ. Ὅταν ἄρα τις τὸ ἕτερον ἕτερον δοξάζῃ, καὶ φησίν, ὡς ἔοικε, τὸ ἕτερον ἕτερον εἶναι πρὸς ἑαυτόν. ¹⁰

^B ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μήν;

ΣΩ. Ἄναμιμνήσκου δὴ εἰ πώποτ' εἶπες πρὸς σεαυτὸν ὅτι παντὸς μᾶλλον τό τοι καλὸν αἰσχρόν ἐστιν

question and answer. When it has agreed with itself upon a final answer, we call this its opinion.

Opinion is a silent proposition.

To think this to be that, is to say, 'This is that.' Now who ever said

probably thinking of *Odyssey* 19. 224: Ἐρέω, ὡς μοι ἰνδάλλεται ἦτορ. Compare the φάσματα in the beginning of the dialogue. 'The semblance which the mind presents to me, when it thinks, is simply that of conversing, and of being engaged in question and answer with itself.'

2. ὅταν δὲ ὀρίσασα] 'But when it has come to a determination, whether slowly, or by darting swiftly to its conclusion, and so is now at one and not divided in judgment, we call this its opinion.'

13. παντὸς μᾶλλον..παντάπασιν ἄρα..ἀνάγκη] These adverbs give an almost dramatic vividness to the description of the process of thought. Note especially the liveliness of τοι, which some critics have rejected. Cp. *Phil.* 38 C: Αὐτόν..ἀνέροι' ἂν ᾤδε..τί ποτε ἄρα ἔστι τὸ παρά τὴν πέτραν..

The Greek language from Homer downwards was peculiarly apt to suggest such re-

flections as these. *διαλεκτική* was its proper development. The following remarks of Col. Mure (*Lit. of Greece*, 2. 14. § 1) on the self-dialogue of Homer, apply in some degree to all Greek literature: 'Exclusively proper to Homer is his power of dramatizing, not merely action, but thought; not merely the intercourse between man and man, but between man and himself, between his passions and his judgment. The mechanism of which the poet here chiefly avails himself is to exhibit the person under the influence of excited feelings as communing with, or, as Homer defines it, addressing his own mind; discussing the subject of his solicitude under its various aspects as a question at issue between his judgment and himself. The conflicting feelings are thus, as it were, personified; while the current of the language, often the very sound of the words, is

to himself,
'Surely fair
is foul,' or
'wrong is
right,' or
'odd is
even'?

ἢ τὸ ἄδικον δίκαιον, ἢ καί, τὸ πάντων κεφάλαιον, p. 190
σκόπει εἴ ποτ' ἐπεχείρησας σεαυτὸν πείθειν ὡς παν-
τὸς μᾶλλον τὸ ἕτερον ἕτερόν ἐστιν, ἢ πᾶν τοῦναντίον
οὐδ' ἐν ὕπνῳ πώποτε ἐτόλμησας εἰπεῖν πρὸς σεαυτὸν
5 ὡς παντάπασιν ἄρα τὰ περιττὰ ἄρτιά ἐστιν ἢ τι
ἄλλο τοιοῦτον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

Or, 'the
cow must
be a horse,'
or 'two is
one.'

ΣΩ. Ἄλλον δέ τινα οἶει ὑγιαίνοντα ἢ μαινόμενον
τολμῆσαι σπουδῇ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν εἰπεῖν, ἀναπέιθοντα
10 αὐτόν, ὡς ἀνάγκη τὸν βοῦν ἵππον εἶναι ἢ τὰ δύο εἶναι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔγωγε.

Therefore
when I mis-
take this
for that, I
cannot
have both
in my mind.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰ τὸ λέγειν πρὸς ἑαυτὸν δοξάζειν
ἐστίν, οὐδεὶς ἀμφοτέρα γε λέγων καὶ δοξάζων καὶ
ἐφαπτόμενος ἀμφοῖν τῇ ψυχῇ εἴποι ἂν καὶ δοξάσειεν
15 ὡς τὸ ἕτερον ἕτερόν ἐστιν. ἑατέον δ' *ἔσται σοι τὸ

so nicely adapted to the turns of the self-dialogue, that the breast of the man seems to be laid open before us, and in the literal sense of the term, we read his thoughts as they flit through his bosom.'

4. ἐν ὕπνῳ . . . ὑγιαίνοντα ἢ μαινόμενον] Note the liveliness with which fresh touches are thrown in. It must be remembered here that sensible perception is excluded from consideration for the present, as well as learning and forgetting. Everything is either known or unknown: present to the mind, or not present.

8. ὑγιαίνοντα ἢ μαινόμενον] These words have been unreasonably questioned, on the ground that no limit can be set to the illusions of madness. Not to dwell on the general weakness of such minute philosophy,—the critics forget that

τὸν βοῦν is the ox, *thought of as such*. Cp. the words ἀμφοτέρα γε . . . τῇ ψυχῇ just below. This reference to the extreme case of madness which has been already cited (supr. 157 E) is quite in Plato's manner.

15. ἑατέον δ' *ἔσται] These words are intended to meet the difficulty which may have been felt about the general statement (τὸ πάντων κεφάλαιον) ὡς παντὸς μᾶλλον τὸ ἕτερον ἕτερόν ἐστιν, in supr. B. Several of the MSS., including Bodl. and Coisl., have ἑατέον δὲ καὶ σοὶ τὸ ῥῆμα ἐπὶ τῶν ἐν μέρει, ἐπειδὴ τὸ ῥῆμα ἕτερον τῷ ἑτέρῳ κατὰ ῥῆμα ταυτὸν ἐστὶ περὶ τοῦ ἑτέρου, where ἐπὶ τῶν ἐν μέρει evidently refers to 189 E: Ἦτοι ἄμα γε ἢ ἐν μέρει. This cannot be adopted without rejecting περὶ τοῦ ἑτέρου as confusing the sentence. The drift would then be, 'You must not dwell upon the words as regards

190. ῥῆμα περὶ τοῦ ἑτέρου. λέγω γὰρ αὐτὸ τῆδε, μηδένα
 D δοξάζειν ὡς τὸ αἰσχροὺν καλὸν ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοι-
 οὔτων.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἄλλ', ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐὼ τε καὶ μοι δοκεῖ
 ὡς λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Ἄμφω μὲν ἄρα δοξάζοντα ἀδύνατον τὸ ἕτε-
 ρον ἕτερον δοξάζειν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔοικεν.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλὰ μὴν τὸ ἕτερόν γε μόνον δοξάζων, τὸ
 δὲ ἕτερον μηδαμῆ, οὐδέποτε δοξάσει τὸ ἕτερον ἕτερον ¹⁰
 εἶναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις· ἀναγκάζοιτο γὰρ ἂν ἐφά-
 πτεσθαι καὶ οὐ μὴ δοξάζει.

things alternately presented to the mind, seeing that the word ἕτερον, as far as the word goes, is the same as applied to both. This would be an imperfect way of developing the distinction thrown out above, and unlike Socrates, who, especially in this dialogue, always waits for Theætetus to follow him. And it is equally necessary to 'let the word alone,' whether the objects are conceived alternately or both at once. The words ἐπὶ τῶν ἐν μέρει may therefore confidently be rejected as a mistaken gloss.

If the words ἐπειδὴ . . . ταῦτόν ἐστι are genuine, περὶ τοῦ ἑτέρου must either be omitted or transposed. But it is possible that ἐπειδὴ, κ.τ.λ., has also crept in from the margin, and this suspicion is so far confirmed by the fact that the Bodl. p. m. wrote ἐστίν. We thus revert to the reading of T and several MSS. ἐατέον δὲ καὶ σοὶ τὸ ῥῆμα περὶ τοῦ ἑτέρου. περὶ is often used rather

vaguely, e. g. Rep. 7. 538 E: Καὶ περὶ δικαίου ὡσαύτως καὶ ἀγαθοῦ. If δὲ καὶ σοὶ is retained, καὶ may be understood with reference to supr. 189 D, where Socrates takes credit for not pressing the words ἀληθὲς ψευδός. 'You, too (as I did in the former case), must let the word alone in regard to the Other.'

But this is rather strained. The version of Ficinus led some critics to conjecture εἰ καὶ σοὶ δοκεῖ. But this, as Buttman observes, would not harmonize with Theætetus' reply. I have ventured to change δὲ καὶ σοὶ to δ' ἔσται σοι, an emendation which has often occurred to me in reading the passage. For the sense cp. Euthyd. 301 A, where the word *is* dwelt upon: Τίνα τρόπον, ἔφη, ἑτέρου ἑτέρῳ παραγενομένου τὸ ἕτερον ἕτερον ἂν εἶη; Ἄρα τοῦτο, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἀπορεῖς; . . . ἀλλ' ἐγωγε οὐδ' ἂν παῖδα φῆμιν τοῦτο ἀπορῆσαι ὡς οὐ τὸ ἕτερον ἕτερόν ἐστιν.

12. ἀναγκάζοιτο . . . δοξάζει]

But if I think only of the one, I cannot think the one to be the other, for I cannot have in my mind that of

which I
am not
thinking.

ΣΩ. Οὐτ' ἄρ' ἀμφοτέρα οὔτε τὸ ἕτερον δοξάζοντι p. 190.
ἐγχωρεῖ ἀλλοδοξεῖν. ὥστ' εἴ τις ὀριεῖται δόξαν εἶναι ε
ψευδῆ τὸ ἕτεροδοξεῖν, οὐδὲν ἂν λέγοι. οὔτε γὰρ ταύτη
οὔτε κατὰ τὰ πρότερα φαίνεται ψευδῆς ἐν ἡμῖν οὔσα
5 δόξα.

This trans-
ference,
therefore,
is also in-
conceiv-
able.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκ ἔοικεν.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλὰ μέντοι, ὦ Θεαίτητε, εἰ τοῦτο μὴ φα-
νήσεται ὄν, πολλὰ ἀναγκασθησόμεθα ὁμολογεῖν καὶ
ἄτοπα.

10 ΘΕΑΙ. Τὰ ποῖα δῆ;

We are
in great
straits.
But we
dare not
face the
conse-
quences of
failure un-
til we have
turned
every
stone.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἐρῶ σοι πρὶν ἂν πανταχῆ πειραθῶ σκο-
πῶν. αἰσχυνοίμην γὰρ ἂν ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν, ἐν ᾧ ἀπορου-
μεν, ἀναγκαζομένων ὁμολογεῖν οἷα λέγω. ἀλλ' ἐὰν
εὔρωμεν καὶ ἐλεύθεροι γενώμεθα, τότε ἤδη περὶ τῶν p. 191.
15 ἄλλων ἐρουῦμεν ὡς πασχόντων, *αὐτοὶ ἐκτὸς τοῦ γε-
λοίου ἐστῶτες. ἐὰν δὲ πάντη ἀπορήσωμεν, ταπεινω-

These words are clearly given
to Theætetus in the Cesena
MS., as well as in Heindorf's
edition.

3. οὔτε γὰρ ταύτη] 'The
truth is, that the existence of
false opinion in our minds does
not appear on this any more
than on the (two) former
grounds.' The clauses, though
connected outwardly by γάρ,
are rather parallel than conse-
quent, as in 152 C. Cp. also
supr. 182 B. In all these
places some would change γάρ
to ἄρα.

8. πολλὰ . . . καὶ ἄτοπα] E. g.
that it is impossible to dis-
tinguish the sophist from the
true philosopher; and the other
difficulties brought out in the
Sophistes.

11. πειραθῶ σκοπῶν] For the
participial construction (in fa-

miliar use with πειράομαι) cp.
supr. 187 A: Ἠρχόμεθα διαλεγό-
μενοι.

12. αἰσχυνοίμην . . . λέγω] 'I
should feel ashamed on our
behalf, if, while we were still
in doubt, the strange conse-
quences I refer to were pressed
upon us.'

15. *αὐτοὶ ἐκτὸς τοῦ γελοίου
ἐστῶτες] 'When we are our-
selves free from the absurdity,'
'exempt from the ridicule.'
This point is not attained in
the Theætetus; and this whole
passage may be regarded as
an anticipation of the So-
phistes.—The MSS. have πά-
σχοντες αὐτά (sc. τὸ ἀναγκάζεσθαι
ὁμολογεῖν τοιαῦτα, Wohlrab). But
Ast's correction, αὐτοί, is ex-
tremely probable. Heind. con-
jectures πάσχοντας αὐτό, αὐτοί,
κ.τ.λ.

191. θέντες, οἶμαι, τῷ λόγῳ παρέξομεν ὡς ναυτιῶντες πατεῖν τε καὶ χρῆσθαι ὅ τι ἂν βούληται. ἧ οὖν ἔτι πόρον τινὰ εὐρίσκω τοῦ ζητήματος ἡμῖν, ἄκουε.

1. παρέξομεν . . πατεῖν] Gorg. 475 D: Γενναίως τῷ λόγῳ ὡσπερ ἱατρῷ παρέχων ἀποκρίνου, alib. There is an allusion to the proverbial situation described in Soph. Aj. 1142 foll.: "Ἦδη ποτ' εἶδον ἄνδρ' ἐγὼ γλώσση θρασὺν | ναυτὰς ἐφορμήσαντα χειμῶνος τὸ πλεῖν' | ᾧ φθέγγ' ἂν οὐκ ἂν εἶρες ἡνίκ' ἐν κακῷ | χειμῶνος εἴχετ', ἀλλ' ἰφ' εἴματος κρυβείς, πατεῖν παρείχε τῷ θέλοντι ναυτιλῶν. The position imagined is something like that reached at the end of the Parmenides. The point is of course the despair of a bad sailor in a storm. Naber's conjecture, *ναυαγούντες*, is unnecessary, and his alternative, *ὡς ναυτιλῶ ἀξιοῦντες*, is clumsy as well.

The argument from 187 to 191 may be thus condensed:—

We no longer search for knowledge in sensation, which is neither true nor false, but in opinion, where the mind is engaged with its own objects by itself. But here an old difficulty meets us in another form. It seemed that sensation could not be false, because it was relative to the subject. It now seems as though opinion cannot be false, because a thinking subject is necessarily related to knowledge and being. What I do not know cannot be present in thought. Neither can I lay hold in thought on that which is not. But can I take one thing which *is* for another which also *is*? Thought being silent speech, if I lay hold of both, (i. e. if both are present to the mind,) I cannot

mistake them; e. g. No one ever said to himself, Good is evil. And if only one is present to me, I cannot discourse about them, e. g. if I am thinking only of the good, I cannot say, Good is evil. We are in great straits. For the result at which we seem in danger of arriving is contradictory to most important facts.

We must not appeal to these, however, until we have extricated our minds, if possible, from this metaphysical tangle. For logical and metaphysical difficulties are not to be solved 'ambulando,' but by a higher criticism of the forms of thought which have occasioned them.

In what follows, we are brought gradually back from the simple to the complex, from the more abstract to the more concrete. We are compelled to image to ourselves, what was discarded at a former stage of the inquiry (supr. 188 A), a process between the relativity of sense and the absoluteness of knowledge, which, like every process, admits of degrees. Thus, it may be said, the idea of Motion returns upon us in a higher form.

The mind is a storehouse of old impressions, in which we are continually looking for the types of new ones. But the old impressions fade and get confused, and we fail to bring them with precision and clearness into contact with the new. Hence we sometimes think falsely.

We said it was impossible that I should think what I do not know to be what I know, else I should be ignorant of what I know.

ΘΕΑΙ. Λέγε μόνον.

ΣΩ. Οὐ φήσω ἡμᾶς ὀρθῶς ὁμολογήσαι, ἤνικα ὁμολογήσαμεν, ἃ τις οἶδεν, ἀδύνατον δοξάσαι ἃ μὴ οἶδεν εἶναι αὐτά, καὶ ψευσθῆναι· ἀλλὰ πη δυνατόν. B

5 ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐὰν λέγεις ὃ καὶ ἐγὼ τότε ὑπόπτεισα ἤνικ' αὐτὸ ἔφαμεν, τοιοῦτον εἶναι, ὅτι ἐνίστ' ἐγὼ γιγνώσκων Σωκράτη, πόρρωθεν δὲ ὄρων ἄλλον ὃν οὐ γιγνώσκω, ῥήθην εἶναι Σωκράτη ὃν οἶδα; γίγνεται γὰρ δὴ ἐν τῷ τοιοῦτῳ οἶον λέγεις.

10 ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἀπέστημεν αὐτοῦ, ὅτι ἃ ἴσμεν, ἐποίει ἡμᾶς εἰδότας μὴ εἰδέναι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Μὴ γὰρ οὕτω τιθῶμεν, ἀλλ' ὧδε· ἴσως πη ἡμῖν συγχωρήσεται, ἴσως δὲ ἀντιτενεῖ· ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἐν C

But perhaps it is possible in a certain way; e.g. Theaetetus knows Socrates, and yet may

2. ἤνικα, κ.τ.λ.] Supr. 188 C: 'Ἄλλ' οὐ μὴν, κ.τ.λ. This passage proves that the phrase nearest to εἶναι in all these expressions is the subject, and the more remote phrase, generally preceding it, contains the predicate.

5. τότε ὑπόπτεισα] This surmise was naturally suggested by the impossible case, which had been just stated, of Theaetetus being mistaken for Socrates by one who knew neither of them.

6. τοιοῦτον εἶναι] Sc. αὐτό, τὸ ψευδῆ δοξάσαι. τοιοῦτον supplies the antecedent to εἶ. Others (Stephanus, H. Schmidt) omit the comma after ἔφαμεν, and take τοιοῦτον as = ἀδύνατον.

13. οὕτω] So as to imply knowledge of what we do not know.

ὧδε· ἴσως] This is the punctuation of the Bodleian MS. καὶ ἴσως, the reading of T and other MSS., is unnecessary. A qualifying clause is sometimes

thus introduced before ἀλλά—without any particle of connection with what precedes. Compare Soph. El. 450: Σμικρὰ μὲν τάδ', ἀλλ' ὅμως | ἄχω, δὸς αὐτῷ. Œd. Col. 1615: Σκληρὰν μὲν, οἶδα, παῖδες· ἀλλ' ἐν γὰρ μόνον | τὰ πάντα λύει ταῦτ' ἔπος μοχθήματα. Eur. Alc. 353: Ψυχρὰν μὲν, οἶμαι, τέρψιν· ἀλλ' ὅμως βάρος | ψυχῆς ἀπαντλοῖην ἄν. Supr. 171 C: Εἰκὸς γε ἄρα . . . ἀλλ' ἡμῖν ἀναγκή, κ.τ.λ. Compare also the frequent asyndeton with πάντως. For ἴσως . . . ἴσως δέ cp. Apol. 18 A: ἴσως μὲν γὰρ χείρων, ἴσως δὲ βελτίων ἂν εἴη . . . 'Perhaps the difficulty will not resist our treatment, or perhaps it will.'

14. συγχωρήσεται . . . ἀντιτενεῖ] Cp. Soph. 254 D: Ἐὰν ἄρα ἡμῖν πη παρεικάθη τὸ μὴ ὃν λέγουσιν ὡς ἔστιν ὄντως μὴ ὃν ἀθόως ἀπαλλάττειν. Rep. 1. 348 E: Τοῦτ' ἤδη στερεώτερον, and, for a similar forlorn hope, Rep. 5. 453 D. ἀλλὰ γὰρ] 'But we must

191. τοιούτω ἐχόμεθα, ἐν ᾧ ἀνάγκη πάντα μεταστρέφοντα λόγον βασανίζειν. σκόπει οὖν εἴ τι λέγω. ἄρα ἔστι μὴ εἰδότα τι πρότερον ὕστερον μαθεῖν ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔστι μέντοι.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ αὐθις ἕτερον καὶ ἕτερον ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί δ' οὐ ;

ΣΩ. Θές δὴ μοι λόγου ἕνεκα ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἡμῶν ἐνὸν κήρινον ἐκμαγεῖον, τῷ μὲν μεῖζον, τῷ δ' ἔλαττον, καὶ τῷ μὲν καθαρωτέρου κηροῦ, τῷ δὲ κοπρωδεστέρου, καὶ σκληροτέρου, ἐνίοις δὲ ὑγροτέρου, ἔστι δ' οἷς με-
 D τρίας ἔχοντος.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τίθημι.

ΣΩ. Δῶρον τοίνυν αὐτὸ φῶμεν εἶναι τῆς τῶν

mistake another whom he sees but does not know, for Socrates whom he knows.

II. a. Hypothesis of the waxen block.

We return therefore in part to the conception of a process, which may be described by

risk the chance of failure, for,' etc.

3. μαθεῖν] The tense is noticeable. Whatever difficulty may attend the conception of the process of learning and forgetting (μανθάνειν, ἐπιλανθάνεσθαι), it is certain that things are learnt and forgotten (μαθεῖν, ἐπιλελησθαι.) In what follows the process itself is imagined rather than analysed.

7. Θές] Cp. Phileb. 33 D: Θές τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἡμῶν . . παθημάτων τὰ μὲν, alib. The image (which was repeated in later Greek philosophy) is not unlike Locke's illustration of the different kinds of memory. Hum. Und. 2. 10. §§ 4, 5: 'The brain in some retains the characters drawn on it like marble, in others like freestone, and in others little better than sand.' Ib. 29. § 3: 'If the organs or faculties of perception, like wax overhardened with cold, will not receive the impression of the seal from

the usual impress wont to imprint it, or like wax of a temper too soft, will not hold it when well imprinted; or else, supposing the wax of a temper fit, but the seal not applied with sufficient force to make a clear impression—in any of these cases the print left by the seal will be obscure.'

8. κήρινον ἐκμαγεῖον] Plato's image is not the common one of a waxen tablet, but of a 'block of wax,' such as was used for sealing. The word ἐκμαγεῖον is used first of the whole mass, afterwards of those parts of it which have received the particular impressions. 'Hanc notionem Plato a Pythagora videtur mutuatus esse. Cp. Hemsterhusius ad Poll. 9. 130.' Wohlrab.

10. σκληροτέρου] Sc. τοῖς μὲν. Cp. supr. 159 B, note on καθεύδοντα δὴ.

13. τῆς τῶν Μουσῶν μητρός] Hes. Theog. 54, Aesch. Prom. 461: Μνήμην θ' ἀπάντων μοι σο-

means of the following image.

Each of us has in his mind a block of wax, on which he receives the stamp of those sensations and perceptions which he wishes to remember. That which he succeeds in stamping there is remembered and known so long as the impression lasts, but that of which the impression

Μουσῶν μητρὸς Μνημοσύνης, καὶ ἐς τοῦτο, ὅ τι ἂν p. 191.
 βουληθῶμεν μνημονεύσαι ὧν ἂν ἴδωμεν ἢ ἀκούσωμεν
 ἢ αὐτοὶ ἐννοήσωμεν, ὑπέχοντας αὐτὸ ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι
 καὶ ἐννοίαις, ἀποτυποῦσθαι, ὥσπερ δακτυλίων σημεῖα
 5 ἐνσημαινομένους. καὶ ὁ μὲν ἂν ἐκμαγῆ μνημονεύειν
 τε καὶ ἐπίστασθαι, ἕως ἂν ἐνῆ τὸ εἶδωλον αὐτοῦ· ὅταν
 δ' ἐξαλειφθῆ ἢ μὴ οἶόν τε γένηται ἐκμαγῆναι, ἐπιλε- E
 λῆσθαι τε καὶ μὴ ἐπίστασθαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔστω οὕτως.

10 ΣΩ. Ὁ τοίνυν ἐπιστάμενος μὲν αὐτά, σκοπῶν δέ
 τι ὧν ὄρα ἢ ἀκούει, ἄθρει εἰ ἄρα τοιῶδε τρόπῳ ψευδῆ
 ἂν δοξάσαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ποίῳ δὴ τινι;

ΣΩ. Ἄ οἶδεν, οἰηθεὶς εἶναι τοτὲ μὲν ἂ οἶδε, τοτὲ δὲ
 15 ἂ μή. ταῦτα γὰρ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν οὐ καλῶς ὠμολο-
 γήσαμεν ὁμολογούντες ἀδύνατα.

μήτορ' ἐργάτιν. Plat. Euthyd.
 275 D: Καθάπερ οἱ ποιηταὶ δέομαι
 ἀρχόμενος τῆς διηγήσεως Μούσας
 τε καὶ Μνημοσύνην ἐπικαλεῖσθαι.

1. ἐς τοῦτο . . ἀποτυποῦσθαι] 'To stamp them upon this, as if we were taking on it the impressions of seal-rings.'

2. ἀκούσωμεν] ἀκούωμεν B T.

3. ἢ αὐτοὶ ἐννοήσωμεν] This addition is occasioned by the account of δόξα given above in 184-187, and prepares the way for the case which follows, *infr.* 195 E. But, although stated here, it is not immediately applied.

ὑπέχοντας αὐτό] 'Holding it' (the wax) 'to receive our perceptions and thoughts.'

4. ἀποτυποῦσθαι] Sc. ἡμᾶς.

ὥσπερ δακτυλίων σημεῖα ἐνσημαινομένους] For the image of the seal cp. Phaed. 75 D, where

it is used of the mind impressing its own idea of Being upon things.

6. ὅταν δ' ἐξαλειφθῆ] 'Ven. Π. corr. ὁ δ' ἂν. Bodl. et Vat. δέ omittunt.' Schanz. The Bodl., however, has δ' in the margin by a later hand. The common reading is sufficiently probable: the regularity of the sentence is broken by the introduction of ἕως ἂν, so that instead of δ δ' ἂν we have ὅταν δέ. Cp. *supr.* 158 E: ὁ ἂν . . ὅταν, and notes.

10. αὐτά] Viz. ἂ ἂν ἴδῃ καὶ ἀκούσῃ ἢ αὐτὸς ἐννοήσῃ (*supr.*)

Although I know what is present to me in sensation, i.e. though I may have in me a previous impression of the same thing, yet I may mistake it, i.e. fail to identify it, when present, as the original of that previous impression.

191. ΘΕΑΙ. Νῦν δὲ πῶς λέγεις ;
192. ΣΩ. Δεῖ ὧδε λέγεσθαι περὶ αὐτῶν, ἐξ ἀρχῆς διοριζομένους, ὅτι ὁ μὲν τις οἶδε σχῶν αὐτοῦ μνημεῖον ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, αἰσθάνεται δὲ αὐτὸ μὴ, τοῦτο οἰηθῆναι ἕτερόν τι ὧν οἶδεν, ἔχοντα καὶ ἐκείνου τύπον, αἰσθάνομενον δὲ μὴ, ἀδύνατον. καὶ ὁ γε οἶδεν αὐ, οἰηθῆναι εἶναι ὁ μὴ οἶδε μῆδ' ἔχει αὐτοῦ σφραγίδα· καὶ ὁ μὴ οἶδεν, ὁ μὴ οἶδεν αὐ· καὶ ὁ μὴ οἶδεν, ὁ οἶδε· καὶ ὁ αἰσθάνεται γε, ἕτερόν τι ὧν αἰσθάνεται οἰηθῆναι εἶναι· καὶ ὁ αἰσθάνεται, ὧν τι μὴ αἰσθάνεται· καὶ ὁ μὴ αἰσθάνεται, ὧν μὴ αἰσθάνεται· καὶ ὁ μὴ αἰσθάνεται, ὧν αἰσθάνεται. καὶ ἔτι γε αὐ ὧν οἶδε καὶ αἰσθάνεται καὶ ἔχει τὸ σημεῖον κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν, οἰηθῆναι αὐ ἕτερόν τι ὧν οἶδε καὶ αἰσθάνεται καὶ ἔχει αὐ καὶ ἐκείνου τὸ σημεῖον κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν, ἀδυνατώτερον ἔτι ἐκείνων, εἰ οἶόν τε. καὶ ὁ οἶδε καὶ † ὁ αἰσθάνεται ἔχων

2. ἐξ ἀρχῆς διοριζομένους] 'Laying down the following preliminary aphorisms.' These are in fact a restatement of the points already agreed upon. There is a change of subject = δεῖ ἡμᾶς λέγειν.

6. ὁ γε οἶδεν] Sc. μὴ αἰσθανόμενος. I. e. not supposing him to have a sensible perception of either object.

8. καὶ ὁ αἰσθάνεται γε] Sc. μὴ εἰδώς. I. e. not supposing him to know it. Both the above cases are distinguished from that in which the predicate is something both known and perceived.

13. καὶ ἔχει τὸ σημεῖον κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν] He holds the stamp left by the former sensation in a line with the present sensation, so that the two impressions coincide. Cp. inf. 194 B: Καταντικρὺ μὲν καὶ κατὰ τὸ εὐθύ.

This is added so as to bear upon the case below, C D: ὧν οἶδε καὶ αἰσθάνεται, κ.τ.λ.

16. The second ὁ is justly questioned by Bonitz.

ἔχων τὸ μνημεῖον ὁρθῶς] Cp. such expressions as ὁρθοῖς ὀμμασιν, ἐξ ὁρθῆς φρενός.

The above statement may be put shortly thus: Mistake is impossible—1. Between things not perceived by sense, when we know both or one or neither of them. 2. Between things not known, when we have a sensible impression of one or both or neither of them. 3. Still more impossible, if that may be, between things, (a) both of which are known, both perceived by sense, and the knowledge of each of which is identified with its proper sensation: (b) One of which we know and also perceive sensi-

is rubbed out, or is imperfectly made, is forgotten and not known.

For what I know in this way I may mistake, sometimes what I do not know.

Mistake is impossible between things both of which are thus known but not present to sense; nor indeed is error possible in any case

without sensation. Still less when two things are known and present to sense, and when the sensation and the old impression coincide: or when neither is present to the mind at all. But when something, either known or unknown, is present to sense, and the mind brings to meet the

τὸ μνημείον ὀρθῶς, ὃ οἶδεν οἰηθῆναι ἀδύνατον· καὶ ὃ p. 192.
 οἶδε καὶ αἰσθάνεται ἔχων κατὰ ταῦτά, ὃ αἰσθάνεται·
 καὶ ὃ αὖ μὴ οἶδε μὴδὲ αἰσθάνεται, ὃ μὴ οἶδε μὴδὲ
 αἰσθάνεται· καὶ ὃ μὴ οἶδε μὴδὲ αἰσθάνεται, ὃ μὴ οἶδε.
 5 καὶ ὃ μὴ οἶδε μὴδὲ αἰσθάνεται, ὃ μὴ αἰσθάνεται.
 πάντα ταῦτα ὑπερβάλλει ἀδυναμία τοῦ ἐν αὐτοῖς
 ψευδῆ τινὰ δοξάσαι. λείπεται δὴ ἐν τοῖς τοιοῖσδε, εἰ
 πέρ που ἄλλοθι, τὸ τοιοῦτον γενέσθαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐν τίσι δὴ; ἐὰν ἄρα ἐξ αὐτῶν τι μᾶλλον
 10 μάθω· νῦν μὲν γὰρ οὐχ ἔπομαι.

ΣΩ. Ἐν οἷς οἶδεν, οἰηθῆναι αὐτὰ ἕτερόν τι εἶναι
 ὧν οἶδε καὶ αἰσθάνεται· ἢ ὧν μὴ οἶδεν, αἰσθάνεται
 δέ· ἢ ὧν οἶδε καὶ αἰσθάνεται, ὧν οἶδεν αὖ καὶ αἰσθά-
 νεται.

15 ΘΕΑΙ. Νῦν πολὺ πλείον ἀπελείφθην ἢ τότε.

bly, and identify the knowledge of it with the sensation: (c) Both or either of which we neither know nor perceive sensibly.

The only cases left, in which mistake is possible, are (1) when one thing is known and another perceived sensibly; or (2) when two things are known and also present to sense, but we fail to connect knowledge and sensation rightly.

3. καὶ ὃ αὖ μὴ οἶδε . . ὃ μὴ αἰσθάνεται] In order to exhaust every conceivable case, the converse or negative of each of the foregoing cases, in which knowledge and sense were combined, must be fully stated.

6. ὑπερβάλλει ἀδυναμία] Cp. supr. B: Ἀδυνατότερον ἔτι ἐκείνων εἰ οἶόν τε. The genitive is governed by ἀδυναμία. 'All these cases are beyond everything in regard to the impossibility of

any man's thinking wrongly in any of them.' Cp. supr. 180 A.

9. ἐὰν ἄρα ἐξ αὐτῶν τι μᾶλλον μάθω] 'For perhaps if you state them, I may better perceive your meaning.' Cp. supr. 156 C: Ἐάν πως ἀποτελεσθῆ. The question here = λέγε.

11-14. Ἐν οἷς . . αὖ καὶ αἰσθάνεται] Error arises amongst things already known, when we mistake for these either (1) other things already known and now perceived through sense, or (2) something now perceived by sense but not previously known, or (3) when for something known and perceived we mistake something else which is also perceived and known. Cp. supr. 191 A: Ἠνίκα, κ.τ.λ., and note.

15. ἀπελείφθην] 'I am lost.' For this use of the aorist of the immediate past, where a person reflects on his own state,

92. ΣΩ. ᾠδε δὴ ἀνάπαλιν ἄκουε. ἐγὼ εἰδὼς Θεό-
 δωρον καὶ ἐν ἐμαυτῷ μεμνημένος οἴός ἐστι, καὶ Θεαί-
 τητον κατὰ ταυτά, ἄλλο τι ἐνίστε μὲν ὀρῶ αὐτούς,
 ἐνίστε δὲ οὐ, καὶ ἄπτομαί ποτ' αὐτῶν, τοτὲ δ' οὐ, καὶ
 ἀκούω ἢ τινα ἄλλην αἴσθησιν αἰσθάνομαι, τοτὲ δ' 5
 αἴσθησιν μὲν οὐδεμίαν ἔχω περὶ ὑμῶν, μέμνημαι δὲ
 ὑμᾶς οὐδὲν ἦττον καὶ ἐπίσταμαι αὐτὸς ἐν ἐμαυτῷ;

sensation
 her old
 impression
 of a dif-
 ferent
 thing—
 then the
 mind mis-
 takes.

E ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Τοῦτο τοίνυν πρῶτον μαθὲ ὦν βούλομαι δη-
 λῶσαι, ὡς ἐστι μὲν ἂ οἶδε μὴ αἰσθάνεσθαι, ἐστι δὲ 10
 αἰσθάνεσθαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθῆ.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἂ μὴ οἶδε, πολλάκις μὲν ἐστι
 μηδὲ αἰσθάνεσθαι, πολλάκις δὲ αἰσθάνεσθαι μόνον;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔστι καὶ τοῦτο.

15

ΣΩ. Ἴδὲ δὴ, ἐάν τι μᾶλλον νῦν ἐπίσπη. Σωκράτης
 93. ἐπιγιγνώσκει Θεόδωρον καὶ Θεαίτητον, ὀρᾶ δὲ μηδέ-
 τερον, μηδὲ ἄλλη αἴσθησις αὐτῷ πάρεστι περὶ αὐτῶν·
 οὐκ ἄν ποτε ἐν ἑαυτῷ δοξάσειεν ὡς ὁ Θεαίτητος ἐστὶ
 Θεόδωρος. λέγω τι ἢ οὐδέν; 20

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί, ἀληθῆ γε.

ΣΩ. Τοῦτο μὲν τοίνυν ἐκείνων πρῶτον ἦν ὦν
 ἔλεγον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἦν γάρ.

ΣΩ. Δεύτερον τοίνυν, ὅτι τὸν μὲν γιγνώσκων 25
 ὑμῶν, τὸν δὲ μὴ γιγνώσκων, αἰσθανόμενος δὲ μηδέ-
 τερον, οὐκ ἄν ποτε αὐ οἰηθείην, ὄν οἶδα, εἶναι ὄν μὴ
 οἶδα.

cp. Soph. Aj. 693: Ἐφριξ' ἔρωτι
 περιχαρῆς δ' ἀνεπτόμαν, alib. ἀπο-
 λειφθῆναι is the opposite of ἐφέ-
 πεσθαι.

I. ᾠδε δὴ. . . ἄκουε] Cp. supr.
 182 A B.

16. Σωκράτης, κ. τ. λ.] This
 putting of the case is equiva-
 lent to an hypothetical clause:
 hence the use of μηδέτερον and
 the apparent asyndeton in οὐκ
 ἄν ποτε, κ. τ. λ.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὅρθως.

ΣΩ. Τρίτον δέ, μηδέτερον γιγνώσκων μηδὲ αἰσθάνομενος οὐκ ἂν οἰηθείην, ὃν μὴ οἶδα, ἕτερόν τιν' εἶναι ἢ ὃν μὴ οἶδα. καὶ τὰλλα τὰ πρότερα πάνθ' ἐξῆς νόμιξε
 5 πάλιν ἀκηκοέναι, ἐν οἷς οὐδέποτ' ἐγὼ περὶ σοῦ καὶ Θεοδώρου τὰ ψευδῆ δοξάσω, οὔτε γιγνώσκων οὔτε ἀγνοῶν ἄμφω, οὔτε τὸν μὲν, τὸν δ' οὐ γιγνώσκων. καὶ περὶ αἰσθήσεων κατὰ ταῦτά, εἰ ἄρα ἔπει.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔπομαι.

10 ΣΩ. Λείπεται τοίνυν τὰ ψευδῆ δοξάσαι ἐν τῷδε, ὅταν γιγνώσκων σὲ καὶ Θεόδωρον, καὶ ἔχων ἐν ἐκείνῳ τῷ κηρίνῳ ὡσπερ δακτυλίων σφῶν ἄμφοῖν τὰ σημεῖα, ἢ
 15 διὰ μακροῦ καὶ μὴ ἰκανῶς ὄρων ἄμφω προθυμηθῶ, τὸ οἰκεῖον ἑκατέρου σημεῖον ἀποδοὺς τῇ οἰκείᾳ ὄψει, ἐμβιβάσας προσαρμόσαι εἰς τὸ ἑαυτῆς ἴχνος, ἵνα γένηται ἀναγνώρισις, εἶτα τούτων ἀποτυχὼν καὶ ὡσπερ οἱ ἐμπαλιν ὑποδοούμενοι παραλλάξας προσβάλω τὴν ἑκατέρου ὄψιν πρὸς τὸ ἀλλότριον σημεῖον, ἢ καὶ οἶα τὰ ἐν τοῖς κατόπτροις τῆς ὄψεως πάθη, δεξιὰ εἰς ἀρι-

False opinion is the wrong putting together of sensation and thought.

13. διὰ μακροῦ, κ.τ.λ.] 'Seeing both of you imperfectly far off, I endeavour to assign the right impression of memory to the right visual impression, and to make the latter stand in its own foot-print, so as to fit, that recognition may take place; and then failing to do so, and bringing the new and old stamps cross-wise like men who put their sandals on the wrong feet, . . .'

14. ἐμβιβάσας προσαρμόσαι] Sc. τὴν ὄψιν. These words and the following (ἵνα γένηται ἀναγνώρισις) suggest an allusion to Aesch. Choeph. 205-211: Καὶ μὴν στίβοι γε, κ.τ.λ.

17. παραλλάξας] Cp. for the

metaphorical use of this word (which here retains something of its literal sense) Tim. 71 E: Οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἔννοος ἐφάπτεται μαντικῆς, ἀλλ' ἢ καθ' ὕπνον . . . πεδηθεὶς . . . ἢ διὰ νόσον ἢ διὰ τινα ἐνθουσιασμόν παραλλάξας.

18. ἢ καὶ οἶα] 'Or my mind errs being affected in the same way as the sight is affected in looking at a mirror, when it shifts so that right becomes left.' Vision is conceived of as flowing from the eye to its object. Cp. Tim. 43.

19. δεξιὰ εἰς ἀριστερὰ μεταρροούσης] 'Slifting, right-side to left.' The words have given some trouble. Buttman conjectured μεταφερούσης, Hein-

03. στερὰ μεταρρεούσης, ταῦτὸν παθὼν διαμάρτω· τότε
 D δὴ συμβαίνει ἢ ἑτεροδοξία καὶ τὸ ψευδῆ δοξάζειν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔοικε γάρ, ὦ Σώκρατες· θαυμασίως ὡς
 λέγεις τὸ τῆς δόξης πάθος.

ΣΩ. Ἐπι τοίνυν καὶ ὅταν ἀμφοτέρους γινώσκων 5
 τὸν μὲν πρὸς τῷ γινώσκειν αἰσθάνωμαι, τὸν δὲ μὴ,
 τὴν δὲ γνώσιν τοῦ ἑτέρου μὴ κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν ἔχω,
 ὃ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν οὕτως ἔλεγον καὶ μοῦ τότε οὐκ
 ἐμάνθανες.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

10

ΣΩ. Τοῦτο μὴν ἔλεγον, ὅτι γινώσκων τὸν ἕτερον
 E καὶ αἰσθανόμενος, καὶ τὴν γνώσιν κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν
 αὐτοῦ ἔχων, οὐδέποτε οἰήσεται εἶναι αὐτὸν ἕτερόν
 τινα ὃν γινώσκει τε καὶ αἰσθάνεται καὶ τὴν γνώ-

dorf says 'medelam a libris expecto.' Stallb. conjectures δεξιᾶς εἰς ἀριστεράν. But (1) may not δεξιᾶ εἰς ἀριστερά be an adverbial expression, originating in apposition? Thus: Ἡ ὄψις μεταρρεῖ δεξιᾶ εἰς ἀριστερά (i. e. τὰ δεξιᾶ αὐτῆς εἰς τὰ ἀριστερά) — when the case of ὄψις changes, δεξιᾶ remains unchanged. Compare ἄνω κάτω στρέφων, Phædr. 278 D; and especially Soph. Ant. 340: Ἰλλομένων ἀρότρων ἔτος εἰς ἔτος, where some MSS. have ἔτους εἰς ἔτος metro repugnante, showing that a similar difficulty had been experienced there. (2) Riddell (Digest of Idioms, § 2) explains δεξιᾶ as in agreement with an unexpressed cognate accusative. (3) It is better to adopt Buttman's conjecture than to take μεταρρεούσης causatively.

1. The phrase ταῦτὸν παθὼν contains the antecedent to οἶα.

3. ὡς] So Bodl. and other MSS., but some have φ. 'Your description tallies wonderfully with one's experience of what Opinion is.' The other reading (which is possibly right) requires a comma at Σώκρατες, 'One's experience of opinion tallies wonderfully with your description.' (Ces. δ. Schanz is silent about the reading of T.)

7. τοῦ ἑτέρου] Viz. of the former, which is present to sense.

8. ὃ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν] This refers to the expression τὴν γνώσιν κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν ἔχειν. Cp. supr. 192 B C.

11. Heind. would insert ὁ before γινώσκων: but for the transition from the 1st to the 3rd person when the nominative is indefinite cp. infr. 195 D E: Οἰηθείημεν . . . οἰηθείη.

14. ὃν γινώσκει] This is the Bodleian reading, which seems

σιν αὖ καὶ ἐκείνου ἔχει κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν. ἦν γὰρ p. 193
τοῦτο;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Παρελείπετο δέ γέ που τὸ νῦν λεγόμενον, ἐν
5 ᾧ δὴ φαμέν τὴν ψευδῆ δόξαν γίνεσθαι τὸ ἄμφω γι-
γνώσκοντα καὶ ἄμφω ὀρώντα ἢ τινα ἄλλην αἴσθησιν p. 194
ἔχοντα ἀμφοῖν, τὸ σημείω μὴ κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ αἴσθη-
σιν ἐκάτερον ἔχειν, ἀλλ' οἷον τοξότην φαῦλον ἰέντα
παραλλάξαι τοῦ σκοποῦ καὶ ἀμαρτεῖν, ὃ δὴ καὶ ψευ-
10 δος ἄρα ὠνόμασται.

ΘΕΑΙ. Εἰκότως γε.

ΣΩ. Καὶ ὅταν τοίνυν τῷ μὲν παρῆ αἴσθησις τῶν
σημείων, τῷ δὲ μή, τὸ δὲ τῆς ἀπουσίας αἰσθήσεως τῆ
παρούση προσαρμύση, πάντη ταύτη ψεύδεται ἢ διά-
15 νοια. καὶ ἐνὶ λόγῳ, περὶ ᾧ μὲν μὴ οἶδέ τις μηδὲ ἐπή-
σθετο πώποτε, οὐκ ἔστιν, ὡς εἴκειν, οὔτε ψεύδεσθαι B
οὔτε ψευδῆς δόξα, εἴ τι νῦν ἡμεῖς ὑγιᾶς λέγομεν. περὶ
δὲ ᾧ ἴσμεν τε καὶ αἰσθανόμεθα, ἐν αὐτοῖς τούτοις

preferable to ᾧν, the reading of T. The reference of ἐκείνου is thus made more distinct.

1. ἦν γὰρ τοῦτο;] 'We agreed to this?'

6. ἢ τινα . . . ἔχειν] 'Or having some other sensible perception of them, to fail in holding the previous impressions of both, each over against the sensation which belongs to it.' This reading of Van Heusde is supported by T and other MSS., which read τῷ σημείῳ. The Bodl. has τὸ σημείον. Stallb. reads τὸ σημείον . . . ἐκατέρου, Heindorf, τῶν σημείων . . . ἐκάτερον.

8. ἀλλ' οἷον τοξότην φαῦλον] I. e. we try, sometimes in vain, to make our memory coincide

with present facts. We are beginning to have a livelier conception of the *movement* of the mind and of the *remoteness* of sensible things from our notions of them.

12. Καὶ ὅταν τοίνυν] 'So likewise when,' etc. In the former case both objects were known, and both present in sensation: in this, while both are known, one only is present to sense.

13. τὸ δὲ τῆς ἀπουσίας αἰσθήσεως] Sc. σημείον.

14. προσαρμύση] Sc. ἢ διάνοια.

15. ἐπήσθετο] Sc. αὐτῶν. Most MSS. read μηδὲ ἴσθετο, but the correction of the Bodl. is in the ancient hand.

18. ἐν αὐτοῖς . . . ἡ δόξα] 'Here, and here alone, opinion twists

4. στρέφεται καὶ ἐλίπτεται ἢ δόξα ψευδῆς καὶ ἀληθῆς
 γιγνομένη, καταντικρὺ μὲν καὶ κατὰ τὸ εὐθὺ τὰ οἰκεία
 συνάγουσα ἀποτυπώματα καὶ τύπους ἀληθῆς, εἰς
 πλάγια δὲ καὶ σκολιὰ ψευδῆς.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκοῦν καλῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, λέγεται; 5

ΣΩ. Ἐτι τοῖνυν καὶ τάδε ἀκούσας μᾶλλον αὐτὸ
 ἐρεῖς. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀληθὲς δοξάζειν καλόν, τὸ δὲ
 ψεύδестhai αἰσχρόν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς δ' οὐ;

ΣΩ. Ταῦτα τοῖνυν φασὶν ἐνθένδε γίγνεσθαι. ὅταν 10
 μὲν ὁ κηρός του ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ βαθύς τε καὶ πολὺς καὶ
 λείος καὶ μετρίως *ᾠργασμένος ἦ, τὰ ἴοντα διὰ τῶν
 αἰσθήσεων, ἐσημαινόμενα εἰς τοῦτο τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς
 κέαρ, ὃ ἔφη Ὀμηρος αἰνιττόμενος τὴν τοῦ κηροῦ
 D ὁμοιότητα, τότε μὲν καὶ τούτοις καθαρὰ τὰ σημεῖα 15
 ἐγγιγνόμενα καὶ ἰκανῶς τοῦ βάθους ἔχοντα πολυχρόνιά

The cause of this lies in the nature of the waxen block, which may be either too shallow, or too hard, or too soft, or too narrow, or

and twirls about, becoming true and false alternately.' Cp. the language of Rep. 5. 479 D: Ὅτι τὰ τῶν πολλῶν πολλὰ νόμμα... μεταξὺ που κυλιθεῖται, κ.τ.λ.

3. ἀποτυπώματα καὶ τύπους] (1) τύπος is here the present impression, which we endeavour to fit into the mark left by the former one (ἀποτύπωμα). τύπος can scarcely be (2) 'the form of the object.' This would be inconsistent with the previous use of the word, 192 A.

6. μᾶλλον αὐτὸ ἐρεῖς] Plato is satirizing the fallacy of supposing that physical illustrations can serve to explain the operations of the mind.

10. φασίν] This may or may not imply a reference to some contemporary doctrine. It indicates the half mythical tone which Socrates has assumed. He knows nothing

of himself, but only repeats what he has heard.

12. *ᾠργασμένος] 'Tempered.' This word has been restored from Timæus to Suidas, the latter of whom quotes this passage. MSS. εἰργασμένος.

τὰ ἴοντα διὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων... ἐσημαινόμενα... καθαρὰ τὰ σημεῖα ἐγγιγνόμενα] The thread of the sentence is resumed in an altered form. Cp. Polit. 295 D: Πᾶν τοιοῦτον... ξύμβαινον... γέλως ἂν... γίγνοιτο τῶν τοιούτων... Phæd. 69 B C: Χωριζόμενα δέ, κ.τ.λ.

14. κέαρ] The Homeric form is κῆρ. But κέαρ, although still a poetical form, might be felt to harmonize better with Attic Greek. See above, 173 E, and note.

16. ἰκανῶς... ἔχοντα] 'Being adequate in respect of their depth.'

impure, whence the impressions are either imperfect or faint, or short-lived, or crowded, or coarse and dim, so that it is difficult for the mind to make each sensation correspond to its proper footprint.

τε γίγνεται καὶ εἰσὶν οἱ τοιοῦτοι πρῶτον μὲν εὐμαθεῖς, p. 194
 ἔπειτα μνήμονες, εἶτα οὐ παραλλάττουσι τῶν αἰσθήσεων τὰ σημεῖα ἀλλὰ δοξάζουσιν ἀληθῆ. σαφῆ γὰρ καὶ ἐν εὐρυχωρίᾳ ὄντα ταχὺ διανέμουσιν ἐπὶ τὰ αὐτῶν
 5 ἕκαστα ἐκμαγεία, ἃ δὴ ὄντα καλεῖται. καὶ σοφοὶ δὴ οὗτοι καλοῦνται. ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὑπερφυῶς μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ὅταν τοίνυν λάσιόν του τὸ κέαρ ἦ, ὃ δὴ ἐ
 ἐπήνεσεν ὁ πάντα σοφὸς ποιητής, ἢ ὅταν κοπρῶδες

2. τῶν αἰσθήσεων] 'Do not fail in identifying the new impressions with the old.' The genitive depends on παραλλάττουσι, like τοῦ σκοποῦ above.

3. σαφῆ γὰρ καὶ ἐν εὐρυχωρίᾳ ὄντα . . . καλεῖται] (1) There is here a similar irregularity to that noticed above. The sentence begins as though it were to be σαφῆ γὰρ . . . ὄντα (sc. τὰ σημεῖα) ταχὺ εὐρίσκουσιν, or something of the kind: but the thought grows as we proceed: and σαφῆ . . . ὄντα is left as an accusativus pendens. What follows is to be construed thus: ταχὺ διανέμουσιν (οἱ τοιοῦτοι ταῦτα) ἃ δὴ ὄντα καλεῖται, ἕκαστα ἐπὶ τὰ αὐτῶν ἐκμαγεία. 'Such persons quickly distribute things (as we term them) each to the place of its own former impress upon the block.'

Or (2) ἐκμαγεία may possibly here, as in Legg. 7. 800, 801, mean the mould or form of the seal which gives the impression. Cp. supra, note on ἀποτυπώματα καὶ τύπους, (2). This gives a simpler construction and a good meaning, but ἐκμαγεία is used in the other sense infr. E. 'For they quickly assign

them (τὰ σημεῖα) as being distinct, and having room enough, each to its proper (sensible) original, or so-called reality.'

5. ἃ δὴ ὄντα καλεῖται] Supr. 152 D: ἃ δὴ φάμεν εἶναι, 153 E. The latter part of the dialogue does not forget the earlier part.

σοφοί] Supr. 161 D, 167 B.

8. λάσιον . . . κέαρ] Π. 2. 851: Πυλαιμένους λάσιον κῆρ. 16. 554: Πατροκλῆος λάσιον κῆρ. In Homer the epithet 'shaggy' is transferred from σιτήθος το κῆρ,—but is here understood of a rugged surface that will not take clear impressions. The wisdom of Homer consists in his knowing of the κηρός, rather than in his praise, which is, of course, mistaken. But Plato is satirizing the allegorical method of interpretation, which may have been often not less absurdly applied.

9. ὁ πάντα σοφὸς ποιητής] To appreciate the irony here, it is well to compare Soph. 233 DE, where the parallel is drawn between the man who 'creates' everything and the man who knows everything; as well as Rep. 10. 596, εἰqq.

94. καὶ μὴ καθαροῦ τοῦ κηροῦ, ἢ ὑγρὸν σφόδρα ἢ σκληρόν, ὧν μὲν ὑγρὸν, εὐμαθεῖς μὲν, ἐπιλήσμονες δὲ γίνονται, ὧν δὲ σκληρόν, τάναντία. οἱ δὲ δὴ λάσιον καὶ τραχύ, λιθῶδες τι ἢ γῆς ἢ κόπρου συμμιγείσης ἔμπλεων, ἔχοντες, ἀσαφῆ τὰ ἐκμαγεῖα ἴσχουσιν. ἀσαφῆ δὲ 5
 95. καὶ οἱ τὰ ὑγρά· ὑπὸ γὰρ τοῦ συγχεῖσθαι ταχὺ γίνονται ἀμυδρά. εἰάν δὲ πρὸς πᾶσι τούτοις ἐπ' ἀλλήλων συμπεπτωκότα ἢ ὑπὸ στενοχωρίας, εἰάν του σμικρὸν ἢ τὸ ψυχάριον, ἔτι ἀσαφέστερα ἐκείνων. πάντες οὖν 10
 οὔτοι γίνονται οἷοι δοξάζειν ψευδῆ. ὅταν γάρ τι ὀρώσιν ἢ ἀκούωσιν ἢ ἐπινοῶσιν, ἕκαστα ἀπονέμειν

3. τάναντία] I. e. δυσμαθεῖς μὲν, μὴμόνες δέ. Plato is again thinking of the rare combination of brilliancy with solidity, which is present in Theætetus, supr. 144 A.

λάσιον] 'Shaggy.' Here, as in the case of βλοσυρός, we experience what is a frequent difficulty in Plato, that of determining the precise ethical meaning with which he adapts an Epic word.

4. λιθῶδες τι] 'Those in whom it is shaggy and rugged, a gritty substance, or one filled with an admixture of earth or dung.' The correction λιθῶδες τε (Ficin. Heusd.) avoids the inconsistency of putting as a single case what are spoken of above as two (λάσιον . . ἢ . . κοπρῶδες): 'In whom it is shaggy and rugged and stony, or full of the admixture of earth or dung.'

10. ψυχάριον] Cp. Rep. 7. 519 A: 'Ὡς δριμύν βλέπει τὰ ψυχάριον.

12. ἢ ἐπινοῶσιν] Cp. supr. 191 D: *Ἡ αὐτοὶ ἐννοήσωμεν.

It may be asked, whether these expressions do not provide for the difficulty that is raised afterwards about 11 and 12? The answer probably is, that the difficulty which is brought into full light afterwards, is here silently anticipated. (Compare the introduction of ἀγαθόν and καλόν in 157 D, and the deliberate slurring over, in 188 C, of the case which is afterwards to be recognized, 191 A. The inconsistency must be admitted, but it is not necessary, with H. Schmidt, to condemn the words.

The case supposed, though not distinctly stated, may be that in which an impression of sense calls up an alien association: i. e. the second of the two cases given above, 194 A.

As we dwell upon the image we have raised, we find that it is too simple to express more than the relations of sense and memory, and instead of multiplying κήρυμα πλάσματα, a fresh image is in-

ταχὺ ἐκάστοις οὐ δυνάμενοι βραδεῖς τέ εἰσι καὶ ἀλ- p. 195.
λοτριονομοῦντες παρορώσι τε καὶ παρακούουσι καὶ
παρανοοῦσι πλείστα, καὶ καλοῦνται αὐ οὔτοι ἐψευ-
σμένοι τε δὴ τῶν ὄντων καὶ ἀμαθεῖς.

5 ΘΕΑΙ. Ὅρθότατα ἀνθρώπων λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες. Β.
ΣΩ. Φῶμεν ἄρα ἐν ἡμῖν ψευδεῖς δόξας εἶναι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Σφόδρα γε.

ΣΩ. Καὶ ἀληθεῖς δὴ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ ἀληθεῖς.

10 ΣΩ. Ἦδη οὖν οἴομεθα ἱκανῶς ὠμολογήσθαι ὅτι
παντὸς μᾶλλον ἐστὸν ἀμφοτέρα τούτω τὸ δόξα;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὑπερφυῶς μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Δεινόν τε, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ὡς ἀληθῶς κινδυνεύει
καὶ ἀηδὲς εἶναι ἀνὴρ ἀδολέσχης.

15 ΘΕΑΙ. Τί δέ; πρὸς τί τοῦτ' εἶπες;

ΣΩ. Τὴν ἐμαντοῦ δυσμαθίαν δυσχεράνας καὶ ὡς ο

roduced in Plato's usual man-
ner. The touches of humour
have led some critics to sup-
pose that Plato is alluding to
contemporary opinions (supr.
191 C, note on l. 8). But may
he not be laughing at himself?

The description of the act
of recollecting in the Philebus,
34 B, should be compared
with the present passage:
"Ὅταν ἂ μετὰ τοῦ σώματος ἐπασχε
πάθη ἢ ψυχῇ, ταῦτ' ἄνευ τοῦ σώ-
ματος αὐτῇ ἐν ἑαυτῇ ὅ τι μάλιστα
ἀναλαμβάνη, τότε ἀναμνήσκεσθαι
που λέγομεν. ἢ γάρ; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
Καὶ μὴν καὶ ὅταν ἀπολέσασα μνή-
μην εἴτε αἰσθήσεως εἴτ' αὐ μαθή-
ματος αὐτῆς ταύτην ἀναπόληση ἐν
ἑαυτῇ, καὶ ταῦτα ξύμπαντα ἀναμνή-
σεις καὶ μνήμας που λέγομεν. The
former and simpler process
corresponds to the search for
the impression upon the wax;

the latter to the hunt in the
aviary for a missing bird.

ἕκαστα . . ἐκάστοις] (1) τὰ ὄντα
τοῖς ἐκμαγείοις, or (2) τὰ σημεῖα
τοῖς οὐσιν. See above, note on
σαφῆ γάρ, κ.τ.λ. (194 D, l. 3).

1. ἀλλοτριονομοῦντες] 'Mis-
appropriating,' i. e. 'Assigning
wrongly.'

3. καλοῦνται αὐ οὔτοι] αὐ re-
fers to supr. 194 D: Καὶ σοφοὶ
δὴ οὔτοι καλοῦνται. ἀμαθεῖς is the
opposite of σοφοί, the words
ἐψευσμένοι τε δὲ τῶν ὄντων being
inserted by way of explanation.

13. Δεινόν τε] The old edi-
tions had γε. The abruptness
of the reading in the text is
better than such a meaning-
less connection. Socrates breaks
out, after a pause, with an
expression, the relevancy of
which does not at once ap-
pear.

195. ἀληθῶς ἀδολεσχίαν. τί γὰρ ἂν τις ἄλλο θεῖτο ὄνομα, ὅταν ἄνω κάτω τοὺς λόγους ἔλκη τις ὑπὸ νωθείας οὐ δυνάμενος πεισθῆναι, καὶ ἧ̄ δυσπαλλάκτος ἀφ' ἐκάστου λόγου;

ΘΕΑΙ. Σὺ δὲ δὴ τί δυσχεραίνεις;

ΣΩ. Οὐ δυσχεραίνω μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ δέδοικα ὅ τι ἀποκρινούμαι, ἂν τις ἔρηταί με. Ὡ̄ Σώκρατες, εὐρηκας δὴ ψευδῆ δόξαν, ὅτι οὔτε ἐν ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν ἐστι πρὸς ἀλλήλας οὔτ' ἐν ταῖς διανοίαις, ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ συνάψει αἰσθήσεως πρὸς διάνοιαν; Φήσω δὲ ἐγώ, οἶμαι, 10 καλλωπιζόμενος ὡς τι εὐρηκότων ἡμῶν καλόν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ̄ Σώκρατες, οὐκ αἰσχροὺν εἶναι τὸ νῦν ἀποδοδειγμένον.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν, φήσει, λέγεις ὅτι αὐ̄ τὸν ἄνθρωπον ὃν διανοούμεθα μόνον, ὀρώμεν δ' οὔ, ἵππον οὐκ ἂν 15 ποτε οἰθηείμεν εἶναι, ὃν αὐ̄ οὔτε ὀρώμεν οὔτε ἀπτόμεθα, διανοούμεθα δὲ μόνον καὶ ἄλλ' οὐδὲν αἰσθανόμεθα περὶ αὐτοῦ; Ταῦτα, οἶμαι, φήσω λέγειν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ ὀρθῶς γε.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν, *φήσει, τὰ ἔνδεκα, ἃ̄ μηδὲν ἄλλο ἧ̄ 20 διανοεῖται τις, ἄλλο τι ἐκ τούτου τοῦ λόγου οὐκ ἂν ποτε οἰθηεῖ δώδεκα εἶναι, ἃ̄ μόνον αὐ̄ διανοεῖται; ἴθι οὖν δὴ, σὺ ἀποκρίνου.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἄλλ' ἀποκρινούμαι, ὅτι ὀρών μὲν ἂν τις ἧ̄

2. ἄνω κάτω τοὺς λόγους ἔλκη τις] Compare the still livelier image supr. 191 C: Ἐν ᾧ̄ ἀνάγκη πάντα μεταστρέφοντα λόγον βασανίζειν.

14. Οὐκοῦν, φήσει, λέγεις ὅτι αὐ̄] 'Is it not then part of your hypothesis, he will say, that on the other hand . . .' If mistake arises upon the wrong union of sensation and thought, thought cannot be mistaken

when unaccompanied by sensation. (Cp. supr. 190 C.) The opposition between these two cases is expressed by αὐ̄. Most MSS. have φησί. But φήσει is in Par. 1812.

16. ὃν αὐ̄] 'Which again,' i. e. as well as the man.

20. *φήσει] Bodl. φησί with Vat. Ven. Π. φησί T. Stephanus corr.

But, when we consider it, the hypothesis is not adequate to the phenomena. E. g. The numbers eleven and twelve are not objects of sensation, but of thought, i. e. they are impressions on the waxen block, and yet in adding 7 and 5 people sometimes take eleven instead of twelve.

ἐφαπτόμενος οἰηθείη τὰ ἔνδεκα δώδεκα εἶναι, ἃ μέντοι p. 195.
 ἐν τῇ διανοίᾳ ἔχει, οὐκ ἂν ποτε περὶ αὐτῶν ταῦτα
 δοξάσειεν οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; οἶει τινὰ πώποτε αὐτὸν ἐν αὐτῷ
 5 πέντε καὶ ἑπτὰ, λέγω δὲ μὴ ἀνθρώπους ἑπτὰ καὶ p. 196.
 πέντε προθέμενον σκοπεῖν μηδ' ἄλλο τοιοῦτον, ἀλλ'
 αὐτὰ πέντε καὶ ἑπτὰ, ἃ φάμεν ἐκεῖ μνημεῖα ἐν τῷ
 ἔκμαγείῳ εἶναι καὶ ψευδῆ ἐν αὐτοῖς οὐκ εἶναι δοξάσαι,
 ταῦτα αὐτὰ εἴ τις ἀνθρώπων ἤδη πώποτε ἐσκέψατο
 10 λέγων πρὸς αὐτὸν καὶ ἐρωτῶν πόσα ποτ' ἐστί, καὶ ὁ
 μὲν τις εἶπεν οἰηθεὶς ἔνδεκα αὐτὰ εἶναι, ὁ δὲ δώδεκα, ἢ
 πάντες λέγουσίν τε καὶ οἴονται δώδεκα αὐτὰ εἶναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ἀλλὰ πολλοὶ δὴ καὶ
 ἔνδεκα· εἰ δέ γε ἐν πλείονι ἀριθμῷ τις σκοπῆται, B
 15 μᾶλλον σφάλλεται. οἶμαι γάρ σε περὶ παντὸς μάλ-
 λον ἀριθμοῦ λέγειν.

7. αὐτὰ πέντε καὶ ἑπτὰ] The insertion of the article after αὐτὰ does not seem necessary, though it may possibly be right.

ἐκεῖ . . ἐν τῷ ἔκμαγείῳ] 'In that block of which we spoke.'

μνημεῖα] 'Records.' At this stage of psychological inquiry, Memory is made to do the work of Abstraction.

9. εἴ τις ἀνθρώπων] The question is resumed with εἰ, depending on λέγω, which has broken the regularity of the sentence. 'I mean to ask if . . .' If the sentence had proceeded regularly, it would be followed by σκεψάμενον . . . εἰπεῖν. But εἴ τις, κ.τ.λ., follows λέγω = ἐρωτῶ.

10. λέγων πρὸς αὐτόν] Socrates refers to his own description of the process of thinking, supr. 189, 190.

14. εἰ δέ γε] Theætetus is permitted to enlarge a little upon the subject of calculation, with which he is familiar (supr. 145 D). We seek to identify the sum of 7 and 5, of which we have thought (ἐπινοήσαμεν) with the corresponding number in our minds: and by mistake we identify it with 11 instead of 12.

The statement of this case shows the inadequacy of the figure we have adopted. For where are the 7 and 5 and the sum of them of which we think? They are not in sensation: must they not then be in the waxen block? The former difficulty returns—we have taken one thing which we know for another thing which we know.

196. ΣΩ. Ὁρθῶς γὰρ οἶει. καὶ ἐνθυμοῦ μή τί *τότε γίνεταί ἄλλο ἢ αὐτὰ τὰ δώδεκα τὰ ἐν τῷ ἐκμαγείῳ ἔνδεκα οἰηθῆναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔοικέ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰς τοὺς πρώτους πάλιν ἀνήκει λό- 5 γους; ὁ γὰρ τοῦτο παθῶν, ὃ οἶδεν, ἕτερον αὐτὸ οἶεται εἶναι ὧν αὐτὸ οἶδεν, ὃ ἔφαμεν ἀδύνατον, καὶ τούτῳ αὐτῷ ἠναγκάζομεν μὴ εἶναι ψευδῆ δόξαν, ἵνα μὴ τὰ αὐτὰ ὁ αὐτὸς ἀναγκάζεταιτο εἰδῶς μὴ εἰδέναι ἅμα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθέστατα.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἄλλ' ὅτιοῦν δεῖ ἀποφαίνειν τὸ τὰ 10 ψευδῆ δοξάζειν ἢ διανοίας πρὸς αἰσθησιν παραλλαγῆν. εἰ γὰρ τοῦτ' ἦν, οὐκ ἂν ποτε ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς διανοήμασιν ἐψευδόμεθα. νῦν δὲ ἦτοι οὐκ ἔστι ψευδῆς δόξα, ἢ ἃ τις οἶδεν, οἷόν τε μὴ εἰδέναι. καὶ τούτων 15 πότερα αἰρεῖ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀπορον αἵρεσιν προτίθης, ὧ Σώκρατες.

197. ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μέντοι ἀμφοτέρᾳ γε κινδυνεύει ὁ λόγος οὐκ ἑάσειν. ὅμως δέ, πάντα γὰρ τολμητέον, τί εἰ ἐπιχειρήσῃμεν ἀναισχυντεῖν;

1. *τότε] MSS. πότε. Heind. corr. οἰηθῆναι, sc. τὸν σκοποῦντα.

5. Οὐκοῦν εἰς τοὺς πρώτους] 'The discussion has reverted to its first stage.' Supr. 188 B. Comparing Phil. 43 C, one is tempted to read ἄν ἦκοι.

8. ἠναγκάζομεν . . ἀναγκάζοιτο] 'It was by this very argument we tried to make the non-existence of false opinion inevitable, because otherwise it would be inevitable that the same person should know and be ignorant at once.'

11. ἄλλ' ὅτιοῦν] 'Anything but this.' So Bodl. Most MSS. give ἄλλο τι οὖν.

18. ἀμφοτέρα] Viz. τὸ εἶναι ψευδῆ δόξαν and ἃ τις οἶδεν οὐχ οἷόν τε εἶναι μὴ εἰδέναι.

19. τί . . ἀναισχυντεῖν] 'How, if we were for once to venture on a shameless course? The distinction between potential and actual now to be made requires a definition of the act of knowing. The difference meant is analogous to that observed by Aristotle between ἐπίστασθαι and θεωρεῖν; which is his favourite example of the difference between ἐξῆς and ἐνέργεια. Cp. Eth. N. I. 8: Διαφέρει δ' οὐ μικρὸν ἐν κτήσει ἢ ἐν χρήσει τὸ ἄριστον ὑπολαμβάνειν. The ten-

To meet this difficulty, we venture to say what it is to know, —(a daring step, as we are still to seek for the definition of Knowledge.)

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς;

ΣΩ. Ἐβελήσαντες εἰπεῖν ποῖόν τί ποτ' ἐστὶ τὸ ἐπίστασθαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ τί τοῦτο ἀναίσχυντον;

5 ΣΩ. Ἐοικας οὐκ ἐννοεῖν, ὅτι πᾶς ἡμῖν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὁ λόγος ζήτησις γέγονεν ἐπιστήμης, ὡς οὐκ εἰδῶσι τί ποτ' ἐστίν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐννοῶ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ἐπειτ' οὐκ ἀναιδὲς δοκεῖ, μὴ εἰδότας ἐπιστή-
10 μην ἀποφαίνεσθαι τὸ ἐπίστασθαι οἷόν ἐστιν; ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ Θεαίτητε, πάλαι ἐσμὲν ἀνάπλεω τοῦ μὴ καθα-
ρῶς διαλέγεσθαι. μυριάκις γὰρ εἰρήκαμεν τὸ γιγνώ-

dency to this distinction appears in Sophocles, Ant. 1278 :

Ἔ δεσπόθ', ὡς, ἔχων τε καὶ κεκτημένος, κ.τ.λ.

9. μὴ εἰδότας, κ.τ.λ.] Socrates' ideal requirement of a perfect definition as the first step in discussion is perpetually mocking us in Plato. Protag. 361, Rep. I. 354.

11. ἀνάπλεω τοῦ μὴ καθαρῶς διαλέγεσθαι] 'Infected with logical imperfection.' Cp. Charm. 175 BC: Καίτοι πολλά γε ξυγκεχωρήκαμεν οὐ ξυμβάινονθ' ἡμῖν ἐν τῷ λόγῳ. καὶ γὰρ ἐπιστήμην ἐπιστήμης εἶναι ξυνεχωρήσαμεν, οὐκ ἔωντος τοῦ λόγου οὐδὲ φάσκοντος εἶναι· καὶ ταύτη αὐτῇ ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν ἔργα γινώσκειν ξυνεχωρήσαμεν, οὐδὲ τοῦτ' ἔωντος τοῦ λόγου. . . τοῦτο μὲν δὴ καὶ παντάπασι μεγαλοπρεπῶς ξυνεχωρήσαμεν, οὐδ' ἐπισκεψάμενοι τὸ ἀδύνατον εἶναι, ἃ τις μὴ οἶδε μηδαμῶς, ταῦτα εἰδέναι ἁμῶς γέ πως. . . καίτοι, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, οὐδενὸς ὅτου οὐχὶ ἀλογώτερον τοῦτ' ἂν φανείη.

τοῦ μὴ καθαρῶς διαλέγεσθαι] In other words, we have felt our way hitherto, not by ab-

stract definition and inference, but (as it is expressed in Rep. 7. 533 C) τὰς ὑποθέσεις ἀναρῶντες ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχήν. We first ventured the hypothesis ἀσθησις ἐπιστήμη. This was rejected, but the difficulties we met with pointed to a further hypothesis, ὅτι ἡ ἀληθὴς δόξα ἐπιστήμη ἐστίν. Here again we are met by fresh difficulties, but the discussion of them leads to a fresh hypothesis, viz. that we may know, without having knowledge in hand.

12. μυριάκις γὰρ εἰρήκαμεν] We are haunted throughout by a difficulty respecting the search for knowledge akin to that respecting its definition. Can we know it, and yet not know it? To inquire about it implies ignorance of its nature, and yet how can we use the name even in inquiry without knowing the meaning of the name? 147 B: Ἡ οἶε τίς τι συνήσις τινος ὄνομα, ὃ μὴ οἶδε τί ἐστι; 210 A: Καὶ παντάπασί γε εἴηθες ζητούντων ἡμῶν ἐπιστήμην δόξαν φάναι ὀρθὴν εἶναι μετ' ἐπιστήμης.

196. σκομεν καὶ οὐ γιννώσκομεν, καὶ ἐπιστάμεθα καὶ οὐκ ἐπιστάμεθα, ὥς τι συνιέντες ἀλλήλων ἐν ᾧ ἔτι ἐπιστήμην ἀγνοοῦμεν. εἰ δὲ βούλει, καὶ νῦν ἐν τῷ παρόντι κεχρήμεθ' αὐτῷ τῷ ἀγνοεῖν τε καὶ συνιέναι, ὡς προσήκον αὐτοῖς χρῆσθαι, εἴπερ στερόμεθα ἐπι- 5 στήμης.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἄλλὰ τίνα τρόπον διαλέξει, ὦ Σώκρατες, τούτων ἀπεχόμενος ;

197. ΣΩ. Οὐδένα ὧν γε ὁς εἰμί· εἰ μέντοι ἦν ἀντιλογικός· οἷος ἀνὴρ εἰ καὶ νῦν παρῆν, τούτων τ' ἂν ἔφη 10 ἀπέχεσθαι καὶ ἡμῖν σφόδρ' ἂν ἂ ἐγὼ λέγω ἐπέπλητ-
τεν. ἐπειδὴ οὖν ἐσμὲν φαῦλοι, βούλει τολμήσω εἰπεῖν οἷόν ἐστι τὸ ἐπίστασθαι ; φαίνεται γάρ μοι προὔργου τι ἂν γενέσθαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τόλμα τοίνυν νῆ Δία. τούτων δὲ μὴ ἀπε- 15
χομένῳ σοι ἔσται πολλὴ συγγνώμη.

7. Ἄλλὰ τίνα τρόπον διαλέξει, ὦ Σώκρατες] Compare what was said of being, 157 B: τὸ δ' εἶναι πανταχόθεν ἐξαιρετέον, οὐχ ὅτι καὶ ἡμεῖς πολλὰ καὶ ἄρτι ἠναγκάσμεθα ὑπὸ συνηθείας καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνης χρῆσθαι αὐτῷ.

That there is such a thing as absolute knowledge and absolute being is the postulate of Plato's mind. That he himself or any man can wholly grasp either is more than he will dare to say. The sacredness of this belief, which it would be impious to relinquish, appears also in Theætetus' answer: τούτων δὲ μὴ ἀπεχομένῳ ἔσται σοι πολλὴ συγγνώμη. Cp. Parm. 135 C: τί οὖν ποιήσεις φιλοσοφίας περὶ ; ποῖ τρέψει ἀγνοουμένων τούτων ;

9. ὧν γε ὁς εἰμί] Cp. Phædr. 243 E: Ἐωσπερ ἂν ἦς ὁς εἶ.

εἰ μέντοι ἦν ἀντιλογικός] The apodosis (διελεγόμην ἂν ὡς τούτων ἀπεχόμενος) is omitted, and the construction changed, because, from supposing himself ἀντιλογικός, Socrates proceeds to imagine the effect of the presence of such a man upon the discussion.

10. τούτων τ' ἂν ἔφη ἀπέχεσθαι] Not exactly with Heind., Stallb., 'abstineret nos jubeatur,' but (1) (sub. δεῖν) 'would have dwelt on the necessity of abstaining,' or, possibly, (2) (throwing an emphasis on ἡμῖν), 'Would have professed to abstain.' The kind of sophistry intended is illustrated supr. 157 B C, 165-7. τούτων ἀπεχόμενος is not, as some interpreters would have it, 'without definition,' but 'without assuming the reality of knowledge.'

ΣΩ. Ἀκήκοας οὖν ὃ νῦν λέγουσι τὸ ἐπίστασθαι; p. 197.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἴσως· οὐ μέντοι ἔν γε τῷ παρόντι μνημονεύω.

ΣΩ. Ἐπιστήμης που ἕξι φασὶν αὐτὸ εἶναι.

5 ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθῆ.

ΣΩ. Ἡμεῖς τοίνυν σμικρὸν μεταθώμεθα καὶ εἰ-
πωμεν ἐπιστήμης κτήσιν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί οὖν δὴ φήσεις τοῦτο ἐκείνου διαφέρειν;

ΣΩ. Ἴσως μὲν οὐδέν· ὃ δ' οὖν δοκεῖ, ἀκούσας
10 συνδοκίμαζε.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐάν πέρ γε οἴός τ' ὦ.

ΣΩ. Οὐ τοίνυν μοι ταῦτὸν φαίνεται τῷ κεκτῆσθαι
τὸ ἔχειν. οἶον *εἰ ἰμάτιον πριάμενός τις καὶ ἐγκρατῆς
ὦν μὴ φοροῖ· ἔχειν μὲν οὐκ ἂν αὐτὸν αὐτό, κεκτῆσθαι

15 δέ γε φαῖμεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὅρθῶς γε.

ΣΩ. Ὅρα δὴ καὶ ἐπιστήμην εἰ δυνατὸν οὕτω κε-
κτημένον μὴ ἔχειν, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ εἰ τις ὄρνιθας ἀγρίας,
περιστερὰς ἢ τι ἄλλο, θηρεύσας οἴκοι κατασκευασά-
20 μενος περιστερεῶνα τρέφοι. τρόπον μὲν γὰρ ἂν πού
τινα φαῖμεν αὐτὸν αὐτὰς ἀεὶ ἔχειν, ὅτι δὴ κέκτηται.
ἢ γάρ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

4. Ἐπιστήμης . . ἕξιν] Euthyd. 277 B: Τὸ δ' ἐπίστασθαι . . ἄλλο τι ἢ ἔχειν ἐπιστήμην ἥδη ἐστίν; Phæd. 76 B.

13. *εἰ ἰμάτιον] Stallb. attempts to defend the optative without εἰ (which has only slight authority), from Rep. 549 A, ἄγριος εἶη, which is not quite parallel, (and there is MS. authority for inserting ἄν.) The comparison of 193 A: Σωκράτης ἐπιγινώσκει, κ.τ.λ., suggests the conjecture φορεῖ as an

alternative reading. The Bodl. has φορῶν as an early correction.

18. μὴ ἔχειν, ἀλλ'] This opposition between minute parts of a sentence is characteristic of the Greek idiom. Cp. infr. 199 A B.

ὥσπερ] The apodosis (sc. οὕτω τὴν ἐπιστήμην κεκτῆσθαι) is suppressed,—the main thread being resumed in πάλιν δὴ, κ.τ.λ. Cp. Rep. 3. 402 A—C. Join οἴκοι τρέφοι.

To know is not to have, but to possess, knowledge.

This distinction is illustrated by a new image.

II. B. Hypothesis of the cagefull of birds.

197. ΣΩ. Τρόπον δέ γ' ἄλλον οὐδεμίαν ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ δύναμιν μὲν αὐτῷ περὶ αὐτὰς παραγεγονέναι, ἐπειδὴ ἐν οἰκείῳ περιβόλῳ ὑποχειρίου ἐποίησατο, λαβεῖν δὲ καὶ σχεῖν, ἐπειδὴ βούληται, θηρευσάμενῳ ἣν ἂν αἰεὶ ἐθέλη, καὶ πάλιν ἀφιέναι· καὶ τοῦτο ἐξεῖναι ποιεῖν, 5 ὅποσάκις ἂν δοκῇ αὐτῷ.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔστι ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Πάλιν δὴ, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν κήρινόν τι ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς κατεσκευάζομεν οὐκ οἶδ' ὅ τι πλάσμα, νῦν αὖ ἐν ἐκάστη ψυχῇ ποιήσωμεν περιστερεῶνά τινα 10 παντοδαπῶν ὀρνίθων, τὰς μὲν κατ' ἀγέλας οὔσας χωρὶς τῶν ἄλλων, τὰς δὲ κατ' ὀλίγας, ἐνίας δὲ μόνας διὰ πασῶν ὅπη ἂν τύχωσι πετομένας.

Ε ΘΕΑΙ. Πεποιήσθω δὴ. ἀλλὰ τί τούντεῦθεν;

ΣΩ. Παιδίων μὲν ὄντων, φάναι χρή, εἶναι τοῦτο 15 τὸ ἀγγεῖον κενόν, ἀντὶ δὲ τῶν ὀρνίθων ἐπιστήμας νοῆσαι· ἣν δ' ἂν ἐπιστήμην κτησάμενος καθείρξῃ εἰς

The mind is like a cage, empty at birth, which we fill by degrees with what we learn. Whatever knowledge then is caught by us, is known so long as it remains in this cage. And yet before we have it in hand, there is a further chase required.

2. δύναμιν μὲν] Heind. well compares infr. 201 B: Πείσαι μὲν.

3. λαβεῖν . . ἐθέλη] 'To take and to hold, when he desires to do so, any one of them which he chooses to catch.'

8. κήρινόν τι] 'We sought to establish in the mind a sort of moulding-block of wax.'

10. ποιήσωμεν] 'Let us frame.' Cp. Rep. 9. 588 D.

11. τὰς μὲν κατ' ἀγέλας, κ.τ.λ.] The distinction indicated is probably that between, (1) individuals in the aggregate (πολλὰ ἀθροισθέντα, 157 B); (2) intermediate abstractions, as the virtues, numbers, etc.; (3) the highest abstractions, as Being, Goodness, resemblance, difference, etc. Little is thought,

however, of any distinction between memory and abstraction, as appears from the interchange of the terms *μνημείον* and *διάνομα* in what precedes.

12. κατ' ὀλίγας] E. g. the virtues, arts, etc.

ἐνίας δὲ μόνας διὰ πασῶν] E. g. τὴν οὐσίαν . . . τοῦτο γὰρ μάλιστα ἐπὶ πάντων παρέπεται, 186 A. The supremacy of certain universal forms, or categories, is a conception which belongs to the maturity of Plato's thought. (See Introduction.)

15. φάναι χρή, εἶναι] Although φάναι χρή is parenthetical, the sentence receives an indirect turn from it. νοῆσαι, sc. χρή.

16. ἀγγεῖον] 'Receptacle.'

17. κτησάμενος] Sc. τις. Cp. ἐκάστη ψυχῇ supr. D.

τὸν περίβολον, φάναι αὐτὸν μεμαθηκέναι ἢ εὐρηκέναι p. 197.
τὸ πρᾶγμα οὐ ἦν αὕτη ἢ ἐπιστήμη, καὶ τὸ ἐπίστασθαι
τουτ' εἶναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔστω.

5 ΣΩ. Τὸ τοίνυν πάλιν ἦν ἂν βούληται τῶν ἐπιστη- p. 198.
μῶν θηρεῖν καὶ λαβόντα ἴσχειν καὶ αὐθις ἀφιέναι,
σκόπει τίνων δεῖται ὀνομάτων, εἴτε τῶν αὐτῶν ὧν τὸ
πρῶτον, ὅτε ἐκτάτο, εἴτε ἐτέρων. μαθήσει δ' ἐνθένδε
σαφέστερον τί λέγω. ἀριθμητικὴν μὲν γὰρ λέγεις
10 τέχνην;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ταύτην δὴ ὑπόλαβε θήραν ἐπιστημῶν ἀρτίου
τε καὶ περιττοῦ παντός.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὑπολαμβάνω.

15 ΣΩ. Ταύτη δὴ, οἶμαι, τῇ τέχνῃ αὐτός τε ὑποχει-
ρίους τὰς ἐπιστήμας τῶν ἀριθμῶν ἔχει καὶ ἄλλω πα- B
ραδίδωσιν ὁ παραδιδούς.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Καὶ καλοῦμέν γε παραδιδόντα μὲν διδάσκειν,
20 παραλαμβάνοντα δὲ μανθάνειν, ἔχοντα δὲ δὴ τῷ κε-
κτῆσθαι ἐν τῷ περιστερεῶνι ἐκείνῳ ἐπίστασθαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνν μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Τῷ δὴ ἐντεύθεν ἤδη πρόσσχες τὸν νοῦν.
ἀριθμητικὸς γὰρ ὧν τελέως ἄλλο τι πάντας ἀριθμοὺς

8. ἐνθένδε] The Bodl. MS. has ἐντεύθεν, which might mean, 'If you will come and look from where I stand.'

15. ὑποχειρίους] 'Under (in the power of) his hand.' (Supr. 197 C.) But not necessarily προχείρους, 'in hand.'

16. ἔχει] The omission of the subject (τις, ὁ ἔχων) is supplied in the next clause by the addition of ὁ παραδιδούς.

23. Τῷ δὴ ἐντεύθεν] δὲ δὴ, the reading of the Bodl. and its two companions, has probably slipped in from ἔχοντα δὲ δὴ above. The example is not merely intended to illustrate the distinction between having and holding, but more immediately to show how we are to conceive of the process of realizing knowledge.

To apply
this to the
case of
number :

The arith-
metician
has know-

198. ἐπίσταται; πάντων γὰρ ἀριθμῶν εἰσὶν αὐτῷ ἐν τῇ
 ψυχῇ ἐπιστήμαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μήν;

ΣΩ. Ἦ οὖν ὁ τοιοῦτος ἀριθμοὶ ἂν ποτέ τι ἢ αὐ-
 τὸς πρὸς αὐτὸν αὐτὰ ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν ἔξω ὅσα ἔχει 5
 ἀριθμὸν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ ἀριθμεῖν γε οὐκ ἄλλο τι θήσομεν τοῦ
 σκοπεῖσθαι πόσος τις ἀριθμὸς τυγχάνει ὢν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Ὁ ἄρα ἐπίσταται, σκοπούμενος φαίνεται ὡς
 οὐκ εἰδώς, ὃν ὠμολογήκαμεν ἅπαντα ἀριθμὸν εἰδέναι.
 ἀκούεις γὰρ πού τὰς τοιαύτας ἀμφισβητήσεις.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐγωγε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἡμεῖς ἀπεικάζοντες τῇ τῶν περιστε- 15

ledge of
 every num-
 ber in his
 mind.

Yet in cal-
 culating he
 searches
 for what he
 knows, put-
 ting his
 hand as it
 were into
 the cage.

10

4. ἢ αὐτὸς πρὸς αὐτὸν αὐτά] This is the reading of the MSS. with the exception of Vat. Δ, which omits αὐτά: the reading ἐντός is a conjecture of Cornarius. The common reading is defensible. If αὐτά is omitted, the antithesis is imperfect; and if grammatical symmetry were desired, it could be restored by substituting αὐτό for αὐτά. But there is no real flaw, for τι is cognate accusative, and ἀριθμοὶ τι = cast up a sum. The second accusative in the plural, of the things which constitute the sum, is therefore perfectly admissible; and it is also pointed, referring to αὐτὰ πέντε καὶ ἑπτὰ in supr. 196 A. 'Might he not cast up a sum, either of abstract numbers in his head, or of things about him that happen to be numerable?'

As in the Parmenides, where

unity is provisionally negated, so here, where it has not been fully reached, the objects of Knowledge (or rather Knowledges themselves) appear in loose bundles which fly as we approach them.

9. πόσος τις ἀριθμὸς τυγχάνει ὢν] 'What such-and-such a sum amounts to.' (ἀριθμητική here seems to include λογιστική.)

11. The question here is not of error, but of inquiry. The pursuit of knowledge implies ignorance even where the process is correct.

13. ἀκούεις . . ἀμφισβητήσεις] Cp. supr. 158 B and esp. Meno, 80 D E: Καὶ τίνα τρόπον ζητήσεις, ὃ Σώκρατες, τοῦτο, ὃ μὴ οἶσθα τὸ παράπαν ὃ τι ἔστι; . . Σω. μανθάνω οἷον βοῦλει λέγειν, ὃ Μένων. ὁρᾷς τοῦτον ὡς ἐριστικὸν λόγον κατάγει; ὡς οὐκ ἄρα, κ.τ.λ.

ρῶν κτήσει τε καὶ θήρα ἐροῦμεν, ὅτι διττὴ ἦν ἡ θήρα, p. 198.
 ἡ μὲν πρὶν ἐκτῆσθαι τοῦ κεκτῆσθαι ἕνεκα· ἡ δὲ κε-
 κτημένῳ τοῦ λαβεῖν καὶ ἔχειν ἐν ταῖς χερσὶν ἂ πάλαι
 ἐκέκτητο. οὕτω δὲ καὶ ὧν πάλαι ἐπιστήμαι ἦσαν αὐτῶ
 5 μαθόντι καὶ ἠπίστατο αὐτά, πάλιν ἔστι καταμανθάνειν
 ταῦτα ταῦτα ἀναλαμβάνοντα τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἐκάστου
 καὶ ἴσχοντα, ἣν ἐκέκτητο μὲν πάλαι, πρόχειρον δ' οὐκ
 εἶχε τῇ διανοίᾳ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθῆ.

10 ΣΩ. Τοῦτο δὴ ἄρτι ἠρώτων, ὅπως χρὴ τοῖς ὀνό- E
 μασι χρώμενον λέγειν περὶ αὐτῶν, ὅταν ἀριθμήσων
 ἢ ὁ ἀριθμητικὸς ἢ τι ἀναγνωσόμενος ὁ γραμματικὸς,
 ὡς ἐπιστάμενος ἄρα ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ πάλιν ἔρχεται μα-
 θησόμενος παρ' ἑαυτοῦ ἂ ἐπίσταται;

15 ΘΕΑΙ. Ἄλλ' ἄτοπον, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ἂ οὐκ ἐπίσταται φῶμεν αὐτὸν ἀναγνώ-
 σεσθαι καὶ ἀριθμήσειν, δεδωκότες αὐτῶ πάντα μὲν
 γράμματα, πάντα δὲ ἀριθμὸν ἐπίστασθαι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦτ' ἄλογον.

p. 199.

20 ΣΩ. Βούλει οὖν λέγωμεν ὅτι τῶν μὲν ὀνομάτων
 οὐδὲν ἡμῖν μέλει, ὅπη τις χαίρει ἔλκων τὸ ἐπίστασθαι

We shall
 say then
 that it is

1. ἦν] The past tense im-
 plies 'We have found it to
 be . . .' Supr. A.

2. πρὶν ἐκτῆσθαι] So the MSS.
 And it is unsafe to change to
 κεκτῆσθαι, as such variations
 may have depended on some
 law of euphony. Cp. Sophocl.
 O. C. 5: Σμικρὸν μὲν ἐξαιτοῦντα,
 τοῦ μικροῦ δ' ἔτι, κ.τ.λ.

7. πρόχειρον] As we say, 'at
 his fingers' ends.'

10. Τοῦτο] Accusative in
 apposition with the action of
 the verb, as ταῦτα is very fre-
 quently used. 'This was my

drift in asking,' etc. Cp. Rep.
 2. 377 A.

20. ἔτι, κ.τ.λ.] The question
 asked above, 198 A, was τὸ . . .
 θηρέειν, κ.τ.λ., τίνων δείται ὀνο-
 μάτων. But the illustration has
 thrown so clear a light upon
 the subject that in giving our
 answer we may dispense with
 nominal definitions.

21. ὅπη τις χαίρει ἔλκων]
 'Whatever confusion may be
 wilfully made with the verbs
 to *learn* and to *know*,' i. e. in
 the ἀμφισβητήσεις above referred
 to, that a man cannot learn

199. καὶ μανθανεῖν, ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὠρισάμεθα ἕτερον μὲν τι τὸ
 κερτῆσθαι τὴν ἐπιστήμην, ἕτερον δὲ τὸ ἔχειν, ὃ μὲν
 τις κέρτῆται μὴ κερτῆσθαι ἀδύνατόν φαμεν εἶναι,
 ὥστε οὐδέποτε συμβαίνει ὃ τις οἶδε μὴ εἰδέναι, ψευδῆ
 μέντοι δόξαν οἶόν τ' εἶναι περὶ αὐτοῦ λαβεῖν; μὴ γὰρ ⁵
 ἔχειν τὴν ἐπιστήμην τούτου οἶόν τε, ἀλλ' ἐτέραν ἀντ'
 ἐκείνης, ὅταν θηρεύων τινὰ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ ἐπιστήμην δια-

impossible
 for him not
 to know
 what he
 knows,
 i. e. not to
 possess
 what he
 possesses,
 but yet he
 may mis-
 take one
 thing that
 he knows

what he knows nor what he
 does not know. For the lan-
 guage cp. Soph. 259 C: Χαίρει
 τότε μὲν ἐπὶ θάτερα τότε δ' ἐπὶ
 θάτερα τοὺς λόγους ἔλκων.

4. ὥστε οὐδέποτε] 'So that
 in no case does it come to pass
 that a man is ignorant of what
 he knows, but still he may get
 hold of a wrong notion in re-
 gard to it; for he may not
 have in hand the knowledge
 of the particular thing in ques-
 tion, but another instead, when
 in hunting up some particular
 knowledge from his stock (τοῦ
 ὃ κέρτῆται) he gets hold of the
 wrong one by mistake as they
 flit across him: that is to say,
 when he thought eleven to be
 twelve, he got hold of the
 knowledge of eleven instead
 of that of twelve,—in other
 words, the rock-pigeon that
 was caged within him instead
 of the dove.'

5. μὴ γὰρ ἔχειν] These words
 are put emphatically forward
 in antithesis to μὴ κερτῆσθαι.
 When hunting for some particu-
 lar knowledge amongst what
 he possesses and knows, he
 catches one for another as they
 fly about: e. g. the arithmeti-
 cian makes a mistake in regard
 to number when he seeks in
 the flock of numbers for that
 which = 7 + 5, and takes hold
 of 11 instead of 12.

The germ of the present me-
 taphor appears in the Euthyde-
 mus, 290 C, 291 B: Θηρευτικοὶ
 γὰρ εἰσι καὶ οὔτοι (οἱ λογιστικοί)
 κ.τ.λ. αὐτοὶ γὰρ (οἱ στρατηγοὶ) οὐκ
 ἐπίστανται χρῆσθαι τοῖσι ἅ ἐθή-
 ρευσαν, ὥσπερ, οἶμαι, οἱ ὀρνυγοθή-
 ραι τοῖσι ὀρνυγοτρόφοις παραδιδό-
 σιν . . . ἀλλ' ἤμεν πάνν γελοιοί,
 ὥσπερ τὰ παιδιά τὰ τοὺς κορυδούς
 διώκοντα, αἰεὶ φόμεθα ἐκάστην τῶν
 ἐπιστημῶν ἀντίκα λήψεσθαι αἰ δ'
 αἰεὶ ὑπεξέφυγον. Compare also
 Arist. Met. I. 5. 1009 b: Τὸ γὰρ
 τὰ πετόμενα διώκειν τὸ ζητεῖν ἂν
 εἴη τὴν ἀλήθειαν.

7. ἀπ' αὐτοῦ] The difficulty of
 the sentence lies in these words.
 They probably refer to ὃ κέρτῆ-
 ται . . . ὃ οἶδε above. For it is dif-
 ficult to imagine that ἀπ' αὐτοῦ
 and περὶ αὐτοῦ above do not re-
 fer to the same thing. If this
 be so, the meaning is, that he
 makes a mistake concerning
 some general subject, e. g. con-
 cerning number in general,
 when he takes one particular
 thing contained in it for an-
 other. τούτου therefore has a
 narrower reference, and means,
 'of this particular thing,' viz.
 which he is in search of. For
 a similar use of τούτου, without
 anything to which it immedi-
 ately refers, cp. supr. 180 A: Κἀν
 τούτου ζητῆς λόγον λαβεῖν, τί εἴ-
 ρηκε. Infr. 202 C: Τὸν μὴ δυνά-
 μενον δοῦναι τε καὶ δέξασθαι λόγον

for another that he knows, when, failing in this after-search, he takes the wrong knowledge in hand.

πετομένων ἀνθ' ἑτέρας ἐτέραν ἁμαρτῶν λάβῃ, — ὅτε ἄρα p. 199.
τὰ ἔνδεκα δώδεκα ᾤθητι εἶναι, τὴν τῶν ἔνδεκα ἐπιστή-
μην ἀντὶ τῆς τῶν δώδεκα λαβῶν, τὴν ἐν ἑαυτῷ οἶον
φάτταν ἀντὶ περιστερᾶς.

5 ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔχει γὰρ οὖν λόγον.

ΣΩ. Ὅταν δέ γε ἦν ἐπιχειρεῖ λαβεῖν λάβῃ, ἀψευ-
δεῖν τε καὶ τὰ ὄντα δοξάζειν τότε, καὶ οὕτω δὴ εἶναι
ἀληθῆ τε καὶ ψευδῆ δόξαν, καὶ ὧν ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ο
ἐδυσχεραίνομεν οὐδὲν ἐμποδὼν γίγνεσθαι; ἴσως οὖν
10 μοι συμφήσεις. ἢ πῶς ποιήσεις;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Καὶ γὰρ τοῦ μὲν ἂ ἐπίστανται μὴ ἐπίστασθαι
ἀπῆλλάγμεθα· ἂ γὰρ κεκτήμεθα μὴ κεκτήσθαι οὐ-

ἀνεπιστήμονα εἶναι περὶ τούτου (sc. οὐδ' ἂν μὴ δύνηται, κ.τ.λ.). διαπετο-
μένων is genitive absolute, in
partial construction with ἑτέραν.
The words ἀπ' αὐτοῦ have been
questioned by many critics.
Ast's τῶν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ is the most
plausible of the conjectural
emendations.

1. ὅτε ἄρα . . . ᾤθητι εἶναι, . . .
λαβῶν] We pass from ὅταν to
ὅτε ἄρα, because reference is
now made to the case actually
in question. The participle
λαβῶν is exegetic to the verb
understood in what precedes.
'He has hold of something
else: that is (in the case above
adduced) taking the knowledge
of eleven for that of twelve.'
As if ἔχειν . . . οἶόν τε were τάχ'
ἂν ἔχοι. The change to the
nominative is partly occasioned
by ὅταν λάβῃ coming in between.
ἄρα = 'as in our illustration.'

For a similar expegegesis cp.
Legg. 3. 690 E: Ἄγνοήσαντες
τὸν Ἡσίοδον ὀρθότατα λέγοντα ὡς
τὸ ἡμῖν τοῦ παντὸς πολλάκις ἐστι

πλέον' ὀπόταν ἢ τὸ μὲν ὄλον λαμ-
βάνειν ζημιῶδες, τὸ δ' ἡμῖν μέ-
τριον, τότε τὸ μέτριον τοῦ ἀμέτρου
πλέον ἡγήσατο, ἄμεινον δὲν χεί-
ρονος.

6. ἀψευδεῖν] In construction
with φαμέν, supr.

12. Καὶ γὰρ τοῦ μὲν . . . μέντοι]
'For indeed we have got rid of
the trouble of men not knowing
what they know . . . : notwith-
standing there is a still worse
danger which now looks in
upon us.'

ἐπίστανται] So the Bodleian
with all the other MSS. except
pr. Ven. Π. This is hardly suf-
ficient authority for the change
to ἐπίσταται. The transition from
singular to plural is not more
remarkable than that from the
3rd person to the 1st in κεκτή-
μεθα, infr. It may be accounted
for by the fact that Socrates is
speaking generally, and no
longer with reference to the
individual case supposed above.
Compare especially Rep. 7.
537 E and v. rr.

199. δαμοῦ ἔτι συμβαίνει, οὔτε ψευθεῖσίν τινος οὔτε μή. δεινότερον μέντοι πάθος ἄλλο παραφαίνεσθαι μοι δοκεῖ.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. Εἰ ἡ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν μεταλλαγὴ ψευδῆς γε- 5
νήσεται ποτε δόξα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς δῆ;

D ΣΩ. Πρώτον μὲν τό τινος ἔχοντα ἐπιστήμην τοῦτο
αὐτὸ ἀγνοεῖν, μὴ ἀγνωμοσύνη ἀλλὰ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ ἐπι-
στήμῃ· ἔπειτα ἕτερον αὖ τοῦτο δοξάζειν, τὸ δ' ἕτερον 10
τοῦτο, πῶς οὐ πολλὴ ἀλογία, ἐπιστήμης παραγενο-
μένης γνῶναι μὲν τὴν ψυχὴν μηδέν, ἀγνοῆσαι δὲ
πάντα; ἐκ γὰρ τούτου τοῦ λόγου κωλύει οὐδὲν καὶ
ἄγνοιαν παραγενομένην γνῶναί τι ποιῆσαι καὶ τυφλό-
τητα ἰδεῖν, εἴπερ καὶ ἐπιστήμη ἀγνοῆσαί ποτέ τινα 15
ποιήσει.

E ΘΕΑΙ. Ἴσως γάρ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐ καλῶς τὰς
ὄρνιθας ἐτίθεμεν ἐπιστήμας μόνον τιθέντες, ἔδει δὲ
καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνας τιθέναι ὁμοῦ συνδιαπετομένας
ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, καὶ τὸν θηρεύοντα τοτὲ μὲν ἐπιστήμην 20

But, if it is
Knowledge
that he has
in hand,
how can he
mistake it?
How can
Knowledge
be the oc-
casion of
error?

Perhaps
there were
ignorances
flying
about
amongst
the know-

2. παραφαίνεσθαι] As it were,
'looking in at the window.'
The reading παρεμφαίνεσθαι
(Ven. Ξ etc.) deserves mention.

5. Εἰ . . γενήσεται] εἰ with
the fut. ind., as usual after δει-
νόν, expresses alarm or indig-
nation, 'to think of such a
possibility!'

8. τό τινος] These words de-
pend immediately on δεινότερον,
in common with εἰ ἡ τῶν . . δόξα:
but πῶς οὐ πολλὴ ἀλογία also has
reference to them.

9. ἀγνωμοσύνη] Used here
in its most literal sense, = τῷ
μὴ γινώσκειν, 'from being un-
acquainted.'

τῇ ἑαυτοῦ ἐπιστήμῃ] Viz. which
he possesses, ὃ τι δὴ ἔχει τε καὶ
κέκτηται, referring to ἔχοντα.

11. πῶς οὐ πολλὴ ἀλογία] The
clause which follows this is a
more particular statement or
explanation of that which pre-
cedes. Compare the structure
of Rep. 4. 445 B: Τῆς δὲ αὐτοῦ
τούτου ᾧ ζῶμεν φύσεως παραπο-
μένης καὶ διαφθειρομένης βιωτὸν
ἄρα ἔσται, ἐάν πέρ τις ποιῇ ὃ ἀν-
βουληθῇ ἄλλο πλὴν τοῦτο ὁπόθεν
κακίας μὲν καὶ ἀδικίας ἀπαλλαγῇ-
σεται, κ.τ.λ., supr. 144 A.

19. ἀνεπιστημοσύνας] Cp. the
Charmides, 166 E, etc.

ledges, and he has taken one of them.

λαμβάνοντα, τοτὲ δ' ἀνεπιστημοσύνην τοῦ αὐτοῦ πέρι, p. 199.
 ψευδῆ μὲν δοξάζειν τῇ ἀνεπιστημοσύνῃ, ἀληθῆ δὲ τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ.

ΣΩ. Οὐ ρᾶδιόν γε, ὦ Θεαίτητε, μὴ ἐπαινεῖν σε.
 5 ὁ μέντοι εἶπες, πάλιν ἐπίσκειναι. ἔστω μὲν γὰρ ὡς λέγεις· ὁ δὲ δὴ τὴν ἀνεπιστημοσύνην λαβὼν ψευδῆ p. 200.
 μὲν, φῆς, δοξάσει. ἢ γάρ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐ δὴ που καὶ ἠγήσεται γε ψευδῆ δοξάζειν.

10 ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γάρ;

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ἀληθῆ γε, καὶ ὡς εἰδὼς διακίεσται περὶ ὧν ἔψευσται.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μὴν;

ΣΩ. Ἐπιστήμην ἄρα οἴσεται τεθηρευκῶς ἔχειν,
 15 ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀνεπιστημοσύνην.

ΘΕΑΙ. Δῆλον.

But if he has the ignorance in hand, how can he mistake it for knowledge? After making a long circuit, we are again at fault.

Unless we have recourse to

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν μακρὰν περιελθόντες πάλιν ἐπὶ τὴν
 πρώτην πάρεσμεν ἀπορίαν. ὁ γὰρ ἐλεγκτικὸς ἐκείνος
 γελάσας φήσει· Πότερον, ὦ βέλτιστοι, ἀμφοτέρας B
 20 τις εἰδὼς, ἐπιστήμην τε καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνην, ἣν οἶδεν,
 ἑτέραν αὐτὴν οἶεται τινα εἶναι ὧν οἶδεν; ἢ οὐ-
 δετέραν αὐτοῖν εἰδὼς, ἣν μὴ οἶδε, δοξάζει ἑτέραν ὧν
 οὐκ οἶδεν; ἢ τὴν μὲν εἰδὼς, τὴν δ' οὐ, ἣν οἶδεν, ἣν μὴ
 οἶδεν; ἢ ἣν μὴ οἶδεν, ἣν οἶδεν ἠγεῖται; ἢ πάλιν αὖ

4. Οὐ ρᾶδιόν γε, κ.τ.λ.] Socrates is again charmed by the dialectical readiness of Theætetus, and yet is compelled to refuse his suggestion. Cp. supr. 184 C, infr. 204 E: Ἀνδρικῶς γε, κ.τ.λ. Phædo, 62 E: Ἡσθῆναί τέ μοι ἔδοξε τῇ τοῦ Κέβητος πραγματεία, κ.τ.λ.

17. ἐπὶ τὴν πρώτην πάρεσμεν ἀπορίαν] 'We find ourselves

again confronted with the same difficulty which encountered us at first.' Cp. Phil. 13 C: Πάλιν εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν φερόμεθα λόγον, ὦ Πρώταρχε.

18. ὁ . . ἐλεγκτικὸς ἐκείνος] Supr. 165, 195 C, 197 A.

20. ἣν οἶδεν, κ.τ.λ.] Supr. 188 B, 192.

22. αὐτοῖν] Most MSS. have αὐτὴν, from the preceding line.

200. μοι ἐρέϊτε ὅτι τῶν ἐπιστημῶν καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσυνῶν
 εἰσὶν αὖ ἐπιστήμαι, ἃς ὁ κεκτημένος ἐν ἐτέροις τισὶ
 γελίοις περιστερεῶσιν ἢ κηρίοις πλάσμασι καθείρ-
 ξας, ἕως περ ἂν κεκτῆται, ἐπίσταται, καὶ ἂν μὴ προ-
 χείρους ἔχη ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ; καὶ οὕτω δὴ ἀναγκασθή- 5
 σεσθε εἰς ταῦτον περιτρέχειν μυριάκις οὐδὲν πλέον
 ποιοῦντες; Τί πρὸς ταῦτα, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἀποκρινού-
 μεθα;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ μὰ Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔγωγε οὐκ
 ἔχω τί χρὴ λέγειν.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν ἡμῖν, ὦ παῖ, καλῶς ὁ λόγος ἐπι-
 πλήττει, καὶ ἐνδείκνυται ὅτι οὐκ ὀρθῶς ψευδῆ δόξαν
 D προτέραν ζητοῦμεν ἐπιστήμης, ἐκείνην ἀφέντες; τὸ
 δ' ἐστὶν ἀδύνατον γνῶναι, πρὶν ἂν τις ἐπιστήμην
 ἱκανῶς λάβῃ τί ποτ' ἐστίν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀνάγκη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐν τῷ παρόντι ὡς
 λέγεις οἴεσθαι.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν τις ἐρεῖ πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐπιστήμην;
 οὐ γάρ που ἀπεροῦμέν γέ πω.

3. γελίοις περιστερεῶσιν] It would be rash to infer from this ridicule that the image is not Plato's own. Is Socrates never made to accuse himself of absurdity? Rep. 1. 354 A: Οὐ μέντοι καλῶς γε εἰστιάμαι δι' ἑμαντὸν ἀλλ' οὐ διὰ σέ. Prot. 340 E: Εἰμί τις γελίοις ἰατρός. He is here speaking dramatically in the person of the ἐριστικὸς ἀνὴρ, who is bent on exposing their weak points. Cp. supr. 162 D, 166 A.

5. καὶ οὕτω δὴ, κ.τ.λ.] Cp. esp. Charm. 167 foll., and, for the 'ad infinitum' argument, Parm. 132 E foll.

11. ὁ λόγος] Either this particular argument, or rather the

discussion generally, in the form of an imaginary disputant. Supr. 195 D.

13. ἐκείνην] ψευδῆς δόξα is the subject immediately in hand, hence ἐκείνη stands for ἐπιστήμη as the more remote.

τὸ δέ] Sc. ψευδῆς δόξα τί ποτ' ἐστίν.

15. ἱκανῶς λάβῃ] Supr. 145 E.

19. που is the reading of Ven. II., and is probably right. (Cett. πω.) Schanz reads οὐ γέ πω ἀπεροῦμεν. This is partly confirmed by the scribe of the Bodl. MS. having begun to punctuate after ἀπεροῦμεν, and in then adding γέ πω, having forgotten to accentuate the last syllable of ἀπεροῦμεν.

the image of another cage or waxen block, containing the Knowledges of the knowledges and ignorances, and go on thus to infinity, 'in wandering mazes lost.'

10

15

The truth is, we have no right to be searching for false opinion until we have

found
Know-
ledge. And,
though
we can
attempt
nothing
better than
our last an-
swer, per-
haps if we
return and
examine it,
the object
of our
search may
show itself.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἦκιστα, εἴνπερ μὴ σύ γε ἀπαγορεύσης. p. 200.

ΣΩ. Λέγε δῆ, τί ἂν αὐτὸ μάλιστα εἰπόντες ἦκιστ'
ἂν ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς ἐναντιωθεῖμεν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὅπερ ἐπεχειροῦμεν, ὦ Σώκратες, ἐν τῷ Ε
5 πρόσθεν· οὐ γὰρ ἔχω ἔγωγε ἄλλο οὐδέν.

ΣΩ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὴν ἀληθῆ δόξαν ἐπιστήμην εἶναι. ἀνα-
μάρτητόν γέ πού ἐστι τὸ δοξάζειν ἀληθῆ, καὶ τὰ ὑπ'
αὐτοῦ γιγνόμενα πάντα καλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ γίγνεται.

10 ΣΩ. Ὁ τὸν ποταμὸν καθηγούμενος, ὦ Θεαίτητε,
ἔφη ἄρα δείξειν αὐτό· καὶ τοῦτο ἐὰν ἴοντες ἐρευνῶμεν,
τάχ' ἂν ἐμπόδιον γενόμενον αὐτὸ φήνεια τὸ ζητούμε- p. 201.
νον, μένουσι δῆ δῆλον οὐδέν.

1. ἀπαγορεύσης] So T pr. Vat. Coisl. Zitt. The Bodl. has ἀπαγορεύεις with an erasure. Schanz reads ἀπαγορεύης. The usual aorist form is ἀπέειπης.

8. καὶ τὰ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ γιγνόμενα πάντα] True opinion guides to right action, but it is a blind guide. See esp. Rep. 6. 506 C: Οὐκ ἦσθησαι τὰς ἀνευ ἐπιστήμης δόξας, ὡς πᾶσαι αἰσχυραί, κ.τ.λ.

10. Ὁ τὸν ποταμὸν] 'The man who had to show where the river was fordable is reported (ἄρα) to have said, Go on, and you will find.' For the expressions αὐτὸ δείξει, τάχ' ἂν αὐτὸ φήνεια cp. Phileb. 20 C: Προῖόν δ' ἔτι σαφέστερον δείξει. Protag. 324 A: Αὐτὸ σε διδάξει. Cratyl. 402 C: Τοῦτο γε ὀλίγου αὐτὸ λέγει ὅτι πηγῆς ὄνομα ἐπικεκρυμμένον ἐστί. Hipp. Maj. 288 B: Εἰ δ' ἐπιχειρήσας ἔσται καταγέλαστος, αὐτὸ δείξει. The Scholiast says: Δείξειν αὐτό. ἐπὶ τῶν ἐκ πείρας γινωσκομένων. κατιόντων γάρ τινων εἰς ποταμὸν πρὸς τὸ διαπερᾶσαι ἤρετό τις τὸν

προηγούμενον εἰ βίβλος ἔχει τὸ ὕδωρ. ὁ δὲ ἔφη, αὐτὸ δείξει.

The explanation is probable, though the authority is uncertain.

See above, πλείω αἰεὶ ἐπιρρέοντα . . τὸν ἐξ ἀρχῆς λόγον; and cp. Rep. 5. 453 D: 'Εάν τέ τις εἰς κολυμβήθραν μικρὰν ἐμπέσῃ εἴαν τε εἰς τὸ μέγιστον πελαγος μέσον, ὅμως γε νεὶ οὐδὲν ἦττον.

12. τάχ' ἂν . . [ζητούμενον] Either (1) (Heindorf), 'Perhaps by giving us trouble, it may of itself bring to light that of which we are in search,' or (2) 'Perhaps the very thing we are in search of may come in our way and show itself,' or (3) taking ἐμπόδιον γενόμενον with τοῦτο and αὐτὸ φήνεια τὸ ζητούμενον as a new sentence. 'If we proceed with this inquiry, perhaps, through its giving us trouble,—the very object of our search may show itself.' In (2) ἐμπόδιον is used with a forcing of the derivation, like πρόχειρον supr., 'amongst

201. ΘΕΑΙ. Ὅρθως λέγεις· ἀλλ' ἰωμέν γε καὶ σκο-
πῶμεν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τοῦτό γε βραχείας σκέψεως· τέχνη
γάρ σοι ὅλη σημαίνει μὴ εἶναι ἐπιστήμην αὐτό.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς δὴ; καὶ τίς αὕτη;

ΣΩ. Ἡ τῶν μεγίστων εἰς σοφίαν, οὓς δὴ καλοῦσι
ρήτοράς τε καὶ δικανικούς. οὗτοι γάρ που τῇ ἑαυτῶν
τέχνη πείθουσιν οὐ διδάσκοντες, ἀλλὰ δοξάζειν ποι-
οῦντες ἂν βούλωνται. ἢ σὺ οἶε δεινούς τινεσ οὔτω
B διδασκάλους εἶναι, ὥστε οἷς μὴ παρεγένοντό τινεσ 10
ἀποστερουμένοις χρήματα ἢ τι ἄλλο βιαζομένοις,
τούτοις δύνασθαι πρὸς ὕδωρ σμικρὸν διδάξαι ἰκανῶσ
τῶν γενομένων τὴν ἀλήθειαν;

our feet.' Both in (2) and (3) the idiomatic use of δεικνυμι is extended to φαίνω.

ἐμπόδιον γενόμενον] 'Coming in our way,' i.e. giving us trouble. Those fording the river were feeling the bottom with their feet. Compare the way in which justice 'turns up' in the Republic, 4. 432 D: Πάλαι, ὦ μακάριε, φαίνεται πρὸ ποδῶν ἡμῶν κυλινδούμενον. Prof. Jowett translates, 'We may stumble upon the thing which we are looking for.'

3. βραχείας σκέψεως] Sc. εὔρειν. Cp. Rep. 3. 414 C: Πέισαι δὲ συχνῆς πειθοῦς.

4. αὐτό] Sc. τὸ εἰρημένον, i.e. δόξα ἀληθῆς.

6. Ἡ τῶν μεγίστων εἰς σοφίαν] The irony is almost as transparent as in Polit. 266 C: Γένει τῶ τῶν ὄντων γενναιοτάτῳ καὶ ἅμα εὐχερεστάτῳ. Cp. Phædr. 260 C sqq., Gorg. 462 C, alib. μεγίστων is masc. antec. to οὓς. (ἴ om. Bodl.)

In what follows the Bodleian

A brief examination is sufficient here. The rhetoric of the law-courts proves that true opinion is not knowledge.

For in cases where the evidence of the senses is alone sufficient,

MS. gives τούτοις with Vat. Δ. Ven. II. This is better than τούτους, which can be defended only by supposing the plaintiff to plead his own cause. Trans. 'Or do you suppose there are such clever teachers in the world, as to be able to convey to others the reality of what happened to men, of whose being robbed or otherwise assaulted the hearers were not eyewitnesses?' Schanz reads, from Naber's conjecture, εἰ μὴ . . . τούτους . . .

12. πρὸς ὕδωρ σμικρόν] κατεπίγει γὰρ ὕδωρ ῥέον. Supr. 172 D. The ῥήτωρ professed to instruct the court. Cp. Hyperid. Euxen. 25: Τοὺς δικαστὰς ὑπὲρ τοῦ πράγματος τὰ δίκαια διδάξαι.

Failing to conceive of false opinion, we return to examine the theory of Knowledge which identifies it with true opinion. We have not to search far; for in the familiar case of judicial evidence, a true opinion may be

the court may be brought to give a true verdict. The judges, then, in such a case have true opinion without knowledge.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδαμῶς ἔγωγε οἶμαι, ἀλλὰ πείσαι μὲν. p. 201.

ΣΩ. Τὸ πείσαι δ' οὐχὶ δοξάσαι λέγεις ποιῆσαι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μῆν;

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὅταν δικαίως πεισθῶσι δικασταὶ
5 περὶ ὧν ἰδόντι μόνον ἔστιν εἰδέναι, ἄλλως δὲ μῆ,
ταῦτα τότε ἐξ ἀκοῆς κρίνοντας, ἀληθῆ δόξαν λαβόν-
τες, ἄνευ ἐπιστήμης ἔκριναν, ὁρθὰ πεισθέντες, εἶπερ
εὖ ἐδίκασαν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

10 ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄν, ὦ φίλε, εἴ γε ταυτὸν ἦν δόξα τε
ἀληθῆς †καὶ δικαστήρια† καὶ ἐπιστήμη, ὁρθὰ ποτ' ἄν

formed by the judges without the possibility of knowledge; since in questions of fact nothing short of personal observation ensures certainty. The definition 'Knowledge is true opinion,' is therefore inadequate. And the example given is calculated to suggest the next definition—δόξα ἀληθῆς μετὰ λόγου.

The question returns, Are the above conceptions and images Plato's own, or is he repeating in them some contemporary theories? The comparison of other dialogues and the close examination of the passage itself tend to the conclusion that although they may have been suggested to him from without, they may be fairly regarded as his own creation. See especially the passage in Phil. 44 C foll., in which, after certain men have been brought forward as 'soothsayers' or 'allies,' there follows the analysis of the pleasure derived from Comedy, which is one of the most original and 'modern' passages in Plato. The image of the 'im-

pressions' on the wax has not only been revived in speculation, but perpetuated in common language. And that of the aviary has probably been less fortunate only from its greater boldness and subtlety.

1. πείσαι μὲν] The implied antithesis is διδάξαι δ' οὐ. Cp. Rep. 5. 475 E: Οὐδαμῶς, εἶπον, ἀλλ' ὁμοίους μὲν φιλοσόφοις. Τοὺς δ' ἀληθινούς, ἔφη, τίνας λέγεις; Soph. 240 B: Οὐδαμῶς ἀληθινόν γε, ἀλλ' εὐκλὸς μὲν.

11. †καὶ δικαστήρια†] Several MSS. read δικαστήριον. These words were rejected by the older critics, except Buttmann, who conjectured καὶ δικαστική, very aptly for the sense, if the word can be made to signify 'worthy of a good judge.' See the words εἶπερ εὖ ἐδίκασαν . . ὁρθὰ ποτ' ἄν δικαστῆς ἄκρος ἐδόξαζεν. It is in Plato's manner thus ostensibly to restrict himself to the case in point. Cp. 152 C: Ἐν τε θερμοῖς καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς τοιοῦτοις. 204 D: Ἐν γε τοῖς ὅσα ἐξ ἀριθμοῦ ἔστιν.

Possibly (1) καὶ δικαστοῦ ἀξία may be the true reading. Cp.

201. δικαστῆς ἄκρος ἐδόξαζεν ἄνευ ἐπιστήμης· νῦν δὲ ἔοικεν ἄλλο τι ἐκάτερον εἶναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὁ γε ἐγώ, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰπόντος του

Apol. 18 A: Δικαστοῦ γὰρ αὕτη ἀρετή. And see Phileb. 13 C, where the Bodl. has *πειρόμεθα* for *πειρασόμεθα*. Ib. 36 E, where *παραφροσύναις* in the same MS. is a correction for *πάσαις ἀφροσύναις*, which the first hand wrote. Or (2) *κατὰ δικαστήρια*, a conjecture adopted by Prof. Jowett (or *κατὰ δικαστήριον*)—‘in the judicial sphere,’ cp. supr. 153 D: *κατὰ τὰ ὄμματα πρῶτον* (‘In the sphere of vision’). Tim. 19 C: *κατὰ τε τὰς ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις πράξεις καὶ κατὰ τὰς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις διερμηνεύσεις πρὸς ἐκάστας τῶν πόλεων*. The mode of expression in this case approaches still more nearly to that of infr. 204 C, supr. 152 C,—the passages quoted above. But (3) it is after all conceivable that *δικαστηρία* may be the feminine of an adjective not found elsewhere, except in the neuter substantive *δικαστήριον*. (This suggestion is also made by Madvig, Adv. 1. 377, and adopted by Schanz.) Or (4) as Wohlrab suggests, *καὶ δικαστήριον* should be transposed to after *δικαστῆς ἄκρος*, ‘A good judge or court-full of judges.’ The second of the above conjectures (2) seems, on the whole, the most probable.

To resume the argument from 195.

Viewing the mind as a receptacle of impressions (or ideas), we said that to think falsely was to fail in identifying present impressions with the ideas already existing in the mind. And thus it seemed impossible

to be mistaken about these ideas themselves apart from impressions from without. But in fact we do mistake in things independent of sensation. E.g. a scientific calculator, who possesses the knowledge both of 11 and 12, will sometimes say that the sum of 7 and 5 is 11. We resort therefore to a less simple conception of knowing, and to a more complex image. To know is to possess knowledge. We may possess it without having it in hand. We therefore image to ourselves false opinion thus. We have caught, as it were (in learning), various species of knowledge, some gregarious, some domestic, some noble and solitary, (i.e. highly abstract), and have caged them in the mind, like birds. We try to take in hand one of these birds which we possess, and as they flutter about, we take hold of another instead of it. But then, if we have this one in hand, how can we mistake it for the other? How can Knowledge be the means of error? Perhaps (Theætetus suggests) there were ignorances flying about amongst the knowledges, and we have taken one of them. But if I have an Ignorance in hand, how can I take it for a Knowledge? Must we imagine another cage or waxen block to contain the Knowledge of the knowledges and ignorances? This would be endless.

3. Ὁ γε . . ἐπελελήσμη] ‘A distinction, Socrates, which I

III. Theætetus now remembers to have heard that

true opinion, unless accompanied with an account of its object, is not knowledge.

Socrates identifies the saying thus quoted with what he himself has heard from certain 'as in a dream;' viz. that

ἀκούσας ἐπελελήσμην, νῦν δ' ἐννοῶ. ἔφη δὲ τὴν μὲν p. 201.
μετὰ λόγου ἀληθῆ δόξαν ἐπιστήμην εἶναι, τὴν δὲ D
ἄλογον ἐκτὸς ἐπιστήμης· καὶ ὧν μὲν μὴ ἔστι λόγος,
οὐκ ἐπιστητὰ εἶναι, οὕτωςι καὶ ὀνομάζων, ἃ δ' ἔχει,
5 ἐπιστητὰ.

ΣΩ. Ἡ καλῶς λέγεις. τὰ δὲ δὴ ἐπιστητὰ ταῦτα
καὶ μὴ πῆ διήρει, λέγε, εἰ ἄρα κατὰ ταῦτα σύ τε
κάγῳ ἀκηκόαμεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἄλλ' οὐκ οἶδα εἰ ἐξευρήσω· λέγοντος μὲν-
10 τὰν ἑτέρου, ὡς ἐγῶμαι, ἀκολουθήσαιμι.

ΣΩ. Ἄκουε δὴ ὄναρ ἀντὶ ὀνειράτος. ἐγὼ γὰρ αἰ

once heard expressed in a way which until this moment I had forgotten.'

I. τὴν μὲν μετὰ λόγου ἀληθῆ δόξαν] Cp. Meno, 97 E, 98: Καὶ γὰρ αἱ δόξαι αἱ ἀληθεῖς, ὅσον μὲν χρόνον παραμένωσι, καλὸν τὸ χρῆμα, καὶ πάντα τὰγαθὰ ἐργάζονται. πολλὸν δὲ χρόνον οὐκ ἐθέλουσι παραμένειν, ἀλλὰ δραπετεύουσιν ἐκ τῆς ψυχῆς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ὥστε οὐ πολλοῦ ἀξιαί εἰσιν, ἕως ἄν τις αὐτὰς δήση αἰτίας λογισμῶ. . . ἐπειδὴν δὲ δεθῶσι, πρῶτον μὲν ἐπιστήμαι γίνονται, ἔπειτα μόνιμοι· καὶ διὰ ταῦτα δὴ τιμιώτερον ἐπιστήμη ὕρθῆς δόξης ἐστί, καὶ διαφέρει δεσμῶ ἐπιστήμη ὀρθῆς δόξης. See the whole passage. Also Polit. 309 C: Τὴν . . . ὄντως οὐσαν ἀληθῆ δόξαν μετὰ βεβαιώσεως. Symp. 202 A: Ἡ οὐκ ἦσθησαι ὅτι ἐστί τι μεταξὺ σοφίας καὶ ἀμαθίας; τί τοῦτο; τὸ ὀρθὰ δοξάζειν καὶ ἄνευ τοῦ ἔχειν λόγον δοῦναι οὐκ οἶσθ', ἔφη, ὅτι οὐτ' ἐπίστασθαί ἐστιν ἄλογον γὰρ πρᾶγμα πῶς ἂν εἴη ἐπιστήμη; οὔτε ἀμαθία· τὸ γὰρ τοῦ ὄντος τυγχάνον πῶς ἂν εἴη ἀμαθία; ἐστί δὲ δὴ που τοιοῦτον ἡ ὀρθῆ δόξα, μεταξὺ φρονησεως καὶ ἀμαθίας. Rep. 6. 506 C: Οὐκ ἦσθησαι τὰς ἄνευ ἐπιστή-

μης δόξας, ὡς πᾶσαι αἰσχραὶ; ὧν αἱ βέλτισται τυφλαί· ἢ δοκοῦσί σοί τι τυφλῶν διαφέρειν ὁδὸν ὀρθῶς πορευομένων οἱ ἄνευ νοῦ ἀληθῆς τι δοξάζοντες;

4. οὕτωςι καὶ ὀνομάζων] I. e. using this strange term ἐπιστητὰ. Infr. τὰ δὲ δὴ ἐπιστητὰ ταῦτα. (For the participle cp. Gorg. 493 B: Τὸ ἀειδὲς δὴ λέγων, Sophocle. Phil. 64.) ἐπιστητός, like αἰσθητής and ποιότης, supra, 160 D, 182 A, is a novel word, and is formed on the analogy of αἰσθητός.

6. Ἡ . . . λέγεις] 'Truly, that is fortunate.' 'A timely recollection, indeed!' Gorg. 447 C.

7. εἰ ἄρα] 'That I may know whether.' Cp. supr. 192 C: Ἐάν ἄρα . . . μάθω.

εἰ ἄρα κατὰ ταῦτα σύ τε κάγῳ ἀκηκόαμεν] Had they both heard from the same source? Or is Plato here, as in the beginning of the dialogue, weaving together two distinct theories? If infr. 206 C is to be construed strictly, the latter is true. (See Introduction.)

11. ὄναρ] Cp. Phileb. 20 B: Λόγων ποτέ τινων πάλαι ἀκούσας

201. ἐδόκουν ἀκούειν τινῶν ὅτι τὰ μὲν πρῶτα οἶονπερὶ
^Eστοιχεῖα, ἐξ ὧν ἡμεῖς τε συγκεῖμεθα καὶ τᾶλλα,
 λόγον οὐκ ἔχοι· αὐτὸ γὰρ καθ' αὐτὸ ἕκαστον ὀνο-
 μάσαι μόνον εἶη, προσειπεῖν δὲ οὐδὲν ἄλλο δυνατὸν
 202. οὐθ' ὡς ἔστιν, οὐθ' ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν· ἤδη γὰρ ἂν οὐσίαν ἢ 5
 μὴ οὐσίαν αὐτῷ προστίθεσθαι, *δεῖν δὲ οὐδὲν προσ-
 φέρειν, εἶπερ αὐτὸ ἐκείνο μόνον τις ἐρεῖ. ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ τὸ
 αὐτὸ οὐδὲ τὸ ἐκείνο οὐδὲ τὸ ἕκαστον οὐδὲ τὸ μόνον
 οὐδὲ τοῦτο προσοιστέον, οὐδ' ἄλλα πολλὰ τοιαῦτα.

ἄναρ . . . νῦν ἐννοῶ . . . Phæd. 61
 D: 'Ἀλλὰ μὴν κἀγὼ ἐξ ἀκοῆς . . .
 λέγω. It suits Plato's humour
 to speak in this distant fashion
 of a school towards which he
 felt an 'imperfect sympathy.'
 What Socrates has heard care-
 lessly, as well as that which The-
 ætetus once heard but had for-
 gotten, is compared to a dream.

1. ἐδόκουν ἀκούειν] 'I heard
 in my dream.'

τὰ πρῶτα οἶονπερὶ στοιχεῖα]
 'The first rudiments, so to
 speak, of things.' In what
 follows it is vain to distinguish
 between different senses of στοι-
 χείων. The word is here regarded
 by Plato as a generic term, of
 which the denotation of the
 letters of the alphabet is only
 the most familiar use. 'Every-
 one will acknowledge that mu-
 sical notes are also στοιχεῖα'
 (206 B). In fact the unit of
 apprehension in every subject
 is the στοιχείων of that particular
 subject-matter. The word συλ-
 λαβή is similarly generalized, so
 that in passing from language
 to other things there is no
 change in the meaning of the
 word. Cp. infr. 202 E: Τὰ τῶν
 γραμμάτων στοιχεῖά τε καὶ συλλα-
 βάς, ἢ οἷε ἄλλοσέ ποι βλέποντα
 ταῦτα εἰπεῖν τὸν εἰπόντα ἂ λέγομεν.

For such figurative generaliza-
 tion, which is different from
 poetic metaphor, cp. esp. Legg.
 7. 823 B: Θήρα γὰρ πάμπολύ τι
 πράγμα ἐστι, κ.τ.λ. See some
 valuable remarks of Prof.
 Jebb's on the use of metaphor
 in Pindar, Journal of Hellenic
 Studies, 3. 1. 167.

3. αὐτὸ γὰρ . . . εἶη] 'For that
 each element in its proper self-
 existence can only be named.'
 Cp. especially Soph. 251 B:
 Χαίρουσιν οὐκ ἐὼντες ἀγαθὸν λέ-
 γειν ἀνθρώπων, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ἀγα-
 θὸν ἀγαθόν, τὸν δὲ ἀνθρώπων ἀν-
 θρώπων.

4. προσειπεῖν δὲ οὐδὲν ἄλλο δυ-
 νατόν] 'But it is impossible to
 go on to predicate anything of
 it (the element), either affirma-
 tively or negatively. For in so
 doing there is added the idea
 of existence or non-existence:
 but nothing must be added,
 seeing that you can only speak
 of the element by itself.'

5. ἤδη γὰρ] Sc. εἰ ἄλλο τι
 προσείπη τις.

9. οὐδὲ τοῦτο] This has
 given needless trouble. Heindorf
 thought the article was re-
 quired as with the other words,
 and inserted it. Buttman ob-
 jected to τοῦτο being so far se-
 parated from ἐκείνο, and ingeni-

the ele-
 ments of all
 things can-
 not be ex-
 pressed in
 a proposi-
 tion, but
 can only
 be named.
 You can-
 not give
 them any
 attribute,
 since even
 such com-
 mon præ-
 dicables

as 'this' and 'that' are separable from the things to which they are applied. As the elements are combined in Nature, so definition is a combination of names. That which is named is

ταῦτα μὲν γὰρ περιτρέχοντα πᾶσι προσφέρεσθαι, p. 202.
 ἕτερα ὄντα ἐκείνων οἷς προστίθεται, δεῖν δέ, εἴπερ ἦν
 δυνατόν αὐτὸ λέγεσθαι καὶ εἶχεν οἰκείον αὐτοῦ λόγον,
 ἄνευ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων λέγεσθαι. νῦν δὲ ἀδύνατον
 5 εἶναι ὅτιοῦν τῶν πρώτων ῥηθῆναι λόγῳ· οὐ γὰρ εἶναι B
 αὐτῷ ἀλλ' ἢ ὀνομάζεσθαι μόνον· ὄνομα γὰρ μόνον
 ἔχει· τὰ δὲ ἐκ τούτων ἤδη συγκείμενα, ὥσπερ αὐτὰ
 πέπλεκται, οὕτω καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα αὐτῶν συμπλεκέντα
 λόγον γεγονέναι· ὀνομάτων γὰρ συμπλοκὴν εἶναι
 10 λόγου οὐσίαν. οὕτω δὴ τὰ μὲν στοιχεῖα ἄλογα καὶ

ously conjectured οὐδὲ τὸ τό. Both objections are obviated by observing that αὐτὸ, ἐκείνο, ἕκαστον, μόνον, occur in the preceding lines. For this reason they are put first, and with the article, and οὐδὲ τοῦτο. . οὐδ' ἄλλα πολλὰ τοιαῦτα is added afterwards. Cp. supr. 157 B: Τὸ δ' εἶναι πανταχόθεν ἐξαιρετέον. . . οὐ δεῖ. . . οὔτε τι ξυγχωρεῖν οὔτε του οἷτ' ἐμοῦ οὔτε τόδε οὔτ' ἐκείνο οὔτε ἄλλο οὐδὲν ὄνομα ὃ τι ἂν ἰσθῆ. Accordingly in the reference to this passage, 205 C (which Buttman must have overlooked), the article is introduced—οὐδὲ τὸ τοῦτο.

1. περιτρέχοντα πᾶσι προσφέρεσθαι] Cp. supr. 197 D: 'Ενίας δὲ μόνος διὰ πασῶν ὅπῃ ἂν τύχῳσι πετομένας. Rep. 3. 402 A: Τὰ στοιχεῖα . . ἐν ἅσπαι . . περιφερόμενα. Polit. 278 D; Phil. 15 D.

2. εἴπερ ἦν δυνατόν αὐτὸ λέγεσθαι] αὐτό is not emphatic. 'If it could be spoken of,' λέγεσθαι is the emphatic word. λόγος is here equivalent to 'predication.'

6. αὐτῷ] Bonitz conjectures αὐτό. But the dative suits better with ἔχειν following.

7. ἦδη] I.e. 'when we come to them.'

9. ὀνομάτων γὰρ συμπλοκὴν εἶναι λόγου οὐσίαν] Cp. Sophist, 262 D: where it is described more accurately as συμπλέκων τὰ ῥήματα τοῖς ὀνόμασιν. See the whole passage.

A passage of Aristot. Metaph. 7. 3. 1043 b, is closely parallel to this. He has just shown that sensible reality (αἰσθητὴ οὐσία) consists of matter or potentiality (ὕλη, δύναμις), and form or actuality, (μορφή, ἐνέργεια): Ὡστε ἡ ἀπορία ἦν οἱ ἄντισθένοι καὶ οἱ οὕτως ἀπαίδευτοι ἠπόρουσιν, ἔχει τινὰ καιρόν, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι τὸ τί ἐστίν ὀρίσασθαι (τὸν γὰρ ὄρον λόγον εἶναι μακρόν), ἀλλὰ ποῖόν μὲν τί ἐστίν ἐνδέχεται καὶ διδάξαι, ὥσπερ ἄργυρον τί μὲν ἐστίν, οὐ, ὅτι δ' οἶον καττίτερος. ὥστ' οὐσίας ἐστὶ μὲν ἧς ἐνδέχεται εἶναι ὄρον καὶ λόγον, οἶον τῆς συνθέτου, ἐάν τε αἰσθητὴ ἐάν τε νοητὴ ἢ· ἐξ ὧν δ' αὐτῆ πρώτων, οὐκ ἔστιν, εἴπερ τι κατὰ τινος σημαίνει ὁ λόγος ὁ ὀριστικός, καὶ δεῖ τὸ μὲν ὥσπερ ὕλην εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ὡς μορφήν. (See Introduction.)

Locke's 'simple ideas' are not very different from the meaning of στοιχεῖον here.

202. ἄγνωστα εἶναι, αἰσθητὰ δέ· τὰς δὲ συλλαβὰς γνω-
 στάς τε καὶ ῥητὰς καὶ ἀληθεῖ δόξῃ δοξαστάς. ὅταν
 μὲν οὖν ἄνευ λόγου τὴν ἀληθῆ δόξαν τινός τις λάβῃ,
 ἀληθεύει μὲν αὐτοῦ τὴν ψυχὴν περὶ αὐτό, γινώ-
 σκει δ' οὐ· τὸν γὰρ μὴ δυνάμενον δοῦναί τε καὶ 5
 δέξασθαι λόγον ἀνεπιστήμονα εἶναι περὶ τούτου·
 προσλαβόντα δὲ λόγον δυνατὸν τε ταῦτα πάντα
 γεγονέναι καὶ τελείως πρὸς ἐπιστήμην ἔχειν. Οὕτως
 σὺ τὸ ἐνύπνιον ἢ ἄλλως ἀκήκοας;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὕτω μὲν οὖν παντάπασιν.

ΣΩ. Ἄρέσκει οὖν σε καὶ τίθεσαι ταύτη, δόξαν
 ἀληθῆ μετὰ λόγου ἐπιστήμην εἶναι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Κομιδῆ μὲν οὖν.

D ΣΩ. Ἄρ', ὦ Θεαίτητε, νῦν οὕτω τῆδε τῆ ἡμέρα

1. τὰς . . συλλαβὰς] This word, like *στοιχεῖα* *supr.*, is of course to be taken in the figurative sense, for the 'combinations of simple objects or ideas.'

2. καὶ ῥητὰς] There is possibly an allusion, as in *ἄλογον* *supr.*, to the mathematical use of the word. Cp. *Rep.* 8. 546 C: Πάντα προσήγορα καὶ ῥητὰ πρὸς ἄλληλα ἀπέφηναν. *Ib.* 7. 534 D: Ἄλόγους ὥσπερ γραμμάς. But the immediate reference is to ῥηθῆναι λόγῳ, 'Capable of expression.'

4. ἀληθεύει . . περὶ αὐτό] 'Is exercised truly with regard to it.'

6. περὶ τούτου] *Sc.* οὐ ἂν μὴ δύνηται δοῦναι λόγον. Cp. *supr.* 199 A.

7. δυνατὸν . . . ταῦτα πάντα] *Sc.* ἀληθεύειν καὶ γινώσκειν καὶ δοῦναί τε καὶ δέξασθαι λόγον. On this kind of pronominal expression see Riddell's *Digest*, § 55 and §§ 17 foll.

Contrast with this *Arist. Phys. Ausc.* 1. 1 (who points out that the elements, or simple ideas, are known not by sensation, but by analysis; and that definition distinguishes, while the name signifies an undivided whole):

"Ἔστι δ' ἡμῖν τὸ πρῶτον δῆλα καὶ σαφῆ τὰ συγκεχυμένα μᾶλλον ὕστερον δὲ ἐκ τούτων γίνεται γνώριμα τὰ στοιχεῖα καὶ αἱ ἀρχαί, διαιροῦσι ταῦτα. . . . Τὸ γὰρ ὅλον κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν, γνωριμώτερον. Τὸ δὲ καθόλου, ὅλον τί ἐστι. Πολλὰ γὰρ περιλαμβάνει ὡς μέρη τὸ καθόλου. Πέπονθε δὲ ταῦτο τοῦτο τρόπον τινα καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα πρὸς τὸν λόγον. Ὅλον γάρ τι καὶ ἀδιορίστως σημαίνει, οἷον ὁ κύκλος· ὁ δὲ ὀρισμὸς αὐτοῦ διαιρεῖ εἰς τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα.

11. Ἄρέσκει . . . σε] *Supr.* 172 D.

14. νῦν οὕτω] I. e. 'in a casual conversation.' *Supr.* 142 E.

the object of Sensation; the combination of these elements is alone the object of Knowledge. For that impression deserves not to be called knowledge, which cannot be expressed in a proposition.

Knowledge then is true opinion giving an account of

itself. Let this be our third answer.

Can we prove it true?

1. The answer may be a true one, and yet the theory on which we have based it may be unsound. This therefore is examined first.

εὐλήφασμεν ὁ πάλαι καὶ πολλοὶ τῶν σοφῶν ζητοῦντες p. 202.
πρὶν εὐρεῖν κατεγήρασαν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐμοὶ γοῦν δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, καλῶς λέγεσθαι τὸ νῦν ρηθέν.

5 ΣΩ. Καὶ εἰκός γε αὐτὸ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχειν· τίς γὰρ ἂν καὶ ἔτι ἐπιστήμη εἴη χωρὶς τοῦ λόγου τε καὶ ὀρθῆς δόξης; ἐν μέντοι τί με τῶν ρηθέντων ἀπαρέσκει.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποῖον δῆ;

ΣΩ. Ὁ καὶ δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι κομψότατα· ὡς τὰ
10 μὲν στοιχεῖα ἄγνωστα, τὸ δὲ τῶν συλλαβῶν γένος
γνωστόν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκοῦν ὀρθῶς;

ΣΩ. Ἰστέον δῆ· ὥσπερ γὰρ ὀμήρους ἔχομεν τοῦ
λόγου τὰ παραδείγματα, οἷς χρώμενος εἶπε πάντα
15 ταῦτα.

1. καὶ πολλοὶ τῶν σοφῶν] 'Many a philosopher.' καὶ πολὺς, like καὶ μάλα, is an intensive form. Rep. 8. 562 C.

5. αὐτὸ τοῦτο] 'The definition itself,' whatever may be said of the theory that has been stated as a ground for it. Heindorf's conjecture, εἰκός γ' αὖ τοῦτο, would give a different turn to the sense. 'It is natural to suppose that we have said well.'

9. λέγεσθαι κομψότατα] 'To be the cream of the whole theory.'

10. τὸ δὲ τῶν συλλαβῶν γένος] The 'complex mode' is a natural class or genus, which these philosophers suppose themselves to have discovered. Cp. infr. 206 B: Τὸ τῶν στοιχείων γένος.

13. Ἰστέον] Symp. 217 C. Cp. τάχ' εἰσόμεθα, Euthyphro, 9 E.

ὥσπερ . . . ὀμήρους] So that if we put them to the torture, we may bring him (τὸν λόγον) to terms.

14. τὰ παραδείγματα] Cp Polit. 277 E, 278 D, where the same example, that of letters, is introduced to illustrate the nature of Example: "Ὅτι τῶν στοιχείων ἕκαστον ἐν ταῖς βραχυτάταις καὶ ῥάσταις τῶν συλλαβῶν ἰκανῶς διαισθάνονται . . . μετατιθέμενα δ' εἰς τὰς τῶν πραγμάτων μακρὰς καὶ μὴ ῥάδιαις συλλαβὰς ταῦτα ταῦτα πάλιν ἄγνωεῖ.

H. Schmidt observes that παραδείγματα here are rather archetypes (Vorbilder) than examples (Beispiele). And it is true that the argument from letters is not so much an illustration as the very foundation of the theory.

εἶπε] Sc. the person from whom Socrates and Theaetetus are supposed to have heard

202. ΘΕΑΙ. Ποῖα δῆ.

ΣΩ. Τὰ τῶν γραμμάτων στοιχεῖά τε καὶ συλλαβάς. ἢ οἶε ἄλλοσέ ποι βλέποντα ταῦτα εἰπεῖν τὸν εἰπόντα ἃ λέγομεν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκ, ἀλλ' εἰς ταῦτα.

203. ΣΩ. Βασανίζωμεν δὴ αὐτὰ ἀναλαμβάνοντες, μᾶλλον δὲ ἡμᾶς αὐτούς, οὕτως ἢ οὐχ οὕτως γράμματα ἐμάθομεν. φέρε πρῶτον· ἄρ' αἱ μὲν συλλαβαὶ λόγον ἔχουσι, τὰ δὲ στοιχεῖα ἄλογα;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἴσως.

ΣΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν καὶ ἐμοὶ φαίνεται. Σωκράτους γοῦν εἴ τις ἔροιτο τὴν πρώτην συλλαβὴν οὕτωςί, ὦ Θεαίτητε, λέγε τί ἐστὶ σῶ, τί ἀποκριεῖ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὅτι σῖγμα καὶ ὦ.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τοῦτον ἔχεις λόγον τῆς συλλαβῆς;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐγώ γε.

B ΣΩ. Ἴθι δῆ, οὕτως εἶπέ καὶ τὸν τοῦ σῖγμα λόγον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ πῶς τοῦ στοιχείου τις ἐρεῖ στοιχεῖα; καὶ γὰρ δῆ, ὦ Σώκρατες, τό τε σῖγμα τῶν ἀφώνων ἐστί, ψόφος τις μόνον, οἷον συριπτούσης τῆς γλώτ-

the theory 'in a dream.' Cp. supr. 201 C: Εἰπόντος του ἀκούσας. Infr. 206 E.

6. Βασανίζωμεν δὴ αὐτά] 'Let us take and examine them, or rather let us put the question to ourselves.' The image of hostages, whom we may treat as we please, is kept up.

μᾶλλον δὲ ἡμᾶς αὐτούς] This is done more fully by and by, 206 A; cp. supr. 155 A.

7. οὕτως ἢ οὐχ οὕτως] For εἴτε omitted cp. supr. 169 D.

15. λόγον is predicative. 'You have this for an account.'

18. Καὶ πῶς στοιχεῖα]

'How is one to spell each single letter?'

19. τό τε σῖγμα . . . τοῦ δ' αὖ βῆτα] For τε followed by δέ cp. Rep. 3. 394 C.

Theætetus extemporizes the theory of phonetics, which is given more fully in Phil. 18 B foll. Sigma is a semivowel.

20. οἷον συριπτούσης τῆς γλώττης] This mode of definition reminds us of the Antisthenean saying quoted by Aristotle—ποιὸν μὲν τί ἐστὶν ἐνδέχεται καὶ διδάξαι, κ.τ.λ.; and also of Euclides' objection to definition by comparison.

5
It soon appears that we were right in saying the element cannot be defined.

10

15

20

της· τοῦ δ' αὖ βῆτα οὔτε φωνὴ οὔτε ψόφος, οὐδὲ τῶν p. 203.
πλείστων στοιχείων. ὥστε πάνυ εὖ ἔχει τὸ λέγεσθαι
αὐτὰ ἄλογα, ὧν γε τὰ ἐναργέστατα αὐτὰ τὰ ἐπτὰ
φωνὴν μόνον ἔχει, λόγον δὲ οὐδ' ὄντιν οὔν.

5 ΣΩ. Τουτὶ μὲν ἄρα, ὦ ἑταῖρε, κατωρθώκαμεν περὶ
ἐπιστήμης.

ΘΕΑΙ. Φαινόμεθα.

2. But is it
therefore
unknown?

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ δῆ; τὸ μὴ γνωστὸν εἶναι τὸ στοιχείου, C
ἀλλὰ τὴν συλλαβὴν, ἄρ' ὀρθῶς ἀποδεδείγμεθα;

10 ΘΕΑΙ. Εἰκός γε.

First, How
is the com-
plex related
to it?

ΣΩ. Φέρε δῆ, τὴν συλλαβὴν πότερον λέγομεν τὰ
ἀμφοτέρα στοιχεῖα, καὶ ἐὰν πλείω ἢ ἢ δύο, τὰ πάντα,
ἢ μίαν τινὰ ἰδέαν γεγονυῖαν συντεθέντων αὐτῶν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὰ ἅπαντα ἔμοιγε δοκοῦμεν.

E.g. is the
syllable the
same with
the letters
of which it
is com-
posed? If
so, they
must be
equally
known
with it.

15 ΣΩ. Ὅρα δῆ ἐπὶ δυοῖν, σίγμα καὶ ὦ. ἀμφοτέρᾳ
ἔστιν ἢ πρώτη συλλαβὴ τοῦ ἐμοῦ ὀνόματος. ἄλλο τι
ὁ γινώσκων αὐτὴν τὰ ἀμφοτέρα γινώσκει;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μῆν;

ΣΩ. Τὸ σίγμα καὶ τὸ ὦ ἄρα γινώσκει.

20 ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; ἐκάτερον ἄρ' ἀγνοεῖ, καὶ οὐδέτερον
εἰδὼς ἀμφοτέρα γινώσκει;

3. ἐναργέστατα] Bodl. ἐνεργέ-
στατα, sed ex em., the second ε
being in rasura.

9. ἀποδεδείγμεθα] Heindorf
conjectured ἀποδεδέγμεθα, for
which MS. authority (Coisl. et
Par. E. ex corr.) has since been
found; and it has been re-
ceived by Bekker. But Stall-
baum rightly defends ἀποδε-
δείγμεθα in the sense 'we have
declared our opinion;' in
which meaning the pf. pass. is
used by Xenophon and Lysias.
Cp. supr. 180 D: 'Αποδεικνυ-

μένων, 195 D: Τὸ νῦν ἀποδεδειγ-
μένον. Cp. however infr. 205
C: 'Απεδεχόμεθα ἡγοῦμενοι εὖ λέ-
γεσθαι. But this refers to a
part of the theory which has
been accepted in the words
τοῦτο μὲν . . κατωρθώκαμεν.

11. τὴν συλλαβὴν] Arist. Met.
7. 3. 1043 b: Οὐ φαίνεται δὴ
ζητοῦσιν ἢ συλλαβὴ ἐκ τῶν στοι-
χείων οὕσα καὶ συνθέσεως.

The word συλλαβή is used
probably not without the con-
sciousness of its etymology.

203. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἄλλὰ δεινὸν καὶ ἄλογον, ὧ̄ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλὰ μέντοι εἶ γε ἀνάγκη ἐκάτερον γινώσκειν, εἴπερ ἀμφοτέρᾳ τις γνώσεται, προγινώσκειν τὰ στοιχεῖα ἅπαντα ἀνάγκη τῷ μέλλοντί ποτε γνῶσθαι συλλαβὴν, καὶ οὕτως ἡμῖν ὁ καλὸς λόγος 5 ἀποδεδρακῶς οἰχῆσεται.

Ε ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ μάλα γε ἐξαίφνης.

ΣΩ. Οὐ γὰρ καλῶς αὐτὸν φυλάττομεν. χρῆν γὰρ ἴσως τὴν συλλαβὴν τίθεσθαι μὴ τὰ στοιχεῖα, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἐκείνων ἔν τι γεγονὸς εἶδος, ἰδέαν μίαν αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ 10 ἔχον, ἕτερον δὲ τῶν στοιχείων.

Or is it something by itself resulting from them?

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν· καὶ τάχα γ' ἂν μᾶλλον οὕτως ἢ ἐκείνως ἔχοι.

ΣΩ. Σκεπτέον, καὶ οὐ προδοτέον οὕτως ἀνάνδρως μέγαν τε καὶ σεμνὸν λόγον.

15

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

204. ΣΩ. Ἐχέτω δὴ ὡς νῦν φαμέν, μία ἰδέα ἐξ ἐκά-

In that case it cannot

5. ὁ καλὸς λόγος ἀποδεδρακῶς οἰχῆσεται] The image is that of the disappearance of a favourite slave (Prot. sub init.). Compare with the humorous pathos with which this is spoken Phæd. 89 B: Τήμερον, ἔφη, κἀγὼ τὰς ἐμὰς καὶ σὺ ταύτας, εἴηπερ ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος τελευτήσῃ καὶ μὴ δυνώμεθα αὐτὸν ἀναβιώσασθαι. καὶ ἔγωγ' ἂν, εἰ σὺ εἶην καὶ με διαφύγοι ὁ λόγος, ἔνορκον ἂν ποιησαίμην ὥσπερ Ἀργεῖοι, μὴ πρότερον κομήσειν πρὶν ἂν νικήσω ἀναμαχόμενος τὸν Σιμμίου τε καὶ Κέβητος λόγον.

ing unity. (See Appendix D.)

15. μέγαν τε καὶ σεμνὸν λόγον] In these words, as in the figure of the dream, and in κομψότατα supr. 202 D, the Socratic irony is manifest. For μέγαν cp. Phædo, 62 B.

17. Ἐχέτω δὴ ὡς νῦν φαμέν, μία ἰδέα] There is no occasion to suspect the reading, or to conjecture μίαν ἰδέαν. ἐχέτω ὡς = ἔστω ὁ . . . , and the whole clause μία . . . συλλαβὴ is in apposition to ὡς . . . φαμέν. Cp. Rep. 7. 517 B: Τὰ δ' ἐμοὶ φαινόμενα οὕτω φαίνονται, ἐν τῷ γνωστῷ τελευταία ἢ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέα καὶ μόγις ὁράσθαι.

10. εἶδος, ἰδέαν] εἶδος is here rather more concrete, ἰδέα more abstract; but ἰδέα is used for εἶδος a few lines below. Generally, εἶδος is more logical, implying distinction; ἰδέα more metaphysical, imply-

‘Let the case be then as we have now put it, that the syllable or complex (whether of letters or of anything else in the world) is a simple form

have parts :
unless we
regard
every
whole in
the same
way as
something
different
from all
its parts,
although
resulting
from them.

στων τῶν συναρμοσθέντων στοιχείων γιγνομένη ἢ p. 204.
συλλαβῆ, ὁμοίως ἔν τε γράμμασι καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις
ἅπασιν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

5 ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν μέρη αὐτῆς οὐ δεῖ εἶναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί δὴ;

ΣΩ. Ὅτι οὐ ἂν ἦ μέρη, τὸ ὅλον ἀνάγκη τὰ πάντα
μέρη εἶναι. ἢ καὶ τὸ ὅλον ἐκ τῶν μερῶν λέγεις γε-
γονὸς ἐν τι εἶδος ἕτερον τῶν πάντων μερῶν;

10 ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐγώ γε.

ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ δὴ πᾶν καὶ τὸ ὅλον πότερον ταῦτον
καλεῖς ἢ ἕτερον ἐκάτερον;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐχῶ μὲν οὐδὲν σαφές, ὅτι δὲ κελεύεις
προθύμως ἀποκρίνασθαι, παρακινδυνεύων λέγω ὅτι
15 ἕτερον.

ΣΩ. Ἡ μὲν προθυμία, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ὀρθή· εἰ δὲ καὶ
ἢ ἀπόκρισις, σκεπτέον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Δεῖ δέ γε δὴ.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν διαφέροι ἂν τὸ ὅλον τοῦ παντός, ὡς
20 ὁ νῦν λόγος;

arising out of each combina-
tion of harmonious elements.'
The words 'Ἐχέτω δὴ ὡς take
up the thread of τάχ' ἂν μᾶλλον
οὕτως ἢ ἐκείνως ἔχοι. In the
conjectural reading the words
ἐχέτω . . . μίαν ιδέαν would of
course refer to ιδέαν μίαν αὐτὸ
ἑαυτοῦ ἔχον. Schanz reads ἔστω.
But the anacluthon is not
more harsh than in supr. 173
D: Σπουδαὶ δὲ ἔταιρειῶν ἐπ' ἀρχάς,
κ.τ.λ. Soph. 218 E: Τί δὴτα προ-
ταξαίμεθ' ἂν εὐγνωστον, . . . οἶον
ἀσπαλιεντής; Apol. 21 C: Διαλε-
γόμενος αὐτῶ, . . . ἔδοξέ μοι. See
Riddell's Digest, §§ 270, 271.
For μία ιδέα=εἶδος ιδέαν μίαν

ἔχον cp. Euthyphr. 6 D: Τὸ
εἶδος ᾧ πάντα τὰ ὅσια ὀσια ἔστιν;
ἔφησθα γὰρ πον μὴ ιδέα τὰ τε
ἀνόσια ἀνόσια εἶναι καὶ τὰ ὅσια
ὅσια. Infr. 205 C: Μία τις
ιδέα . . . συλλαβῆ ἂν εἴη.

18. Δεῖ δέ γε δὴ] Sc. καὶ
τὴν ἀπόκρισιν ὀρθὴν εἶναι.

19. τὸ ὅλον τοῦ παντός . . . τὰ
πάντα καὶ τὸ πᾶν] Cp. Ar. Met.
4. 26. 1024 a: Ὑδωρ γὰρ καὶ
ὅσα ὑγρὰ καὶ ἀριθμὸς πᾶν μὲν
λέγεται, ὄλος δ' ἀριθμὸς καὶ ὄλον
ὑδωρ οὐ λέγεται, ἂν μὴ μεταφορᾶ.
πάντα δὲ λέγεται, ἐφ' οἷς τὸ πᾶν
ὡς ἐφ' ἐνί, ἐπὶ τούτοις πάντα ὡς
διηρημένους· πᾶς οὗτος ὁ ἀριθμὸς,
πᾶσαι αὐταὶ αἱ μονάδες.

With a
view to this
we venture
to assert
that the
Whole is
different
from the
All.

B

p. 204.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ δῆ; τὰ πάντα καὶ τὸ πᾶν ἔσθ' ὅ τι
 διαφέρει; οἷον ἐπειδὴν λέγωμεν ἓν, δύο, τρία, τέ-
 ταρα, πέντε, ἕξ, καὶ ἐὰν δις τρία ἢ τρις δύο ἢ τέτταρά
 τε καὶ δύο ἢ τρία καὶ δύο καὶ ἓν, πότερον ἐν πᾶσι 5
 τούτοις τὸ αὐτὸ ἢ ἕτερον λέγομεν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ταυτόν.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' ἄλλο τι ἢ ἕξ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδέν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐφ' ἐκάστης λέξεως πάντα τὰ ἕξ 10
 εἰρήκαμεν;

5. ἢ τρία καὶ δύο καὶ ἓν] The words ἢ πέντε καὶ ἓν, which were introduced by Cornarius, are anticipated in the simple enumeration ἓν, δύο, etc. They do not occur in the Bodleian or any other MS.

10. Οὐκοῦν ἐφ' ἐκάστης λέξεως πάντα τὰ ἕξ εἰρήκαμεν;] So far the MSS. give a meaning perfectly clear and natural. The words which follow are not so clear. The only way in which it seems possible to construe them as they stand in the MSS., viz. πάλω δ' οὐδέν λέγομεν τὰ πάντα λέγοντες, is by laying an unnatural stress on ἓν in οὐδέν. 'Again, while we speak of all (in the plural), is there no *one* thing of which we speak?' This is brought out more distinctly by C. F. Hermann's conjecture, οὐχ ἓν.

In my former edition I proposed to substitute πᾶν for πάλω. But πάλω is probably to be retained. Cp. Symp. 183D: Εἰς δὲ ταῦτά τις αὖ βλέψας ἡγήσασαι' ἂν πάλω, κ.τ.λ. Phil. 14 D: Πολλοὺς εἶναι πάλω. And I now think the most probable

solution is to suppose πᾶν to have dropped out from its similarity to πάλω. H. Schmidt justly observes that this line of conjecture is more logical than that followed by Heindorf and others, who substitute the awkward expression πᾶν τὰ ἕξ for πάντα τὰ ἕξ in the previous line. 'Do we not *repeat* something when we say τὰ πάντα' is not a satisfactory sense. The present passage is one in which a reader of Plato will expect extreme clearness and minuteness of logical sequence. And to put πᾶν τὰ ἕξ in the beginning of the argument would be to assume bluntly that which it is intended to prove, viz. that an aggregate may be regarded as one thing. With this object it is necessary to reason from the plural to the singular, and to do so gradually. The above argument might lead to the substitution of τὸ πᾶν for τὰ πάντα (a suggestion adopted by Schanz, and in part by Wohlrab, who reads τὸ πᾶν αὐτά). 'In counting six, we said "all

But can we go so far as to distinguish All, in the singular, from All, in the plural?

It is evident that 'all of six' is the same as 'all six.'

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Πάλιν δέ, *πᾶν οὐδὲν λέγομεν τὰ πάντα λέγοντες;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀνάγκη.

5 ΣΩ. Ἡ ἄλλο τι ἢ τὰ ἕξ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδέν.

ΣΩ. Ταῦτὸν ἄρα ἔν γε τοῖς ὅσα ἕξ ἀριθμοῦ ἐστί, D τό τε πᾶν προσαγορεύομεν καὶ τὰ ἅπαντα;

ΘΕΑΙ. Φαίνεται.

10 ΣΩ. Ὡδε δὴ περὶ αὐτῶν λέγομεν. ὁ τοῦ πλέθρου ἀριθμὸς καὶ τὸ πλέθρον ταυτόν· ἢ γάρ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Καὶ ὁ τοῦ σταδίου δὴ ὡσαύτως.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

six" (in the plural). Again, in speaking of *all*, in the singular, is there nothing which we express? 'There must be.' 'And is not this six?' 'Yes.' But there is needless obscurity in the logical inversion by which, after reasoning *from* the number, we should then reason *to* it. The required sequence is restored by reading as in the text. The passage may then be rendered, 'Have we not, then, in each expression, spoken of all the six?' 'Yes.' 'But again, while speaking of them all, is there no one thing *all* of which we express?' 'There must be.' 'And is that anything but the six?' 'Nothing.' This gives much greater force to the inference here and in E. Compare with the resumption of the previous admission in τὰ πάντα λέγοντες, Soph. 238 E: Οὐκοῦν τό γε

εἶναι προσάπτειν πειρώμενος ἐναντία τοῖς πρόσθεν ἔλεγον; Φαίνει. Τί δέ; τοῦτο προσάπτων οὐχ ὡς ἐνὶ διελεγόμεν; After ἀνάγκη, we must understand πᾶν τι λέγειν. Compare Symp. 192 E: Οὐδ' ἂν εἰς ἐξαρηθείη . . . ἀλλ' οἷοι' ἂν (sc. πᾶς τις), κ.τ.λ. alib. The reasoning of Parm. 144 C may be advantageously compared. See also Aristot. Poet. 1451 a. And for the abrupt form of the question with οὐδέν cp. Gorg. 474 D: Τί δέ τόδε; τὰ κατὰ πάντα . . . εἰς οὐδέν ἀποβλέπων καλεῖς ἐκάστοτε καλά;

7. Ταῦτὸν . . . προσαγορεύομεν] 'We give the names πᾶν and πάντα to the same thing.'

10. λέγομεν] Several MSS. have λέγομεν. If λέγομεν is right, it refers, not to the present sentence, but to the argument which it introduces about the relation of parts to a whole.

204. ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν καὶ ὁ τοῦ στρατοπέδου γε καὶ τὸ στρατόπεδον, καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ὁμοίως; ὁ γὰρ ἀριθμὸς πᾶς τὸ ὄν πᾶν ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ἐστίν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ὅ δὲ ἐκάστων ἀριθμὸς μῶν ἄλλο τι ἢ μέρη 5
ἐστίν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδέν.

ΣΩ. Ὅσα ἄρα ἔχει μέρη, ἐκ μερῶν ἂν εἶη;

ΘΕΑΙ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Τὰ δέ γε πάντα μέρη τὸ πᾶν εἶναι ὁμολογεῖται, 10
ἐπερ καὶ ὁ πᾶς ἀριθμὸς τὸ πᾶν ἐσται.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Τὸ ὅλον ἄρ' οὐκ ἐστίν ἐκ μερῶν. πᾶν γὰρ ἂν εἶη, τὰ πάντα ὄν μέρη.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκ εἴκειν.

ΣΩ. Μέρος δ' ἐστ' ὅτου ἄλλου ἐστίν ὅπερ ἐστίν 15
ἢ τοῦ ὅλου;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τοῦ παντός γε.

205. ΣΩ. Ἀνδρικῶς γε, ὦ Θεαίτητε, μάχει. τὸ πᾶν δὲ οὐχ ὅταν μῆδὲν ἀπῆ, αὐτὸ τοῦτο πᾶν ἐστίν; 20

2. ὁ γὰρ ἀριθμὸς] I. e. ὁ ἀριθμὸς πᾶς ἐκάστου ἐστὶ τὸ ὄν πᾶν ἕκαστον.

'The number of each taken altogether is each real thing taken altogether,' or 'each taken altogether so far as it exists.' Stallbaum's conjecture, ἐκάστου, would be more convenient, but we cannot venture to say that ἕκαστον is wrong. τὸ ὄν .. ἕκαστον = ἕκαστον, ὁ ἐστίν. Cp. Rep. 6. 490 B: Αὐτοῦ ὁ ἐστίν ἐκάστου τῆς φύσεως. It must be admitted, however, that the text becomes more uncertain in the last few pages of the dialogue.

5. Ὅ δὲ ἐκάστων ἀριθμὸς] The

word ἀριθμὸς implies plurality. Hence ἐκάστων, unless it is corrupt. We are now reasoning from singular to plural, as before from plural to singular.

10. ὁμολογεῖται] ὁμολόγηται, the reading of T, is of nearly equal authority.

16. Μέρος δ' ἐστ' ὅτου . . ὅλου] Cp. Parm. 147 C, Soph. 245 A.

19. Ἀνδρικῶς μάχει] Viz. for the θέσις he has chivalrously taken up, 204 B: Παρακινδυνεύων λέγω ὅτι ἕτερον.

20. αὐτὸ τοῦτο πᾶν ἐστίν] Is this very thing *all*, just as above, ἐστίν ὅπερ ἐστίν. πᾶν, being predicate, does not need the article.

But all (plural) implies number, and number implies parts.

Therefore all (singular) also implies parts.

Therefore if all (singular) and the whole are different, the whole is without parts.

But this is absurd.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Ὀλον δὲ οὐ ταῦτόν τοῦτο ἔσται, οὐδ' ἂν μηδαμῇ μηδὲν ἀποστατῇ; οὐδ' ἂν ἀποστατῇ, οὔτε ὄλον οὔτε πᾶν, ἅμα γενόμενον ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ τὸ αὐτό;

5 ΘΕΑΙ. Δοκεῖ μοι νῦν οὐδὲν διαφέρειν πᾶν τε καὶ ὄλον.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐλέγομεν ὅτι οὐδ' ἂν μέρη ἦ, τὸ ὄλον τε καὶ πᾶν τὰ πάντα μέρη ἔσται;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ γε.

10 ΣΩ. Πάλιν δὴ, ὅπερ ἄρτι ἐπεχείρουν, οὐκ, εἴπερ ἡ συλλαβὴ μὴ τὰ στοιχεῖά ἐστιν, ἀνάγκη αὐτὴν μὴ ὡς μέρη ἔχειν ἑαυτῆς τὰ στοιχεῖα, ἢ ταῦτόν οὖσαν αὐτοῖς ὁμοίως ἐκείνοις γνωστὴν εἶναι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὕτως.

We cannot therefore view the whole as different from the all. But, if the whole is all the parts, the complex, if distinct from its elements, is not the whole of which they are the parts.

2. Ὀλον] To be taken predicatively, like πᾶν immediately above.

3. οὔτε ὄλον οὔτε πᾶν] Sc. ἔσται γενόμενον. 'Will have become at once not-whole and not-all.'

4. ἅμα γενόμενον, κ.τ.λ.] 'Being changed in the same instant from forms which are identical to other forms which are likewise identical.

ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ] Viz. ὄλον=οὐδ' ἂν μηδὲν ἀποστατῇ=πᾶν.

τὸ αὐτό] Viz. οὐχ ὄλον=οὐ πᾶν.

'Both equally lose their entirety of nature.' (Jowett.)

7. ἐλέγομεν] The argument is resumed from 204 A: 'Ὅτι οὐδ' ἂν ἡ μέρη, τὸ ὄλον ἀνάγκη τὰ πάντα μέρη εἶναι.

10. Πάλιν δὴ . . ἀνάγκη] 'Then I may repeat, what I was trying to suggest a little while ago, that if the syllable is distinct from the letters, they are

not its parts; else, if they are, it must be indistinguishable from them, and no more knowable than they are.' In fact it was shown that the knowledge of the letters was a condition of syllables being known. Supr. 203 D, 204 A: Προγιγνώσκειν τὰ στοιχεῖα ἅπασα ἀνάγκη τῷ μέλλοντι ποτε γνώσεσθαι συλλαβὴν, . . οὐκοῦν μέρη αὐτῆς οὐ δεῖ εἶναι.

12. ἢ ταῦτόν οὖσαν αὐτοῖς ὁμοίως ἐκείνοις γνωστὴν εἶναι] For the turn of the sentence compare Rep. 6. 490 A: 'Ἦγεῖτο δ' αὐτῶ, εἰ νῶ ἔχεις, πρῶτον μὲν ἀλήθεια, ἣν διώκειν αὐτὸν πάντως καὶ πάντῃ ἔδει ἢ ἀλάζου ὄντι μηδαμῇ μετέναι φιλοσοφίας ἀληθινῆς. Ib. 503 A: 'Ἐλέγομεν δ', εἰ μνημονεύεις, δεῖν . . τὸ δόγμα τοῦτο μίτ' ἐν πόνοις μίτ' ἐν φόβοις . . φαίνεσθαι ἐκβάλλοντας ἢ τὸν ἀδυνατοῦντα ἀποκριτέον. Ib. 7. 525 B: Διὰ τὸ τῆς οὐσίας ἀπτερόν εἶναι γενέσεως ἐξαναδύντι ἢ μηδέποτε λογιστικῶ γενέσθαι.

p. 205. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τοῦτο ἵνα μὴ γενηται, ἕτερον αὐτῶν αὐτὴν ἐθέμεθα;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τί δ' ; εἰ μὴ τὰ στοιχεῖα συλλαβῆς μέρη ἐστίν, ἔχεις ἄλλ' ἄττα εἰπεῖν, ἃ μέρη μὲν ἐστι συ- 5 λαβῆς, οὐ μέντοι στοιχεῖά γ' ἐκείνης;

And it can have no other parts.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδαμῶς. εἰ γάρ, ὡς Σώκρατες, μόρια ταύτης συγχωροίην, γελοῖόν που τὰ στοιχεῖα ἀφέντα ἐπ' ἄλλα ἰέναι.

c ΣΩ. Παντάπασι δὴ, ὡς Θεαίτητε, κατὰ τὸν νῦν 10 λόγον μία τις ἰδέα ἀμέριστος συλλαβῆ ἂν εἴη.

Therefore it can have no parts.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔοικεν.

ΣΩ. Μέμνησαι οὖν, ὡς φίλε, ὅτι ὀλίγον ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν ἀπεδεχόμεθα ἠγούμενοι εὖ λέγεσθαι ὅτι τῶν πρώτων οὐκ εἴη λόγος, ἐξ ὧν τὰ ἄλλα σύγκειται, 15 διότι αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ ἕκαστον εἴη ἀσύνθετον, καὶ οὐδὲ τὸ εἶναι περὶ αὐτοῦ ὀρθῶς ἔχοι προσφέροντα εἰπεῖν, οὐδὲ τὸ τοῦτο, ὡς ἕτερα καὶ ἀλλότρια λεγόμενα, καὶ αὕτη δὴ ἡ αἰτία ἀλογόν τε καὶ ἄγνωστον αὐτὸ ποιοῖ;

But that which has no parts is uncompounded, i. e. an element, and therefore (by our hypothesis) unknown.

ΘΕΑΙ. Μέμνημαι.

d ΣΩ. Ἡ οὖν ἄλλη τις ἢ αὕτη ἡ αἰτία τοῦ μονοειδές τι καὶ ἀμέριστον αὐτὸ εἶναι; ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ οὐχ ὀρῶ ἄλλην. 20

11. συλλαβῆ] The absence of the article marks our familiarity with the word, and also gives it a certain indefiniteness: as in the expression πάντων μέτρον ἄνθρωπος. Cp. Rep. 2. 369 B: Γίγνεται τοίνυν . . πόλις . . ἐπειδή, κ. τ. λ.

21. Ἡ οὖν ἄλλη τις] 'And is not this same thing (viz. that it is uncompounded) the cause of its having a simple form without parts?'

The same cause makes it to be unknowable and without parts. Therefore if the 'syllable' or complex is without parts, it must be unknowable. Bonitz objects to the logic of this and reads τό for τοῦ. This is tautological, and Bonitz' reasoning is rightly rejected by H. Schmidt. See below, E. For illogical conversion in Plato cp. supr. 152 B C, 159 A.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν δὴ φαίνεται.

p. 205.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰς ταῦτον ἐμπέπτωκεν ἡ συλλαβὴ εἶδος ἐκείνω, εἶπερ μέρη τε μὴ ἔχει καὶ μία ἐστὶν ἰδέα;

5 ΘΕΑΙ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Εἰ μὲν ἄρα πολλὰ στοιχεῖα ἢ συλλαβὴ ἐστὶ καὶ ὅλον τι, μέρη δ' αὐτῆς ταῦτα, ὁμοίως αἶ τε συλλαβαὶ γνωσταὶ καὶ ῥηταὶ καὶ τὰ στοιχεῖα, ἐπέεπερ τὰ πάντα μέρη τῶ ὅλω ταῦτον ἐφάνη.

10 ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ μάλα.

E

ΣΩ. Εἰ δέ γε ἔν τε καὶ ἀμερές, ὁμοίως μὲν συλλαβὴ, ὡσαύτως δὲ στοιχεῖον ἀλογόν τε καὶ ἄγνωστον ἢ γὰρ αὐτὴ αἰτία ποιήσει αὐτὰ τοιαῦτα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκ ἔχω ἄλλως εἰπεῖν.

15 ΣΩ. Τοῦτο μὲν ἄρα μὴ ἀποδεχόμεθα, ὅς ἂν λέγη συλλαβὴν μὲν γνωστὸν καὶ ῥητόν, στοιχεῖον δὲ τούναντίον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Μὴ γάρ, εἶπερ τῶ λόγῳ πειθόμεθα.

ΣΩ. Τί δ' αὖ; τούναντίον λέγοντος ἄρ' οὐ μάλ- p. 206.
20 λον ἂν ἀποδέξαιο ἐξ ὧν αὐτὸς σύνοισθα σαυτῶ ἐν τῇ τῶν γραμμάτων μαθήσει;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. Ὡς οὐδὲν ἄλλο μανθάνων διετέλεσας ἢ τὰ στοιχεῖα ἔν τε τῇ ὄψει διαγιγνώσκεις πειρώμενος καὶ

If then the complex is an aggregate of simple parts, it and they are equally known and describable. If it is one and without parts, it and the elements are equally indeterminate and unknown.

Therefore it is untrue to say that the complex is known, but the simple unknown.

And we have experience to the contrary: for we learnt our letters before we could read,

3. εἶδος] Used here without reference to the sense in which it occurs above. Cp. 148 D: 'Ἐνὶ εἶδει περιλαβεῖν.

ἐκείνω] 'Sc. τῶ τῶν πρώτων εἶδει,' Heindorf. Rather ἐκάστα τῶν πρώτων. Cp. περὶ αὐτοῦ, supr. C.

15. μὴ ἀποδεχόμεθα, ὅς ἂν λέγη] For this common use of ὅς ἂν without antecedent cp. esp.

Soph. Ant. 35: 'Ἄλλ' ὅς ἂν τούτων τι δρᾷ, | φόνον προκείσθαι δημόλευστον ἐν πόλει.

16. γνωστόν] ἄγνωστον Bodl. pr. sed ā erasum.

23. Ὡς οὐδὲν ἄλλο] 'That in learning you continued doing nothing else but endeavouring to distinguish, etc.' Cp. Men. 80 A: 'Ὅτι οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ αὐτὸς τε ἀπορεῖς.

p. 206. ἐν τῇ ἀκοῇ αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ ἕκαστον, ἵνα μὴ ἡ θέσις
σε ταράττοι λεγομένων τε καὶ γραφομένων.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Ἐν δὲ κιθαριστοῦ τελέως μεμαθηκέναι μῶν
B ἄλλο τι ἦν ἢ τὸ τῶ φθόγγῳ ἕκαστῷ δύνασθαι ἐπακο- 5
λουθεῖν, ποίας χορδῆς εἶη· ἃ δὲ στοιχεῖα πᾶς ἂν ὁμο-
λογήσειε μουσικῆς λέγεσθαι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδὲν ἄλλο.

ΣΩ. Ὡν μὲν ἄρ' αὐτοὶ ἔμπειροὶ ἐσμεν στοιχείων
καὶ συλλαβῶν, εἰ δεῖ ἀπὸ τούτων τεκμαίρεσθαι καὶ 10
εἰς τὰ ἄλλα, πολὺ τὸ τῶν στοιχείων γένος ἐναργε-
στέραν τε τὴν γνῶσιν ἔχειν φήσομεν καὶ κυριωτέραν
τῆς συλλαβῆς πρὸς τὸ λαβεῖν τελέως ἕκαστον μά-
θημα, καὶ ἐάν τις φῆ συλλαβὴν μὲν γνωστόν, ἄγνω-
στον δὲ πεφυκέναι στοιχείον, ἐκόντα ἢ ἄκοντα παίζειν 15
ἡγησόμεθ' αὐτόν.

and our
notes be-
fore we
could play
the lyre.

From this
it appears
that the
element is
more
known
than the
syllable,
the simple
than the
complex.

15. ἐκόντα ἢ ἄκοντα παίζειν] *That he is either playing with us, or talking nonsense.*

The tendency of the present passage is to rise from the conception of elementary objects of sense (simple ideas of sensation) to that of abstract ideas, (universals, predicables), as the true elements of Knowledge.

Cp. Ar. Met. I a, 995 b: Πότερον αἱ ἀρχαὶ καὶ τὰ στοιχεῖα τὰ γένη ἐστὶν ἢ εἰς ἃ διαίρεται ἐνυπάρχοντα ἕκαστον.

This may be illustrated from the frequent use by Plato of the example of letters, elementary sounds, etc., to represent the Ideas and the mode of becoming acquainted with them.

The following passage,—Rep. 3. 402,—is an instance of this:—

Ὅσπερ ἄρα . . γραμμάτων περί τότε ἰκανῶς ἔχομεν, ὅτε τὰ στοι-

χεῖα μὴ λανθάνοι ἡμᾶς ὀλίγα ὄντα ἐν ἅπασιν οἷς ἐστὶ περιφερόμενα, καὶ οὐτ' ἐν σμικρῷ οὐτ' ἐν μεγάλῳ ἡτιμάζομεν αὐτά, ὡς οὐ δέοι αισθάνεσθαι, ἀλλὰ πανταχοῦ προῦθυμούμεθα διαγιγνώσκειν, ὡς οὐ πρότερον ἐσόμενοι γραμματικοὶ πρὶν οὕτως ἔχομεν. Ἀληθῆ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ εἰκόνας γραμμάτων, εἴ ποιν ἢ ἐν ὕδασι ἢ ἐν κατόπτροις ἐμφαίνοντο, οὐ πρότερον γνωσόμεθα, πρὶν ἂν αὐτὰ γνῶμεν, ἀλλ' ἔστι τῆς αὐτῆς τέχνης τε καὶ μελέτης; παντάπασιν μὲν οὖν. Ἄρ' οὖν, ὃ λέγω, πρὸς θεῶν, οὕτως οὐδὲ μουσικοὶ πρότερον ἐσόμεθα, οὔτε αὐτοὶ, οὔτε οὐδ' φαμέν ἡμῖν παιδευτέον εἶναι τοὺς φύλακας, πρὶν ἂν τὰ τῆς σωφροσύνης εἶδη καὶ ἀνδρείας καὶ ἐλευθεριότητος καὶ μεγαλοπρεπείας καὶ ὅσα τούτων ἀδελφὰ καὶ τὰ τούτων αὐ ἐναντία πανταχοῦ περιφερόμενα γνωρίζωμεν καὶ ἐνόντα ἐν οἷς ἔνεστιν αισθανόμεθα καὶ αὐτὰ καὶ εἰκόνας αὐτῶν, καὶ μήτε ἐν σμικροῖς μήτε ἐν μεγάλοις ἀτιμάζωμεν,

ΘΕΑΙ. Κομιδῆ μὲν οὖν.

p. 206.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλὰ δὴ τούτου μὲν ἔτι κὰν ἄλλαι φανείεν ^c
ἀποδείξεις, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ· τὸ δὲ προκείμενον μὴ ἐπι-
λαθόμεθα δι' αὐτὰ ἰδεῖν, ὅ τι δὴ ποτε καὶ λέγεται τὸ

ἀλλὰ τῆς αὐτῆς οἰώμεθα τέχνης εἶ-
ναι καὶ μελέτης;

At the same time it is hinted that the sensible elements, so far as each of them can be regarded as one individual thing, are also objects of Knowledge.

Cp. Ar. Met. I a, 994 b: "Ἐτι τὸ ἐπίστασθαι ἀναυροῦσιν οἱ οὕτως λέγοντες (viz. τὸ ἄπειρον λ.) οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε εἶδέναι πρὶν ἢ εἰς τὰ ἄτομα ἐλθεῖν.

To resume the argument from 201. Theætetus has heard it said that true opinion with a reason was knowledge: and that nothing which had not a reason could be known. This reminds Socrates of a theory which said that of the elements (or alphabet) of things no account could be given—they could only be named. But of their combinations an account could be given, and these could be known. Knowledge according to this consists in being able to give an account of anything. This, however, may be true, and yet the theory on which we have based it may be unsound. Testing this by the example of letters, we find that of the syllable $\sigma\omega$ an account can be given (it can be analysed), but not of its constituents σ and ω . But is the syllable known, the letter unknown? If so, in what way are we to conceive of the syllable? As all the letters? How then can I know them all, and yet

none singly? Or is it a simple unity formed out of them? It cannot then be related to them as a whole to its parts,—unless we can establish a distinction between whole and all. But all (singular) cannot be distinguished from all (plural); and this, containing all the parts, can scarcely be distinguished from the whole. Hence whole and all are indistinguishable. Therefore either the syllable has parts, and, consisting of things unknown, must be itself unknown; or, not having parts, it is uncompounded, and therefore itself, according to the theory, unknown. But our own memory ought to teach us that we first learnt to know the letters, and then the syllables and combinations of them.

Though the theory is rejected, we gain through criticising it the notion of a complex whole.

2. κὰν ἄλλαι φανείεν ἀποδείξεις] The train of thought here broken off is resumed in the Sophist, where the ἀσώματα εἶδη are treated as elements, and combinations of them are shown to be possible; also in the admission of θάτερον. Cp. Phileb.

4. ὅ τι δὴ . . γεγόναι] There is here a beginning of the formal or pedantic rhythm which is more common in the Sophist, Politicus, and Philebus. Indeed the manner of Socrates in this part of the Theætetus bears a close resemblance to that of the Eleatic Stranger.

This need not, however, affect the truth of our third answer.

p. 206. μετὰ δόξης ἀληθοῦς λόγον προσγεγόμενον τὴν τελεωτάτην ἐπιστήμην γεγονέναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκοῦν χρὴ ὀράν.

ΣΩ. Φέρε δὴ, τί ποτε βούλεται τὸν λόγον ἡμῖν σημαίνειν; τριῶν γὰρ ἔν τί μοι δοκεῖ λέγειν. 5

ΘΕΑΙ. Τίνων δὴ;

D ΣΩ. Τὸ μὲν πρῶτον εἶη ἂν τὸ τὴν αὐτοῦ διάνοιαν ἐμφανῆ ποιεῖν διὰ φωνῆς μετὰ ῥημάτων τε καὶ ὀνομάτων, ὥσπερ εἰς κάτοπτρον ἢ ὕδωρ τὴν δόξαν ἐκτυπούμενον εἰς τὴν διὰ τοῦ στόματος ῥοήν. ἢ οὐ 10 δοκεῖ σοι τὸ τοιοῦτον λόγος εἶναι;

What is meant in it by 'giving an account?' One of three things. Either, III. a. The reflexion of thought in speech.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐμοιγε. τὸν γοῦν αὐτὸ δρῶντα λέγειν φαμέν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τοῦτό γε πᾶς ποιεῖν δυνατὸς θάπτων ἢ σχολαίτερον, τὸ ἐνδείξασθαι τί δοκεῖ περὶ ἐκάστου 15 αὐτῶ, ὃ μὴ ἐνεὸς ἢ κωφὸς ἀπ' ἀρχῆς· καὶ οὕτως ὅσοι E τι ὀρθὸν δοξάζουσι, πάντες αὐτὸ μετὰ λόγου φανοῦνται ἔχοντες, καὶ οὐδαμοῦ ἔτι ὀρθῆ δόξα χωρὶς ἐπιστήμης γενήσεται.

But this is not peculiar to those who know.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθῆ.

ΣΩ. Μὴ τοίνυν ῥαδίως καταγιγνώσκωμεν τὸ μῆ-

20

4. τί ποτε βούλεται] The subject is either ὃ ταῦτα λέγων (cp. infr. E: Τὸν ἀποφηνάμενον ἐπιστήμην ὃ νῦν σκοποῦμεν), or ὃ λόγος, viz. τὸ μετὰ δόξης ἀληθοῦς λόγον προσγεγόμενον τὴν τελεωτάτην ἐπιστήμην γεγονέναι.

τὸν λόγον . . σημαίνειν] Id. qu. τὸν λόγον εἰπὼν σημαίνειν. 'What are we to understand by the term λόγος?' Three meanings are put forward as possible: (1) Expression in words. (2) Analysis. (3) Definition.

9. ὥσπερ εἰς κάτοπτρον] Cp. Phileb. 38 D: Κἄν τίς γ' αὐτῶ παρῆ, τά τε πρὸς αὐτὸν ῥηθέντα

ἐντείνας εἰς φωνὴν πρὸς τὸν παρόντα αὐτὰ ταῦτα ἂν πάλιν φθέγγαστο, καὶ λόγος δὴ γέγονεν οὕτως ὃ τότε δόξαν ἐκαλοῦμεν;

10. ἐκτυπούμενον] 'Imaging.' Cp. the saying of Democritus, λόγος ἔργου σκιή.

For τὴν διὰ τοῦ στόματος ῥοήν cp. Tim. 75 E: Τὸ δὲ λόγων νᾶμα ἕξω ῥέον καὶ ὑπηρετοῦν φρονήσει κάλλιστον καὶ ἄριστον πάντων νημάτων. Soph. 263 E.

14. Οὐκοῦν] Ven. Π. and another MS. give οὐκοῦν αὔ.

21. καταγιγνώσκωμεν] 'Accuse in our minds.'

τὸ μηδέν] 'Nothing at all,'

δὲν εἰρηκέναι τὸν ἀποφηνάμενον ἐπιστήμην ὃ νῦν p. 206.
σκοποῦμεν. ἴσως γὰρ ὁ λέγων οὐ τοῦτο ἔλεγεν, ἀλλὰ
τὸ ἐρωτηθέντα τί ἕκαστον δυνατὸν εἶναι τὴν ἀπόκρι-
σιν διὰ τῶν στοιχείων ἀποδοῦναι τῷ ἐρομένῳ. p. 207.

Or, III. β.
The enu-
meration of
the elemen-
tary parts
of the com-
plex whole.

5 ΘΕΑΙ. Οἶον τί λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Οἶον καὶ Ἡσίοδος περὶ ἀμάξης λέγει τὸ
ἑκατὸν δέ τε δούραθ' ἀμάξης. ἃ ἐγὼ μὲν οὐκ ἂν
δυναίμην εἰπεῖν, οἶμαι δὲ οὐδὲ σύ· ἀλλ' ἀγαπῶμεν
ἂν ἐρωτηθέντες ὅ τί ἐστὶν ἄμαξα, εἰ ἔχοιμεν εἰπεῖν
10 τροχοί, ἄξων, *ὑπερτερία, ἄντυγες, ζυγόν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ὅ δέ γε ἴσως οἶοιτ' ἂν ἡμᾶς, ὥσπερ ἂν τὸ
σὸν ὄνομα ἐρωτηθέντας καὶ ἀποκρινομένους κατὰ
συλλαβὴν, γελοίους εἶναι, ὀρθῶς μὲν δοξάζοντας καὶ B
15 λέγοντας ἃ λέγομεν, οἰομένους δὲ γραμματικούς εἶναι
καὶ ἔχειν τε καὶ λέγειν γραμματικῶς τὸν τοῦ Θεαι-
τήτου ὀνόματος λόγον. τὸ δ' οὐκ εἶναι ἐπιστημόνως

i. e. 'utter nonsense.' Cp. supr.
180 A: Ἦπτον . . . ἢ τὸ μηδέν.
Tim. 77 B: ᾧ . . . νοῦ μέτεστι τὸ
μηδέν. This is better than to
take the article with the infin-
itive, because the sense passes
on more smoothly from καταγι-
γνώσκωμεν, than if this word
were used quite absolutely.

Otherwise expressed, μὴ . . .
καταγιγνώσκωμεν τοῦ . . . ἀποφηνα-
μένου, ὡς τὸ μηδὲν εἴρηκεν.

3. τὸ ἐρωτηθέντα, κ.τ.λ.] This
is suggested (μαιευτικῶς) by the
preceding argument (206 A B).

6. Οἶον καὶ Ἡσίοδος] Or. et
D. 454: Φησὶ δ' ἀνὴρ φρένας
ἀφνεῖος πῆξασθαι ἄμαξαν, | νήπιος,
οὐδὲ τὸ οἶδ', ἕκατον δέ τε δούραθ'
ἀμάξης.

Cp. Arist. Met. 2. 3. 998 b:
Ἔτερος δ' ἔσται ὁ διὰ τῶν γενῶν
ὀρισμὸς καὶ ὁ λέγων ἐξ ὧν ἔστιν

ἐνυπαρχόντων.

10. *ὑπερτερία] The MSS.
have ὑπερρηρία, or ὑπερτήρια.

12. Ὅ δέ γ' ἴσως οἶοιτ' ἂν ἡμᾶς]
ὁ δέ, sc. ὁ λέγων, supr. The
apodosis is deferred, as is often
the case when an illustration
has been introduced with ὥσ-
περ. It is resumed with οὕτω
τοίνυν. Cp. Rep. 3. 402 A:
Ὅσπερ ἄρα . . . γραμμάτων περί . .
Ἄρ' οὖν, ὃ λέγω, πρὸς θεῶν, οὕτως
οὐδὲ μουσικοί, κ.τ.λ.

14. γελοίους εἶναι (sc. οἶοιτο) be-
longs equally to the protasis
and to the suppressed apodosis.
Cp., for a similar interweaving
of the illustration with the case
illustrated, supr. 147 A C.

17. τὸ δ' οὐκ εἶναι] 'Whereas,
he would say, it is impossible.'
Cp. 157 B: Τὸ δ' οὐ δέει, and
note.

p. 207. οὐδὲν λέγειν, πρὶν ἂν διὰ τῶν στοιχείων μετὰ τῆς ἀληθοῦς δόξης ἕκαστον περαίνει τις, ὅπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν που ἐρρήθη.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐρρήθη γάρ.

ΣΩ. Οὕτω τοίνυν καὶ περὶ ἀμάξης ἡμᾶς μὲν ὁρ- 5
θὴν ἔχειν δόξαν, τὸν δὲ διὰ τῶν ἑκατὸν ἐκείνων δυνά-
c μενον διελθεῖν αὐτῆς τὴν οὐσίαν, προσλαβόντα τοῦτο, λόγον τε προσειληφέναι τῇ ἀληθείᾳ δόξῃ καὶ ἀντιδοξαστικῷ τεχνικόν τε καὶ ἐπιστήμονα περὶ ἀμάξης οὐσίας γεγόνεαι, διὰ στοιχείων τὸ ὅλον περάναντα. 10

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκοῦν εὖ δοκεῖ σοι, ὦ Σώκρατες ;

ΣΩ. Εἰ σοί, ὦ ἑταῖρε, δοκεῖ, καὶ ἀποδέχει τὴν διὰ στοιχείου διέξοδον περὶ ἑκάστου λόγον εἶναι, τὴν δὲ κατὰ συλλαβὰς ἢ καὶ κατὰ μείζον ἔτι ἀλογίαν, τοῦτό 15
D μοι λέγε, ἵν' αὐτὸ ἐπισκοπῶμεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἄλλὰ πάννυ ἀποδέχομαι.

ΣΩ. Πότερον ἡγούμενος ἐπιστήμονα εἶναι ὄντιν οὖν ὄτου οὖν, ὅταν τὸ αὐτὸ ὅτε μὲν τοῦ αὐτοῦ δοκῇ αὐτῷ εἶναι, τοτὲ δὲ ἕτερον, ἢ καὶ ὅταν τοῦ αὐτοῦ τοτὲ μὲν ἕτερον, τοτὲ δὲ ἕτερον δοξάζῃ ; 20

ΘΕΑΙ. Μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Εἶτα ἀμνημονεῖς ἐν τῇ τῶν γραμμάτων μαθήσει κατ' ἀρχὰς σαυτὸν τε καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους δρώντας αὐτά ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐὰρα λέγεις τῆς αὐτῆς συλλαβῆς τοτὲ μὲν 25

2. ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν] 206 A :
'Ὡς οὐδὲν ἄλλο μανθάνων διετέλεσας,
κ. τ. λ.

11. εὖ] Sc. οἶεσθαι, from οἶοι' ἂν, supr. A.

12. Εἰ σοί] εἰ is interrogative, depending on τοῦτό μοι λέγε.

15. αὐτό] 'Your answer.'

17. Πότερον, κ.τ.λ.] Cp. Soph. 228 A.

18. τὸ αὐτὸ ὅτε μὲν . .] E. g. thinking τ to be the first letter both of τε and θε. For the construction cp. Phæd. 59 A, supr. 192 D.

19. τοῦ αὐτοῦ τοτὲ μὲν] E. g. thinking the first letter of θε at one time θ, at another τ.

24. αὐτά] 'What I have described.'

ἕτερον, τοτὲ δὲ ἕτερον ἡγουμένους γράμμα, καὶ τὸ p. 207.
αὐτὸ τοτὲ μὲν εἰς τὴν προσήκουσαν, τοτὲ δὲ εἰς ἄλλην^E
τιθέντας συλλαβὴν;

ΣΩ. Ταῦτα λέγω.

5 ΘΕΑΙ. Μὰ Δί' οὐ τοίνυν ἀμνημονῶ, οὐδέ γέ πω
ἡγοῦμαι ἐπίστασθαι τοὺς οὕτως ἔχοντας.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; ὅταν ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ καιρῷ Θεαίτητον
γράφων τις θῆτα καὶ εἰ οἴηταί τε δεῖν γράφειν καὶ p. 208.
γράφῃ, καὶ αὖ Θεόδωρον ἐπιχειρῶν γράφειν ταῦ καὶ
10 εἰ οἴηταί τε δεῖν γράφειν καὶ γράψῃ, ἄρ' ἐπίστασθαι
φήσομεν αὐτὸν τὴν πρώτην τῶν ὑμετέρων ὀνομάτων
συλλαβὴν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἄλλ' ἄρτι ὠμολογήσαμεν τὸν οὕτως
ἔχοντα μήπω εἰδέναί.

15 ΣΩ. Κωλύει οὖν τι καὶ περὶ τὴν δευτέραν συλλα-
βὴν καὶ τρίτην καὶ τετάρτην οὕτως ἔχει τὸν αὐτόν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδέν γε.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν τότε τὴν διὰ στοιχείου διέξοδον
ἔχων γράφει Θεαίτητον μετὰ ὀρθῆς δόξης, ὅταν ἐξῆς
20 γράψῃ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Δῆλον δῆ.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἔτι ἀνεπιστήμων ὢν, ὀρθὰ δὲ δοξά- B
ζων, ὡς φαμέν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

7. ἐν... καιρῷ] Sc. κατ' ἀρχὰς
τῆς τῶν γραμμάτων μαθήσεως.

17. Οὐδέν γε] Sc. κωλύει.
'Certainly not,' γε assents to
the meaning of the question.
Cp. Phil. 38 A: Οὐδέν γε, ἀλλ'
ἄπερ ἀκούω λέγω.

18. Ἄρ' οὖν, κ.τ.λ.] 'Soc. Then
in writing out correctly the
word *Theætetus*, he will do so
not only with right opinion,
but with command of the enu-

meration of elements; will he
not? *Th.* Clearly he will.
Soc. And that while still without
knowledge, though with right
opinion. Is not that what we
say? *Th.* Yes. *Soc.* And yet
with definition added to right
opinion. For he wrote with
command of the way through
the elements; and this we ad-
mitted to be knowledge.'

But I may
perform
this
rightly in
the case of
Theætetus'
name, and
yet mistake
in the first
syllable of
Theodorus'
though it is
the same
in both.
This is not
to know the
syllable.

p. 208. ΣΩ. Λόγον γε ἔχων μετὰ ὀρθῆς δόξης. τὴν γὰρ διὰ τοῦ στοιχείου ὁδὸν ἔχων ἔγραφεν, ἣν δὴ λόγον ὠμολογήσαμεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθῆ.

ΣΩ. Ἔστιν ἄρα, ὦ ἑταῖρε, μετὰ λόγου ὀρθὴ δόξα, 5 ἣν οὐπω δεῖ ἐπιστήμην καλεῖν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Κινδυνεύει.

ΣΩ. Ὅναρ δὴ, ὡς εἴκειν, ἐπλουτήσαμεν οἰθθέντες ἔχειν τὸν ἀληθέστατον ἐπιστήμης λόγον. ἢ μήπω κατηγορῶμεν; ἴσως γὰρ οὐ τοῦτό τις αὐτὸν ὀριεῖται, 10 ἢ ἀλλὰ τὸ λοιπὸν εἶδος τῶν τριῶν, ὧν ἔν γέ τι ἔφαμεν λόγον θήσεσθαι τὸν ἐπιστήμην ὀριζόμενον δόξαν εἶναι ὀρθὴν μετὰ λόγου.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὅρθῶς ὑπέμνησας· ἔτι γὰρ ἐν λοιπόν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἦν διανοίας ἐν φωνῇ ὥσπερ εἶδωλον, τὸ δ' 15 ἄρτι λεχθὲν διὰ στοιχείου ὁδοῦ ἐπὶ τὸ ὅλον· τὸ δὲ δὴ τρίτον τί λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Ὅπερ ἂν οἱ πολλοὶ εἴποιεν, τὸ ἔχειν τι σημεῖον εἶπεῖν ἢ τῶν ἀπάντων διαφέρει τὸ ἐρωτηθέν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οἶον τίνα τίνος ἔχεις μοι λόγον εἶπεῖν; 20

D ΣΩ. Οἶον, εἰ βούλει, ἡλίου περί ικανὸν οἶμαί σοι

Or, lastly, III. γ. The power of adding a mark which distinguishes it from all other things. I. e. Definition by the characteristic difference, or by the

8. Ὅναρ . . ἐπλουτήσαμεν] Cp. Polit. 277 D: Κινδυνεύει γὰρ ἡμῶν ἕκαστος οἶον ὄναρ εἰδὼς ἅπαντα, πάντ' αὐτὸ πάλιν ὥσπερ ἔστιν ἀγνοεῖν. 278 E: Ἔνα ἔστιν ἂν ὄνειρατος ἡμῖν γίγνηται. Lys. 218 C. The expression is proverbial, and there is no distinct reference to the 'dream' of Socrates. supr. 201 D.

9. ἐπιστήμης λόγον] λόγος is used here in a double sense. (1) 'Definition of Knowledge.' Cp. 148 D: Ἐνὶ λόγῳ προσεπιεῖν. (2) That 'account' of a thing which (with right opinion) constitutes Knowledge. The play

of words may be preserved: 'when we thought we had found the most indubitable "account" concerning Knowledge.'

10. τις] Viz. the nameless author of our theory.

18. Ὅπερ ἂν οἱ πολλοὶ εἴποιεν] The two former were inferences from different meanings of λέγειν;—'to express' and 'to enumerate.' See 206 D: Τὸν γοῦν αὐτὸ δρῶντα λέγειν φημέν.

20. ικανὸν . . ἀποδέξασθαι] 'Sufficient to obtain your assent.' ἀποδέξασθαι is an epexegetic infinitive.

sum of the distinctive elements.

εἶναι ἀποδέξασθαι, ὅτι τὸ λαμπρότατόν ἐστι τῶν κατὰ p. 208 τὸν οὐρανὸν ἰόντων περὶ γῆν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Λαβὲ δὴ οὐ χάριν εἶρηται. ἔστι δὲ ὅπερ ἄρτι
5 ἐλέγομεν, ὡς ἄρα τὴν διαφορὰν ἐκάστου ἀν λαμβάνης
ἢ τῶν ἄλλων διαφέρει, λόγον, ὡς φασί τινες, λήψει·
ἕως δ' ἀν κοινοῦ τινὸς ἐφάπτη, ἐκείνων πέρι σοι ἔσται
ὁ λόγος ὧν ἀν ἡ κοινότης ἦ.

ΘΕΑΙ. Μανθάνω· καί μοι δοκεῖ καλῶς ἔχειν λόγον E
10 τὸ τοιοῦτον καλεῖν.

ΣΩ. Ὃς δ' ἀν μετ' ὀρθῆς δόξης περὶ ὅτου οὖν τῶν
ὄντων τὴν διαφορὰν τῶν ἄλλων προσλάβη αὐτοῦ,
ἐπιστήμων γεγωνὸς ἔσται οὐ πρότερον ἢν δοξα-
στής.

15 ΘΕΑΙ. Φαμέν γε μὴν οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Νῦν δῆτα, ὧ Θεαίτητε, παντάπασιν ἔγωγε
ἐπειδὴ ἐγγὺς ὥσπερ σκιαγραφήματος γέγονα τοῦ
λεγομένου, ξυνίημι οὐδὲ σμικρόν· ἕως δὲ ἀφεστήκη
πόρρωθεν, ἐφαίνεταιό τί μοι λέγεσθαι.

20 ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς τί τοῦτο;

ΣΩ. Φράσω, ἐὰν οἴός τε γένωμαι. ὀρθὴν ἔγωγε p. 209.
ἔχων δόξαν περὶ σοῦ, ἐὰν μὲν προσλάβω τὸν

4. Λαβέ] I. e. μάθε. 'Let me explain to you.'

6. ὡς φασί τινες] The τινες are certainly Socratics, and probably the Megarians are meant. (See Introduction.)

12. αὐτοῦ,] This punctuation appears preferable when it is observed that there has been a tendency in the last few pages to accumulate genitives. τὴν διαφορὰν αὐτοῦ τῶν ἄλλων, 'Its distinction from other things.' Others join αὐτοῦ ἐπιστήμων.

13. δοξαστής] Cp. 160 D:

'Ἐπιστήμων ἀν εἶην, ὧνπερ αἰσθητής.

17. σκιαγραφήματος] Cp. Phæd. 69 B: Μὴ σκιαγραφία τις ἢ ἡ τοιαύτη ἀρετή. Rep. 2. 365 C, 7. 523 B, 10. 602 D, Soph. 235 E, Parm. 165 C. The illusion of σκιαγραφία depended on distance, and the picture would seem unmeaning from close at hand. Soph. Fr. 773 (N.): Πόρρω δὲ λείσσω, ἐγγύθεν δὲ πᾶς τυφλός.

20. Πῶς τί τοῦτο] 'What do you mean? and why is it so?'

Even this disappoints us on a nearer view.

p. 209. σὸν λόγον, γινώσκω δὴ σε, εἰ δὲ μὴ, δοξάζω μόνον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Λόγος δέ γε ἦν ἢ τῆς σῆς διαφορότητος ἐρμηνεία.

5

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Ἐνὶ τῷ οὖν ἐδόξαζον μόνον, ἄλλο τι ᾧ τῶν ἄλλων διαφέρεις, τούτων οὐδενὸς ἠπτόμην τῇ διανοίᾳ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκ ἔοικεν.

10

ΣΩ. Τῶν κοινῶν τι ἄρα διανοούμην, ὧν οὐδὲν σὺ μᾶλλον ἢ τις ἄλλος ἔχει.

B ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Φέρε δὴ πρὸς Διός· πῶς ποτὲ ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ σὲ μᾶλλον ἐδόξαζον ἢ ἄλλον ὄντιν οὖν; θεὸς γάρ με 15 διανοοῦμενον ὡς ἔστιν οὗτος Θεαίτητος, ὃς ἂν ἦ τε ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἔχη ῥίνα καὶ ὀφθαλμοὺς καὶ στόμα καὶ οὕτω δὴ ἐν ἕκαστον τῶν μελῶν. αὕτη οὖν ἡ διάνοια ἔσθ' ὅτι μᾶλλον ποιήσει με Θεαίτητον ἢ Θεόδωρον διανοεῖσθαι, ἢ τῶν λεγομένων Μυσῶν τὸν ἔσχατον; 20

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί γάρ;

For unless I can distinguish Theaetetus from Socrates and every one else, how can I be said to have a right opinion of him? If then by the comprehension of a true

1. δῆ] According to the hypothesis.

4. ἦν] 'Is,' according to the hypothesis.

τῆς σῆς διαφορότητος] 'Of your differentia.' Plato affects this abstract termination. Cp. esp. δικαιοῦτης, Prot. 331 B, Gorg. 508 A.

7. ᾧ τῶν ἄλλων διαφέρεις, τούτων οὐδενός] It occurs to Socrates while speaking that the 'Difference' of one person from another is not one but many. Hence the inexact correlation.

12. ἢ τις ἄλλος ἔχει] The verb

(ἔχεις) is attracted by τις ἄλλος.

20. τῶν λεγομένων Μυσῶν] The phrase Μυσῶν ἔσχατος is strengthened by the insertion of the article. The earlier editors (under protest from Buttmann) read τὸ λεγόμενον. There is no reason for this. Cp. supr. 173 D: οἱ τῆς θαλάττης λεγόμενοι χόες. Arist. Eth. N. 8. 3: Δεῖ γὰρ τοὺς λεγομένους ἄλας συναναλωσαι. In the examples quoted by the Scholiast the proverb is used to express contempt. Here it rather conveys the notion of indifference.

account is meant 'right opinion of the distinctive difference,' this is a necessary part of right opinion.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ἐὰν δὴ μὴ μόνον τὸν ἔχοντα ρῖνα καὶ ὀφθαλμοὺς διανοηθῶ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν σιμόν τε καὶ ἐξ-
ὀφθαλμον, μή τι σὲ αὖ μᾶλλον δοξάσω ἢ ἑμαυτὸν ἢ ὅσοι τοιοῦτοι;

5 ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδέν.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' οὐ πρότερόν γε, οἶμαι, Θεαίτητος ἐν ἐμοὶ δοξασθήσεται, πρὶν ἂν ἡ σιμότης αὕτη τῶν ἄλλων σιμοτήτων ὧν ἐγὼ ἐώρακα διάφορόν τι μνημεῖον παρ' ἐμοὶ ἐνσημηναμένη καταθῆται, — καὶ τᾶλλα οὕτως
10 ἐξ ὧν εἶ σύ, — [ἢ] ἐμέ, καὶ ἐὰν αὖριον ἀπαντήσω, ἀναμνήσει καὶ ποιήσει ὀρθὰ δοξάζειν περὶ σοῦ.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθέστατα.

ΣΩ. Περὶ τὴν διαφορότητα ἄρα καὶ ἡ ὀρθὴ δόξα ἂν εἴη ἐκάστου πέρι.

2. τὸν σιμόν τε καὶ ἐξόφθαλμον] Supr. 143 E. In Xen. Cyr. 1. 9 ἐξόφθαλμος is opposed to κοιλόφθαλμος. But in Ar. H. A. 1. 8. § 5 the words ἐκτός and ἐντός seem rather to refer to the *position* of the eyes.

8. μνημεῖον . . . ἐνσημηναμένη] Cp. 191 D, 192 A, 194 C, 196 A. The theory which has been rejected is still permitted and intended by Plato to leave an impression on the mind.

10. εἶ σύ, — [ἢ] ἐμέ, καὶ] Bodl. εἶ σύ ἐμέ καί: Ven. Ξ. et pr. Π.

εἶ σύ ἢ ἐμέ καί: Ces. εἶση ἐμέ καί: Ven. Ξ. γρ. οἴση ἐμέ: cett. εἶση ἐμέ καί. The reading is uncertain. That adopted in the text is the most plausible which can be said to rest on MS. authority. ἢ refers back to αὕτη ἡ σιμότης, passing over τᾶλλα οὕτως ἐξ ὧν εἶ σύ, which is added διὰ μέσου and answers to ἐξόφθαλμον in the previous sentence.

Heindorf's conjecture, ε, re-

ferring to μνημεῖον, is unsatisfactory, because it is rather the *object* of sense, which, by fitting the μνημεῖον, would be said to remind. Hence ἢ ἐμέ καί (adopted by Wagner) would seem a fair emendation. But a still simpler line of conjecture is to suppose, as in my former edition (1861), ἐμέ καί in the Bodleian reading to have been transposed from καὶ ἐμέ. This gives the same meaning (the sentence as usual passing out of the relative construction), and accounts naturally for the corruption. If this emendation is right, the sentence must be supposed to revert by a conversational licence to the indicative mood. Cp. supr. 149 D: Ποιεῖν καὶ . . . ἀμβλίσκουσιν, and note. Schleiermacher's conjecture, ἢ ἐμέ, κ.τ.λ., leaves the subject of ἀναμνήσει doubtful. That of the Zurich editors, εἶσει σύ ἐμέ, καὶ ἐμέ, introduces an abrupt and awkward inversion.

ΘΕΑΙ. Φαίνεται γε.

ΣΩ. Τὸ οὖν προσλαβεῖν λόγον τῇ ὀρθῇ δόξῃ τί ἂν ἔτι εἴη; εἰ μὲν γὰρ προσδοξάσαι λέγει ἢ διαφέρει τι τῶν ἄλλων, πάνυ γελοία γίνεταί ἢ ἐπίταξις.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς;

ΣΩ. Ὡς ὀρθὴν δόξαν ἔχομεν ἢ τῶν ἄλλων διαφέρει, τούτων προσλαβεῖν κελεύει ἡμᾶς ὀρθὴν δόξαν ἢ τῶν ἄλλων διαφέρει. καὶ οὕτως ἢ μὲν σκυτάλης ἢ ὑπέρου ἢ ὅτου δὴ λέγεται περιτροπῇ πρὸς ταύτην τὴν ἐπίταξιν οὐδὲν ἂν λέγοι, τυφλοῦ δὲ παρακέλευσις ἂν καλοῖτο δικαιότερον· τὸ γάρ, ἃ ἔχομεν, ταῦτα προσλαβεῖν κελεύειν, ἵνα μάθωμεν ἃ δοξάζομεν, πάνυ γενναίως ἔοικεν ἐσκοτωμένῳ.

ΘΕΑΙ. ***††εἴ γε δὴ τι νῦν δὴ ὡς ἐρῶν ἐπύθου;

And the use of οἶδα in this sense is questionable.

9. ὑπέρου . . περιτροπῇ] ἐπὶ τῶν τὰ αὐτὰ ποιούντων πολλάκις καὶ μηδὲν ἀννόντων, ἢ ἐπὶ τῶν ταχέως τι πραττόντων. μέμνηται δὲ αὐτῆς Φιλήμων ἐν Ἑρωσι καὶ ἐναυθα Πλάτων. (Schol.)

10. οὐδὲν ἂν λέγοι] I. e. λῆρος ἂν εἴη. Cp. Phædo, 72 B, Legg. 3. 698 A: Λέγοντες ἔργοις ὅτι λῆρος πρὸς χρυσόν τε καὶ ἄργυρόν ἐστιν ἐκάστοτε τὰ λεγόμενα τίμια καὶ κατὰ πόλιν.

12. πάνυ γενναίως . . ἐσκοτωμένῳ] Cp. esp. Rep. 8. 558 C: Ἡ δὲ συγγνώμη . . αὐτῆς.—Πάνυ, ἔφη, γενναία.

14. ***††εἴ γε δὴ] So the Bodleian MS. (but with no accents by the first hand.) Ven. T. has εἰπέ, with the rest, except Vat. Δ, which has εἰ δέ. The Bodleian continues without punctuation from ἐσκοτωμένῳ, and accents as above. But the accents appear to have been added by a later hand. Is it possible

some words may have slipped out? such as τί οὖν δὴ; εἴ γε δὴ τι —‘Well, what then? If, as I presume, your question just now’ (supr. D) ‘prepared the way for some announcement.’ The reading of Vat. Δ (εἰ δὲ δὴ . . τί, κ.τ.λ.) admits of being rendered, however: ‘Well, but if,— what were you just now going to say, when you asked the question?’ Most of the editors give Εἰπέ. The question referred to is τὸ οὖν προσλαβεῖν . . τί ἂν ἔτι εἴη; This is a little difficult; and Badham, reading Εἰ δέ, most ingeniously conjectures τί νῦν δὴ ὡς ἕτερον ὑπέθου, i. e. ‘what was the suppressed alternative implied by your use of μὲν?’ But ὑποτίθεσθαι elsewhere refers to a distinctly expressed postulate or condition (Rep. 1. 346 B), and if it could be used of something merely implied, the imperfect tense would be required in such a reference. πῦθέσθαι and

But if it means, ‘Knowledge of the distinctive difference,’ the term Knowledge remains still unanalysed.

ΣΩ. Εἰ τὸ λόγον, ὃ παῖ, προσλαβεῖν γινῶναι κε- p. 209
 λεύει, ἀλλὰ μὴ δοξάσαι τὴν διαφορότητα, ἥδὲ χρῆμ'
 ἂν εἴη τοῦ καλλίστου τῶν περὶ ἐπιστήμης λόγου. τὸ
 γὰρ γινῶναι ἐπιστήμην που λαβεῖν ἐστίν. ἦ γάρ; p. 210

5 ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐρωτηθεῖς, ὡς ἔοικε, τί ἐστὶν ἐπι-
 στήμη, ἀποκρινεῖται ὅτι δόξα ὀρθὴ μετὰ ἐπιστήμης
 διαφορότητος. λόγου γὰρ πρόσληψις τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη
 κατ' ἐκείνον.

10 ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐοικεν.

ΣΩ. Καὶ παντάπασί γε εὔηθες, ζητούντων ἡμῶν
 ἐπιστήμην, δόξαν φάναι ὀρθὴν εἶναι μετ' ἐπιστήμης
 εἴτε διαφορότητος εἴτε ὁπουοῦν. οὔτε ἄρα αἴσθησις,
 ὃ Θεαίτητε, οὔτε δόξα ἀληθῆς οὔτε μετ' ἀληθοῦς
 15 δόξης λόγος προσγιγνόμενος ἐπιστήμη ἂν εἴη. B

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκ ἔοικεν.

ΣΩ. Ἦ οὖν ἔτι κυοῦμέν τι καὶ ὠδίνομεν, ὃ φίλε,
 περὶ ἐπιστήμης, ἣ πάντα ἐκτετόκαμεν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δί' ἔγωγε πλείω ἢ ὅσα εἶχον
 20 ἐν ἐμαυτῷ διὰ σέ εἶρηκα.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ταῦτα μὲν πάντα ἣ μαιευτικὴ ἡμῖν
 τέχνη ἀνεμιαῖά φησι γεγενῆσθαι καὶ οὐκ ἄξια τρο-
 φῆς;

ΘΕΑΙ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

Though
Theætetus
has brought
forth more
than he
knew was
in him, the
art of So-
crates has
hitherto re-
jected all.

ἐρέσθαι are nearly synonymous
in Plato. Theætetus very properly
recalls Socrates from his
unwonted discursiveness. Mr.
Paley reads εἶα δῆ, τί νῦν δῆ, κ.τ.λ.

2. ἥδὲ χρῆμ' ἂν εἴη τοῦ] The
genitive is due to a sort of at-
tractive ethical force in ἡδύ, cp.
ἄτοπα τῆς συμκρολογίας above.
Soph. Phil. 81: 'Ἄλλ' ἡδὲ γάρ
τοι κτῆμα τῆς νίκης λαβεῖν.

'An amusing sort of creature

does our fairest of the *accounts*
of knowledge prove!'

7. ἀποκρινεῖται] Sc. ὁ λόγος.

12. φάναι] ἐκείνον sc. The
absurdity is in fact the same
as in Theætetus' first attempt,
supr. 147 B.

17. For the 1st pers. plural
cp. supr. 154 D. It may be
called the good physician's
figure,—σχήμα ἱατρικόν.

19. Καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δί' ἔγωγε πλείω]

0. 210. ΣΩ. Ἐὰν τοίνυν ἄλλων μετὰ ταῦτα ἐγκύμων ἐπι-
 c χειρῆς γίγνεσθαι, ὧ Θεαίτητε,—ἐάν τε γίγνη, βελτιό-
 νων ἔσει πλήρης διὰ τὴν νῦν ἐξέτασιν, ἐάν τε κενὸς
 ἦς, ἦττον ἔσει βαρὺς τοῖς συνοῦσι καὶ ἡμερώτερος,
 σωφρόνως οὐκ οἰόμενος εἰδέναι ἂ μὴ οἶσθα. τοσοῦτον 5
 γὰρ μόνον ἢ ἐμὴ τέχνη δύναται, πλέον δὲ οὐδέν, οὐδέ
 τι οἶδα ὧν οἱ ἄλλοι, ὅσοι μεγάλοι καὶ θαυμάσιοι ἄν-
 δρες εἰσὶ τε καὶ γεγόνασι. τὴν δὲ μαιεῖαν ταύτην
 ἐγὼ τε καὶ ἡ μήτηρ ἐκ θεοῦ ἐλάχομεν, ἡ μὲν τῶν
 D γυναικῶν, ἐγὼ δὲ τῶν νέων τε καὶ γενναίων καὶ ὅσοι 10
 καλοί. νῦν μὲν οὖν ἀπαντητέον μοι εἰς τὴν τοῦ
 βασιλέως στοὰν ἐπὶ τὴν Μελήτου γραφήν, ἣν με
 γέγραπται· ἔωθεν δέ, ὧ Θεόδωρε, δεῦρο πάλιν ἀπαν-
 τῶμεν.

But the youth is cured of thinking that he knows what he does not know.

καὶ πλείω, 'even more:'—ναὶ μὰ Δί' ἔγωγε is interposed.

1. Ἐὰν . . ἐάν τε . . ἐάν τε] For this hypothesis within hypothesis cp. supr. 147 A, and note. ἐάν τε . . ἐάν τε are correlatives.

'Then, Theætetus, should you go about hereafter to conceive afresh,—whether you do conceive, your state will be the more promising for what you have now gone through, or whether you remain barren, you will be gentler and less offensive to those about you, for you will be too modest to think that you know what you do not know.'

9. ἐκ θεοῦ] θεός is here generalised. Cp. supr. 149 B, 150 C.

10. ὅσοι καλοί] Supr. 185 E: Ὅ γὰρ καλῶς λέγων καλός τε καὶ γαθός. The word accentuates Socrates' satisfaction with Theætetus. Cp. supr. 142 C: Πάνυ ἀγασθῆναι αὐτοῦ τὴν φύσιν.

11. τὴν τοῦ βασιλέως στοὰν] Indictments for impiety were laid before the ἄρχων βασιλεύς, who was the representative of the ancient kings in their capacity of High-Priest, as the Rex Sacrificulus was at Rome. (Smith's Dict. of Ant.) It is at this point that the Euthyphro is supposed to open.

13. ἔωθεν δέ, κ.τ.λ.] These words may have originally belonged to the dialogue without implying the promise of a continuation. Cp. Lach. sub fin.

APPENDIX A.

Heraclitus and Parmenides.

As after-ages saw amongst Plato's contemporaries distinctions which were only partially developed in his time, so in a less degree, and with the difference which his genius implies, Plato viewed the past through a generalization and an antithesis. Heraclitus and Empedocles, and from another point of view Protagoras, were the representatives of one tendency, Parmenides and his followers, of the contrary one. The opposition between them is that between rest and motion, unity and diversity, absolute and relative, universal and particular, finite and infinite, positive and negative, between knowledge and opinion, ideas or conceptions and impressions.

In endeavouring to conceive what Parmenides, Heraclitus, and Protagoras really were, it is necessary to divest our minds of this contrasted form under which we are led to think of them in reading Plato.

It would only be an approximation towards a true estimate to say that Parmenides represents the idea of unity, being, or rest, Heraclitus that of dualism, of a process, or motion, and Pythagoras that of harmony and order, or definite proportions, as intermediate between the other two. Earlier Philosophies.

Philosophy was yet too near its origin for its streams to have diverged very far. As we come nearer to those early thinkers, we find that they had more in common than we supposed. They have a common mythological element, the atmosphere in which their thoughts move, and which they strive to pierce, although it veils their meaning partly from themselves; inhaled by some in the Greek and Sicilian valleys, by some, perhaps in earlier purity, on the Eastern plains, but in all finding its highest sensuous embodiment in the Sun or Fire. The notion of *Δίκη* is common to Heraclitus and Parmenides, the *εἰμαρμένη* of the one is paralleled by the *ἀνάγκη* of the other.

The endeavour to pierce this veil of language¹ is accompanied in all of them by a melancholy scepticism and contempt for the common opinions of men. The words of Plato in the *Phædo*, *οἱ πολλοὶ ψηλαφῶντες ὡσπερ ἐν σκότῳ*, might have been applied by any of the earlier philosophers to the condition of men, who believe the testimony of their senses before that of reason, and cling to their own narrow thoughts instead of being conformed to the law of Nature or Being.

With this scepticism is combined in all of them what may be termed an ideal Pantheism: the speculative and religious intellect filling the void of observation with the intensity of its own early thought². All that is particular owes its being to Wrong, in the universal alone is harmony and righteousness and peace. The world of opinion is a world of 'nought and night;' the fulness of being is absolute, and commensurate with thought. The nature of things, says Philolaus, belongs to divine, and not to human knowledge.

Such being the ground colours more or less discernible throughout the philosophy of the sixth century B.C., what were the distinguishing features by which they were relieved? It is now proposed to consider this in the case of Heraclitus and (more briefly) of Parmenides; and it may be remarked in passing, that, historically speaking, it does not seem very probable that either of these philosophers pursued his reflections with direct reference to the other. The idea of the History of Philosophy is a little apt to intercept our view of the History itself. As a Platonist sees in the Ionian and Eleatic two opposite poles, so the Hegelian is tempted to trace the progress of thought from Parmenides to Heraclitus, while a Kantian may view the Eleatic transcendentalism as the higher. Such thoughts may supply a valuable theory, but they are not strictly historical. Parmenides and Heraclitus were nearly contemporary, Heraclitus being the earlier of the two: they lived far apart, and were subject to different influences.

Heraclitus. I. Heraclitus of Ephesus was an Eastern Greek, and it is not merely fanciful to find an analogy between his thoughts and the more dreamy speculations of the remoter East. But they have a greater interest for the student of philosophy, not only as having contributed primarily to the speculative impulse of the Greek mind, but as permanently valuable in themselves, and anticipating some of the most fruitful of modern ideas. Bacon drew

¹ Cp. Παρμεν. : 'Ὀσάμεναι κροτάφων ἄπο χερσὶ καλύπτρας.

² Τὸ γὰρ πλεον ἐστὶ νόημα, Παρμεν.

from them some of his happiest expressions ; and Hegel professed to have embodied in his own Logic every principle which they contained. 'The voice of the Sibyl,' says Heraclitus, 'although its notes be harsh and rude, yet penetrates to a thousand years.' This pregnant saying may be well applied to the obscure utterances of Heraclitus himself. Half understood even by his own followers, imperfectly appreciated by Plato and Aristotle, he exercised a wide-spread influence, second only to that of Parmenides in its intensity. Caught up afresh by the Stoics and Neo-platonists, and by the Fathers of the Christian Church, and read by them in the light of deeper wants, his words received a new interest from their sublime spirit of awe and sadness. And thus many of them have been preserved to us ; and reveal in dim and broken outline the proportions of a most noble and far-seeing intellect.

It is the common fate of great thinkers in an early time, that for the most part only the negative side of their teaching 'lives after them.' One reason is, that it is the most distinct and intelligible to themselves and their contemporaries. Deep intuitions, but unsubstantial, though clothed in palpable imagery ; anticipations, vague and unsupported by proof, of the human mind, dreaming on thoughts to come, partly become engulfed by time, partly remain dead and fruitless and unknown, until their meaning is revealed by the development of cognate thoughts in distant ages, and a late sympathy detects what is hidden there in germ. So the doctrine of Heraclitus, which undoubtedly contained an element of order and unity, if not of rest, and had been as ideal as any, was degraded to be the support of the doctrine of sense, although it again enters to restore the balance of philosophy when in danger of being bound fast in the Eleatic One¹.

Heraclitus himself had followed in the wake of previous thinkers. As the emigrant Xenophanes had 'looked up to the vault of heaven and said that the One was God,' so Thales had looked forth on the expanse of the Ægean and said that Water was the All, with a vague sense that Nature must be simple and all-pervading. The tendency of his successors had been towards the idea of a homogeneous Infinite. Heraclitus rose to the conception of Nature as a universal ever-acting Law.

He felt deeply the falseness and contradictoriness of sensation and opinion, not because he contrasted their objects with that of knowledge, but because he felt that these are presented as being

¹ Thus the dialectic of Plat. Rep. 6 is a sort of ὁδὸς ἀνω κάτω μία. See also the Sophist and Parmenides.

something in themselves,—‘not fluctuating but fixed,’—and not as moments in the Universal Process. This is itself unseen, but is symbolised in several ways. ‘The Order that embraces all things is an everliving Fire, Eternal, Uncreated, kindling itself by measures and extinguishing itself by measures;’ i.e. The Idea of the universe implies at once absolute activity and perfect law. This Idea is also represented as ‘the invisible harmony’ which is ‘better than the visible,’ as the ‘Thought which guides all through all,’ as the ‘Universal Word’ or ‘Reason,’ as the ‘One Wisdom,’ as ‘Time,’ as ‘Righteousness,’ as ‘Fate,’ as the ‘Name of Zeus.’ This Eternal process, which is at the same time a law or harmony, is inseparable in the mind of Heraclitus from the notion of dualism. The process is from This to That and back again, the harmony is between opposites, which do not cease to be opposites, although the one passes into the other. This was not lost upon Plato. ‘The universe is ever drawn asunder and together at once, says the muse of firmer tone,’ viz. the Ionian: Plat. Soph. 242. It is implied in the blunt words, ‘War is the Father of all things:’ and in a saying of more doubtful meaning, Παλίντονος ἀρμονίη κόσμου, ἕκωσπερ λύρης καὶ τόξου¹. Different interpretations of this have been suggested. Perhaps it might be paraphrased, ‘As the arrow leaves the string, the hands are pulling opposite ways to each other, and to the different parts of the bow (cp. Plato, Rep. 4. 439), and the sweet note of the lyre is due to a similar tension and retention; the secret of the Universe is the same².’ Thus Homer is blamed for praying that strife may be no more, since without strife there can be no harmony. ‘The Deity is Day and Night in one, winter and summer, war and peace, fulness and hunger.’ Each thing is ever producing or passing into its opposite—evil into good, and good into evil: light into darkness and darkness into light. This Eternal process is the world: ‘All coming out of one, and one arising out of all.’ Its nature is to reveal itself in contradictions: *Συνάφειας οὐλα καὶ οὐχὶ οὐλα*³, κ.τ.λ. *Ἐν τῷ σοφῶν μόνον λέγεσθαι οὐκ ἐθέλει καὶ ἐθέλει, Ζητὸς οὐνομα*⁴.

But it is more particularly described as the way upwards and downwards, which is the same. In everything there is contrariety, and the action of the all-embracing, all-dividing fire. But there is a more general contrariety between the fire itself and its grosser forms, i.e. between the absolute process itself and

¹ Fr. 56 (Bywater).

² Hor. Epist. 1. 12. 19: ‘Quid velit et possit rerum concordia discors.’

³ Fr. 59.

⁴ Fr. 65.

the elements which are at once the subjects and the products of its Law. Fire is becoming all things, and all things are becoming fire;—the things are typified as air and water and earth. Here it is more difficult to separate the symbol from the thought. There is an effort made to give greater outward reality to the process, and the language becomes more sensuous accordingly. The way upwards is the way from earth through water and air to fire, the way downwards is from fire through air and water to earth. Both processes are ever moving on together; and each element has its own harmony or law. There is then not only contrariety and harmony in the world, but also a lower and a higher. This is more simply expressed by the distinction between the moist and dry exhalations; e.g. the clouds and the sun: the one dark, the other light; the one tending downwards, the other upwards. These are, as it were, the body and soul of the world. The death of either is the other's life. The Universal Process is perpetually circling between them. At this point we return to the world of sensible things. They exist only by perpetual strife, life and death work together in them; their birth is a death, their death or absorption into the higher region is the true life; the only harmony amongst them is due to war. But is there war in heaven? Is there no escape from this region of conflicting elements? Is the fire itself, the origin and goal of the struggle of existence, torn asunder by a similar struggle? We may possibly imagine the primordial activity and its law (*πῦρ, μέτρα*) as two coexistent and opposite principles, the balance of which is order (*κόσμος*); but it is probably nearer the truth to say, that the fire is inseparable from the world, and therefore from the conflict of things: as these in their war are ever coming into existence and absorbed again, so the fire is ever parted asunder so as to become all things, and at the same time united out of them¹, quenched into the lower forms and kindled into itself again. But then this process is all-embracing; not isolated like the war of particular things: and for each thing to rise from earth to fire, that is, from particular existence to the Universal Process, is to attain to peace. This seems to be implied in the notice of Diog. L. (9. 8): *Τῶν δὲ ἐναντίων τὸ μὲν εἰς γένεσιν ἄγον καλεῖσθαι πόλεμον καὶ ἔριν, τὸ δ' ἐπὶ τὴν ἐκπίρωσιν ὁμολογίαν καὶ εἰρήνην*². On the other hand, that which is wearied with the 'Eternal process moving on,' is carried downwards by a weak desire of rest and of particular being; and to this is

¹ Διαφερόμενον ἀεὶ συμφέρεται.

² Cp. too the words *Νούσος ὑγιήν*

ἔποίησεν ἡδὺ καὶ ἀγαθόν,—κάματος ἀνά-
πασιν.

attributed the origin of the individual soul. (See Lassalle, *Her.* vol. 1. pp. 123 sqq.)

What is the bearing of this theory on the mind, on human knowledge, and on human life?

1. The universal law or process may be conceived of as a continued act or utterance of mind (*γνώμη ἢ κυβερνήσει πάντα, τὸ ἐν σοφόν, θεῖος λόγος*). This, though more or less personified (as *Ζεὺς, Δίκη, Θεός*), is nowhere distinctly personal. The act or utterance itself is the soul of the World, not exactly 'immanent,' but ever moving throughout all, passing into everything and returning into itself again. Yet while thus pervading all things, it essentially holds the upper ethereal region, and embraces all, being opposed to the things beneath it as universal to particular.

2. Knowledge therefore is the acquaintance and union with this universal and pervading mind or law. That human mind is the best, which most partakes of it; that which lives in its own world of particular impressions and notions, is 'nearer earth and less in light.' This idea finds a symbolical and also an abstract expression. 'A dry soul is the wisest and best, flashing through the body as lightning through a cloud' (cp. *ξηρὰ ἀναθυμίασις*). 'The soul that is moist (e. g. with wine) "embodies" itself like a gathering cloud' (cp. *ὕγρὰ ἀναθυμίασις*). 'The Law of things is a law of universal Reason, but most men live as if they had a wisdom of their own.' 'To live in the light of the universal Order is to be awake, to turn aside into our own microcosm is to go to sleep.' 'Most men even when they hear are as though they heard not, their speech bewrays that though present they are absent mentally.' It is an obscure question, and one which Heraclitus probably did not distinctly ask himself, by what path, according to this theory, the mind passes from sense to knowledge, from the darkness of the particular into the light of the universal. The answer would probably be little more than that the eye of the soul is opened. As the faculty of sight is quenched in sleep, so the mind is quenched while it is concerned only with the things surrounding it. But if a man is awake, the fire within him finds its kindred fire, and flashes through the clouds of the sensible world. Thus living in the universal order he becomes a partaker of the mind which follows all through all. Sensation is not annihilated, but is absorbed into the grander movement of the mind, and becomes the transparent medium of true vision. (See the expression *κατὰ φύσιν ἐπαίειν*, where the transition from sensible to mental perception is not marked.) While the mind is thus acquainted with the universal

law, it must also follow the swiftness of the universal motion (Plat. Cratyl. 412 : *Διὰ τοῦ ἰόντος ἰέναι παντός*), distinguishing all things into their true elements (*διαιρέων ἕκαστον κατὰ φύσιν καὶ φράζων ὅκως ἔχει*¹), perceiving their transformations, comprehending their unseen harmony (*πάντα τὸ πῦρ ἐπελθὼν κρινέει καὶ καταλήφεται*²). Heraclitus could not be unconscious that this was an ideal state for man, who 'lights a taper for himself in the night,' and 'is but an ape to compare with God.' The subtlety of Nature far exceeds the subtlety of man's intellect, and her energy far exceeds his power to grapple with it. Hence as in the Heaven of Heraclitus there is no rest, so in his philosophy there is occasionally a despairing tone. This, however, never occurs in speaking of the Eternal process, but only of its comprehension by man.

3. For in comparison with the grandeur of the Universal Law, human life becomes a very little thing, if it be not more fitly called a death. Indeed, as in all things else, so in man, life and death are ever working together. His body is ever absorbed into his soul, his soul is ever dying into his body; his birth into the world is the entombment of a higher life, the death of what is earthly in him is the awaking of the God. As the Reason is but a small part in any man, so the good amongst men are few, and misunderstood (for dogs also bark at him they know not). Even the philosopher is like the gold-digger, who toils much and finds little³, and often his truest wisdom is to know himself, and to feel the nothingness of his individual Being in the presence of the Universal Order. Yet public law is to be zealously maintained, as more general than the private will, the excesses of which are to be quenched as a dangerous fire⁴.

Such is the bare outline of a thought the grandeur of which was far beyond the comprehension of that time. The *Λόγος* or Law of Heraclitus was not exactly a law of progress, for his elements are ever circling in one round, yet it is as near an approach to that Idea as is to be found in Ancient Philosophy. A still nearer approach is made to the conception of the infinity and simplicity of Nature. And while we feel that the metaphysical systems of Plato and Aristotle owe much of their strength and reality and perfection to the One Being of Parmenides, and in part also to the Pythagoreans, in whose philosophy finite and infinite were already combined, it is im-

¹ Fr. 2.² Fr. 26.³ Cp. Plat. Rep. 5. 450.⁴ "Ἵβριν χρὴ σβεन्नύειν μάλλον ἢ πυρκαϊήν, Fr. 103.

possible not to recognise in Plato a nearer kindred to Heraclitus than to any other of his predecessors. The union of Imagination and Reason, the plasticity of mind, the tendency at once to soar and to roam, may be mentioned as some of the points of communion between them. Many scattered thoughts, as well as the spirit pervading whole passages, might be quoted in confirmation of this. It is not surprising therefore if Plato grasped the thought of Heraclitus more firmly than the dark philosopher's own followers had done¹.

The fate of Heraclitus' teaching at Ephesus² reminds us of his own picture of the soul that is too weak to follow the Universal motion, and falls away from it to take an individual shape. The very multiplicity of his symbolism seems to have contributed to this result; each disciple interpreting the whole theory by the figure which was most intelligible to himself: one fastening on the Fire, another on the Sun, another on the dry exhalation, another on the more abstract Righteousness, or the ruling Mind, while some appear to have seized upon his habit of teaching by strange outward signs, if there be any truth in what Aristotle gravely asserts, that Cratylus at length

¹ The two passages in which this appreciation appears most distinctly are, Sophist. 242: Διαφερόμενον γὰρ (sc. τὸ ὄν) δεῖ ξυμφέρεται, φασὶν αἱ συντονώτεροι τῶν Μουσῶν (with which contrast Sympos. 187, where the saying is explained away), and Cratyl. 412: "Ὅσοι γὰρ ἠγοῦνται τὸ πᾶν εἶναι ἐν πορείᾳ, τὸ μὲν πολλὸν αὐτοῦ ὑπολαμβάνουσι τοιοῦτόν τι εἶναι, ὅλον οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ χωρεῖν, διὰ δὲ τούτου παντὸς εἶναι τι διεξιόν, δι' οὗ πάντα τὰ γιγνώμενα γίγνεται. εἶναι δὲ τάχιστον τοῦτο καὶ λεπτότατον· οὐ γὰρ ἂν δύνασθαι ἄλλως διὰ τοῦ λόγος εἶναι παντός, εἰ μὴ λεπτότατόν τε ἦν, ὥστε αὐτὸ μηδὲν στέγειν, καὶ τάχιστον, ὥστε χρῆσθαι ὡσπερ ἐστῶσι τοῖς ἄλλοις. ἐπεὶ δ' οὖν ἐπιτροπεύει τὰ ἄλλα πάντα διατόν, κ.τ.λ.

² This may be illustrated by the continuation of the passage of the Cratylus just quoted, Μέχρι μὲν οὖν ἐνταῦθα, ὃ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν, παρὰ πολλῶν ὁμολογεῖται τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ δίκαιον. ἐγὼ δέ, ὡς Ἐρμόγενης, ἅτε λιπαρῆς ἂν περὶ αὐτοῦ, ταῦτα μὲν πάντα διαπέτυσμαι ἐν ἀπορρήτοις, ὅτι τούτ' ἐστὶ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ αἴτιον—δι' ὃ γὰρ γίγνεται, τούτ' ἐστὶ τὸ αἴτιον—καὶ ἰδίᾳ καλεῖν

ἔφη τις τοῦτο ὀρθῶς ἔχειν διὰ ταῦτα· ἐπειδὴν δ' ἡρέμα αὐτοὺς ἐπανερωτῶ ἀκούσας ταῦτα μηδὲν ἤττον, Τί οὖν ποτ' ἔστιν, ὦραθε, δίκαιον, εἰ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει; δοκῶ τε ἤδη μακρότερα τοῦ προσήκοντος ἔρωτᾶν καὶ ὑπὲρ τὰ ἐσκαμμένα ἄλλεσθαι. ἰκανῶς γὰρ μέ φασι πεπύσθαι καὶ ἀκηκοέναι καὶ ἐπιχειροῦσι, βουλόμενοι ἀποπιμπλάειν με, ἄλλος ἄλλα ἤδη λέγειν, καὶ οὐκέτι συμφωνοῦσιν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ τίς φησι τοῦτο εἶναι δίκαιον, τὸν ἥλιον· τούτου γὰρ μόνον διαίοντα καὶ κάοντα ἐπιτροπεύειν τὰ ὄντα. ἐπειδὴν οὖν τῷ λέγω αὐτὸ ἄσμενος ὡς καλόν τι ἀκηκόω, καταγελά μου οὕτως ἀκούσας καὶ ἔρωτᾶ, εἰ οὐδὲν δίκαιον οἶμαι εἶναι ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἐπειδὴν ὁ ἥλιος δῆλ. λιπαροῦντος οὖν ἔμοῦ ὅ τι αὐτὸ ἐκείνος λέγει, αὐτὸ τὸ πῦρ φησί· τοῦτο δὲ οὐ βῆδιόν ἐστιν εἰδέναι· ὁ δὲ οὐκ αὐτὸ τὸ πῦρ φησίν, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ τὸ θερμόν τὸ ἐν τῷ πυρὶ ἐνόν. ὁ δὲ τούτων μὲν πάντων καταγελᾶν φησίν, εἶναι δὲ τὸ δίκαιον ὁ λέγει· Ἀναξαγόρας, νοῦν εἶναι τοῦτο. αὐτοκράτορα γὰρ αὐτὸν ὄντα καὶ οὐδενὶ μεμιγμένον πάντα φησὶν αὐτὸν κοσμεῖν τὰ πράγματα διὰ πάντων λόγια. ἐνταῦθα δὴ ἐγὼ, ὡς φίλε, πολλὴ ἐν πλείονι ἀπορία εἰμὶ ἢ πρὶν ἐπιχειρῆσαι μαθάνειν περὶ τοῦ δίκαιου, ὃ τί ποτ' ἔστιν.

only moved his finger. These divided members of Heraclitus continued after him a partial and spasmodic life, and the system ended consistently in a kind of war.

Until the end of last century the fragments of the early Greek philosophers were only accessible to the few scholars whose reading extended over a large field. These of Heraclitus were first collected by Schleiermacher in 1807. But the discovery of the *Philosophumena* in 1851 gave materials not previously accessible. For Hippolytus, or whoever wrote that treatise, sought to discredit Noëtus by identifying his teaching with that of the old Ephesian, and to this pious wish we are indebted for several fresh quotations from the *Περὶ Φύσεως*. The sentences containing these additional fragments were carefully re-edited in 1854 by Jacob Bernays, by whom the study of Heraclitus has been otherwise greatly advanced (*Heraclitea*, 1848, etc.). More recently, in 1869, there appeared from the same acute and learned pen *Die Heraclitischen Briefe, ein Beitrag zur philosophischen und religionsgeschichtlichen Litteratur*, a memorable essay towards determining the complex question, 'What kind of evidence can be obtained from spurious writings?' In this work, and also in his *Heraclitea*, Prof. Bernays has pointed out many echoes of Heraclitus in subsequent literature.

The fragments of Heraclitus.

Mr. Bywater¹ has conceived the design of presenting in one view the substance and the shadow of Heraclitus, of letting us hear the 'voice of the Sibyl' and its reverberations; not by weaving the scattered fragments into a complete whole with the help of unlimited conjecture, as was done by Lassalle (more theologian than scholar) in 1858, and more recently by Schuster in a laborious effort of 'constructive criticism' (Teubner, 1873), but by displaying the relevant facts, including the citation of authorities, with as much exactness and with as little admixture of conjecture as possible.

The citations throw considerable light both on the interpretation of Heraclitus and on the history of his influence. An obscure phrase often becomes clearer when we see how it was quoted (see esp. Fr. 60); and even the names of the authors are instructive. We are reminded by them how a secondary phase of Heraclitus' doctrine came to be woven into the philosophy of Plato; how

¹ *Heracliti Ephesii Reliquiæ*. Recensuit I. Bywater, Coll. Ex. Soc. Oxon. 1877. Some of the remarks

which follow here were printed in an article for the 'Academy' of that year.

the dark speaker was compelled by Aristotle to render up his logical account, as Locke and Leibnitz are by our Hegelians at the present day; how the Stoics gave him fresh currency, having been attracted to him both by the austerity of his spirit, and by the kindred nature of his symbolism (*πῦρ, ἐκπύρωσις*); lastly, how the Fathers of the Church employed him as they did other heathen writers, now wresting him to their side for the condemnation of Pagan superstition, now seeking to overthrow an adversary by comparing him with the infidel philosopher.

The reproach of obscurity was more deserved by Heraclitus than that of melancholy, which became proverbial perhaps in consequence of his association with Stoicism, although it is true that the philosophy of change, which saw 'man kindled and extinguished like a spark in the night' (Fr. 77), was in close accord with the sadness which had characterised much of the earlier Ionian reflexion (Mimnermus, Fr. 2; Hdt. 7. 46). But it may be questioned if he were more obscure than other prophets of the mind, who in the sixth century B.C., perhaps unconsciously moved by some Oriental influence, strove to catch the universe in aphorisms. And if his *Περὶ Φύσεως* were now extant, abrupt and disjointed as it would probably still appear (not, as Bacon thought, outweighing Plato), it might be more intelligible to us than it was either to Aristotle or to the Stoics.

The 'transcendent Pantheism,' whether of Heraclitus or Parmenides, is an open secret to the student of Descartes and Spinoza. The Hegelian, for whom the true individual is the true universal, and all thought proceeds by collision of opposites, can understand his master's saying that he had taken up the philosophy of Heraclitus into his own. And some of our modern *φυσιολόγοι* might be surprised to find, in what they supposed to be a fistful of air, the expression of principles which they have verified, such as the permanence of the sum of energy, the interchangeableness of energy and heat, the reciprocal transmutation of elementary forces, the transience of phenomena, the permanence of law, the relativity of perception to the organs of sense (Fr. 37), and might acknowledge that 'Anticipatio Naturæ' was less a term of opprobrium than they had imagined. But the wonder would be all on their side, for Heraclitus would have wondered at nothing so much as if these things had turned out otherwise.

The scholar might find germs of Platonic thought and expression (Fr. 115, 114; cp. Rep. 2. 376, 7. 540); the general critic, unconscious

coincidences with remote literatures, like that between Fr. 69, 'Time is a child at chess,' and the well-known lines of Omar Khayyám. The agnostic and the mystical theologian might both find meaning in the deep saying, 'God at once reveals and hides himself;' while the religious reformer would rejoice to see that Greek no less than Hebrew prophets felt the abomination and absurdity of sacrifice. 'They think to purge their sins by polluting themselves with blood' (Fr. 130). So rich in germinal expression was this prophetic soul, who, in clinging to a seeming paradox, was really presaging thoughts of many generations.

The character of Heraclitus came nearer than that of Socrates to Plato's description of the great mind born in a little State and despising her birthplace, but soaring aloft to survey things in Heaven and Earth. The pride shown in his contempt for Pythagoras and Xenophanes, and his grudging praise of Bias, may help to account for the conceit which Plato noted in his followers: but there is a Socratic loftiness in the tone in which he speaks of death (as an emanation, Fr. 37, a sloughing-off of the body, Fr. 85), and in his outburst on behalf of Hermodorus we see a trace of underlying kindness and of the passion for justice which is the best note of the philosophic spirit. We gather from Fr. 73 that he was more austere in his habits than Xenophanes.

II. The sublime thought of the Eternal movement of an infinite law was not, however, destined to be the final conception of the Greek mind. While life and death and the succession of phenomena were thus idealized on the Eastern shores of the Ægean, a different, though parallel impulse was preparing elsewhere, it is said at Elea in Magna Græcia: an impulse equally if not more sublime, yet by itself no less incapable of giving rise to such a philosophy as Plato's. Xenophanes had already said—

'There is one God above all in heaven or earth, not like to mortals either in form or mind.' 'He is all sight, all thought, all hearing.' 'He ever abides immoveable in one stay: nor does it become him to waver to and fro.'

Inspired with this thought Parmenides rose at once into an ideal world of mind and being, not seeking there an explanation of the sensible universe, nor endeavouring to grasp its law, or idealize its continual process, but dwelling solely on the all-sufficient object of Absolute and Perfect Being. From

the world in which his thought reposed, growth and decay were exiled far, into a region which Pure Being did not enter, a world of nothingness, which yet seemed to satisfy the minds of ordinary men, who trusted in the blindness of opinion and sense, and lived amongst contradictions. For in this lower world of opinion, opposite principles ever strove, light and darkness, heat and cold. But Pure Being is one, a rounded whole, perfect and full, identical with the Absolute Mind. The only symbol of Parmenides is the Perfect Sphere.

The main effort of Plato's dialectic, as is well known, is to bring these opposite poles of thought, the Eleatic and Ionian, into organic and well-balanced harmony. In its most abstract conception it is the problem of the one and the many (*τῶν λόγων ἀγῆρων πάθος παρ' ἡμῖν*), or of motion and rest. In this effort he was assisted by the Pythagoreans, who had already found a sort of middle term in Number.

The doctrine of Parmenides does not enter directly into the Theætetus, from which the discussion of it is expressly excluded: but his influence is notwithstanding present in the Megarian method, which was in part derived from Zeno (see Introduction), in whose hands the One had acquired a negative power, and was used rather to distinguish than to comprehend, so becoming rather the form than the sole object of thought. This Eleatic influence appears chiefly (1) in the relentless way in which sensation and motion are reduced to nothingness, and because they have no unity are shown to present no object to the mind: (2) in the crowning point of the dialogue, where it is admitted that there are universal perceptions of pure mind, and that Being is the principal of these: (3) in the paradox about false opinion, which is similar to that of Zeno about motion,—not 'it is impossible for a thing to be in two places at once,' but 'it is impossible to know and not to know at the same time,'—and is solved in the same way by reverting to the conception of degrees: (4) in the form of argument with which this paradox is enforced, *ὁ εἶν γέ τι ὁρῶν ὅν τι ὁρᾷ*; (5) in the question about the whole and its parts, pp. 203, 204.

APPENDIX B.

"Ανθρωπος μέτρον.

PROTAGORAS, who gives to the inquiry in the *Theætetus* its subjective turn, and some part of its dramatic interest, had died at the age of seventy, some ten or twelve years before the trial of Socrates, which is the supposed date of the conversation. The real share borne by him (or by his Shade) in the dialogue is less than appears at first sight. It is to his 'disciples' that the doctrine of sense based on that of motion is attributed, and though he is made to bear the brunt of the attack, because the guardians whom he has left will not defend his 'orphan' theory, yet when challenged to meet him upon his own ground, Socrates falls back upon the saying quoted at first, 'Man is the measure of all things,' and the explanation of it, 'Things are to me as they appear to me, and to you as they appear to you.' The same words occur also in the *Cratylus*. This, then, is nearly all that we can with any certainty point to in this dialogue as Protagorean, except the name of his treatise *'Αλήθεια*, the sceptical fragment about the existence of the gods, and perhaps one or two rhetorical words, such as *μεγαλειοτέρως*, *πολυάρατος*. For it is evident that the doctrine of motion and becoming, which he is said to have entrusted to his disciples 'in a mystery' (cp. *Cratyl.* 413), cannot have been extant in his writings. It is therefore surprising to find Sextus Empiricus representing the tenets of Protagoras in language closely resembling that used in the *Theætetus*. The wonder is abated, however, if we reflect that there was really a very close affinity between Protagoras and the Cyrenaics, and that of this affinity Plato is in this dialogue the interpreter. Aristotle follows Plato in identifying the theories of Protagoras and Heraclitus. And there are thus three sources, independent of Protagoras, from which the account of Sextus may have been derived: the Cyrenaics, the *Theætetus*, and Aristotle. The similarity of the language in which different sensationist theories are described in later times may possibly indicate

the influence of this very dialogue in fixing the terminology of that aspect of thought.

It is therefore the more interesting to examine the one saying of Protagoras which is here preserved: Πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἀνθρώπου εἶναι, τῶν μὲν ὄντων ὡς ἔστι, τῶν δὲ μὴ ὄντων ὡς οὐκ ἔστι. Might not this seem at first sight to imply something less than the absolute relativity of knowledge? Might it not even be interpreted to mean, 'quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus?' In answer to this it may be remarked, first, that Protagoras appears so far at least to have interpreted his own saying, ὡς οἷα μὲν ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, τοιαῦτα μὲν ἔστιν ἐμοί, οἷα δὲ σοί, τοιαῦτα δὲ αὖ σοί. But it may be added, secondly, that the distinction between the race and the individual, between the general term 'man,' and the singular term 'this man,' was probably not distinctly present to his mind. When we reflect on the absence of any abiding consciousness of the universal and of the distinction between abstract and concrete, exhibited, for instance, in the first answer of Theætetus, or in the attempt of Meno to define virtue, it becomes evident that the term *man*, thus barely used by a popular teacher, would naturally call up the idea, not of human nature or of the human mind, nor of the race collectively, but of 'a man,' 'this or that man,' an individual, 'you or me,' not, however, conceived of as an individual, nor consciously distinguished from any abstract or generic notion of man, but simply present to the imagination¹.

Protagoras saw that men were weary of systems which had no reference to human life, and seemed to make knowledge unattainable. He saw persons teaching astronomy and the nature of Being to those who wanted to learn how to become able and successful citizens. Like other popular teachers, he had a keener eye for the immediate wants of those who came to him than for abstract truth. The theory of Parmenides, which had its warm advocates at Athens, was one purely objective; although beginning and ending in the mind, it was wholly independent of any human standard: the highest aim for man was to rise by pure thought into the world of being.

Protagoras felt, like Socrates, that the truth which man requires is relative to man, but, unlike Socrates, he made this the end and not the starting-point of his inquiry, and instead of searching by reflection for that one truth by which man ought to live, he

¹ Cp. τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, Thuc. i. 140, which does not correspond to the modern generic use of the word.

was contented with inferring that truth was variable, according to the common notion, 'many men, many minds.'

As embodied in the Theætetus, the above doctrine receives some fresh characteristics, first, as being made the type of a contemporary theory, and being interwoven with that of Heraclitus; secondly, as holding one side of an antithesis, which gives a sharpness and precision to the term *ἄνθρωπος*, as equivalent to *ἕκαστος ἡμῶν*, which it probably had not when first used; and, thirdly, by being pushed to its minutest results, according to the Megarian method,—not only 'man' but 'each man,' not only so, but 'every creature,' and even the same person at different times.

APPENDIX C.

*Protagoras and Mr. Grote*¹.

I. KNOWLEDGE is relative in two senses, not wholly unconnected with each other, which in ancient philosophy were not yet clearly distinguished. There is the relation of subject to object, and the relation of the universal to the particular. For the sake of clearness, these different aspects of the relativity of knowledge may be treated separately, although the study of either involves the consideration of both.

(1) Knowledge is relative to the mind. But here also there is a distinction which must not be overlooked. For there is a general and a particular subjectivity. (a) There can be no knowledge apart from the mind which knows. An object of knowledge without a subject is inconceivable. Or rather, knowledge cannot be conceived except as the joint working of the mind and of that which is external to the mind. All knowledge is necessarily in this sense subjective. But this condition in no way limits or impairs the certainty or perfection of knowledge. Relativity of this sort is not inconsistent with the existence of Absolute Truth. (b) It is otherwise with the peculiar subjective conditions of individual minds. These modify and render defective the knowledge of particular men, 'who see and know but in part, and have different prospects of the same thing according

¹ From an article in the Quarterly Review for January, 1856.

to their different positions to it¹. Yet even this partial knowledge, in so far as it is *knowledge*, has an objective and universal reality.

Now, although it is mere nonsense to talk of eliminating the subjective element, if by object-without-subject is meant knowledge *minus* mind, there is no such absurdity in supposing that knowledge, while remaining under the conditions of mind, may become perfect through being purified from the effect of bias. Nor is it chimerical to hope that to this ideal an indefinite approximation may be made in the growth of science, in which every forward step is the relinquishment of that which some have thought, for that which all who understand the proofs must think. This process is, in effect, the enlightenment or enfranchisement of individual minds. The aim of every scientific inquirer is to come forth from the den and stand under the open heaven; to correct the inequality of the mirror of a particular mind by a method valid for all minds; to shake off the idols of the tribe and theatre, and become the denizen and pupil of the universe, and no longer of a country or of a sect only. Such are the images, borrowed from the old philosophy, in which Bacon described the progress of knowledge. Those who believe in the reality of inductive science will hardly maintain that they are illusory. And they point to an idea of knowledge as something wholly different from individual opinion; as containing what, in contradistinction to the particular subjective, may be called the subjective-universal.

Closely parallel to this, if account be taken of the intellectual circumstances of the time, was the idea of knowledge which Plato derived from Socrates. He looked for a definition that should hold universally, an irrefragable hypothesis, an opinion which could not be shaken by examination. In other words, he sought for that which is true, not for the individual thinker only, but for all who think. He everywhere acknowledges, however, or rather insists, that general truths cannot be attained or imparted except through the awakening of individual minds. There is no vision until the eye is turned in the direction of the light. It is only the coarse Thrasymachus who imagines that he can take and thrust his notions bodily down his hearer's throat. And Socrates, in attempting to answer him, is unable to say anything but what he individually thinks. The Socratic dialogue represents the meeting-point of a particular conscious-

¹ Locke's *Conduct of the Understanding*, § 3.

ness with universal reason, and the process which results is an approximation on the part of two individuals to a universal truth. In none of the dialogues in which Socrates is the chief speaker is there any element of authority; but they are equally removed from sanctioning an arbitrary or capricious 'private judgment.' No testimony is admitted but that of the respondent's own mind; no persuasion or enforcement, except that of argument, is applied. The single duty recognised is that of obeying reason. But there is no dispensation from this duty. Except in passages which are clearly playful or ironical, mere verbal juggling and all opinionativeness are earnestly deprecated, and the speakers simply endeavour, by means of dialectic, to obtain and exhibit Truth. 'We must use our own faculties, such as they are, and say what we really think¹.' 'We must follow, at all risks, whithersoever reason guides².' 'No logical puzzles can frighten us from pursuing the path of knowledge³.' 'We have to consider, not who said this, but whether that which is now said be true⁴.' 'It is my way, Crito, to yield to no influence of those surrounding me, but to the reason, which, when I think, seems to me the best⁵.' This is the reply of Socrates, when urged to escape from prison: and so in the same prison he advised his friends. 'Care not for Socrates, but care much rather for the truth⁶.' This position was contrasted by Plato with that of Protagoras, who asserted the subjectivity of all knowledge without distinguishing the universal from the particular subject. His formula was rude, but intelligible: 'Man is the measure; that is to say, things are to me as they appear to me, and to you as they appear to you.' This Plato understood as the denial of that belief in a common measure or universal truth which was implied in the work of Socrates, and he joined issue with Protagoras accordingly. Mr. Grote has given fresh life and interest to this ancient controversy by taking the part of Protagoras against Plato. Himself holding that while the subjective feeling of belief is universal, the object or matter of belief varies in each particular case, and apparently thinking that this radical imperfection is incurable; not distinguishing, as it would seem, between the propositions, 'My belief is my belief,' and 'My belief depends wholly upon my individual peculiarities'—or, at least, not recognising the difference between belief

¹ Theæt. 171 D.

² Rep. 3. 394 D.

³ Theæt. 197 A; Men. 81 E.

⁴ Charm. 160.

⁵ Crito, 46.

⁶ Phæd. 91 C; cf. Soph. 246 D.

grounded on sufficient and insufficient reasons—he can imagine no alternative between a blind dogmatism and the entire relativity of truth. Either one individual opinion is the infallible standard by which all other opinions are to be judged, or else every opinion is alike valid, not indeed for those who question that opinion, but for the person holding it. But is not a third case possible? That which is different need not be wholly different¹; and may there not be in all human experience, however diverse, a common element? If belief is universal, so also is the process of reasoning. May not the exercise of this on the facts of experience bring men gradually to the acknowledgment of universal truths—not such as have been laid down by dogmatists, but such as are found, at least approximately, after long inquiry, when out of many ingenious hypotheses some have been verified beyond the possibility of doubt? It is not necessary that these should be dogmatically taught. Indeed, they cannot be imparted thoroughly unless the learner is led to repeat the process of invention. His curiosity must be aroused and satisfied, his reason must be awakened to perceive and solve the difficulties surrounding each hypothesis. Otherwise, he may believe, but cannot know.

Mr. Grote accuses Plato of first misrepresenting Protagoras and afterwards following him, and of misrepresenting him in two ways: in identifying his doctrine with another and a different doctrine, that knowledge is sensible perception, and in having suppressed the characteristic addition ‘to me,’ ‘to you,’ as if Protagoras had said that relative truth was absolutely true.

The weight of the former charge depends on the intention of Plato in blending the two theories, and on the exact signification of the term which we translate Sensation or Perception. Now it should be observed that the word *Æsthesis* is expressly said to include, according to the theory, the feelings of pleasure, pain, desire, and fear², and apparently also the distinction between good and evil³. The common characteristic of these impressions and of knowledge, according to this theory, is that of constituting the experience of an individual at a particular moment (*τὸ παρὸν ἐκάστῳ πάθος*). Such present impressions are regarded as more certain than the fainter repetition of the same in memory⁴; and the active operation of the mind, in reviewing and reasoning over her impressions, is supposed to be

¹ See *Theæt.* 158 E.

² *Ibid.* 152 B.

³ *Ibid.* 157 E.

⁴ *Theæt.* 166 A, compare Hume.

left out of view¹. Protagoras might possibly have exclaimed at this, and said that the individual was the measure to himself in thought as well as in sensation. But he seems to have drawn his examples from the facts of sense²; and Plato's object is to show that while the impressions of sense and feeling have in themselves only a momentary value, it is not so with the reasonings of the mind by which these are compared and generalised, and which are often justified not at the moment, but long afterwards in the actual experience of those who did not share them at the time.

This brings us to the other accusation, that Plato has suppressed the words ('to me,' 'to you,') which mark the essential relativity of Protagoras' 'Measure.' He has certainly not forgotten them, for he has been at some pains to illustrate this very point, where it is shown how the theory justifies the illusions of a sick palate³; and, again, where it is observed that the opinion of the true prophet proves not less true for those who did not believe him. If Plato is unfair to Protagoras, it is in making an addition, which may or may not have been consciously implied in the formula, 'Each man is the measure of what is true to him.' To this Plato adds in effect, 'and there is no other standard of true being.' But this negative aspect of the doctrine necessarily becomes explicit, when the statement is viewed as having a controversial import. The assertion 'Man is the measure' is unmeaning, unless this measure is brought into competition with some other, such as the Eleatic Being. Now, if the formula is thus interpreted, there are two less exact modes of expressing the same thing. Either 'nothing is true' (i. e. absolutely), or

¹ The difference between ancient and modern philosophical language is repeatedly exemplified in this discussion; what Mr. Grote calls 'compared facts of sense,' e. g. weighing, measuring, etc. (ii. 364), Plato would probably have treated as the conclusions of the mind on reviewing her passive impressions.

² Theæt. 152 B: 'Ἐπακολουθήσωμεν οὖν αὐτῷ, κ. τ. λ.

³ They are true to the sick man during his sickness. Mr. Grote says (ii. 353), 'Socrates imputes it as a contradiction to Protagoras—"Your doctrine is pronounced to be false by many persons; but you admit that the belief of all persons is true; therefore your doctrine is false." Here also Plato omits the qualification an-

nexed by Protagoras to his general principle—Every man's belief is true—that is, true *to him*. That a belief should be true to one man, and false to another, is not only no contradiction to the formula of Protagoras, but is the very state of things which his formula contemplates.' Plato is more wide awake than Mr. Grote imagines. He points out that Protagoras did not hold the principle of relativity to be only relatively true; otherwise he must have admitted that all the world, who differed from him, were not to themselves measures of truth, and that he himself in their judgment, that is in relation to them, was not a measure, so that his principle was not applicable to them.

'everything is alike true' (i. e. relatively). Either 'there is no absolute,' or 'the relative is the only absolute.' Both forms of expression are found in the *Theætetus*¹. But it is not fair to infer from this that Plato has argued 'a dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter.' The same cavil would apply at least with equal force to the language of Protagoras himself, who called his treatise *Ἀλήθεια*, real (not phenomenal) truth.

'There can be no discussion without reference to a common ideal standard.' 'There can be no discussion without reference to individual belief.' Mr. Grote's whole argument proceeds on the implied assumption that these two propositions are irreconcilable. Hence he charges Plato with inconsistency in at one time appealing to an imaginary expert or wise man (the *βασιλεὺς τεχνικός* of the *Politicus*), the personified ideal of knowledge, and at other times repudiating all authority except that of the consciousness of the respondent in the dialogue, and thus upholding what Mr. Grote characteristically styles the 'autonomy' of the individual reason. But the whole spirit of Plato's dialectic lies in bringing together the individual and the universal consciousness, and if cross-questioned on the point he would probably have said, as he has said of the kindred antithesis of the one and many, that this union is essentially inherent in the nature of thought, *τῶν λόγων αὐτῶν ἀθάνατόν τι καὶ ἀγήρων πάθος*². Those beliefs, however, which are more particularly the respondent's own, which he derives from natural idiosyncrasy or from previous intercourse, are invariably shaken and removed by Socrates, and much also of what is evoked during the conversation by his suggestive art, is in turn criticised and cut away. That which is allowed to remain as the result of the discussion (though still open to further examination) is certainly the present belief of the respondent; but is different in kind from the belief with which he entered on the argument. He began with loose impressions gathered from hearsay or from his own half-reasoning; he ends with a conviction which has been evolved by an active exercise of the reason, in which reference has been made at every step to an ideal standard of knowledge. This result is not adequately described by saying that the beliefs and convictions of one person are modified by another. Plato appeals at once to the requirements of the argument, and to the consciousness of the individual reasoner, and, whether his position is tenable

¹ *Theæt.* 152, 166, 167; cp. 179 B. The former expression, 'Nothing is true,' is however more frequently assigned to Gorgias.

² *Phil.* 15 D.

or not, he cannot be accused in this of alternating between opposite points of view. If the two appeals are mutually destructive, he makes them, not alternately, but together. The horns of Mr. Grote's dilemma pass harmlessly on either side of Plato. Even one who professed to have found absolute truth, might hold that this could only be communicated by awakening gradually the individual mind. But Plato in most of his dialogues professes to be still seeking for the truth in whose reality he believes, and invites others to help him in the search. He views universal truth as neither hopelessly lost, nor actually found, but in continual process of discovery¹. He certainly does hold inquiry to be a real endeavour, and not a mere mental exercise, and believes (in spite of difficulties which he keenly appreciates) that the distinction between truth and error has a value that is independent of human opinions. And it is here that he parts company with his English critic. Mr. Grote urges, in language nearly similar to that with which Socrates in the *Theætetus* affects to defend Protagoras²: 'To say that a man is wise, is to say that he is wise in some one's estimation, your own, or that of some one else³.' This is undeniable: but then every such estimate must be either true or false, nearer to or farther from a perfect estimate. Of this difference, indeed, no man is an infallible judge, though one man can judge more correctly than another, as experience proves. God, not man, is the measure, as Plato himself has said⁴. But it is not less clear on this account that the degree of approximation is something real, and that he who judges more correctly of this is in reality the better judge. Mr. Grote admits that, in his own opinion, in matters involving future contingency most men judge *badly*⁵: only a few persons, possessed of sufficient skill and knowledge, judge *well*. He believes the distinction to be real and important, and allows that most other persons believe the same. He adds, 'In acting on this distinction, I follow out my belief, and so do they. This is a general fact, respecting the conditions which determine individual belief. Like all other causes of belief, it

¹ *Phæd.* 75 E: "Ὁ καλοῦμεν μανθάνειν, οἰκείαν ἐπιστήμην ἀναλαμβάνειν ἀν εἶη.

² *Theæt.* 166, 167.

³ Vol. ii. p. 352.

⁴ *Legg.* 4. 716 C.

⁵ This language, like that in the defence of Protagoras (*Theæt.* 167), seems to be adopted (unconsciously)

to avoid the words true and false. But it is at least as arbitrary to withhold the terms true and false from judgments, as to apply them to pleasures, which Plato has been censured for doing in the *Philebus*. See also vol. ii. p. 351, where the question of degrees of mental force is substituted for the question of truth or reality.

operates relatively to the individual mind.' (Vol. ii. p. 355.) This is indisputable: but those who believe the distinction to be real and important, believe in a measure of truth, which they do not suppose to alter with the variations of belief. They believe the distinction to be important for others as well as for themselves. 'When a man speaks of truth, he means what he himself (along with others, or singly, as the case may be) believes to be truth:' he does not mean only what is true to him. Once more, Mr. Grote says, 'You pronounce an opponent to be in error: but if you cannot support your opinion by evidence on authority which satisfies his senses or his reason, he remains unconvinced. Your individual opinion stands good to you, his opinion stands good to him. You think that he ought to believe as you do, and in certain cases you feel that he will be brought to that result by future experience; which of course must be relative to him and his appreciative powers. He entertains the like conviction in regard to you.' (Vol. ii. p. 515.) This is freely admitted—and amounts to this, that each (either truly or falsely) believes his own opinion to be true. When Mr. Grote says he thinks the doctrine of Protagoras respecting pleasure 'nearer to the truth' than that of Gorgias, and that of the Republic 'utterly at variance with the truth,' does he mean nearer to and at variance with what is true to him? No man ever held fast an opinion merely as his opinion, but as the truth. And this implies reference to a standard which is independent of individual judgments. But to confound mere individual belief with belief grounded on evidence, or rather not to admit the difference between them, would take us back to Pyrrho and the ancient sceptics. Nor is there any modern theory of knowledge, whether that of Locke or Kant or any other, on which such a doctrine, which is really the denial of knowledge, is tenable. The same misunderstanding may be made apparent by analysing a favourite expression of Mr. Grote's, viz. 'individual reason.' Granted that nothing is true for me but what I in my own person believe—that it is impossible, even were it desirable, to force conviction—that when I yield to an authority, I exercise my private judgment in pronouncing the authority sufficient,—still the question may be asked, wherein differs the assent of the individual *reason* from impressions of sense or creations of fancy? And it would be difficult to find any distinguishing note, except the consciousness that the object of assent cannot be otherwise, and claims the belief of all who think. Mr. Grote will say that this con-

sciousness often proves delusive, and that the case of sensation is exactly parallel¹. Those whose minds are constituted alike have similar thoughts, as those whose organs are alike have similar perceptions². To this Plato would answer that but for the hope which lay at the root of the endeavour of Socrates, that differing minds may be brought by dialectic nearer to one another, by being brought nearer to unchanging principles of truth, and that the eye of reason may be thus purged to see the light, philosophy would be an idle pursuit, the turning of an oyster-shell or a scytalè, a cycle without the hope of progress, an endless process never moving on, a 'purpose' not 'increasing through the ages,' but terminating in failure and despair³.

How far Plato ever viewed universals as wholly objective is a question which cannot be determined without taking into account the differences of ancient and modern thought. The distinction between the mind and external objects had not yet been clearly made. Both poles (the objective and subjective) were absorbed in the antithesis of Being and Phenomena, which the Eleatics had placed far asunder, leaving their reconciliation as the great problem of the succeeding age. The tendency of the early speculation had been to give to psychological problems what in modern language must be called an objective treatment, in saying which we ought not to forget that we are applying a distinction which was then unknown⁴. Parmenides and Heraclitus were not unconscious of the working of the mind, but their thought did not assume the form of self-reflection. The unity or the energy of scientific intelligence appeared to them as the Permanent Substance or the Law of Change, which constituted the Universe.

¹ Vol. ii. p. 361, note.

² See a curious note in vol. ii. p. 285, where it is said that the controversy between Mr. Mill (who holds the common attribute of many objects to be one) and Mr. Spencer (who says that the same abstract word denotes one attribute in subject A. and another exactly similar in subject B) illustrates forcibly the extreme nicety of the question between the one and the many, under certain supposable circumstances. Also vol. ii. p. 329. 'The Entia Rationis exist relatively to Ratio, as the Entia Perceptionis exist relatively to Sense. You do not, by producing the fact of innate mental intuitions, eliminate the intuitive mind; which must be done in order to establish a negative to the

Protagorean principle.'

³ Mr. Grote sometimes speaks of reason in language which appears to us happily inconsistent with his argument in the present discussion. See for instance his touching and impressive words on the death of Socrates (vol. i. p. 302, note). 'He contemplates death with the eye of calm reason; he has not only silenced "the child within us who fears death," . . . estimating all things then as before, with the same tranquil and independent reason.' Was his estimate really true? Or was Socrates really pitiable to those who pitied him?

⁴ See for instance the verse of Parmenides, τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ νοεῖν ἔστιν τε καὶ εἶναι.

But the theory of Protagoras, and the more potent influence of Socratic inquiry, gave to philosophy what may with equal propriety be called a reflex or subjective turn, and side by side with Existence and Appearance, or Becoming, rose the corresponding difference of Knowledge and Opinion, or Sense. Now Knowledge, according to Socrates, is of Universals, and these Universals Plato identified with Being. He often speaks of general ideas, and especially of the Idea of Good, in language which implies that their reality is independent of particular minds, but yet when Socrates suggests, in answer to Parmenides, that they are of the nature of thought¹, he gives utterance to a mode of conceiving them which is never entirely absent, but is latent even where not expressed. This frequently appears from phrases dropped by the way, as when the form (*εἶδος*) is identified with the definition (*λόγος*²), or when, in the midst of a poetical description of the ideal world, it is said that the human soul must have seen the forms of Truth, because it is necessary that Man should comprehend the meaning of general terms³. And in the well-known passage of the Republic, where the highest truth is set over against the highest knowledge, they are both viewed in relation to the mind, which, through intercourse with the Existent, begets Thought and Truth⁴; and the Idea of Good is regarded not only as the transcendent Form of Being (*ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας*) but as the crowning study or act of intelligence⁵. A transition is thus made from what at first appears a fanciful ontology towards a true psychology, which in the Theætetus, Sophistes, Philebus, and the seventh book of the Republic, is seen to have made considerable progress in the analysis of mind⁶.

(2) The question of Subjectivity has already led us to distinguish between particular and universal, between the modifications of the individual consciousness and true knowledge, in which these differences are lost. And we have seen that this distinction corresponds nearly to that made by Plato between the transitoriness of Phenomena and the permanence of Being, and, still more closely, to his antithesis of Sensation or Opinion and Science. But the knowledge of universal truths would

¹ Μὴ τῶν εἰδῶν ἕκαστον ἢ τούτων νόημα, Parm. 132.

² Theæt. 148 D.

³ Phædrus, 249 B.

⁴ Γεννήσας νοῦν καὶ ἀλήθειαν, Rep. 6. 490 B.

⁵ Μέγιστον μάθημα, Rep. 6. 505 A; ἐν τῷ γνωστῷ τελευταία, Rep. 7. 517 A.

⁶ See esp. Theæt. 185, 186, 189 E, 194; Soph. 261-2; Phileb. 33-43; Rep. 7. 523-4.

be of less value, if these were not applicable to particular facts. And hence the inductive, generalising process, is followed by one deductive and specialising. But this is not merely a return to the subjective particular from which the mind set out. For a phenomenon seen in relation to other phenomena by the light of general laws, is different from the same phenomenon, when at first presented to the inexperienced and unreflecting sense. Therefore the particular modification of the individual subject is to be distinguished from the true particular, which has objective as well as subjective reality. Now as Plato, in the infancy of Induction and of Moral Science, had a notion of universal knowledge, which he believed in but could only partially realise, through an imperfect method of hypotheses and exclusions—so in the absence of any adequate means of verification, he saw the necessity of connecting the universal forms of knowledge with particular facts. The powerful impulse which he received from the Eleatic philosophy tended to the sublation of all diversities of existence, as well as thought, into a merely abstract Unity. But on the other hand, the method of Socrates, whose generalisations were sifted through examples, and the genius of Plato himself with his manifold affinities to the world, required the Muse of Philosophy to descend from these heights, even into the den if necessary¹, and to hold intercourse again with the objects of sense and with mankind. Plato sometimes speaks, especially in his more imaginative moods, as if he wished to repeat the Eleatic contrast of Being and Phenomena in a new form: as if the real and apparent, the Ideal and the Actual, were separated by an impassable chasm. This way of speaking has become stereotyped in what is called the Platonic theory of ideas, including the doctrine of reminiscence: a theory which, in seeking to account for the knowledge of phenomena, creates new difficulties, which it fails to solve. But in those which Plato probably regarded as his more exact writings, the half-mythical crudities of this hypothesis have disappeared, the necessity as well as the difficulty of reconciling the abstract with the concrete, the Ideal with the Actual, is clearly recognised, and more than one dialogue is chiefly devoted to this task. An approach is made to a new and larger idea of knowledge, not merely as the Universal in which subjective peculiarities are done away, but as the Union of all permanent relations in the contemplation of

¹ Rep. 7. 519.

the mind¹. A change of this kind, especially when made gradually by a writer who often ironically half reveals and half conceals his thought, is apt to expose him to the charge of inconsistency. That Plato, in falling into Mr. Grote's hands, has not escaped this fate, is partly due to those who have hitherto represented the philosopher as a mere transcendentalist. But Mr. Grote sometimes speaks as if knowledge could not comprehend the universal with the particular, as if generalisation and specialisation were incompatible. He says (vol. ii. p. 253): 'It is inconsistent in Plato, after affirming that nothing can deserve the name of art except what is general—capable of being rationally anticipated and prescribed beforehand: then to include in art the special treatment required for the multiplicity of particular cases.' He finds fault with the examples drawn from facts of sense to illustrate knowledge in the *Theætetus*², and truth and falsehood in the *Sophist*³. See also a passage in the chapter on the *Politicus* (vol. ii. pp. 471-3), where the relative or specialising aspect of Plato's doctrine is very forcibly characterised. We may notice, as affording a point of transition towards the same mode of thought, a passage of the *Philebus*, where, besides the abstract knowledge of measures, numbers, and forms, the knowledge also of concrete existence is allowed to be necessary for the perfect life 'if a man is to know the way to his own door.' But it is not fair to accuse Plato of returning to the doctrine which he had rejected that 'sense is knowledge,' because he admits that knowledge is related to particulars, any more than it is fair to speak of the argument of the *Theætetus* as the rejection of individual reason (vol. i. p. 295). He has not relinquished his belief in the immutable nature of true knowledge. 'Where there is not absolute permanence there can be no reason' is an emphatic statement of the very dialogue which asserts the relativity of the ideas⁴. Here we repeat that if Plato holds contradictory opinions, he holds them not alternately, but together. While expatiating on the 'plain of truth,' he speaks of general notions as passing from many sensations to a unity comprehended by reasoning⁵. And after describing the happiness of the philoso-

¹ See esp. *Sophist*. 259 C; *Polit.* 72 A, 285 B.

² Viz. the facts of a case of assault or robbery. Plato purposely chooses the simplest examples. But when Mr. Grote represents him (vol. ii. p. 382) as saying that to be personally present and look on is 'essential to

knowledge or cognition,' there is a qualification suppressed. It should be 'knowledge of a concrete fact.'

³ 'Theætetus is sitting—Theætetus is flying.'

⁴ *Sophist*. 249 C.

⁵ *Phædrus*, 249 B.

pher who knows nothing of his neighbour but studies the universal nature of man, he speaks of the mind as abstracting and generalising from her impressions¹. The Phædrus, as Mr. Grote has observed, combines the extreme of generality with the extreme of speciality. But the special is supposed to be enlightened by the general, and this position, whether tenable or not, is in no sense a return to the mere subjective relativity of Protagoras. The Parmenides, Theætetus, Sophistes, Politicus, and Philebus, do, however, show a change or growth in Plato's theory of knowledge, which may be briefly stated thus. The difficulty of finding a way down from the Ideas to sensible things is clearly stated in the Parmenides, and again touched slightly in the Philebus, where, however, the Ideas are conceived somewhat differently as unities amidst plurality, and knowledge, as we have already noticed, is made to include particulars. The Theætetus presents a similar class of difficulties from the subjective side, arising from the co-existence, not of Being with phenomena, but of Knowledge with sensation and opinion. It is natural to suppose that Plato was led by these difficulties towards the modified view which he has expressed in the Sophistes² and Politicus, where the ideas appear as logical wholes, standing in relation to each other, genera comprising species and species individuals under them; where the distinction of absolute and relative, or, in Greek language, of rest and motion, disappears in the notion of a complexity of fixed relations, and universal and particular meet in an all-embracing harmony or law (*μέτρον*).

APPENDIX D.

εἶδος, ἰδέα.

§ 1. THE words *εἶδος* and *ἰδέα* are throughout nearly synonymous in Greek, but there is a tendency observable to a difference in their use, perhaps in some way connected with the difference of gender.

εἶδος seems earlier to have shaken itself clear of metaphor, and to have settled into an abstract meaning. Thus in Thucyd. 2. 20

¹ Theæt. 175-186.

² The important word *μέθεξις*, 'participation in the idea,' occurs only in

the Parmenides and Sophistes in Plato. See Ast's Lexicon, s. v.

τὸ εἶδος τῆς νόσου means simply the nature of the disease, but in 2. 21 τοιαύτη ἦν ἐπὶ πᾶν τὴν ιδέαν, 'was such in its general phenomena:' ιδέα calls up a picture, while εἶδος simply designates a class or kind of thing. So πᾶσα ιδέα . . θανάτου, Thuc. 3. 81, is not 'every kind of death,' but 'death in every form.'

§ 2. The word εἶδος occurs frequently in Plato in its ordinary sense. Thus in Theæt. 157 C: "Ἀνθρωπὸν τε τίθενται καὶ λίθον καὶ καθ' ἕκαστον ζῶόν τε καὶ εἶδος, the word is scarcely more abstract than in Herodotus, 1. 94: Τὰ . . τῶν παιγνέων εἶδα.

A more philosophical application of the same use occurs 181 D, where we have the δύο εἶδη κινήσεως.

§ 3. But it occurs also in a more abstract sense, which we may possibly be right in attributing to Socrates, as a distinctly logical term. εἶδος then means a class, or species, as that to which particular things are referred, which contains them, and marks them off from others, and which itself answers to their definition. See Theætetus, 148 D: Ταύτας πολλὰς οὐσας ἐνὶ εἶδει περιέλαβες. 205 D: Εἰς ταυτὸν ἐμπέπτωκεν ἡ συλλαβὴ εἶδος ἐκείνω.

§ 4. It may be doubted whether in Plato the word εἶδος ever loses entirely the association of its earliest meaning (in which he frequently employs it) of outward appearance, form. (See Ast, Lex. sub voc.) But as it approaches to its technical use in his philosophy, it tends to regain metaphorically the association of visible shape, which in a literal sense it has cast off. The metaphor is not perfect, however, until the word has been changed to ιδέα. Or if we choose to put it so, εἶδος expresses the general shape and contour of a thing; ιδέα implies also the colour and the whole appearance. εἶδος is a colourless ιδέα. See Theæt. 203 E: "Ἐν τι γεγονὸς εἶδος, ιδέαν μίαν αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ ἔχον. And there is a real difference underlying the figurative one. For a comparison of passages tends to prove that εἶδος is applied to the universal forms of existence as they are distinct from one another; ιδέα rather as each of them has a unity in itself. Thus in Theæt. l. c. we have ἔν τι γεγονὸς εἶδος, ιδέαν μίαν αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ ἔχον, ἕτερον δὲ τῶν στοιχείων¹. Again, 204 A: Μία ιδέα ἐξ ἐκάστων τῶν συναρμοττόντων στοιχείων γιγνομένη. Ib. A: "Ἐν τι εἶδος ἕτερον τῶν πάντων μερῶν. 205 C: Μία τις ιδέα ἀμέριστος συλλαβὴ ἂν εἴη. 205 D: Καὶ μία ἐστὶν ιδέα. Cp. 184 D: Εἰς μίαν τινὰ ιδέαν . . συντείνει.

It should be noticed, that in the above passages the use of both words is in a transition state, assuming rather the form of an adapt-

¹ Cp. Rep. 544 C: "Ἡ τινα ἄλλην ἔχεις ιδέαν πολιτείας, ἥ τις καὶ ἐν εἶδει διαφανεῖ τινι κείται.

ation of the ordinary use, than of technical phraseology. Plato may perhaps be teaching the doctrine of ideas by example; but he does not avowedly give to the words the 'second intention' with which they are used in many passages to express the eternal forms of Being. There is also an intermediate transition noticeable in the use of *ιδέα*, from the abstract to the concrete, i.e. it passes, by a kind of *synecdoche*, from meaning the sum of the attributes to mean that to which they belong. So in Thuc. l. c. *πᾶσα ἰδέα θανάτου = θάνατος πάσης ιδέας*. And in Theæt. 184, 205, *μία ἰδέα* is used synonymously with *ἐν εἶδος, ιδέαν μίαν αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ ἔχον*. It is more to the purpose, however, to observe generally, that the word *εἶδος* tends to a use at once more logical (*ἕτερον εἶδος, διττὰ εἶδη, κατ' εἶδη διϊστάς, κατ' εἶδη τέμνειν*) and more concrete—(the *ιδέα* is spoken of as inherent in it): the word *ιδέα* to one more metaphysical (*εἰς μίαν ιδέαν συνορῶντα ἄγειν τὰ πολλαχῆ διεσπαρμένα, μίαν ιδέαν διὰ πολλῶν πάντη διατεταμένην ἰκανῶς διαισθάνεται*), more abstract, and at the same time more figurative.

The word *ιδέα* is a fair symbol of the union of reason and imagination in Plato.

APPENDIX E.

The Theætetus and Aristotle.

ONE chief source of difficulty in the Theætetus to the modern reader is the imperfect development which it presents of the conception of the Proposition¹. In the earlier part, the ever-varying succession of phænomena, bound up with the ever-varying impressions of sense, are only dimly felt to belong to any Subject. Indeed as the argument proceeds, the unity of that which is the subject of different impressions or qualities is expressly denied. At a further stage, where the question arises, How is false opinion possible? there appears indeed a sort of consciousness that all predication implies a subject (188: *Οὔτε περὶ τῶν ὄντων οὔτε αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό*), and that to think is to say to oneself, 'This is that;'—which first shows itself in the example, 'I think Theætetus is Socrates,' and is afterwards more distinctly expressed where it is said that

¹ *Συλλογισμός* in the Theæt. (186) is nearly equivalent to 'abstraction and generalization.'

thought is the mind's silent discourse¹. But that which remains unnoticed is the relation of subject to predicate in any proposition. Thus it is assumed that when one predicate is substituted for another (as when, in the propositions, 'Yonder man is Socrates,' or 'Thersites was handsome,' the terms 'Socrates' and 'handsome' have been substituted by mistake for 'Theætetus' and 'ugly'), this is the same thing as if the terms so confounded were predicated of each other (thus, 'Theætetus is Socrates,' 'What is ugly is handsome').

The relation between the terms of a proposition where the subject is something immediately perceived by sense, is brought out afterwards by the image of the waxen block; but the same indistinctness still hangs about abstract propositions. The line is not clearly drawn between saying, 'the sum of 7 and 5 is 11,' and saying '11 is 12.'

Lastly, when it is asserted that the combination of names in speech corresponds to the combination of elements in the object of knowledge, we are still left in the dark as to the exact relation between words or things which is implied in either combination.

This confusion between subject and predicate is, in other words, to use Aristotelian language, the confusion of matter with form, and of δύναμις with ἐνέργεια. The subject is all its predicates δυνάμει, and is that which, together with the new attribute, becomes τόδε τι. Thus Καλλίας ἄμουσος becomes μουσικός: hence Callias is in one sense the material part.

It may be said, therefore, that in the earlier philosophy, when the matter changes from one form to its opposite, or from a privative to a positive state, it is lost sight of that the form cannot properly be said to change, and that the matter or subject, as such, remains unchanged, while assuming different forms.

1. It is this aspect of the questions raised in the Theætetus which is taken up by Aristotle, who follows Plato in pointing out that the views of Heraclitus and Protagoras meet in one. Their views are thus identified and criticised at length in two very similar passages of the Metaphysics (3. 1005 b-1012 b, 10. 1061 b-1063 b), in both of which Aristotle is engaged in defending the principle of contradiction.

The theory of Heraclitus is stated in its most abstract and logical form, 'Everything at once is and is not.' This is at

¹ A close study of this passage (189, 190) will afford convincing proof of the indeterminate state of the science of logic at this time, and the

necessity of getting behind Aristotle (if the expression may be permitted) in order to understand Plato.

first put forward with the qualification, 'Some (i.e. Plato?) think that Heraclitus means this:' but afterwards it is made to figure as the Heraclitean theory, 'adopted by many physical philosophers.' The theory of Protagoras is shown to come to the same thing; for if every man's impression is true, then contradictories are true (and not true) together.

Aristotle does not profess to use direct proof in defence of what he assumes to be self-evident and the basis of all reasoning, but he brings forward a number of indirect arguments, which throw considerable light upon the nature of the question. These are intended for such persons as really feel the difficulty: there are others for whom a more summary method is required (*οἱ μὲν γὰρ πείθους δέονται, οἱ δὲ βίαις*¹). Amongst these arguments there are two which deserve especial notice here, as being of a different kind from any which are to be met with in the dialogue.

(a) 'We will not say that the act of predication must either *be* or *not be* something, lest they should accuse us of begging the question; but we will say, that every predicate *means* something, and that its meaning is one, and not indefinitely various; otherwise language and even thought is destroyed. And to predicate it in this one meaning of a particular subject is either true or false. Hence, "man" and "not man" cannot be truly predicated together of the same subject.'

(b) 'The difference between the same man's impressions at different times regards not the quality, but the subject of it. Sweet and bitter are the same to the sick as to the healthy man: it is the wine that appears to him at one time sweet and at another bitter. The idea of sweet is the same to him in the past, present, and future.'

There are other points in which the discussion is characteristic of Aristotle (as where it is said that the principle of motion rests on a too narrow induction; or that if all creatures having sensation were destroyed, the universe would still exist; or where he points out that the admission of degrees, e.g. 'nearer and farther from the truth,' necessitates a standard of truth to which the approach is made); but the influence of this dialogue and of the discussions (Megarian and Platonic) which preceded and followed it is also very apparent. The following points of coincidence are worth mentioning:—

¹ Cp. Hom. Il. 2. 188-199: "Ὀντινα μὲν βασιλῆα καὶ ἔξοχον ἄνδρα κηχίη, | τὸν δ' ἀγανοῖς ἐπέεσσιν ἐρητύσασκε

παραστάς | . . *Ὀν δ' αὖ δῆμον τ' ἄνδρα ἴδοι βοῶντά τ' ἐφεύροι, | τὸν σιήπτρα ἐλάσασκεν, ὀμοκλήσασκέ τε μύθῳ.

(1) It is assumed, as part of the theory, that everything is thus and not-thus (*οὕτως καὶ οὐχ οὕτως*). But this is nearly the last point to which the principle of motion is reduced in the *Theætetus* (183 A B). Aristotle proceeds to infer that everything must be infinite; and this in two ways: first, as 'not-this' means 'everything but this,' it follows that everything must be everything else¹; and, secondly (with *Plat. Theæt. loc. cit.*), if *οὕτως καὶ οὐχ οὕτως* is true, then its contradictory (*οὐθ' οὕτως οὔτε οὐχ οὕτως*) must also be true; and this, he adds, must go on to infinity. The theory gives an indefinite, that is, a purely negative account of Being (*τὸ μὴ ὂν λέγει*).

(2) Further, in reference to Protagoras it is shown that, in making all impressions true, he makes them also false,—his own theory amongst the rest.

(3) The Heraclitean or Protagorean philosopher is seen to avoid tumbling into a ditch. It is evident therefore that he acknowledges the distinction between good and bad. Everything then is not equally indifferent. And if there are impressions to which the theory does not apply, so much has been conceded. Or, 'as Plato puts it,' with regard to the future, the physician is a better judge of what will prove wholesome than a chance person.

(4) Aristotle further points out the absolute relateness of the doctrine. They cannot say, 'What appears, is,' but 'What appears to me, is to me.'

The following scattered touches may be quoted without comment:—

'The theory of Protagoras is called *ἡ περὶ τὰ φαινόμενα ἀλήθεια*.'

'My eyes may each receive a different impression from the same thing.'

'The doubt about the criterion of knowledge is like the question whether the waking or the dreaming life is real.'

'Socrates is not a different person for every different attribute.'

'When a pleasant thing appears bitter, this is in consequence of a manifest defect, viz. disease. The one state then (i.e. the healthy one), and not the other, is to be held the measure of things.'

'Language is made impossible.'

'The man thinks thus and not thus: i.e. it is equally true that he is not thinking as that he thinks. He is reduced to the condition of a vegetable.'

(5) Lastly, Aristotle, like Theodorus, remarks upon the difficulty of reasoning with the men, because they will not lay down anything to start with, and allow it to remain firm.

Aristotle's view may be summarily described by saying that he

¹ Καὶ γίγνεται δὴ τὸ Ἀναξαγόρου, ὁμοῦ πάντα χρήματα. Aristotle thinks that if this argument had been put to

Heraclitus himself, he would have been compelled to acknowledge its force.

meets the indefiniteness of the physical and sophistic theories by asserting the distinction between form and matter and the eternity of form.

2. But he does not deny that a continual process takes place between them, or that there is a world in which growth and decay, generation and corruption, are ever going on, viz. the world of sensible things, which in Aristotle reasserts its reality, as being inseparable from the natural forms, and perhaps even from the relations expressed in mathematics.

This is not the place for the discussion of Aristotle's theory of becoming. It is enough to notice (1) that he adopts from the early philosophers, whom he classes together as upholding the material cause, on the one hand the dualism, and on the other the indeterminateness of matter (Phys. Ausc. 1), and points out that therefore it can only be the object of knowledge 'by analogy,' with reference to the form. And (2) his conception of sensation as a realization of mental life is very similar to that expressed in the Theætetus and Timæus. The *ἐνέργεια αἰσθήσεως*, which is inseparable from the *ἐνέργεια αἰσθητοῦ*, is the meeting point of active and passive elements in motion. (In modern language it is a process between object and subject.) But the *φαντασία* or mental image, which accompanies sensation but is separable from it in thought, in the Theætetus is merged in sensation, although the term as here used is simply the noun of *φαίνεσθαι* (*φαντασία ἄρα καὶ αἴσθησις ταυτὸν*), but is clearly distinguished from it by Aristotle. The distinction is made the ground of an argument for the possibility of error¹.

3. The same distinction between matter and form is also applied to the solution of the doubt, whether the complex whole is one or many, e.g. whether the syllable is all the letters combined, or something above and beyond them. Aristotle shows that neither

¹ (Met. I. 1010 b: Οὐδ' ἡ αἴσθησις ψευδὴς τοῦ ἰδίου ἐστὶν ἀλλ' ἡ φαντασία οὐ ταυτὸν τῇ αἰσθήσει.) Again, even where the *φαντασία* is false the *δόξα* may be true. De Somn. 3. Cp. de An. 3. 3.

The difference between Aristotle and Plato (in this dialogue), on this point of psychology, may be illustrated by the following tabular view:—

Aristotle thus traces the gradual ascent of the human mind from sense to knowledge:

7. σοφία.
6. ἐπιστήμη.
5. τέχνη.
4. ἐμπειρία.
3. μνήμη.
2. φαντασία.
1. αἴσθησις.

Plato distinguishes
ἐπιστήμη
from

These two are in some cases inseparable. { μνήμη } each of which is accompanied by { δόξα } φαντασία. { αἴσθησις. }

the parts nor their arrangement can create the form of the whole : much rather it is this mould which determines the arrangement of the parts. It is prior to them, and is eternal and uncreated. They affect the nature of the compound thing only by being capable of receiving a certain form.

At this point Plato (in the *Theætetus*) and Aristotle seem almost to touch one another, except that in Aristotle the conception of the *end* (τὸ οὐ ἕνεκα) is bound up with that of the form.

As the tendency in the *Theætetus* is to rise from the ordinary notion of an element to that of elementary Ideas, so Aristotle points out that the universal is in one sense an element : (i. e. logically.) (*Met.* 4. 1014 b.)

4. Among the germs which the *Theætetus* (like most of Plato's dialogues) contains of Aristotelian formulæ, the most remarkable is the distinction between possessing and having Knowledge, which obviously corresponds to Aristotle's distinction between Knowing and Contemplating (*ἐπίστασθαι, θεωρεῖν*),—his favourite illustration of the difference between possession and use, or between a potential and an actual state. No such general application is made of it by Plato. The notion enters into the *Theætetus* only as a last ineffectual attempt to reconcile the existence of Knowledge with the possibility of error, and it is expressed through an imaginary symbol. But the distinction latent in the image—between the potential and the actual—is the same by which Aristotle afterwards solved this and other difficulties, if not finally, yet with admirable completeness.

APPENDIX F.

Platonic Idioms in the Theætetus.

Ἄλλ' οὐ πρότερόν γε, οἶμαι, Θεαίτητος ἐν ἐμοὶ δοξασθήσεται, πρὶν ἂν ἡ σιμότης αὐτῆ τῶν ἄλλων σιμοτήτων ὧν ἐγὼ ἐώρακα διάφορόν τι μνημείον παρ' ἐμοὶ ἐνσημηγυμένη καταθήται, *Theæt.* 209 C.

The words of Socrates, it is said in the *Euthyphro* (11 B, 15 B), are like the words of Dædalus ; they are endued with motion. This image expresses the most characteristic peculiarity of Plato's style, the source of much both of its beauty and of its difficulty. His thoughts are not fixed and dead, like specimens in a museum

or cabinet, but flying as he pursues them, doubling, hiding, re-appearing, soaring aloft, and changing colour with every change of light and aspect.

The reader of the *Theætetus*, for example, is disappointed, if he looks for perfect consistency with the *Republic*, or if he expects to find the logical statement of a definite theory. The ground is shifted several times. One line of inquiry is abandoned, and yet the argument presently returns from a new starting-point upon the former track. A position is assumed and then relinquished;—the figures are erased,—and yet the subsequent discussion is not without reference to the hypothesis which has been demolished. The doctrine of sense, for instance, is wholly negatived, and yet it cannot be said that we are not intended to gather something from it.

Plato's metaphors are 'living creatures' rather than figures of speech; he regards them not as airy nothings, but as realities; he recurs to them with fondness, as Lord Bacon does. But no expression is ever merely repeated in Plato. If an image is recalled, it is with some additional or altered feature: if a conception is resumed, it is not merely copied, but a fresh picture is drawn from the life. Even in recapitulating, some modification is often made, or the argument is carried further. Thus the photograph, as it has been called, of the connection is apt to be blurred, from the thought moving as we read. Even in the same passage, where an ordinary writer would be contented with referring to an example or illustration just adduced, Plato surprises the reader with a different one, which perhaps gives a new direction to the current of thought. A fair instance of this occurs in *Theæt.* 169 A, where Theodorus says: 'It was mere nonsense in me to hope that you would excuse me and not compel me to strip for the contest, as the *Lacedæmonians* do. You are rather to be compared to *Sciron*: for they tell one either to strip or go away; but you are rather like *Antæus* in your way of doing business, for you will let no man go till you have *stripped him* (like *Sciron*) and *compelled him to wrestle with you* (like *Antæus*).'

The argument itself (ὁ λόγος) is continually personified and is spoken of under a Protean variety of figures.

It is at one time our servant, who must wait our leisure, or who runs away from us, or who seems likely to die and vanish away 'like a tale.' More frequently it has power over us, like a General commanding us, like a sea in which we must swim for our lives, while it rolls its successive waves over us, like a wind which carries us we know not whither. Sometimes 'its name is legion,' and

it is multiplied into a swarm or an impetuous throng. Or it takes a milder form, as the raft, or dolphin, on which we seek to escape from a sea of doubt, or the wall behind which we screen ourselves from the driving shower. The Argument talks with us, it goes through a subject, takes up a position, hides its face from some threatening objection and passes on. It rebukes us for unfair treatment of itself, it can be insulted, it stands in need of help, it has a father, and guardians of its orphanhood.

This movement or plasticity of ideas, which penetrates the whole of Plato's writings, is closely connected with their conversational form, and manifests itself in what may be called his poetical use of language.

The observation of both these elements of Plato's style is of importance to the student, because it saves him from the necessity of resorting to some forced construction, or flying to conjecture, upon each occasion of grammatical perplexity.

I. Conversationalisms. In Plato we often meet with irregularities of construction, which in an oration or set treatise would be referred to looseness or inelegance of diction, but which only make the dialogue more easy and lively and natural.

a. Changes of construction. The following are a few out of several instances in the *Theætetus* :—

(1) 144 A: Τὸ γὰρ εὐμαθῆ ὄντα . . . πρῶτον αὐ εἶναι . . . ἐγὼ μὲν οὐτ' ἂν δόμην γενέσθαι οὔτε ὁρῶ γιγνομένους. Theodorus begins by simply expressing his surprise, but proceeds to dwell upon his previous anticipations and experience to account for it.

(2) 153 B: 'Η δ' ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἕξις . . . κτᾶται τε μαθήματα, κ.τ.λ. Cp. 173 D: Σπουδαὶ δ' ἑταιρειῶν ἐπ' ἀρχάς . . . οὐδ' ὄναρ πρᾶττει προσίσταται αὐτοῖς.

The emphasis on the first words causes the sentence to begin vaguely, and the construction is determined as it proceeds.

(3) 167 B: Πονηρᾶς ψυχῆς ἕξει δοξάζοντας συγγενῆ ἑαυτῆς.

Here, unless something is corrupt, a transition is made to the reflexive pronoun, as if *ψυχῇ* were the subject of *δοξάζοντας*: a transition from the persons who think to the mind which thinks.

(4) 172 B: Οὐκ ἂν τολμήσειε φῆσαι (ὁ λόγος) . . . ἐθέλουσιν ἰσχυρίζεσθαι. He passes from what the argument would say, to what certain persons do say. So elsewhere there is often a transition from the indefinite singular to the indefinite plural.

To this may be added the occasionally difficult use of the cases of nouns: e. g. *Theæt.* 147 C: Ἐν τῇ τοῦ πηλοῦ ἐρωτήσει, without *περί*:

just as we might say in conversation, 'the mud-question,' for 'the question about the mud.'

β. Resumption. A thought is frequently resumed in the same sentence, for the sake of modifying it, or of particularizing the aspect in which it is considered, or merely for the sake of clearness. The introduction of the pronoun *αὐτός*, to recall a noun which has been thrown back for the sake of emphasis, is a familiar instance of this.

E. g. 155 D: Ἐάν σοι ἀνδρῶν . . τῆς διανοίας τὴν ἀλήθειαν . . συν-
εξερευνήσωμαι αὐτῶν;

Perhaps the most marked instance of resumption in the Theætetus occurs 171 B: Μᾶλλον δὲ ὑπό γε ἐκείνου ὁμολογήσεται, ὅταν τῷ τάναντία λέγοντι συγχωρῇ ἀληθῆ αὐτὸν δοξάζειν, τότε καὶ ὁ Πρωταγόρας αὐτὸς συγχωρήσεται.

γ. Redundancy. There are other ways in which regularity of construction is sacrificed to fulness of expression.

E. g. 153 C: Ἔτι οὖν σοι λέγω νημερίας τε καὶ γαλήνας καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα, ὅτι αἱ μὲν ἡσυχίαι σήπουσι καὶ ἀπολλύασι, τὰ δ' ἔτερα σώζει.

172 D: Τοὺς λόγους ἐν εἰρήνῃ ἐπὶ σχολῆς ποιοῦνται, ὥσπερ ἡμεῖς νυνὶ τρίτον ἤδη λόγον ἐκ λόγου μεταλαμβάνομεν, οὕτω κάκεινοι, ἐὰν αὐτοὺς ὁ ἐπελθὼν τοῦ προκειμένου μᾶλλον, καθάπερ ἡμᾶς, ἀρέσῃ.

199 B: Μὴ γὰρ ἔχειν τὴν ἐπιστήμην τούτου οἶόν τε, ἀλλ' ἑτέραν αὐτ' ἐκείνης, ὅταν . . ἀνθ' ἑτέρας ἐτέραν ἀμαρτῶν λάβῃ, ὅτε ἄρα τὰ ἔνδεκα δώδεκα φήθη εἶναι, τὴν τῶν ἔνδεκα ἐπιστήμην ἀντὶ τῆς τῶν δώδεκα λαβῶν, τὴν ἐν ἑαυτῷ οἶον φάτταν ἀντὶ περισσευῶσ.

An occasional consequence of this fulness of expression is the deferred apodosis, which sometimes occurs, especially after ὥσπερ: e. g. Rep. 3. 402 B: Ὡσπερ ἄρα . . Ἄρ' οὖν, ὃ λέγω, πρὸς θεῶν, οὕτως, κ.τ.λ. Theæt. 207 A: Ὡσπερ ἂν . . οὕτω τοῖνον, κ.τ.λ.

δ. Also connected with the conversational form of Plato's writings, and the plastic, growing condition of his thoughts, is the imperfect kind of argument which he sometimes employs. It is a saying of Aristotle's that Dialectic deals tentatively with those subjects on which Philosophy dogmatizes (ἡ διαλεκτικὴ πειραστικὴ περὶ ὧν ἡ φιλοσοφία γνωριστικὴ); and Bacon speaks of a Socratic induction. To this, and to a certain economy used towards the respondent, is to be attributed the frequency of the argument from example (the example often covering more ground than is quite fair), and of the inference, by means of simple conversion, from particular to universal.

The immaturity of the science of logic no doubt renders this mode of reasoning more easy and natural than it could be in a later age, but it is not explained without allowing for the fact that the inquiry is conducted, at least on the part of the respondent, in a tentative and inductive spirit.

An instance occurs in the *Theætetus*, 159 A, when it is argued that if what is different is dissimilar, then whatever is dissimilar is wholly different, and what is similar is the same. That Plato was fully aware of the inconclusiveness of the form of argument thus ironically adopted, appears from *Protag.* 350 C, where Socrates is checked for it by Protagoras, who says, "Ἐγωγε ἐρωτηθεὶς ὑπὸ σοῦ, εἰ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι θαρραλέοι εἰσίν, ὡμολόγησα· εἰ δὲ καὶ οἱ θαρραλέοι ἀνδρεῖοι, οὐκ ἠρωτήθην· εἰ γάρ με τότε ἤρου, εἶπον ἂν ὅτι οὐ πάντες."

And sometimes, even where an instance is really meant to cover a large conclusion, its power is ostensibly limited with persuasive modesty: as in *Theæt.* 152 C: *Φαντασία ἄρα καὶ αἴσθησις ταῦτόν ἐν τε θερμοῖς καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς τοιούτοις. . . Αἴσθησις ἄρα τοῦ ὄντος ἀεί ἐστι.*

Ib. 204 D: *Ταῦτόν ἄρα ἐν γε τοῖς ὄσα ἐξ ἀριθμοῦ ἐστί, τό τε πᾶν προσαγορεύομεν καὶ τὰ ἅπαντα.*

ε. It is difficult to separate between the conversational and the poetical element in Plato. Their combination gives him the power of 'saying anything.' Just as there is a freedom of expression possible in conversation, which we feel to be impossible in writing, or as the poet can express with grace and dignity what by other lips were better left unsaid.

II. This leads us to the *Poetical use of language*. Plato's words have frequently a different value from any that could be given them by a mere prose writer. The language as well as the thought is instinct with a creative power, which gives it a dramatic vividness and refinement; at times even a dithyrambic cadence, or a lyrical intensity. The poet whom Plato most resembles in this is Sophocles; but his style may be regarded as the mirror of all Greek literature.

a. Poetical use of single words.

(1) Choice of a more sensuous expression (*πρὸ ὀμμάτων ποιεῖν*).

150 D: Ἐναργές ὅτι for δῆλον ὅτι ('as clear as day').

155 A: Ταῦτα τὰ φάσματα.

156 B: Συνεκκίπτουσα καὶ γεννωμένη.

160 D: Μὴ πταίων τῇ διανοίᾳ.

162 A: Διωλύγιος φλυαρία.

165 B: Σφαλεῖς γὰρ ἦττον ἀσχημονήσει.

169 B: Μαλ' εἶ ξυγκεκόφασιν.

171 D: Ταύτη ἂν . . ἴστασθαι τὸν λόγον.

172 E: Ἀνάγκην ἔχων ὁ ἀντιδίκος (wielding coercion).

202 A: Ταῦτα . . περιτρέχοντα πᾶσι προσφέρεσθαι.

To which may be added the 'hypocoristic' use of diminutives.

149 C: Φαρμάκια.

195 A: Ἐάν του σμικρὸν ἦ τὸ ψυχάριον.

(2) Use of Epic words, the meaning of which is sometimes *spiritualized*.

149 A: Μαίας γενναίας καὶ βλοσυρᾶς.

162 E: Ἄξιος οὐδ' ἐνὸς μόνου.

174 D: Πολὺ βδᾶλλοντα.

189 E: Τοῦτο γάρ μοι ἰνδάλλεται διανοουμένη.

194 E: Ὅταν τοίνυν λάσιόν του τὸ κέαρ ἦ.

(3) Playing upon a word.

150 C: Εὔρημα. (Cp. Soph. Œd. Tyr. 1108.)

152 A: Τὴν ἀλήθειαν.

181 C: Τοὺς ῥέοντας.

194 C: Τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς κέαρ.

208 B: Ἀληθέστατον ἐπιστήμης λόγον.

Closely related to this is (4) the etymological use of words: i. e. when, by dwelling upon its etymology, a word is made to express something different from, or more than, its ordinary meaning.

149 B: Ὅτι ἄλοχος οὔσα τὴν λοχείαν εἴληχεν.

152 E: (perhaps) Ξυμφερέσθων (let them march one way).

160 E: Τὰ ἀμφιδρόμια αὐτοῦ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἐν κύκλῳ περιθρεκτέον.

193 C: Ὡσπερ οἱ ἔμπαλιν ὑποδοῦμενοι παραλλάξας.

198 D: Πρόχειρον δ' οὐκ εἶχε τῇ διανοίᾳ.

(5) Poetical use of particles: e. g. the frequent use of ἄρα, helping to keep up the idea that Socrates is repeating what he has heard, the occasionally difficult reference with γάρ (152 C: Οἶα γάρ, and note), the hyperbaton of καί (154 E: Καὶ μὴν ἔγωγε), and generally the dramatic liveliness with which successive clauses are contrasted, as if each were put into the mouth of a different person. Speech thus becomes literally a 'self-dialogue.' See especially 155 B: Ὁ μὴ πρότερον ἦν, ἀλλὰ ὕστερον τοῦτο εἶναι (!): and 190 B: Ὅτι παντὸς μᾶλλον . . ὡς παντὸς μᾶλλον . . ὡς παντάπασιν ἄρα . . ὡς ἀνάγκη . . , with which the supposed answers of the mind to itself are introduced.

Compare Phil. 38 C: Τί ποτε ἄρα ἔστι τὸ παρὰ τὴν πέτραν τοῦθ' εἰστάναι φανταζόμενον ὑπὸ τινι δένδρῳ.

β. The same poetical energy shows itself in the expansion of

some of the ordinary forms of grammar. In this also Plato reflects the general tendency of the Greek language.

(1) Apposition. The use of the apposition of clauses (as a form of exegesis) deserves to be reckoned among the more striking peculiarities of Plato's style. One example from the *Theætetus* will suffice to indicate what is meant.

175 D: Πάλιν αὖ τὰ ἀντίστροφα ἀποδίδωσιν . . ἰλιγγίων τε ἀφ' ἰψηλοῦ κρεμασθεῖς . . ἀδημονῶν τε καὶ ἀπορῶν καὶ βαρβαρίζων . . γέλωτα . . παρέχει, κ.τ.λ., where another writer would probably have inserted γάρ. (Cp. Lach. 182 B.)

Sometimes a sentence is thus placed in apposition with a pronoun such as *τοῦτο* (189 E ad fin.) or *ὃ* (158 B). Compare the use of *τὸ* δέ, e. g. 157 E. A slightly different use is that of the accusative in apposition to the sentence. Instances of this are 153 C: Ἐπὶ τούτοις τὸν κολοφῶνα, κ.τ.λ.; 160 E: Τὰ ἀμφιδρόμια αὐτοῦ, κ.τ.λ. (Many of the examples of resumption and redundancy above referred to would fall grammatically under this head.)

(2) Attraction. E. g. where a main verb was to be expected, we find a participle. It can be accounted for; but there is reason to believe that it is partly due to the neighbourhood of another participle, or of some word that is usually construed with a participle.

173 B: Τοὺς δὲ τοῦ ἡμετέρου χοροῦ πότερον βούλει διελθόντες ἢ ἔασαντες πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸν λόγον τρεπόμεθα; where we should have expected διέλθωμεν.

150 D: Τὸ μὲν πρῶτον φαίνονται . . καὶ πάνν ἀμαθεῖς, πάντες δὲ προιούσης τῆς συνουσίας . . θαυμαστὸν ὅσον ἐπιδιδόντες, ὡς αὐτοῖς τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις δοκοῦσι: where, but for the proximity of ὡς . . , ἐπιδιδόντες would probably have been ἐπιδιδάσκιν. See also λαβῶν, 199 B, which but for ὅταν . . λάβῃ would be λαβόντα.

γ. To the same self-consciousness of language which betrays itself in the foregoing instances may be attributed the minuteness of antithesis, which, though common everywhere in Greek, is strikingly so in Plato.

150 E: Ἐμοῦ δὲ καταφρονήσαντες, ἢ αὐτοὶ ὑπ' ἄλλων πεισθέντες (?).

197 C: Εἰ δυνατὸν οὕτω κεκτημένον μὴ ἔχειν, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ, κ.τ.λ.

δ. This power of refining upon language is turned to account in adapting the mode of expression to the exigencies of the argument.

E. g. 152 B, where we are gradually led from the example of the wind, which one man feels cold, and another not, to the position that sensation is the correlative of reality. See also 158 E, 159 B, where, as the argument proceeds, (ἔτερον) ὄλον τοῦτο ὄλω ἐκείνω is substituted for ὄλωσ ἔτερον.

ε. The care which is taken of the rhythm is a further peculiarity of Plato's style, and may be treated as a poetical element. This is especially noticeable (1) in the manner in which quotations from poetry are shaded off so as to harmonize with the surrounding prose, and (2) in the occasional elaboration of prose writing to something like a metrical cadence.

(1) 173 E. In the quotation from Pindar, *φέρεται* is probably substituted for *πέτεται* (see note on the passage), the words *τὰ ἐπίπεδα γεωμετροῦσα* are inserted, and *τῶν ὄντων ἐκάστου ὄλου* is added at the close. Thus the poetical language is interwoven with the sentence, so as to embellish it without interrupting its harmony.

194 C. The substitution of the (early) Attic *κῆαρ* for the Homeric *κῆρ* is probably due to a similar motive.

(2) Dithyrambic and lyric cadences are more frequent in some other dialogues than in the *Theætetus*. See especially *Sympos.* 196, 197, the close of Agathon's speech, especially the last few lines, in which the rhetorical antitheses have more the effect of rhythm than of argument: *Phædr.* 238, 241, *alibi*; *Rep.* 8. 546, 7; 10. 617, 18; and several places of the *Timæus*, e. g. 47 B: Ὦν ὁ μὴ φιλόσοφος τυφλωθεὶς ὀδυρόμενος ἂν θρηνοῖ μάτην. With such passages may be compared *Theæt.* 176 A: Οὐδέ γ' ἁρμονίαν λόγων λαβόντος ὀρθῶς ὑμῆσαι θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνδρῶν εὐδαιμόνων βίον ἀληθῆ.

The same power shows itself more slightly in an occasional inversion of the order of words for the sake of emphasis.

158 B: Οἱ μὲν θεοὶ αὐτῶν οἴωνται εἶναι.

160 D: Κατὰ δὲ Πρωταγόραν τὸν σοφώτατον πάντων χρημάτων ἄνθρωπον μέτρον εἶναι.

ζ. A few words may be added in conclusion on the artificial structure of Plato's dialogues, of which the *Theætetus* is acknowledged to be a prominent example.

There is a unity in each of them, approaching to that of a living organism:—the spirit of the whole breathing in every part:—a continuity independent of the links of question and answer, by which it appears to be sustained; which may be viewed apart from the scenery and the changes of persons, and the passages of humour and pleasantry by which it seems to be interrupted.

And while it is comparatively easy to distinguish the principal stages of the argument, yet there is such a dovetailing and interpenetration of the parts, that it is difficult to adopt an exact division without doing violence to the real harmony, or even to mark the exact point of transition from one hypothesis to another.

An instance of this is the way in which the reader is prepared

for the argument from the idea of expediency, which may be said to be anticipated as early as 157 D: Ἀγαθὸν καὶ καλόν. (Compare the anticipation, at the very beginning of the dialogue, 144 E: Ἐπεσκεψάμεθ' ἂν εἰ μουσικὸς ὧν λέγει, of the conclusion arrived at 179 B: Σοφώτερόν τε ἄλλον ἄλλου εἶναι καὶ τὸν μὲν τοιοῦτον μέτρον εἶναι, κ.τ.λ.) The difficulty of reconciling the ideas of goodness and wisdom with the doctrine of sense appears more distinctly in the defence of Protagoras, 167 A, and presses for solution as an element of the common opinion of men, 170 A: Καὶ ἔν γε τοῖς μεγίστοις κινδύνοις . . . παρὰ σφίσιν.

These two passages have prepared the way for the statement in 171, 2, of the 'semi-Protagoreanism' of those who will not venture to say that every creature knows what is for its own health, nor that every individual and every state knows equally what is expedient in legislation. When a breach has thus been made in the enemy's lines of defence, a rest is afforded to the reader by the vision of the Divine Life which follows, in which, however, the ideas of wisdom and holiness and righteousness have a direct bearing upon the conclusion towards which we are being carried step by step, and its effect upon the tone of the discussion is apparent in the words 177 D: Πλὴν εἴ τις τὸ ὄνομα λέγοι· τοῦτο δέ που σκῶμμ' ἂν εἴη πρὸς ὃ λέγομεν· οὐχί; κ.τ.λ. At this point the argument from Expediency is fully entered into. But it is difficult to say exactly where it began.

A similar gradation may be observed in the development of the difficulty about false opinion.

Note also the artfulness of the transition from sensation to thought, 184-187, and from 'true opinion' to 'true opinion giving an account of itself,' 201.

And while the earlier part is written with a view to what is in reserve, the previous discussion is not forgotten as the inquiry proceeds. See 194 D: Ἄ δὴ ὄντα καλεῖται, compared with 152 D: Ἄ δὴ φαμεν εἶναι, οὐκ ὀρθῶς; and 209 C: Μνημίον παρ' ἐμοὶ ἐνσημασμένη καταθῆται,—an application of the (relinquished) conception of the waxen block.

Plato's philosophy has been compared to a building, of which the Republic is the superstructure, while the other dialogues are the pillars and fretted vaults upon which it rests.

The image fails to give an adequate idea of the perfection of Art, —or rather of Nature conscious of itself,—which gives harmony, but not regularity, a growing, not a fixed, consistency, both to the parts and to the whole.

His writings are the creations of a great master, whose sketches are worked up into the larger monuments of his genius, a cycle surrounding an eternal Epic poem, bound together by the unity not merely of a particular age and country, but of an individual mind.

ὦ θαυμάσιε, ὦ δαιμόνιε, ὦ ἑταῖρε, ὦ μέλεε.

These and the like phrases are apt to be slurred over in translating or interpreting Plato, from the frequency of their recurrence and the difficulty of appreciating their exact force in each connection. They belong to that conversational sprightliness and play of fancy which it is impossible to bind to any rule.

Here, as elsewhere, Plato carries further an existing tendency of the Greek language. Such addresses as *δαιμόνιε*, *δαιμονίη*, *ἡθείε*, in Homer (Il. 6. 407, 486, 518, 521; cp. Plat. Rep. 344 D, ὦ δαιμόνιε *Θρασύμαχε*) vary in signification according to the mood of the speaker. The same may be said of ὦ δαιμόνιε, ὦ μέλεε, in Aristophanes.

In Plato the variety of such addresses is much greater, and the variety of their meaning greater still. They can often be more perfectly rendered by a changed expression of the voice or countenance, than by any words. All that can be said of them generally is, that they give an increased intensity to the tone of the conversation at the moment, whether this be grave or humorous, respectful, ironical or familiar.

ὦ θαυμάσιε in its simplest use conveys a remonstrance, 'I wonder at you.' The most decided instance is in the Phædo, 117 D: Οἶον, ἔφη, ποιεῖτε, ὦ θαυμάσιοι. 'What are you doing! I am amazed at you.' It may also sometimes convey admiration. But it is frequently used where the subject of wonder or surprise has nothing to do with the person addressed: e. g. Cratyl. 439 C, where it indicates Socrates' intense interest in the mystery of the Ideas. Compare the use of the form of congratulation ὦ μακάριε (see Aristoph. Nub. 167) to express Socrates' own delight at some great discovery: e. g. Rep. 432 D, where Justice is discovered; Phæd. 69 A, where Socrates congratulates himself as well as Simmias on the superiority of the philosophic life.—In Theæt. 151 C, ὦ θαυμάσιε can hardly be rendered except by a note of admiration. 'Do you know that many have been ready to bite me!'

Nearly the same is true of ὁ δαιμόνιε, 180 B, though it here retains a slight tone of remonstrance. 'Disciples, my good sir!' 'Disciples, did you say?' While in 172 C it wears quite a different expression, conveying Socrates' genuine admiration for the philosophic life, and is more difficult to render. 'Ah! my good friend, this is not the first time I have observed how natural it is that a philosopher should make a poor figure at the bar!'

The affectionate confidence and familiarity expressed in ὦ ἑταῖρε, ὦ φίλε, ὦ φίλε ἑταῖρε, acquires, in ὦ μέλε, a degree of humorous or triumphant gaiety. Theæt. 178 E: Νῆ Δία, ὦ μέλε, 'My dear fellow! I should rather think he did.'

The use of quaint adjurations and addresses in Shakspeare affords an interesting illustration of this feature of Plato's style. For example, when Hamlet says, 'O good Horatio, I'll take the ghost's word for a thousand pound,' the address is prompted not this time by Horatio's worth, but by the relief caused to his own mind by the discovery of the king's guilt.



THE END.

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